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INTRODUCTION
LYNDA L. BUTLER*
Property matters—whenever and wherever complex societies are
involved. It may not exist in the same form or in the same situation
or provide the same rights and powers, but wherever complex societ-
ies exist, their members have found a way to have property rights.
Sometimes that way is formal and deliberate and sanctioned. Other
times it is informal, arising from customs, cultural norms, or even
outlaw behavior. Property matters because of the human desire to
control resources for the protection of self and family and because, as
complex societies develop, their emergent economic systems create
wealth, enhancing a society’s well-being. Property rights are essen-
tial to that process, providing the framework for creating, trading,
and managing this wealth and for maximizing the benefit of in-
vested labor and capital for individual participants and their society.
A society’s political system, of course, must secure property rights
to enable peaceful transfers to occur in the marketplace and to en-
courage investment. The degree to which property rights are secure
will determine, in large part, how much wealth is created and how
accepted the society’s political, economic, and property systems are.
Cultural norms will affect the structure, the meaning, and the na-
ture of property rights. As long as political and cultural values share
enough common meaning, property rights can coalesce around those
shared meanings and provide a fundamental set of rules to govern
allocation and use of resources. Property systems, in other words,
are a common characteristic of complex human societies worldwide.
In recent years property has come to the fore as a topic of interna-
tional debate as developing countries join the world’s economy and
as developed nations consider how to improve and fine-tune their
economic and property systems. Aspects of this debate include the
divide between public and private property, the extent of govern-
ment’s power to regulate and expropriate private property, the nor-
mative foundations of property rights—especially their economic
*  Chancellor Professor of Law, Director, William & Mary Property Rights Project, and
Editor, Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference Journal, William & Mary Law School.
Special thanks to Jan Abbott and Heather DiAngelis for their excellent work on the Journal.
Without their tireless efforts and dedication, this project would not have happened.
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vision and political role—the role of culture and social institutions
in the evolution of property systems, and the distribution of wealth
among a society’s members. Though nations disagree about their
approach to these matters, the international debate reveals a com-
mon set of attributes of property systems.
The 8th Annual Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference
focused on Comparative Property Rights, continuing the interna-
tional debate by highlighting the commonalities of property systems
that have emerged from complex societies having different cultures
and political histories. More specifically, the Conference explored
the nature of property rights under different legal systems, the role
that property plays in promoting social policy, and the impact of
culture on the definition, interpretation, and protection of property
rights. The Conference also considered how property systems pro-
mote, drive, and shape the economies of different nations, as well as
the relationship between property rights and the environment. Other
Conference topics included a panel on the impact of a leading jurist,
retired Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, on the juris-
prudence of constitutionally protected property, a panel on the role of
practitioners in property systems, and a roundtable on the future of
property rights. Panelists included American and Chinese academics,
judges, and practitioners. The overriding goal of the Conference was
to promote understanding of the property rights systems of different
nations. Without a doubt, the Conference provided that understand-
ing and much more, highlighting the common attributes of property
systems across complex societies and cultures.
In furtherance of the Conference’s goals, the Property Rights
Project at William & Mary Law School will publish papers written
for this and successive conferences in the Brigham-Kanner Property
Rights Conference Journal. The purpose of this Conference Journal
is not only to provide a forum for scholarly debate on property rights
issues but also to extend that debate to a wider audience. The contri-
butions of American and Chinese scholars and practitioners included
in this inaugural volume are quite impressive and demonstrate how
important property rights are in modern societies.
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SUMMARY
In this article, we review how the Fifth Amendment, and the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence applying the Fifth Amendment,
require the government to pay a property owner the full fair-market
value of property the government has taken, together with interest
in an amount sufficient to fairly and fully compensate the owner for
the government’s delay in rendering the owner payment for that
property which the government took.
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The government must pay interest equal to the return an owner
would have earned on the fair-market value of the property taken
had the government actually paid the owner this money on the date
the government took the owner’s property. The appropriate interest
rate—just like the value of the property taken—must be established
by reference to the market at the time of the taking.
The Constitution does not give the legislative or executive branch
authority to statutorily limit the amount of interest (or any other
component of “just compensation”) which the Fifth Amendment re-
quires the government to pay an owner when the government takes
private property. And the interest an owner is due cannot be estab-
lished by reference to government bonds which, by definition, are a
measure of the government’s cost of borrowing money—not a mea-
sure of the owners’ loss of use of the funds over the relevant period.
Some courts, including the Federal Circuit, have sought to estab-
lish a uniform and efficient method to determine the appropriate
rate of interest an owner is due. These courts have established a
rebuttable presumption that the Moody’s Composite Index is a rea-
sonable measure of the appropriate rate of interest to compensate
an owner for the government’s delay in rendering payment. By tak-
ing judicial notice of the Moody’s Index, courts spare property own-
ers the burden of having to prove the appropriate interest rate in
each case.
INTRODUCTION
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution declares:
“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.” But the government does not always comply with
the Constitution. In many cases, the government takes private
property and yet seeks to avoid its obligation to pay the owner. In
other cases, the government takes an owner’s property but only of-
fers to pay a small percentage of what the owner would have been
paid had the owner sold their property on the open market.
When the government refuses to honor its constitutional obli-
gation to pay “just compensation” for property the government has
taken, the owner’s only recourse is to file a lawsuit1 asking a judge
1. See The Federal Eminent Domain Procedure Act of August 1, 1888, 25 Stat. 357
(current version at 40 U.S.C. §3113 (2002)); Declaration of Taking Act of February 26, 1931,
6 PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE JOURNAL [Vol. 1:003
to order the government to pay the owner “just compensation” for
what the government took.
But litigation is costly and takes years to resolve. It typically takes
the better part of a decade to finally resolve a Fifth Amendment in-
verse condemnation lawsuit. Throughout the pendency of an inverse
condemnation lawsuit—from the date it took the owner’s property
until it finally renders payment—the government has had the use
of both the property and the money it should have paid the owner on
the date it took the property.
When the government takes property, the Fifth Amendment re-
quires that it pay the fair-market value of the property on the date
of the taking. The Fifth Amendment also requires the government
to pay compensation for the delay between the date of the taking
and the date that compensation is paid.
This article addresses two questions. First, who decides what rate
of interest is sufficient to compensate the owner for the government’s
delay in rendering the constitutionally mandated payment for that
property which the government took? And, second, what principles
establish the metric by which to determine whether an award of
interest is sufficient to satisfy the constitutional mandate that the
government must pay an owner “just compensation”?
A. The Task of Deciding What Amount of Money Is Sufficient to
Provide “Just Compensation” Falls Exclusively to the Judiciary
It is exclusively the province of the judicial branch to determine
the “just compensation” which an owner is due under the Fifth
46 Stat. 1421 (current version at 40 U.S.C. §3114 (2002)). These statutes apply to direct takings
by the government.
In inverse condemnation cases—such as takings pursuant to the National Trails System
Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1241 et seq.—the government does not provide the owner any notice the gov-
ernment has taken the owner’s property. And the owner frequently does not learn the govern-
ment has taken their land until years later when the trail developer shows up with bulldozers
to construct a public rail-trail corridor across the owner’s land. See Mark F. (Thor) Hearne, II
et al., The Trails Act: Railroading Property Owners and Taxpayers for More Than a Quarter
Century, 45 REAL PROP., TR. & EST. L.J., 115 (2010). In the Trails Act and other federal
“ inverse condemnation” cases, the owner’s only recourse is to pursue an inverse condemnation
claim in the Court of Federal Claims pursuant to the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §1491 (2011).
In a “direct taking,” the government initiates the lawsuit and acknowledges its liability to
compensate the owner. But, when (as is frequently the case) the government only offers to pay
a portion of the value of the property the government has taken, the owner bears the burden
of having to defend the owner’s right to be paid compensation equal to the value of that
property the government took.
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Amendment. This principle applies with equal force to a determina-
tion of compensation the government owes for the value of the prop-
erty taken and the compensation the government owes because the
owner lost use of these funds during the government’s delay in hon-
oring its constitutional obligation to pay the owner.
Congress has no constitutional authority to pass any law incon-
sistent with the Fifth Amendment’s “just compensation” mandate.
Similarly, the executive branch has been granted no constitutional
authority to determine the compensation a property owner is due
under the Fifth Amendment.
It follows from these principles that any rate of interest estab-
lished by a statute passed by the legislature or an edict of an exec-
utive branch can only provide a “floor” and not a “ceiling” on the
amount of interest an owner is due as compensation for the govern-
ment’s delay in paying the owner.
Thus, statutory interest rates, such as those in the Declaration
of Taking Act and the Contract Disputes Act (“CDA”), are of no
authority to a court. The Declaration of Taking Act (“DTA”) rate—
which is currently 0.09%—is also a woefully inadequate rate of
interest by which to establish the compensation an owner is owed
for the many years the owner lost the property and also lost use of
the money the government should have paid him the day the gov-
ernment took the property.
This first issue has been settled since the very earliest Fifth
Amendment cases when the Supreme Court declared it was exclu-
sively the role of the judiciary to decide how much compensation an
owner must be paid for property the government had taken. A dec-
laration by the legislative or the executive branch seeking to limit the
amount of compensation (whether interest or property value) to be
paid the owner is not binding on the court making this determination.
And, when you think about it, this just makes sense. It would thor-
oughly undermine the Fifth Amendment if the legislature, as the
body exercising the government’s power of eminent domain to take
a citizen’s private property, could also set the compensation the
owner would be paid. If this were so, Congress2 could pass a statute
2. The constitutional principles discussed in this article apply equally to federal, state
and local government. But, it is unwieldy to refer to “Congress, the relevant state legislative
body and the local government equivalent of the legislative body.” So, to lighten the reader’s
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declaring, “We condemn a designated owner’s property, and we autho-
rize payment of one thousand dollars for acquisition of this property.”
Should Congress’s declaration bind the court determining the just
compensation which the Fifth Amendment requires, it would become
no more than a matter of legislative grace. This is not what the Con-
stitution provides. Nor is it consistent with the fundamental princi-
ple that the Fifth Amendment is “self-executing” and not dependent
upon Congress’s legislative compensation.
B. The Compensation Owed an Owner for the Government’s
Delay Is to Be Determined by Reference to an Appropriate
Market-Rate That Measures the Likely Income an Owner
Could Have Earned on These Funds Between the Date of
Taking and the Date of Payment
The Supreme Court has declared that “just compensation” due an
owner for a Fifth Amendment taking should be determined by ref-
erence to the objective market-based measure of the owner’s loss.
“[W]e have recognized the need for a relatively objective working
rule.”3 The Court therefore has employed the concept of fair-market
value to determine the condemnee’s loss. Under this standard, the
owner is entitled to receive “what a willing buyer would pay in cash
to a willing seller at the time of the taking.”4
Determining what an owner is due for the government’s delay
in compensation is not substantially different from the manner in
which courts determine the fair-market value of the property taken.
task, we refer to the “government” by reference to the federal structure. Unless the context
dictates otherwise, we intend our discussion to apply with equal force to Fifth Amendment
litigation involving state and local governments.
3. United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979). The Court then
quoted Justice Frankfurter’s opinion in Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5
(1949) in which the Court earlier held:
The value of property springs from subjective needs and attitudes; its value to
the owner may therefore differ widely from its value to the taker. Most things,
however, have a general demand which gives them a value transferable from one
owner to another. As opposed to such personal and variant standards as value
to the particular owner whose property has been taken, this transferable value
has an external validity which makes it a fair measure of public obligation to
compensate the loss incurred by an owner as a result of the taking of his prop-
erty for public use.
4. Id.
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As noted above, the value of the property is determined by what a
hypothetical willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller for
the property at the time the property is taken. This amount is deter-
mined by looking to the market at the time of the taking to provide,
as Justice Frankfurter explained, “external validity.” The owner’s
loss of use of this principal amount should be similarly determined
by reference to a market-based measure to determine the owner’s
loss of the “time value” of the money the owner was due on the date
of taking.
A number of courts have looked to the “prudent investor” rule as
a guide to determine the return an owner would have realized had
a reasonably prudent investor invested these funds on the date of
the taking.
The Federal Circuit (and its predecessor Court of Claims) sought
to avoid the burden of expense and litigating the proper rate of in-
terest in each individual takings case. To avoid relitigating interest
in each case, the Federal Circuit adopted a rebuttable presumption
that the Moody’s Composite Index provides a reasonable measure
of the interest an owner would have earned on the funds were they
prudently invested during the relevant period.
Finally, the courts are in essentially unanimous agreement that
when the delay between the date of taking and the date of payment
is greater than one year, interest must be compounded to justly com-
pensate the owner for losing the use of these funds.
I. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT IS A SELF-EXECUTING CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTEE THAT PROPERTY OWNERS BE JUSTLY COMPENSATED
FOR PROPERTY TAKEN BY THE GOVERNMENT
As soon as private property has been taken . . . the landowner
has already suffered a constitutional violation, and “the self-
executing character of the constitutional provision with respect
to compensation,” is triggered. This Court has consistently rec-
ognized that the just compensation requirement in the Fifth
Amendment is not precatory: once there is a “taking,” compen-
sation must be awarded.5
5. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 654 (1981) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257
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In 1790, John Adams declared, “Property must be secured, or lib-
erty cannot exist.”6 This principle underlies the Fifth Amendment’s
Takings Clause, which provides that “private property [cannot] be
taken for public use without just compensation.”7
Though this provision of the Fifth Amendment is often said to
protect “property rights,” that is something of a misnomer. The
Supreme Court noted:
[T]he dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights
is a false one. Property does not have rights. People have rights.
The right to enjoy property without unlawful deprivation, no less
than the right to speak or the right to travel, is in truth, a “per-
sonal” right, whether the “property” in question be a welfare
check, a home, or a savings account. In fact, a fundamental in-
terdependence exists between the personal right to liberty and
the personal right in property. Neither could have meaning with-
out the other. That rights in property are basic civil rights has
long been recognized.8
The Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that a property owner will be
justly compensated does not exist by legislative grace. Rather, an
owner’s right to “just compensation” after a taking (and the corollary
obligation of the government to fully and justly compensate the owner
for what it has taken) is a self-executing constitutional principle.
(1980)). Justice Brennan’s San Diego dissent was subsequently adopted by a majority of the
Court. See, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
6. John Adams, Discourses on Davila, reprinted in 6 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 280
(Charles Francis Adams ed., 1851); see also James Madison, Property, reprinted in 6 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 101 (Gaillard Hunt ed. 1906) (“[Property] in its particular appli-
cation means ‘that domination which one man claims and exercise over the external things
of the world, in exclusion of every other individual.’”); JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF
EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 42–43 (3d ed. 2008)
(noting John Adams’s statement on this point); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985). Professor Epstein observed, “The prohi-
bition against the taking of private property has ancient and powerful roots in all legal
systems.” Id. at 35; see also David A. Thomas, Why the Public Plundering of Private Property
Rights Is Still a Very Bad Idea, 41 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 25 (2000). Professor Thomas
is the author and editor of Thompson on Real Property.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
8. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972) (citing John Locke, OF CIVIL
GOVERNMENT 82–85); John Adams, A Defense of the Constitutions of Government of the United
States of America, in DEMOCRACY, LIBERTY, AND PROPERTY 121–32 (Francis William Coker ed.
1942); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, *138–40.
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[Inverse condemnation] suits [are] based on the right to recover
just compensation for property taken by the United States for
public use in the exercise of its power of eminent domain. That
right was guaranteed by the Constitution. The fact that condem-
nation proceedings were not instituted and that the right was
asserted in suits by the owners did not change the essential na-
ture of the claim. The form of the remedy did not qualify the right.
It rested upon the Fifth Amendment. Statutory recognition was
not necessary. A promise to pay was not necessary. Such a prom-
ise was implied because of the duty to pay imposed by the amend-
ment. The suits were thus founded upon the Constitution of the
United States.9
The government takes property when it directly appropriates ti-
tle and possession of an owner’s property or when the government
redefines the owner’s right to use and possess their property.10
The Supreme Court has “traditionally recognized the special need
for certainty and predictability where land titles are concerned,”
9. Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16 (1933). In First English, the Court held:
We have recognized that a landowner is entitled to bring an action in inverse
condemnation as a result of “the self-executing character of the constitutional
provision with respect to compensation” . . . . As noted in Justice Brennan’s dis-
sent in San Diego Gas & Electric Co., it has been established at least since Jacobs
that claims for just compensation are grounded in the Constitution itself . . . .
Jacobs v. United States, moreover, does not stand alone, for the Court has fre-
quently repeated the view that, in the event of a taking, the compensation remedy
is required by the Constitution.
First English, 482 U.S. at 315–16 (numerous citations omitted).
The Court similarly held that “[w]here the government’s activities have already worked a
taking of all use of property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty
to provide compensation for the period during which the taking was effective.” Id. at 321; see
also Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing Jacobs, 290 U.S.
13) (“Since the suit was based upon the constitutional provision protecting property rights,
and the provision was considered to be self-executing with respect to compensation, it escaped
the problems of sovereign immunity.”).
10. See, e.g., Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 494 U.S. 1, 8 (1990) (declaring
that the National Trails System Act gives rise to a compensable per se taking by destroying
the owner’s “reversionary” right to regain unencumbered use, title, and possession of their
land); see also Louisiana v. Garfield, 211 U.S. 70, 76 (1908); Iron Silver Mining Co. v. Elgin
Mining & Smelting Co., 118 U.S. 196, 207–08 (1886); Doolittle’s Lessee v. Bryan, 55 U.S. 563,
567 (1852). Following Preseault, the Federal Circuit has declared the National Trails System
Act to be a per se taking in this manner. See, e.g., Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525,
1531 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Ladd v. United States, 630 F.3d 1015 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Hash v. United
States, 403 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Ellamae Phillips Co. v. United States, 564 F.3d 1367
(Fed. Cir. 2009).
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and said it is unwilling “to upset settled expectations to accommo-
date some ill-defined power to construct public thoroughfares with-
out compensation.”11
Whenever the government takes private property, it is doing so by
an exercise of its sovereign power of eminent domain. Only the gov-
ernment possesses the ability to force an unwilling property owner
to surrender title to their property.12 Many owners would rather keep
their property and would not sell at any price. A celebrated example
is Susette Kelo, the eponymous landowner whose home was taken
by the government for the benefit of a private corporation, giving
rise to Kelo v. City of New London, Connecticut.13
When the government acts by eminent domain, an owner’s only
recourse is “just compensation” as guaranteed by the Fifth Amend-
ment. Because the government’s obligation to justly compensate the
owner is the only limitation upon its power of eminent domain, that
obligation must be meaningfully enforced. The principles vindicated
by the constitutional guarantee of “just compensation” are of fun-
damental importance not just to the owners whose land has been
taken, but to every citizen.
II. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT GUARANTEES A PROPERTY OWNER
COMPENSATION THAT “MUST BE A FULL AND PERFECT
EQUIVALENT” OF THE VALUE OF THE TAKEN PROPERTY
The concept of just compensation is comprehensive, and includes
all elements, “and no specific command to include interest is
necessary when interest or its equivalent is a part of such compen-
sation.” The owner is not limited to the value of the property at
the time of the taking; “he is entitled to such addition as will
11. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1979); see also Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1012 (1984) (“If Congress can ‘pre-empt’ state property law in the
manner advocated by EPA, then the Taking Clause has lost all vitality. . . . [A] sovereign, ‘by
ipse dixit, may not transform private property into public property without compensation . . . .
This is the very kind of thing that the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment was meant to
prevent’”); Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980) (“[A] State,
by ipse dixit, may not transform private property into public property without compensation,
even for the limited duration of the deposit in court.”).
12. The government has the ability to exercise its eminent domain authority on behalf of
the private interests. The extent to which the government should delegate its extraordinary
eminent domain power to private interests remains a highly controversial issue.
13. Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
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produce the full equivalent of that value paid contemporaneously
with the taking.” Interest at a proper rate “is a good measure by
which to ascertain the amount so to be added.” 14
The Supreme Court explained that:
[T]he language used in the Fifth Amendment . . . is happily
chosen. . . . The noun “compensation,” standing by itself, carries
the idea of an equivalent. . . . [I]f the adjective “just” had been
omitted, and the provision was simply that property should not
be taken without compensation, the natural import of the lan-
guage would be that the compensation should be the equivalent
of the property. And this is made emphatic by the adjective “just.”
There can, in view of the combination of those two words, be no
doubt that the compensation must be a full and perfect equiva-
lent for the property taken.15
A landowner has been justly compensated only when the govern-
ment pays the owner an amount sufficient to put him in “as good
position pecuniarily as he would have occupied if his property had
not been taken.”16
In Monongahela, the federal government instituted proceedings
to acquire an “upper lock and dam” previously owned by the Monon-
gahela Navigation Company. The parties disputed the value of the
dam, and the federal government argued that it should not be re-
quired to compensate Monongahela for the value of the tolls that it
collected when it owned the dam.17 The Supreme Court disagreed,
holding that private property should not be appropriated “unless a
full and exact equivalent for it be returned to the owner.”18 Only
after the owner has been compensated for the “true value” of his
property can “it be said that just compensation for the property has
been made.”19 This was true even if the United States had been
14. Jacobs, 290 U.S. at 16–17 (quoting Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States, 261
U.S. 299 (1923)).
15. Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312, 325–26 (1893).
16. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943); see also Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v.
United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (holding that courts should “ensure that [the property
owner] is placed in as good a position pecuniarily as he would have occupied if the payment
had coincided with the appropriation.”).
17. Monongahela, 148 U.S. at 314–15.
18. Id. at 326.
19. Id. at 337.
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empowered under the Commerce Clause to perform the taking, be-
cause “the power to regulate commerce is subject to all the limita-
tions imposed by [the Constitution] . . . and among them is that of
the fifth amendment.”20
The government must also compensate a property owner for any
delay in the payment of “just compensation.”21
In Seaboard Air Line Railway Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299
(1923), the federal government took possession of 2.6 acres of land
in South Carolina owned by the Seaboard Railway Line. Seaboard
filed suit against the government, and succeeded, including an award
of interest on its compensation claim. The court of appeals over-
turned the interest award, holding that it was improper because the
statute authorizing the taking made no provision for interest. The
Fourth Circuit denied interest because, in its view, interest cannot be
recovered against the federal government absent an express waiver
of sovereign immunity.22
The Supreme Court disagreed. Instead, it held, citing Monongahela,
that a landowner is “entitled [to] the full and perfect equivalent of
the property taken.”23 Just compensation must put the property owner
“in as good position pecuniarily as he would have been if his property
had not been taken.”24 As such, just compensation is “comprehensive
and includes all elements and no specific command to include interest
20. Id. at 336.
21. See Jacobs, 290 U.S. at 16–17 (“The concept of just compensation is comprehensive, and
includes all elements, and no specific command to include interest is necessary when interest
or its equivalent is a part of such compensation.”); see also Miller, 317 U.S. at 381 (holding
that the government’s failure to render immediate compensation requires the government to
pay “interest on a larger sum from date of taking to final award”); Seaboard Air Line, 261 U.S.
at 306 (holding that interest is “necessary in order that the owner shall not suffer loss and
shall have ‘just compensation’ to which he is entitled”); Schneider v. County of San Diego, 285
F.3d 784, 791 (9th Cir. 2002) (“‘[J]ust compensation’ in the constitutional sense, has been held,
absent a settlement between the parties, to be fair market value at the time of the taking plus
‘interest’ from that date to the date of the payment.”).
22. See Seaboard Air Line, 261 U.S. at 304; see also Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S.
310 (1986) (superseded by statute on other grounds); United States ex rel. Angarica v. Bayard,
127 U.S. 251, 260 (1888) (holding that interest is not generally allowed on claims against
United States based on sovereign immunity); United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 341
U.S. 48, 49 (1951) (calling this the “traditional rule”).
23. Seaboard Air Line, 261 U.S. at 304.
24. Id.; see also Kirby Forest, 467 U.S. at 10 (holding that courts should “ensure that [the
property owner] is placed in as good a position pecuniarily as he would have occupied if the
payment had coincided with the appropriation”); Miller, 317 U.S. at 373; Boston Sand &
Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 52 (1928); United States v. New River Collieries Co.,
262 U.S. 341, 344 (1923).
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is necessary when interest or its equivalent is a part of such com-
pensation.”25 An owner is “not limited to the value of the property at
the time of the taking,” but instead is “entitled to such addition as
will produce the full equivalent of that value paid contemporane-
ously with the taking.”26 A fair rate of interest for the period be-
tween taking and payment, said the Court, “is a good measure by
which to ascertain the amount so to be added.”27 Thus, a fair rate of
interest must be paid to render “just compensation” to the owner,
and because this obligation is inherent in the Fifth Amendment,
Congress need not expressly waive sovereign immunity for payment
to be made.
In Jacobs, the federal government built a dam that flooded the
Jacobs’s property.28 The Fifth Circuit held the government owed com-
pensation, but overruled the trial court’s decision awarding interest.
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that since a Fifth Amendment taking
case was founded upon an implied contract with the United States,
interest could not be awarded because Congress had not waived
sovereign immunity.29
The Supreme Court rejected the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning and
reversed its holding. Instead, it declared that the Fifth Amendment
entitles property owners to “just compensation, not inadequate com-
pensation.”30 This right is not founded on a theory of implied con-
tract, but instead, upon the Constitution and, in particular, the Fifth
Amendment.31 The Court found the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of
25. Seaboard Air Line, 261 U.S. at 306; Baltimore & O.R. Co. v. United States, 298 U.S.
349, 367 (1936) (quoting Seaboard Air Line, 261 U.S. 299).
26. Seaboard Air Line, 261 U.S. at 304; Boston Sand & Gravel, 278 U.S. at 52; Brooks-
Scanlon Corp. v. United States, 265 U.S. 106, 123 (1924); United States v. Klamath & Moadoc
Tribes, 304 U.S. 119, 123 (1938) (“The established rule is that the taking of property by the
United States in the exertion of its power of eminent domain implies a promise to pay just
compensation, i.e., value at the time of the taking plus an amount sufficient to produce the
full equivalent of that value paid contemporaneously with the taking.”); Blackfeet & Gros
Ventre Tribes of Indians v. United States, 119 F. Supp. 161, 164 (Ct. Cl. 1954).
When the taking precedes the payment of compensation, the right to interest as
an element of just compensation under the Fifth Amendment is inseparable from
the claim for the principal value of the land—they arise at the same time—from
the same source—each being a component part of just compensation.
27. Id. The Supreme Court allowed the trial court’s award of interest at the rate set by
the state of South Carolina to stand. Id. The rate of interest was not specifically challenged
in Jacobs.
28. See Jacobs, 290 U.S. at 15.
29. Id. at 16 (citing United States v. N. Am. Transp. & Trading Co., 253 U.S. 330 (1920)).
30. Id.
31. Id.
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“just compensation” “comprehensive,” encompassing “all elements”
of compensation, including interest.32 As in Seaboard, the Supreme
Court overturned the court of appeals and restored the award of in-
terest to the property owners in Jacobs.
Monongahela, Seaboard, and Jacobs conclusively establish that
an appropriate and adequate amount of interest is not added to “just
compensation,” but is instead an essential component of “just com-
pensation” in itself. Lower courts have been following the guidance
laid down in these cases ever since.33
Courts have increasingly held that awarding compound interest is
appropriate in inverse condemnation claims. The first reason for this
is that courts recognize the long delay required to determine liability
in inverse condemnation cases. Direct condemnation proceedings—
where the government openly declares its intention to take land—
are distinguishable from inverse condemnation proceedings, where
a plaintiff must file a lawsuit to “recover the value of property which
has been taken in fact” by the government.34 The Supreme Court has
recognized “important legal and practical differences between an in-
verse condemnation suit and a condemnation proceeding.”35 A direct
condemnation proceeding is “commonly understood to be an action
brought by a condemning authority such as the Government in the
exercise of its power of eminent domain.”36 It requires “affirmative
action on the part of the condemning authority.”37 Thus, compensa-
tion in a direct taking is based on a relatively current valuation of the
32. Id. at 16–17.
33. See, e.g., Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 61 Fed. Cl. 624, 627
(2004) (“Just compensation . . . requires that the owner of the property be compensated not
only for the value of the property on the date of the taking, but also for any delay in payment
of that amount.”) (citing NRG Co. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 659, 664 (1994)); see also
Shosone Tribe of Indians v. United States, 299 U.S. at 497 (“Given such a taking, the right
of interest or a fair equivalent, attaches itself automatically to the right to an award of
damages.”); United States v. 429.59 Acres of Land, 612 F.2d 459, 464 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding
that “[t]he payment of interest on deficiency awards in condemnation cases is designed to
satisfy the constitutional standard of just compensation”); Formanek v. United States, 26 Cl.
Ct. 332, 341 n.11 (1992) (“It is well established that plaintiff, as an owner of property taken
by the Government pursuant to the Fifth Amendment, is entitled to interest computed from
the date of the taking to the date of payment by defendant.”).
34. See Clarke, 445 U.S. at 257 (quoting D. Hagman, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND
DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 328 (1971)).
35. Id. at 255.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 257.
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affected property.38 Moreover, a direct condemnation is less expen-
sive to litigate, and the owner is paid more promptly than an inverse
condemnation taking.
On the other hand, if the government refuses to compensate a
property owner who must bring an inverse condemnation case for
redress, the government necessarily shifts the burden to the land-
owner to “discover the encroachment and to take affirmative action
to recover just compensation.”39 Because a taking is no less a taking
simply because the government denies it occurred, a landowner “is en-
titled to bring [] an [inverse condemnation] action as a result of ‘the
self-executing character of the constitutional provision with respect
to compensation. . . .’”40 Inverse condemnation lawsuits are substan-
tially more costly and burdensome than direct condemnation action.
For example, in Pete v. United States, one court explained the com-
plexity of inverse condemnation proceedings.41 First, a successful
plaintiff must “institute an action and establish the fact of a taking”
over the government’s objection.42 It is only after a taking is success-
fully established that the “plaintiff can advance to the quantum
stage to determine the value of the property for purposes of com-
pensation.”43 As such, it is “inevitable that the successful plaintiff
in the two-step inverse condemnation action will be forced to pay
greater litigation expenses than would have been necessary if the
federal agency had properly performed its function and condemned
the property in question.”44 The length and burden of this procedure
further justify compensating property owners for the loss of the
value of their property.
38. See id. at 258.
39. Clarke, 445 U.S. at 257; United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 747–48 (1947) (“The
Government could, of course, have taken appropriate proceedings, to condemn as early as it
chose, both land and flowage easements. . . . The Government chose not to do so. It left the taking
to physical events, thereby putting on the owner the onus of determining the decisive moment
in the process of acquisition . . . when the fact of taking could no longer be in controversy.”).
40. Clarke, 445 U.S. at 257 (quoting 6 P. Nichols, EMINENT DOMAIN 25.41 (3d rev. ed. 1972));
see also Kirby Forest, 467 U.S. at 5 (owners have a right to bring an “inverse condemnation”
suit); and First English, 482 U.S. at 304 (“[W]here the government’s activities have already
worked a taking of all use of property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve
it of the duty to provide compensation for the period during which the taking was effective.”).
41. Pete v. United States, 569 F.2d 565, 568–69 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
42. Id. at 568.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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III. THE LEGISLATURE HAS NO AUTHORITY TO LIMIT THE
RATE OR AMOUNT OF INTEREST TO BE PAID AN OWNER
The ascertainment of compensation is a judicial function, and
no power exists in any other department of the government to
declare what the compensation shall be or to prescribe any
binding rule in that regard.45
Congress cannot limit the rate of interest necessary to provide a
property owner full and just compensation. Instead, it is the courts’
exclusive province to determine the amount of interest necessary to
“produce the full equivalent of that value paid contemporaneously
with the taking.”46
From the earliest days of its Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court has declared that determining the appropriate amount
of “just compensation,” including interest, to be the exclusive task of
a court—and not the executive or legislative branch. In Monongahela,
the Supreme Court explained that “[t]he right of the legislature of
the state by law to apply the property of the citizen to the public use,
and then to constitute itself the judge of its own case, to determine
what is the ‘just compensation’ it ought to pay therefor . . . cannot
for a moment be admitted or tolerated under our constitution.”47
This is a foundational tenet of Fifth Amendment jurisprudence:
[C]ongress seems to have assumed the right to determine what
shall be the measure of compensation. But this is a judicial, and
not a legislative, question. The legislature may determine what
private property is needed for public purposes; that is a question
of a political and legislative character. But when the taking has
been ordered, then the question of compensation is judicial. It does
not rest with the public, taking the property through con-
gress or the legislature, its representative, to say what com-
pensation shall be paid, or even what shall be the rule of
compensation. The constitution has declared that just com-
pensation shall be paid, and the ascertainment of that is a judi-
cial inquiry.48
45. New River Collieries, 262 U.S. at 343–44.
46. Seaboard Air Line, 261 U.S. at 306.
47. Monongahela, 148 U.S. at 327–28 (quoting Isom v. Miss. Cent. R. Co., 36 Miss. 300
(1858)).
48. Id. at 327 (emphasis added).
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In Jacobs, the Court later emphasized that “the right to just com-
pensation could not be taken away by statute or be qualified by the
omission of a provision for interest where such allowance was appro-
priate in order to make the compensation adequate.”49 As a result, it
is clear that “[i]t does not rest with Congress to say what compensa-
tion shall be paid or even what shall be the rule of compensation.”50
Modern courts adhere to this principle. For example, the Federal
and Ninth Circuits have both recently confirmed that “[c]onsidera-
tion of land taking claims is clearly the role of the judiciary according
to the Constitution . . . [and] ascertainment of ‘just compensation’ is
a judicial function.”51
49. Jacobs, 290 U.S. at 17; see also Phelps v. United States, 274 U.S. 341 (1927) (holding
that judgment in 1926 for the value of the use of property in 1918, without more, was not suf-
ficient to constitute just compensation); Langenegger v. United States, 756 F.2d 1565, 1569
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (citing New River Collieries (“Consideration of land taking claims is clearly
the role of the judiciary according to the Constitution, Amendment V, and ascertainment of
‘just compensation’ is a judicial function.”)); Tektronix, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.2d 343,
354 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (citing Ark. Valley Ry. v. United States, 68 F. Supp. 727, 730 (Ct. Cl. 1946)
(confirming that “determination of fifth amendment compensation is exclusively a judicial
function”)); Verrochi v. Commonwealth, 477 N.E.2d 366, 369 (Mass. 1985) (citing Miller for
the proposition that determination of the proper rate of interest is a judicial function).
50. Miller v. United States, 620 F.2d 812, 839 (Ct. Cl. 1980); see also Jacobs, 290 U.S. at 17
(citing Monongahela, 148 U.S. at 327 (“It does not rest with the public, taking the property,
through congress or the legislature, its representative, to say what compensation shall be paid,
or even what shall be the rule of compensation. The constitution has declared that just com-
pensation shall be paid, and the ascertainment of that is a judicial inquiry.”)); Seaboard Air Line,
261 U.S. at 306 (“It is obvious that the owner’s right to just compensation cannot be made to
depend upon state statutory provisions.”); Schneider, 285 F.3d at 794 (“We conclude, there-
fore, that because the just compensation remedy for a taking is constitutional in nature and
thus a matter of judicial—not legislative—function, the statutory vehicle for providing that
remedy is not determinative of the remedy itself.”); Tektronix, 552 F.2d at 353 (“Though
Congress has from time to time established by statute the rate of interest for delayed compen-
sation in certain situations and geographic areas, the norm is for the court to be without ex-
plicit statutory guidance in setting the interest rate.”) (Bennett, J., concurring); United States
v. United Drill & Tool Corp., 81 F. Supp. 171, 172 (D. D.C. 1948) (“The Court of Claims was cor-
rect in reaching the conclusion that an approach to the market rate of interest was the proper
measure of damages rather than using the analogy of statutory interest.”); Ark. Valley, 68 F.
Supp. at 730 (refusing to adopt legal rate of interest established by the State of Kansas because
“determination of just compensation under the Fifth Amendment is exclusively a judicial func-
tion” and thus “it is for the court to fix upon the rate that it will allow”); United States v. 677.50
Acres of Land in Marion Cnty., Kan., 239 F. Supp. 318, 322 (D. Kan. 1965) (“The landowner is
entitled to his day in court, and the ascertainment of the amount to satisfy the constitutional
requirement of just compensation is established by judicial inquiry under judicially deter-
mined rules of compensation.”).
51. Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1569; Schneider, 285 F.3d at 794.
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Because it is the exclusive role of the Court—and not the legisla-
ture—to determine the correct amount of just compensation, statu-
tory interest rates can only set a “floor” on the amount of interest to be
paid, and certainly cannot limit the government’s interest obligation.
This is true even in direct taking cases.52 The rule is consistent with
a long line of cases providing that a statutory enactment “prescribes
a floor below which protections may not fall, rather than a ceiling
beyond which they may not rise.”53 Thus, even if Congress adopts a
statutory rate of interest, that rate must be independently reviewed
to ensure that for any specific case, it is “reasonable and judicially
acceptable” as one that fully compensates the owner.54
IV. USING A STATUTORY INTEREST RATE TO ACHIEVE AN EFFICIENT
AND UNIFORM RESOLUTION IS SUBORDINATE TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REQUIREMENT OF JUSTLY COMPENSATING THE OWNER
The constitutional mandate in any Fifth Amendment taking case
is that the owner be paid the fair-market value of that property which
the government took, together with “such addition as will produce
the full equivalent of that value paid contemporaneously with the
taking.”55 Some courts have also expressed a “strong judicial policy
52. See Miller v. United States, 620 F.2d 812, 839 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (explaining that the
Declaration of Taking Act sets a “[six] percent as a floor on the rate of interest, and the rate
of interest actually awarded may rise depending on the economic conditions occurring after the
taking”); United States v. 50.50 Acres of Land, 931 F.2d 1349, 1355 (9th Cir. 1991), citing
Blankinship, 543 F.2d at 1275 (holding that the interest rate employed by Congress “cannot
be viewed as a ceiling on the rate of interest allowable” but instead as a “floor”); Kirby Forest,
467 U.S. at 11 (noting that the federal government previously “acquiesced” in several deci-
sions by the federal courts of appeal holding that the six percent rate of interest prescribed
by Declaration of Taking Act was not a “ceiling” on the amount that “can and must be paid
by the Government”); Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. One Parcel of Land in Montgomery
Cnty., Md., 706 F.2d 1312, 1322 (4th Cir. 1983) (United States “conceding” that Declaration of
Taking Act sets a floor in compensation cases); United States v. 329.73 Acres of Land, Situated
in Grenada and Yalobusha Counties, Miss., 704 F.2d 800, 812 (5th Cir. 1983) (“We agree with
the decisions of other federal appellate courts that the 6% delay damages provided by the
Declaration of Taking Act [citation omitted], and by other federal condemnation statutes, sets
a floor, rather than a ceiling, on the rate of interest payable on the deficiency.”); and Verrochi,
477 N.E.2d at 370 (collecting cases).
53. United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 839 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
871 (1990).
54. See Miller, 620 F.2d at 837. Because this is the case, the statutory rate must be inde-
pendently reviewed even in cases where the DTA is specifically invoked, because there may
be factual circumstances under which the statutory rate does not fully compensate plaintiffs.
55. See Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 61 Fed. Cl. 624, 627
(2004) (citing Seaboard, 261 U.S. at 306); see also supra Part II.
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in favor of the establishment of a uniform rate of interest . . . to
avoid discrimination among litigants.”56 But, the desire for unifor-
mity is subordinate to the primary obligation to provide the owner
a full measure of compensation.57
Establishing a “uniform rate of interest,” however, has been a
challenge easier said than done. Courts have adopted a myriad of
“uniform” interest rates in pursuit of “uniform” results, including:
statutory pre-judgment interest rates; the prime rate; the Internal
Revenue Code’s tax-overpayment rate;58 the Contracts Disputes Act
rate;59 the Declaration of Takings Act rate (which was originally 6%
and is now indexed to the 52-week United States Treasury Bill)60 and
the Moody’s Index of Long-Term Corporate Bonds. While each of these
rates is a readily available benchmark interest rate, taken together
they demonstrate just how difficult uniformity has been to achieve.
A. Statutory Pre-Judgment Interest Rates
For instance, the United States Supreme Court has upheld inter-
est awards calculated at rates equal to those adopted by the state
where the taking occurred for pre-judgment interest. In Seaboard,
the Supreme Court reinstated and endorsed the trial court’s deci-
sion to award interest at South Carolina’s statutory pre-judgment
interest rate, calling it a “palpably fair and reasonable method of per-
forming the indispensible condition to the exercise of the right of emi-
nent domain . . . .”61 The advantage of the South Carolina statutory
interest rate was not challenged or considered in Seaboard. The use
of a state’s statutory pre-judgment interest rate continues to find fa-
vor in many state courts.62 Compensating owners by a statutory rate,
56. See Tulare Lake, 61 Fed. Cl. at 627 (citing Miller, 620 F.2d at 838); Brunswick Corp.
v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 204 (1996).
57. See ITT Corp. v. United States, 17 Cl. Ct. 199, 236 (1989) (citing Georgia-Pacific Corp.
v. United States, 226 Ct. Cl. 95 (1980)) (“This court is of the opinion that the goal of establishing
a uniform policy regarding delay compensation in eminent domain cases, although desirable,
must give way to the established law that there is no fixed formula for establishing compen-
sation for fifth amendment takings. Courts have stepped outside the uniform policy when the
requirements of justice so dictated.”).
58. See 26 U.S.C. § 6621 (2012).
59. See 41 U.S.C. § 611 (2012).
60. See 40 U.S.C. § 3114 (2012).
61. Seaboard Air Line, 261 U.S. at 306.
62. See Tucson Airport Auth. v. Freilich, 665 P.2d 1002, 1006 (Ariz. 1983) (refusing to
adopt prudent investor rule because “[i]f each trial court were obligated to receive evidence,
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however, seems to run counter to the Supreme Court’s teaching that
it is for the courts, not legislatures, to determine just compensation.
B. The Tax-Overpayment Rate
The Federal Circuit has upheld at least one interest award based
on the tax overpayment rate set forth in 26 U.S.C. § 6621(b).63 The
use of the tax overpayment rate has not been widely adopted, and
was recently criticized by one judge because, in some cases (in par-
ticular, those years where the investment climate is positive), it may
“understate[ ] somewhat the interest owed.”64
C. The Contract Disputes Rate
Some courts have used the interest rate provided in the federal
Contract Disputes Act to compensate inverse condemnation claims,
on the theory that inverse condemnation takings are akin to an im-
plied lease or similar contract.65 During the early 1980s, the Court
of Federal Claims more commonly used the Contract Disputes Act
rate to calculate interest in a number of cases, but its application ap-
peared to have fallen off in recent years.66 The court’s articulated
determine and apply its own version of the reasonable economic rate, the results in each case
would differ depending upon the evidence put forward by each party and the conclusions of
each individual trier of fact”); State ex rel. Dept. of Transp. v. Penn Cent. Corp., 511 A.2d 382,
384 (Del. Super. 1986) (In Delaware, “[a]wards in condemnation proceedings carry the same
rate which applies to judgments generally.”); Waukegan Port Dist. v. Kyritsis, 471 N.E.2d
217, 219 (Ill. App. 1984) (holding that Illinois claimant was entitled to statutory rate of in-
terest in most eminent domain proceedings); Herman v. City of Wichita, 612 P.2d 588, 593
(Kan. 1980) (concluding that in inverse condemnation cases, courts should award legal rate
of six percent under Kansas law); see also Struble v. Elkhart Cnty. Park and Recreation Bd.,
373 N.E.2d 906, 909 (Ind. App. 1978) (legal rate of interest satisfies constitution so long as it
is “not so unreasonably low as to deprive the landowner of just compensation”). These cases
intimate a rebuttable presumption that use of a statutory pre-judgment interest rate is rea-
sonable unless the owner can prove it is “unreasonably low.”
63. See Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. United States, 766 F.2d 518, 519 (Fed. Cir. 1985);
Bendix Corp. v. United States, 676 F.2d 606, 616 (Ct. Cl. 1982); see also E. Minerals Int’l, Inc.
v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 621, 631 n.13 (1997), rev’d and remanded on other grounds,
Wyatt v. United States, 271 F.3d 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
64. See The Boeing Co. v. United States, 86 Fed. Cl. 303, 323–24 (2009).
65. None of the courts that have applied the Contract Disputes Act rate have analyzed the
question in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Jacobs in which it determined that a Fifth
Amendment taking should not be equated to an implied contract. See infra Part IV.C.
66. See Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 30 Fed. Cl. 411, 411 (1994) (without com-
ment, upholding judgment of compound interest based on rate set forth in Contract Disputes
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policy for using this rate was that it was “uniform” and fostered
“judicial efficiency.” Then, in 2010, the Court of Federal Claims
revived the Contract Dispute Act rate in a case involving the federal
government’s use of certain private property near the U.S.–Mexico
border.67 In Otay Mesa, the federal government had placed several
seismic sensors on the plaintiffs’ property that were designed to as-
sist policing the border. Finding that a taking had occurred and that
interest was owed, the court concluded that the Contract Dispute Act
rate best compensated the plaintiffs because “[i]f the Border Patrol
originally had entered into a lease with Plaintiffs for the placement
of sensors on the five parcels, such a lease would have been a bind-
ing contract.”68 From this, the court concluded the Contract Dispute
Act rate of interest was “best suited to compensate Plaintiffs . . . on
what should have been a contractual arrangement.”69
D. The Prime Rate
A few cases in the Court of Federal Claims have adopted the prime
rate, the lowest short-term interest rate set by the Federal Reserve
on financial depositories’ borrowing and lending funds overnight.70
No court has meaningfully analyzed the use of this rate as the basis
to calculate “just compensation” for a Fifth Amendment taking. This
rate appears to be inadequate as a measure of “just compensation,”
however, because the “prime rate” does not reflect a true market-
based rate determined from the perspective of an owner who has
waited years for compensation. Indeed, we explain more fully below
why any rate tied to a treasury instrument understates the proper
rate of interest because, by definition, such a rate is a measure of the
federal government’s cost to borrow money over the relevant term.
As such, it does not measure the owner’s use of the principal during
this period.
Act); Formanek, 26 Cl. Ct. at 341 n.11; see also Econ. Development and Indus. Corp. of Boston
v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 590, 605 (1987) (holding that CDA rate has the “approval of
Congress”); Hedstrom Lumber Co., Inc. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 16, 34 (1984) (citing Foster v.
United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 738 (1983)) (holding that use of the Contract Disputes Act rate provides
for “uniformity of compensation, notice to the public, and judicial efficiency” in takings cases).
67. See Otay Mesa, 93 Fed. Cl. at 491.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Brunswick, 36 Fed. Cl. at 219; see also Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 939 F.2d
1540, 1545 (1991) (upholding special master’s decision that plaintiff should obtain interest at
the prime rate as not clearly erroneous).
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E. The Declaration of Takings Act Rate
Some courts have calculated interest using the statutory interest
rate provided in the Declaration of Takings Act, a statute enacted
by Congress to apply in direct condemnation cases.71 When passed,
the Declaration of Takings Act provided for interest at a fixed an-
nual rate of 6%, but since Congress amended the DTA, it now pro-
vides for interest at the 52-Week T-Bill rate.72
Use of this rate has been justified on the basis that Congress
“considered [the issue of just compensation] in an analogous con-
text” and thus “the court, when determining how to meet its own
obligations, certainly cannot be barred from considering and apply-
ing the lessons that Congress has learned from its own study of the
just compensation issue.”73
But using the Declaration of Takings Act rate to establish com-
pensation seems particularly inappropriate to compensate property
owners who have been forced to pursue compensation through in-
verse condemnation. By its own terms and legislative history, the
Declaration of Taking Act was expressly intended to apply only to
direct takings74 where “payment is expected to follow quickly from
the taking, rather than in situations where, as here, a significant
amount of time has elapsed between the taking of the property and
the payment of just compensation.”75 Congress simply never contem-
plated that the Declaration of Taking Act would apply in situations
where “a significant amount of time has elapsed between the taking
of the property and the payment of just compensation.”76
The implied assumption for applying the Declaration of Takings
Act rate to inverse condemnation claims is that the landowner, on
the day of the taking, would have invested the fair-market value of
71. See Textainer Equip. Mgmt. Ltd. v. United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 211 (2011); NRG Co. v.
United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 659, 664–65 (1994).
72. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System changed the name of the “52-
Week T-Bill” to the “average one-year constant maturity Treasury yield.” For convenience, we
use the historical “52-Week T-Bill” designation.
73. Id. at 669.
74. There are substantial differences between a “direct taking” and inverse condemnation
actions. See Pete v. United States, 569 F.2d 565, 568–69 (Ct. Cl. 1978); United States v. Clarke,
445 U.S. 253, 257. These differences mean owners are bringing protracted litigation before
they are fully compensated.
75. Tulare Lake, 61 Fed. Cl. at 629–30.
76. Id.
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his property in exclusively 52-Week T-bills, then rolled them over
on the anniversary of the taking each year. In doing so, the owner
(a) receives little interest, (b) no access to the principal; and, (c) zero
diversification77 in one of the lowest possible yielding investments.
Such an “investment” strategy is contrary to every known tenet of
the Prudent Investor Rule and Modern Portfolio Theory, discussed
further below. Indeed, if a fiduciary for an Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act (“ERISA”) fund managed funds by investing them
in a portfolio exclusively in 52-Week T-bills for eight years, that
fiduciary may have violated federal law, and be subject to federal
civil and criminal prosecution.78
Moreover, the Declaration of Takings Act rate is flawed because
it “ contemplates an award of just compensation from the perspec-
tive of the government’s cost of borrowing rather than from the
perspective of the claimant’s rate of return.”79 Using the govern-
ment’s cost of borrowing money to establish the compensation due
an owner violates Justice Holmes’s admonition that when determin-
ing the appropriate “just compensation” the government owes an
owner, “the question is, What has the owner lost? not, What has the
taker gained?”80
77. The lack of diversification alone disqualifies the 52-Week T-bill as a valid proxy for
the return a prudent investor would have obtained over eight years. The Library of Congress
Federal Research Division prepared a study at the request of the federal Security and Exchange
Commission which concluded, “Inadequate portfolio diversification, for example, violates the
principles of best practice set out in Modern Portfolio Theory, which Nobel Prize-winning
economist Harry Markowitz developed in the 1950s.” See LIBRARY OF CONGRESS FEDERAL
RESEARCH DIVISION, BEHAVIORAL PATTERNS AND PITFALLS OF U.S. INVESTORS (2010), available
at http://www.sec.gov/investor/locinvestorbehaviorreport.pdf.
78. The Uniform Prudent Investor Act (“UPIA”) expressly incorporates the concept of
diversification in prudent investing. As a comment to the UPIA explains:
The 1992 Restatement of Trusts takes the significant step of integrating the
diversification requirement into the concept of prudent investing. Section 227(b)
of the 1992 Restatement treats diversification as one of the fundamental elements
of prudent investing, replacing the separate section 228 of the Restatement of
Trusts 2d. The message of the 1992 Restatement . . . is that prudent investing
ordinarily requires diversification.
Unif. Prudent Investor Act § 3 cmt. 7B U.L.A. 29–30 (2006).
Congress has also adopted the prudent investor rule to govern investment advisors that run
pension funds governed by ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a)(1)(b) and (c).
79. Tulare Lake, 61 Fed. Cl. at 629–30.
80. Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910); see also
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946) (“It is the owner’s loss, not the taker’s gain,
which is the measure of the value of the property taken.”); Pitcairn v. United States, 547
F.2d 1106, 1122 (“The yield on a series of hypothetical Government bonds is not relevant in
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From the owner’s perspective—the only perspective that consti-
tutionally counts—an unliquidated inverse condemnation claim
against the federal government is quite different from an invest-
ment in a government bond. This is so because “[y]ou can hold a bill
until it matures or sell it before it matures” and “[w]hen the bill ma-
tures, you would be paid its face value. . . . Your interest is the face
value minus the purchase price.”81
On the other hand, a landowner with a Fifth Amendment claim
against the government earns no interest during the pendency of
the litigation and cannot sell their right to compensation.82 The
landowner is an unwilling captive creditor, whose damages are com-
pounded by the risk of either not succeeding on his claim, or having
to wait up to a decade to do so.83 As such, the 52-Week T-bill inade-
quately compensates an owner for being “an involuntary lender to
a debtor he would often prefer not to have.”84
The 52-Week T-bill rate also fails to compensate a property owner
for his loss of liquidity. The Ninth Circuit noted this point explicitly:
“[T]he marketability of a claim against the United States for a defi-
ciency under the Declaration of Taking Act is considerably less than
that of a marketable public debt security of the United States. Some
allowance for this feature by the trier of fact is not unreasonable.”85
Nevertheless, the ease of applying the Declaration of Takings Act
rate remains a strong enticement for its adoption in inverse condem-
nation actions. Judge Firestone, a highly respected member of the
ascertaining the injury plaintiff has suffered. It measures compensation only according to the
point of view of the taker without reference to that of the owner since he is hardly likely to
be able to borrow money at the rates the Government can.”); Miller, 620 F.2d at 839 (“The
Government, not the unwilling condemnee, should be the one to bear the risk of any fluctu-
ations in interest rates.”).
81. Treasury Bills in Depth, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TREASURYDIRECT, http://www
.treasurydirect.gov/indiv/research/indepth/tbills/res_tbill.htm (last visited Aug. 6, 2012).
82. See 31 U.S.C. § 3727, which prohibits the holder of a claim against the government
from selling this claim.
83. [O]ne whose land was forcibly taken by a public agency on the basis of a defi-
cient cash deposit is no “prudent investor” who has evaluated the risk and ben-
efits of extending credit to the government for the balance due. Rather, he is
an involuntary lender to a debtor he would often prefer not to have. For this
reason, the risk of any difference between the rates the government would
normally pay, and those the condemnee could have achieved by prudent par-
ticipation in the broader market, should fall on the former.
Redevelopment Agency of the City of Burbank v. Gilmore, 700 P.2d 794, 806 (Cal. 1985).
84. Tulare Lake, 61 Fed. Cl. at 630.
85. Blankinship, 543 F.2d at 1277.
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Court of Federal Claims, recently considered this issue in Textainer,
involving the owner of shipping containers that were leased to the
U.S. Army by a third party. The owner brought an action seeking
compensation for a Fifth Amendment taking, alleging that the Army
lost some of those shipping containers.86 Judge Firestone considered
the “measure of interest” the government would owe should it be
found liable for the taking. The owner asked Judge Firestone to
“measure the ‘the actual economic harm’ . . . by calculating the
estimated income that the [container owner] would have earned by
leasing the containers during the relevant period.”87 It argued that
the compensation for the Army’s delay should be “[c]alculat[ed by]
the estimated income earned by an owner/operator of a 20’ container
during the time period 2005 to 2010.”88 This method, it was claimed,
justified “an effective interest rate of 10.39%.”89
On this record, Judge Firestone concluded that “the plaintiff’s
theory of interest is not based on the prudent investor rule, but is
based on a misconception regarding the purpose of interest as part
of just compensation in a takings case.”90 She continued, and correct-
ly explained, “interest is compensation for the lost use of the takings
award between the date of the taking and the date of the payment.
The plaintiffs’ theory of interest, however, seeks compensation, in
effect, for the lost use of the taken property during the period. In es-
sence, the plaintiffs seek rental payment for the containers in addi-
tion to the [buyout value of the containers].” This Court concluded
such a rate would be “an impermissible windfall for the plaintiffs.”91
The property owner having provided Judge Firestone with no
meaningful alternative means for calculating interest, and having
offered no evidence showing why the Declaration of Takings rate (or
any other rate) would not provide just compensation, Judge Firestone
concluded that “absent special proof, the statutorily-set rate in the
DTA shall apply.”92
86. Id. at 213.
87. Id. at 221.
88. See Pl. Textainer’s Supplemental Mot. Summ. J., Textainer Equip. Mgmt. Ltd. v.
United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 211 (2011) (No. 08-610C), available at 2011 WL 443816.
89. Id. at 221.
90. Id. at 222.
91. Id. (emphasis in original).
92. In reaching this holding, Judge Firestone held that “the plaintiffs have presented no
evidence supporting the application of the Moody’s Corporate Bond Index rate in this case.”
The Moody’s rate—discussed further below—was adopted by several Federal Circuit cases
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Notwithstanding the Textainer plaintiff’s failure of proof, courts
that employ the Declaration of Taking Act rate to determine just
compensation in inverse condemnation cases are using a standard
that inherently fails to provide inverse condemnation claimants with
just compensation. Inverse condemnation claims initiated by prop-
erty owners are, by their very nature, a different animal than direct
condemnation claims initiated by the government. In short, judicial
adoption of the Declaration of Taking Act rate converts Congress’s
more defensible intention to justly compensate property owners sub-
ject to direct condemnations into a constitutionally suspect effort
to minimize its obligation to justly compensate inverse condemna-
tion complainants as well. As such, the Declaration of Takings Act
rate, if applied as a ceiling on “just compensation,” violates the Fifth
Amendment and is no more constitutionally defensible than if Con-
gress had passed a law declaring that it would pay no more than ten
dollars an acre for land it has taken.
For most of the past decade the 52-Week Treasury bond rate has
been dropping to essentially zero. This is an essentially nugatory
rate which, as a factual matter, fails to satisfy the constitutional stan-
dard of providing “just compensation.” The Wall Street Journal re-
cently noted, “the 10-year Treasury yield is low and unattractive as
it runs below the US inflation rate.”93 This is a “negative yield” in
which the yield on the bond is less than the rate of inflation. As such,
an investor acquiring and holding such an investment to term is actu-
ally paying the government to take their money. The current 10-Year
Treasury yield is at a historic low last seen in February 1946.94 The
yield on a 52-Week Treasury bond is much lower than the 10-Year
Treasury bond. The present 52-week Treasury rate is 0.17%.95 By
prior to Judge Firestone’s ruling. Nevertheless, the plaintiff did not mention the Moody’s
Composite Rate until its response brief, and only then in arguing that the Moody’s rate was
inadequate. While Judge Firestone’s use of the Declaration of Takings Act rate appears con-
trary to the Federal Circuit’s previous direction (discussed further below), she correctly noted
that the plaintiff failed to present the issue to the Court, and calculated their proposed in-
terest rate based on future use of the property after the taking—a fundamental error. Id.
93. Min Zeng, Treasury Yields Near Historic Lows, and Still Attractive, BMO Says, WALL
ST. J., June 15, 2012 (Marketbeat section), http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2012/05/15/treasury
-yields-near-historic-lows-and-still-attractive-bmo-says/?KEYWORDS=Historically+low
+treasury+rates+10-year (last visited Aug. 6, 2012).
94. Id.
95. Daily Treasury Bill Rates Data, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury
.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-rates/Pages/TextView.aspx?data=billrates (last
visited Aug. 6, 2012).
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comparison, the current Moody’s AAA rate is 3.67%.96 And, there is
no indication that interest rates of essentially zero will not continue
for the immediate future. Again, the Wall Street Journal reports,
“The Fed has said since January that it plans to keep short-term
interest rates at ‘exceptionally low levels’ at least through late 2014
and it didn’t alter that language. The central bank has held short-
term rates near zero since December 2008 . . . .”97
To determine “just compensation” using such essentially nominal
interest rates when the owner could have earned a substantially
higher rate of return on equally secure corporate bonds is to deny
the owner compensation equal to what the owner could have reason-
ably received on the funds had the government paid him the money
it owned him on the date the government took his property.
V. SEVERAL MODERN COURTS USE THE “PRUDENT
INVESTOR RULE” TO DETERMINE A SUFFICIENT RATE
OF INTEREST TO ASSURE THE OWNER IS PAID A “FULL
EQUIVALENT” OF THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY
Because a reasonably prudent investor would diversify his risk,
it is proper to consider the rate of interest paid on different types
of securities with different maturities.98
No doubt reacting to the concerns with statutory ceilings discussed
above, several courts have professed dissatisfaction with statutory
rates of interest altogether, and instead follow a market-based ap-
proach using the prudent investor rule. In one such example, Tulare
Lake Basin Water Storage District v. United States, various Califor-
nia water agencies challenged the taking of their contractual water
rights.99 The government was found liable for the taking, and as-
sessed damages with interest based on the 52-Week Treasury bond
rate provided for in the Declaration of Taking Act.100 The Tulare Lake
96. Selected Interest Rates (Daily)—H.15, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H15/data.htm (last visited Aug. 6, 2012).
97. Kristina Peterson et al., FOMC: Fed Extends Operation Twist Through 2012, WALL ST.
J., June 20, 2012, available at http://www.4-traders.com/news/FOMC-Fed-Extends-Operation
-Twist-Through-2012--14379163/.
98. See 429.59 Acres of Land, 612 F.2d at 465.
99. 61 Fed. Cl. at 626–27.
100. See 40 U.S.C. § 3116(a)(1) (2002).
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plaintiffs asked the court to reconsider, arguing that they were not
justly compensated by its ruling.101 They asked, instead, for the
Court to grant them interest based on the rates of return achieved
on a diversified investment portfolio maintained during the relevant
time frame.102
On reconsideration, the Tulare Lake court agreed that it had in-
appropriately calculated delay compensation using the Declara-
tion of Taking Act rate, concluding that rate offered no guidance in
the context of an inverse condemnation action.103 It agreed that the
Declaration of Taking Act requires immediate payment upon the
issuance of a formal declaration of taking—and thus does not “in
any way affect legislative takings.”104 Instead, Congress adopted a
uniform, short-term interest rate for those cases where, having
affirmatively declared that a taking had occurred, little or no time
had elapsed between the time of condemnation and the payment of
just compensation.105
The Tulare Lake court went further, determining that calculating
an interest award at any government bond rate—short or long term—
impermissibly “contemplates an award of just compensation from
the perspective of the government’s cost of borrowing rather than
from the perspective of the claimant’s rate of return.”106 It found that
the interest due was instead best measured by the “prudent investor”
standard.107 That standard requires that a prudent investor protect
101. 61 Fed. Cl. at 626.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 629 (citing 132 Cong. Rec. S16844 (Oct. 16, 1986)):
MR. GORTON: Would this bill have any effect in situations where the Federal
Government acquires land pursuant to a legislative taking?
MR. THURMOND: The bill does not in any way affect legislative takings. It is an
amendment to the Declaration of Taking Act.
MR. GORTON: I understand that the Department of Justice asked for this bill.
Does the Department agree that this bill has no impact whatsoever on a leg-
islative taking?
MR. THURMOND: The committee has talked with the Department about your
point, and the Department has given its complete assurance that the bill con-
cerns only takings under the Declaration of Taking Act, and that neither the bill
nor the Act have any effect on legislative takings.
105. See id.; see also Miller, 317 U.S. at 381 (holding that the DTA’s purpose is to “give the
former owner . . . immediate cash compensation to the extent of the Government’s estimate
of the value of the property.”).
106. Tulare Lake, 61 Fed. Cl. at 630.
107. Id. at 627.
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the invested capital while considering both the potential for current
income and the need for growth in excess of inflation. U.S. Treasury
bond rates fall short of that standard, because they consider “com-
pensation only according to the point of view of the taker [the gov-
ernment] without reference to that of the owner since he is hardly
likely to be able to borrow money at the rates the Government can.”108
In turn, this is consistent with the rule that whether a rate of return
is reasonable must be determined from the perspective of the prop-
erty owner, not the property taker.109
Based on these factors, the Tulare Lake court concluded “the pru-
dent investor rule requires a rate of return that more accurately
reflects a diversified investment” than the government’s cost of
borrowing funds, and concluded that the award should be made at
the rate at which “a reasonably prudent person would have invested
the funds to produce a reasonable return while maintaining safety
of principal.”110
Other courts have similarly used the Prudent Investor Rule to
calculate interest owed in Fifth Amendment taking cases.111 In Rede-
velopment Agency of the City of Burbank v. Gilmore, the California
Supreme Court reviewed a trial court’s award for a taking executed
by a local government agency. California law, at the time, provided
for a statutory rate of interest on all judgments, and the relevant
eminent domain statute limited the interest rate to this statutory
rate.112 The owners challenged the trial court’s ruling fixing their
108. Id. at 628 (citing Pitcairn, 547 F.2d at 1124).
109. This is true even in cases of direct condemnation under the Declaration of Takings
Act. The Fifth Amendment allows a property owner to obtain whatever relief is appropriate
upon demonstrating that a statutory rate does not reflect a reasonable market rate. A direct
condemnation claimant’s proof that the Declaration of Takings Act fails to justly compensate
him, for whatever reason, would presumably trump the statutory requirement.
110. Tulare Lake, 61 Fed. Cl. at 630, 627 (citing 429.59 Acres of Land, 612 F.2d at 464–65
(9th Cir. 1980)) (internal citations and quotations omitted); Gilmore, 700 P.2d at 805 (adopting
prudent investor principle as a “sound basis for calculation of interest as just compensation”);
United States v. 125.2 Acres of Land Situated in Town & Cnty. Of Nantucket, Mass., 732 F.2d
239 (1st Cir. 1984).
111. Gilmore, 700 P.2d at 804; Lea Co. v. N. Car. Bd. of Transp., 345 S.E.2d 355, 358 (N.C.
1986) (holding that statutory interest rate set floor for just compensation, but that plaintiffs
could demonstrate through evidence that prevailing market rates are higher than the stat-
utory rate); M.B. Claff, Inc. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 797 N.E.2d 426, 429 (Mass. App. 2003)
(holding that statutory rate purporting to award “substantially lower than market rates . . .
deprives [a] property owner of just compensation” but putting burden of proof on claimant to
demonstrate market rates).
112. 700 P.2d at 798.
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pre-judgment interest at the statutory rate, arguing that it did not
offer just compensation under the facts of their case.113
The Gilmore court agreed that “a statutory interest ceiling cannot
prevail” where it falls short of the “just compensation” mandated by
the Fifth Amendment.114 An adequate rate must instead “reflect con-
ditions in the usual interest markets.”115 It held that the relevant in-
terest market is not one that is “geared exclusively to that at which
the condemning agency could have borrowed the unpaid funds in its
usual financial markets,”—i.e., government bond rates.116
The California Supreme Court reminded that after a taking, the
former landowner becomes “an involuntary lender to a debtor he
would often prefer not to have.”117 Thus, the “risk of any difference
between the rates that the government would normally pay”—i.e.,
bond rates, and those that could have been achieved by “prudent par-
ticipation in the broader market, should fall on the [government].”118
The prudent investor rule was the proper benchmark by which to
appropriately compensate a property owner for his loss.119
113. Id.
114. Id. at 800.
115. Id. (citing Miller, 429.59 Acres of Land, Blankinship, and other cases holding similarly).
116. Id.; see also Independence Park Apartments v. United States, 61 Fed. Cl. 692, 717 (2004)
(“[T]he prudent-investor rule does not require that a reference be made only to a rate of
interest on Treasury securities where the United States is the defendant. . . .”), rev’d on other
grounds, Independence Park Apartments v. United States, 449 F.3d 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
117. Gilmore, 700 P.2d at 806.
118. Id. (explaining that eminent domain is not “intended to make condemnees the un-
willing financiers of public acquisitions”); see also A&S Council Oil Co., Inc. v. Saiki, Civ.
A. No. 87-1969-OG, 1993 WL 787241, at *5 (D. D.C. Mar. 26, 1993) (“[I]f anyone should bear
the risk of fluctuation in interest rates over time it should be the government, who has taken
the property, not the unwilling owner.”); Pitcairn, 547 F.2d at 1122 (“The yield on a series of
hypothetical Government bonds is not relevant in ascertaining the injury plaintiff has
suffered. It measures compensation only according to the point of view of the taker without
reference to that of the owner since he is hardly likely to be able to borrow money at the rates
the Government can.”); Miller, 620 F.2d at 839 (“The Government, not the unwilling con-
demnee, should be the one to bear the risk of any fluctuations in interest rates.”). See also
supra note 83.
119. Gilmore, 700 P.2d at 807; see also Concrete Machinery Co., Inc. v. City of Hickory, 517
S.E.2d 155, 159 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (explaining that trial court must consider evidence that
“prevailing rates” are higher than an applicable statutory rate, as well as “investments of
varying lengths and risk [which] typically [include] short, medium, and long-term government
and corporate obligations”); Portland Nat. Gas Transmission Sys. v. 19.2 Acres of Land, 195
F. Supp. 2d 314, 327–28 (D. Mass. 2002) (applying rate of seven percent because “that was the
prevailing money market rate”).
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VI. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT HAS ADOPTED THE
MOODY COMPOSITE CORPORATE BOND RATE AS A
PRESUMPTIVELY APPROPRIATE RATE OF INTEREST
[Moody’s Composite Index rate] should be applied (from now on)
to just compensation cases without need of proof in the individ-
ual instance.120
Some courts—most prominently the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit121—have attempted to bridge the gap between the
search for a “uniform” rate of interest that obviates the need for
proof of the interest rate applicable in each individual case and the
search for a market-based rate that may more fairly compensates an
owner, but may commensurately require more evidentiary proof. In
a series of decisions, the Federal Circuit’s predecessor court—the
Court of Claims—adopted the Moody’s Composite Index of Long-Term
Bonds as a presumptively appropriate interest rate that balanced
the advantage of uniformity with the constitutional imperative of a
market-based rate.
In United States v. Pitcairn, the Court of Claims held that “long-
term corporate bond yields are an indicator of broad trends and
relative levels of investment yields or interest rates. They cover the
broadest segment of the interest rate spectrum.”122 In contrast, it
rejected government bond rates for the same reason that they were
rejected in Tulare Lake and Gilmore, holding that “just compensa-
tion in the constitutional sense is what the owner has lost, and not
what the condemnor has gained.”123
For this reason, Pitcairn rejected the government’s contention
that interest should be established based on “a series of hypotheti-
cal long term Government bonds.” The court found these govern-
ment bond rates to be subjectively constructed by the government to
120. Tektronix v. United States, 552 F.2d 343, 352–53 (Cl. Ct. 1977).
121. Prior to 1982, what is now the Federal Circuit was called the United States Court of
Claims. The decisions of the Court of Claims are binding precedent in the Federal Circuit. See
South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368 (1982).
122. 547 F.2d at 1124.
123. Id. at 1122 (citing 3 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 8.61 (3d ed. rev. 1975)). Pitcairn has
been cited favorably in the D.C. circuit as well. See Bebchick v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit
Comm’n, 645 F.2d 1086, 1093–94 (D.C. Cir. 1981), appealed after remand, 805 F.2d 396
(1986); Littlewolf v. Hodel, 681 F. Supp. 929, 947 n.14 (D.D.C. 1988), aff’d, 877 F.2d 1058
(D.C. Cir. 1989).
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minimize potential returns. The court went on to hold that the gov-
ernment’s use of government bond rates “ignore[d] any relationship”
between the rate of interest and the constitutional principle of just
compensation.124 Holding that the ultimate test was to ensure that
“the plaintiff . . . receive just compensation,” the Pitcairn court
adopted the Moody’s Composite Index.125
Likewise, in Tektronix v. United States, the Court of Claims af-
firmed the Pitcairn standard, holding that Pitcairn’s rates “should be
applied (from now on) to just compensation cases, without need of
proof in the individual instance.”126 The court concluded that other-
wise “it [was] too burdensome to require parties to make specific
proof in every case as to the appropriate interest rate.”127 Instead,
it would “further the goal of equal justice, reduce the costs and com-
plexity of litigation, and facilitate decision (as well as settlement) to
accept and establish the Pitcairn rates and method.”128
And in Miller v. United States, the Court of Claims again found
that the Moody’s Composite Index provided uniformity and resolved
inequities among individual claimants, reiterating the “strong judi-
cial policy in favor of the establishment of a uniform rate of interest
applicable to condemnation cases in order to avoid discrimination
among litigants.”129
Other courts have also used the Moody’s Composite Index to estab-
lish compensation.130 In 1996, the Federal Circuit adopted Pitcairn ’s
endorsement of the Moody’s Composite Bond Index in Hughes Air-
craft Co. v. United States, 86 F.3d 1566, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996), though
its opinion was later reversed and remanded by the United States
Supreme Court for other reasons.131
124. Pitcairn, 547 F.2d at 1122, 1124.
125. Id. at 1121.
126. 552 F.2d at 352–53.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. 620 F.2d at 838 and 840 (“Plaintiffs, without objection from defendant, have requested
this court to take judicial notice of [the Moody’s Composite Index] for the years 1976–79.”).
130. See A & S Council, 1993 WL 787241, at *5 (“[T]he delayed compensation interest will
be determined based upon the yield produced by good quality, long-term corporate bonds, as
set forth in Moody’s Composite Index.”); Georgia-Pacific, 640 F.2d at 366 (citing Tektronix and
Miller) (“We likewise take judicial notice of [the Moody’s Composite Index].”); Leesona Corp.
v. United States, No. 130-70, 1978 WL 14862, at *24, *25 (Ct. Cl. May 1, 1978) (holding that
interest should be awarded at “those rates set down by the court in Pitcairn” and stating that
interest at corporate bond rates was appropriate where “competitively marketed AAA cor-
porate bonds were available at higher yields” than government bonds).
131. See 520 U.S. 1183 (1997).
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The Court of Federal Claims has followed the Claims Court and
Federal Circuit and has calculated the appropriate interest using
the Moody’s Composite Index.132 In an unrelated case also called
Miller v. United States, Judge Bruggink of the Court of Federal
Claims considered and rejected the Declaration of Taking Act rate,
finding it insufficient to “place [owners] in as good a position as they
would have occupied if payment had coincided with the taking.”133
Instead, he concluded that “a rate based on [the Moody’s Composite
Index for Moody’s AAA-rated bonds] more closely approximates
what a prudent investor would have done” because it “produces a
reasonable return and maintains safety of capital.”134
Using the Moody’s Composite Index of corporate bonds—or a
similar market-based rate of return consistent with the return that
would have been generated as a presumptively appropriate interest
rate—addresses the concern that litigation of the interest rate in
each case would prove too costly for individual litigants. The Moody’s
rate also represents a low-risk investment diversified by a portfolio
of AAA-rated bonds, the highest available rating. Adoption of this
benchmark rate allows individual claimants to obtain a rate of re-
turn that balances conservative investing principles with a potential
for growth that government bonds do not offer.
VII. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT REQUIRES
THAT INTEREST BE COMPOUNDED
Simple interest cannot put the property owner in as good a
position pecuniarily as he would have occupied if the payment
had coincided with the appropriation, because it undervalues
the worth of the [property].135
Albert Einstein has been apocryphally quoted as saying that “the
greatest invention of all time was compound interest.”136 Even if this
132. See Miller v. United States, No. 03-2489L, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Aug. 22, 2006) (holding that
a rate based on the Moody’s composite index “more closely approximates what a prudent
investor would have done” than the proposed [52-Week] Treasury bond rate).
133. Id. at *2.
134. Id.
135. Whitney Benefits, 30 Fed. Cl. at 415.
136. There is no credible source validating this quote as really having been said by Einstein.
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attribution is incorrect, the observation captures Benjamin Frank-
lin’s advice to:
[R]emember that time is Money. . . . Remember that credit is
Money. If a Man lets his Money lie in my Hands after it is due,
he gives me the Interest, or so much as I can make of it during
that Time. . . . Money is of a prolific generating Nature. Money
can beget Money, and its Offspring can beget more, and so on.
Five Shillings turn’d, is Six: Turn’d again, ’tis Seven and Three
Pence; and so on ’til it becomes a Hundred Pound. The more there
is of it, the more it produces every Turning, so that the Profits
rise quicker and quicker.137
Judge Learned Hand likewise noted, “Whatever may have been
our archaic notions about interest, in modern financial communities
a dollar to-day is worth more than a dollar next year, and to ignore
the interval as immaterial is to contradict well-settled beliefs about
value. The present use of my money is itself a thing of value, and, if
I get no compensation for its loss, my remedy does not altogether right
my wrong.”138 Courts must assume that if “the full value of just com-
pensation had been [paid when the taking occurred], the landowner
would have been able to earn compound interest.”139 This is because
“the government delays its payment for ‘taken’ property” for a sub-
stantially longer period of time than in direct condemnation claims.140
Denial of compound interest after a long delay “would effectively un-
dercut the protections of the fifth amendment to our Constitution,”
precisely because it would provide property owners with less than
if they had been compensated at the time of the taking.141 Thus, the
137. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, Advice to a Young Tradesman, Written by an Old One, in THE
WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN: PHILADELPHIA, 1726–1757 PHILADELPHIA (Benjamin Franklin
& D. Hall, eds. 1748), available at http://www.historycarper.com/resources/twobf2/advice.htm.
Franklin’s advice also establishes that compounding interest was understood and practiced
in Colonial America at the time the Fifth Amendment was adopted.
138. Procter & Gamble Dist. Co. v. Sherman, 2 F.2d 165 (2nd Cir., 1924).
139. Whitney Benefits, 30 Fed. Cl. at 415; Brunswick, 36 Fed. Cl. at 219 (“[I]nterest rates
shall be compounded annually since no prudent, commercially reasonable investor would in-
vest at simple interest.”).
140. Whitney Benefits, 30 Fed. Cl. at 414 (citing Fla. Rock Indus. v. United States, 23 Cl.
Ct. 653, 658 (1991)); see Otay Mesa, 93 Fed. Cl. at 491 (citing Vaizburd v. United States, 67
Fed. Cl. 499, 504 (2005)) (granting compound interest based on United States’ “decade-long
delay in compensating Plaintiffs for their easement”).
141. Whitney Benefits, 30 Fed. Cl. at 415; see also Dynamics Corp., 766 F.2d at 520 (quoting
Waite v. United States, 282 U.S. 508 (1931)) (“We are persuaded that, based on the facts and
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usual “prohibition on [compound] interest against the government
does not apply in fifth amendment takings cases.”142
CONCLUSION: THE “JUST COMPENSATION” PROVISION OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT REQUIRES THE OWNER TO BE PAID A FAIR-MARKET
RATE OF INTEREST COMPARABLE TO WHAT THE OWNER COULD
HAVE EARNED HAD HE BEEN PAID THIS MONEY ON THE DATE
THE GOVERNMENT TOOK HIS PROPERTY
While it is easy to understand the appeal of statutory interest rates
as a shorthand for determining just compensation, using statutory
interest rates (like, for instance, the 52-Week T-bill rate found in
the Declaration of Takings Act) sacrifices constitutional principle for
purported simplicity and uniformity.143 Courts have adopted various
rates as “reasonable,” but virtually every decision along these lines
begs the question—reasonable compared to what? Most courts take
the reasonableness of one or more of these rates for granted, but
reasonableness generally depends on a host of factual issues—
foremost of which are prevailing market conditions. For a court to
circumstances in a particular case, compound interest may more nearly fit with the policy ‘to
accomplish complete justice as between the plaintiff and the United States’ under the just
compensation clause of the Fifth Amendment.”); N.M. LLC v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 63,
81 (2002) (awarding compounded pre-judgment interest “from the date of the taking until the
date of the judgment”); Innovair Aviation, Ltd. v. United States, 83 Fed. Cl. 498, 507 (2008)
(quoting Shelden v. United States, 34 Fed. Cl. 355, 378 (1995)) (“This Court has awarded
compound interest where there has been ‘a substantial time period between appropriation and
compensation.’”); Cement Div., Nat’l Gypsum Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 144 F.3d 1111, 1116
(7th Cir. 1998) (“It is, of course, settled in the case law that compounding of prejudgment
interest is acceptable.”); Mekuria v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 45 F. Supp. 2d 19,
30–31 (D. D.C. 1999) (holding that obligation to pay compounded interest arises from a taking
to “fully compensate Plaintiffs’ losses”); Osprey Pac. Corp. v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 150, 160
(1998) (awarding compound interest on takings award); Shelden, 34 Fed. Cl. at 377–78 (citing
Whitney Benefits) (awarding compound interest where “a substantial time period [passed]
between appropriation and compensation”).
142. See Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 37, 52 (1994) (“Simple interest cannot put the
property owner in as good a position pecuniarily as he would have occupied if the payment
had coincided with the appropriation, because it undervalues the worth of the property.”);
Whitney Benefits, 30 Fed. Cl. at 414–15.
143. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91 n.22 (1972) (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 656 (1972)) (“[T]he Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency.
Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general . . . that they were designed to pro-
tect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and
efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps more,
than mediocre ones.”); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 96 (1949) (“[I]t was Mr. Justice Holmes
who admonished us that ‘To rest upon a formula is a slumber that, prolonged, means death.’”).
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adopt a statutory rate of interest in a Fifth Amendment case with-
out independently establishing that it matches a market rate of
return the owner would have earned risks unconstitutionally dele-
gating the determination of “just compensation” to Congress—a
danger the Supreme Court has repeatedly warned against.
Any effort to determine just compensation must be governed by
the fundamental principle that the condemnee, if compensated at
the specified rate, will be “place[d] in as good a position pecuniarily
as he would have occupied if the payment had coincided with the
appropriation.”144 As various courts over time have pointed out, none
of the congressionally established rates of interest bear any relation-
ship to the proper constitutional consideration of compensating an
owner for what the owner lost, not what the government took. These
statutory rates—by definition—do not measure the owner’s lost op-
portunity to obtain a market-based rate of return. Indeed, a court
seeking to apply a statutory rate would presumably have to test that
rate against market conditions—thus undermining the very unifor-
mity for which that rate was selected in the first place.
Meanwhile, as demonstrated above, the courts have emphasized
uniformity in their decisions on interest rates, but have been un-
disputedly unable to achieve it. To the contrary, existing legal pre-
cedent supports various outcomes, depending on the arguments of
the parties and the presiding court’s predilections. Even in the past
twenty years, courts have measured interest (or delay compensa-
tion) in no less than six separate ways—all of which yield different
results. As such, the oft-stated goal of uniformity remains aspira-
tional, at best.
Thus, for all the purported effort courts have put into a unified
theory of delay compensation in inverse condemnation litigation, the
case law is littered with detours and false starts. Neither property
owners nor the government can predict the value of their claims. The
result is repeated litigation over the applicable interest standard—
a legal battle that, at this point, threatens to further confuse rather
than clarify the issues.
To remedy this situation, we recommend going back to the basic
constitutional principles underlying just compensation. First, courts
should apply the constitutional standard requiring that property
owners be put in as good a position as they would have been had the
144. See supra note 24.
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taking not occurred. This requires courts to consider rates from the
perspective of what is available to the property owner, leading them
to the broad market-based approach reflected in the prudent investor
rule. Indeed, market-based rates are, by definition, the only rates to
which potential claimants have access, not being able to borrow
money at the favorable rate at which the federal government bor-
rows money. Once a reasonable market-rate of interest has been es-
tablished for a certain time period, courts may take judicial notice
of those decisions in the interest of efficiency and consistency.145
The Federal Circuit’s predecessor court sought to accomplish some-
thing like this when it adopted a reasonable presumption in favor of
the Moody’s Composite Index. While an owner remains free to intro-
duce evidence that the Moody’s Composite Index unfairly minimizes
his return, absent such a showing, the Moody’s Composite Index is
a market-based index balancing growth against a conservative invest-
ment strategy. Its use would also seem to reflect a reasonable, market-
based, rate of return consistent with constitutional principles.
On the other hand, it is never appropriate for a court in an inverse
condemnation action to blindly defer to a statutory interest rate.
Doing so is simply inconsistent with the courts’ constitutional re-
sponsibility. The amount of delay compensation derived from a taking
is simply another question of valuation on which evidence must be
taken and decided. No maxim of judicial convenience can, nor should,
override the constitutional imperative of providing the owner “just
compensation.”
This is of no small import. Courts that allow the government to pay
compensation at an interest rate that is less than a fair-market–
based rate for the relevant term create a perverse incentive for the
government to further protract resolution of these claims. As the
California Supreme Court observed, when the government takes
private property from an owner by eminent domain, the owner be-
comes an unwilling, and now captive, creditor lending to a borrower
he would prefer not to have as a debtor. It adds insult to injury to
then deny that “captive creditor” a less than full market-based rate
of return, even as the owner also is now financing the government’s
acquisition of his property. Just compensation not only deters
145. Textronix, 575 F.2d at 353 (taking judicial notice of adoption of Moody’s rates in
Pitcairn); Miller, 620 F.2d at 840 (same).
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takings, it deters the government from needlessly protracting liti-
gation to take advantage of cheap financing for its takings forays.
Though well-meaning, the courts’ patchwork adoption of varying
“uniform” interest rates—all done in the name of uniformity—has
had quite the opposite effect. Adopting market-based rates of interest
will allow both the government and individuals to predictably assess
their entitlement to just compensation, provide a consistent method
(if not a uniform rate) for establishing the amount of compensation
owed, and encourage the resolution of Fifth Amendment claims.
INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE PROPERTY RIGHTS:
A CROSS-CULTURAL DISCIPLINE COMES OF AGE
PATRICIA E. SALKIN* & DANIEL GROSS**
INTRODUCTION
The decision to hold the annual Brigham-Kanner Property Rights
Conference in Beijing, China provided an opportunity for academics
and practitioners from the United States to consider our notions
of property rights in the context of a global economy. The topic is
timely as just last year Professor Rachelle Alterman observed in
her book, Takings International: A Comparative Perspective on Land
Use Regulations and Compensation Rights, “[a]lthough this topic
should be a prime target for cross-national research, very little has
been published.”1 Yet, it is critically important that in this era of glob-
alization, we begin to understand the differences and similarities
that exist in property rights regimes across the world as clients have
become more “international” in both travel, business dealings, and
investments. Opening up international trade has enriched much of
the developing world, and helped rapid economic growth in developing
countries, further helping the prosperity of these people living in these
places.2 However, as global economy grows and reaches new corners
* Patricia E. Salkin is Dean and Professor of Law at the Touro College Jacob D.
Fuchsberg Law Center. At the time this article was written, she was the Raymond & Ella
Smith Distinguished Professor of Law, Associate Dean and Director of the Government Law
Center at Albany Law School. Special thanks to many members of the International Academic
Association on Land Use and Property Rights for responding to requests for information for
this article.
** Daniel Gross is a Fellow in Government Law & Policy at the Government Law Center
of Albany Law School.
1. RACHELLE ALTERMAN ET AL., TAKINGS INTERNATIONAL: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
ON LAND USE REGULATIONS AND COMPENSATION RIGHTS xix (2010). In fact, Alterman observes,
“Despite the importance of this subject for cross-national knowledge exchange, it has not drawn
much attention from researchers.” Id. at 3. Professor Alterman further explains, “The state
of research and method building on public law related to property is especially rudimentary.”
Id. at 12.
2. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 4 (2002) (“People in the
West may regard low-paying jobs at Nike as exploitation, but for many people in the devel-
oping world, working in a factory is a far better option than staying down on the farm and
growing rice.”).
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of the world, it brings with it different factors, all of which can influ-
ence the property regime in each nation it touches upon. For example,
strong protection of private property rights is believed by some to be
the backbone of capitalism and explains why capitalism has been suc-
cessful in developed nations compared to developing nations. This fact
remains, despite the estimate that “the total value of the real estate
held but not legally owned by the poor of the Third World and former
communist nations is at least $9.3 trillion.”3 This makes it more im-
portant today for lawyers in the United States to be able to generally
inform clients of potential risks when they desire to make invest-
ments in overseas real property. Although the ethical provision of
legal advice may require partnering with foreign law firms and local
counsel, the reality is that general descriptions of the real property
regimes in emerging economic powers and/or in countries offering
desirable labor forces and plentiful land require some basic knowl-
edge for U.S. practitioners. However, the concept of “property” can
differ so radically when viewed through cross-cultural lenses that it
can present a number of difficulties for unfamiliar practitioners.
The right to property, specifically real property, is a global con-
cept that directly affects people and nations in many different ways.
All people view property rights through a different lens, and this has
made the field of property rights a particular mix of social rights, eco-
nomic rights, and civil rights across the world.4 This makes research
in this area a fascinating blend of social norms, economic demands,
civil rights, psychological needs, and political pressures. These often
differing viewpoints on property sometimes clash and sometimes meld
as we enter into the global age. Property rights regimes throughout
the world are “closely intertwined with national identity, societal
values, and sovereignty (or lack thereof, in the case of military con-
quests, imperialism and colonialism).”5 While in the United States
we turn to the law to study the evolution of property rights, in other
countries the history may be discovered in study of anthropology and
other disciplines.6
3. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE
WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 35, 218 (2000).
4. Emily Bourdeaux Smith, South Africa’s Land Reform Policy and International Human
Rights Law, 19 WIS. INT’L L.J. 267, 267 (2000–2001).
5. Amnon Lehavi, The Global Law of the Land, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 425, 437–38 (2010).
6. For example, Annette Stomp, a Ph.D. candidate at the Swiss Federal Institute of
Technology Lausanne (EPFL), reports that in her research “anthropology is often overlooked
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Another challenge in researching and describing property rights
from an international comparative perspective is the differences in
descriptive language used to discuss this area of the law. For example,
in the United States the land use planning and regulatory community
organizes property rights discourse around two main themes: regu-
latory takings and eminent domain or condemnation law. In other
countries, these descriptors can be meaningless and may be referred
to as planning compensation rights, expropriation, and compulsory
purchase.7 An additional factor is the disparate forms of treatment
afforded to property owners in different countries, especially when
comparing those given to citizens of that country compared to foreign
investors. Some foreign governments may pose a significant threat
to the property rights of foreign property owners through the use of
expropriation; others may give greater protections to foreign property
owners through international agreements, while others may not dis-
criminate between the two classes.
This article is intended to provide an overview of the differences
and similarities among a select group of nations through an ex-
amination of their real property protection regimes. The countries
selected in this paper—South Africa, India, Chile, Singapore and
Ghana—were chosen to illustrate how geographical, social, and eco-
nomic diversity all contribute to different property rights cultures
and legal approaches. Part I of this article examines general inter-
national or global factors that affect property rights. Part II offers
a focused look at the historical and cultural development of property
rights in the five selected countries. Part III follows with a discussion
of some of the domestic factors present in these five different coun-
tries that contribute to or influence the development and enforce-
ment of different property rights regimes. The article concludes with
a discussion about the importance of understanding the property
by urban planners, lawyers, etc., but provides a wealth of information on property rights and
tenure systems, and not only ‘tribal’ or ‘traditional’ societies. After all, ideas last for hundreds
of years and are often carried over into what become ‘modern’ societies.” E-mail from Annette
Stomp, Ph.D. Candidate Urban Geography, EPFL (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology
Lausanne) to Patricia Salkin, Raymond & Ella Smith Distinguished Professor of Law, Associate
Dean and Director of the Government Law Center of Albany Law School (9/19/2011) (on file
with the author).
7. Rachelle Alterman, Regulatory Takings and the Role of Comparative Research, in
RACHELLE ALTERMAN ET AL., TAKINGS INTERNATIONAL: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON LAND
USE REGULATIONS AND COMPENSATION RIGHTS 8 (2010).
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rights regimes in other countries to better enable practitioners to
provide responsible legal counsel to clients.
I. INTERNATIONAL FACTORS AFFECTING PROPERTY RIGHTS
There are a number of international factors that affect property
rights in nations across the world. What follows is a brief discussion
of the influence from some of the declarations, treaties, agreements,
and institutions that have international repercussions on property
rights, which accordingly contribute to the need to address property
rights on an international scale.
A. Section 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Despite being referenced in a number of international policy docu-
ments, there is no succinct definition on the right to land in inter-
national law. However, a basis for the right to land in international
law is arguably found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,8
developed by the Commission on Human Rights, which was tasked by
the United Nations to draft an International Bill of Human Rights.9
The Declaration identified or referenced property as a human right in
several sections. In particular, Article 17 states that “(1) [e]veryone
has the right to own property alone as well as in association with
others. (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.”10
Despite these progressive concepts towards property ownership,
Article 17 is viewed as more of a protection on liberal property rights,
and not applicable to economic or redistributive land rights.11 As
such, the Declaration does not further define what the right to own
property encompasses or what an arbitrary deprivation of property
includes.12 The vague language of Article 17 was included so that some
provision for property rights was made in the Declaration, as the topic
of property rights had become controversial during deliberations.
8. Elisabeth Wickeri, “Land Is Life, Land Is Power”: Landlessness, Exclusion and Dep-
rivation in Nepal, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 930, 1000 (2011).
9. Smith, supra note 4, at 272.
10. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217 (III) A, art. 17 U.N. Doc. A/RES/
3/217 (III) (Dec. 10, 1948), available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml.
11. Wickeri, supra note 8, at 1007.
12. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 10; Smith, supra note 4, at 273.
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Earlier proposals for Article 17 had attempted to address the familiar
American property law concept of “public purposes” and “just com-
pensation,” while other proposals sought complete deferral to the in
rem jurisdiction of the property.13
The Declaration did not initially pass as a binding resolution on sig-
natory states, as ideological differences amongst nations on “human
rights in general or property rights in particular” made it impossible
to get the necessary consent.14 Notably, apprehension towards social-
ism and land redistribution systems has stymied the expansions of
a universal standard for international property rights protections.15
However, over the decades following its drafting, the Declaration
eventually became customary international law,16 despite the fact
that there has never been a universal agreement on the scope of
Article 17, nor have subsequent human rights treaties included the
right to property because of the wide disagreement on the language
of a property provision.17 Regardless, it has been well documented
that constitutions, statutes, and judicial opinions drafted in the latter
half of the twentieth century have been influenced by, and sometimes
have expressly adopted, the provisions of the Declaration.18
13. Wickeri, supra note 8, at 1006–07.
14. Smith, supra note 4, at 272–73.
15. Wickeri, supra note 8, at 1006. Note that Article 1 of the First Protocol to the
European Convention on Human Rights, applicable and enforceable by all citizens of all the
forty-four European nations which have ratified the Convention, is outside of the scope of this
paper, since we have focused on non-European states. Article 1 holds that “[n]o one shall be
deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided
for by law and by the general principals of international law.” See Amnon Lehavi & Amir N.
Licht, BITS and Pieces of Property, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 115, 136 (2011) (citing Protocol to the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Mar. 20, 1952,
213 U.N.T.S. 262).
16. Applicability of Article VI, Section 22 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities
of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1989 I.C.J. 177 (Dec. 15).
17. Wickeri, supra note 8, at 1007. Note that explicit rights to land in international law have
developed for two groups: indigenous people and women. See id. at 1019 (citing Convention
(No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27, 1898,
1650 U.N.T.S. 383); United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, art. 26(1),
G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/Res/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007); Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
18. See Egon Schwelb, The Influence of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on
International and National Law, 53 AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. 217 (1959); B.G. RAMCHARAN,
HUMAN RIGHTS: THIRTY YEARS AFTER THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION 3–10 (1979); Knight v.
Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 994 (1999); Public Prosecutor v. F.A.v.A. (Neth.), 1951 Y.B. ON HUM.
RTS. 251, 251–52.
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B. Customary International Law
In some countries, property rights provide different protection for
foreign investors and citizens of that country. Until World War II,
customary international law required countries who hosted foreign
investors and property owners to follow the “Hull Rule,” where if that
host government expropriated the property of foreign investors, it was
required to give “prompt, adequate and effective compensation” to the
former, foreign owner.19 The Hull Rule remained in effect through the
Second World War, as most of the states who objected to the “prompt,
adequate, and effective” standard of compensation were colonies, still
subject to rule of their master nations.20
The Hull Rule fell out of favor in the post-colonial period following
World War II. These newly established developing and communist
states, who traditionally disagreed with the standard of compensa-
tion set forth by the Hull Rule, engaged in short-lived nationalization
programs, seizing the property of foreign investors.21 This led to in-
evitable disputes between the new states, who favored the use of in-
dependent investment agreements (discussed below) between it and
the foreign nation, and the home nations of foreign investors, who
still sought the protection and compensatory regime provided by the
Hull Rule.22
Today, it is generally accepted in international law that a state
has the right to expropriate a foreign investor’s property so long as:
(1) it is for a public purpose, (2) it is not done in a discriminatory
manner, and (3) compensation is paid.23 Although this may seem
19. Andrew T. Guzman, Why LCDs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the
Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 639, 641 (1998). The Hull rule
was formulated by the United States former Secretary of State Cordell Hall in response to the
growing number of expropriations the Mexican Government accomplished against United States
investors between 1915 and 1940. Hull, corresponding with the Mexican Minister of Foreign
Affairs, articulated the rule that would later carry his namesake as: “The Government of the
United States merely adverts to a self-evident fact when it notes that the applicable precedents
and recognized authorities on international law supports its declaration that, under every rule
of law and equity, no government is entitled to expropriate private property without provision
for prompt adequate and effective payment therefor.” Id. (quoting 3 Green H. Hackworth, Digest
of International Law § 228, at 658–59 (1942)).
20. Id. at 646.
21. Id. at 647.
22. Id. at 642.
23. Rahim Moloo & Justin Jacinto, Environmental and Health Regulation: Assessing
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like an uncomplicated standard, in reality it is not; each of the three
factors have been the subject of considerable debate. International
tribunals have consistently struggled to define what a public purpose
is because it “is a broad concept which is not readily susceptible to ob-
jective analysis and examination neither by states nor tribunals.”24
Often, the public purpose reasoning will be lumped in with a finding
of discrimination against the foreign investor on the part of the expro-
priating state.25 Similarly, the issue of compensation provides more
questions than answers in international law,26 although it is generally
held that there is a right to compensation in at least some amount.27
Developed states tend to adhere to the Hull Formula’s idea of “full
compensation,” while developing states believe that compensation
should be “appropriate,” and reflect the subjective and relevant cir-
cumstances facing the host state.28
Although the standards and applications of customary international
law are subject to debate,29 provisions of many constitutions address
Customary International Law, making it relevant in the discussion
of each country’s property regime. For example, Sections 231–233 of
the South African Constitution, discussed in Part II of this article,
includes various provisions for the inclusion of customary interna-
tional law. The Indian Constitution similarly recognizes a “respect
for international law,”30 as does the Ghanaian Constitution.31
Liability Under Investment Treaties, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1, 11 (2011); Yvonne C. L. Lee,
The Governance of Contemporary Sovereign Wealth Funds, 6 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 197 (2010).
24. Kaj Hober, Investment Arbitration in Eastern Europe: Recent Cases on Expropriation,
14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 377, 385 (2003).
25. Id.
26. Factory at Chorzów, Merits, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 46–47 (Sept. 13).
27. Hober, supra note 24, at 387.
28. Hober, supra note 24, at 385 (citing The United Nations Charter of Economic Rights
and Duties of States, adopted by the General Assembly on December 12, 1974, Art. 2(c) at 9. The
position of the developing nations policy of expropriation was included into Article 2 of the 1974
United Nations Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, which held that each state
could expropriate foreign property so long as they paid “appropriate” compensation. See U.N.
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/29/3281 (Dec. 12, 1974). Under Article 2 host nations are also not required
to give preferential treatment to foreign corporations. See Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas
P. Sullivan, Do BITS Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their
Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 67, 69 n.12 (2005)).
29. See Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate Over Customary International Law, 42
VA. J. INT’L L. 365, 461 (2002).
30. INDIA CONST. art. 51(c).
31. GHANA CONST. (1992) § 73.
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C. International Investment Agreements
Although there are a number of international investment agree-
ments (“IIAs”) that affect property rights, the two most often discussed
and most influential to property rights are Bilateral Investment
Treaties (“BITs”) and Free Trade Agreements (“FTAs,” for example,
NAFTA). These agreements are “essentially instruments of inter-
national law.”32 Since the end of World War II there have been ap-
proximately 3,000 international investment agreements signed.
Today, these agreements “[f]or all practical purposes, . . . have be-
come the fundamental source of international law in the area of for-
eign investment.”33
The goal behind IIAs is to “protect and promote” international in-
vestment among the signatory nations. To accomplish this goal, IIAs
generally consist of two basic promises among the signatory states:
first, to treat investors and investments from other signatory states
in accordance with the IIA, and second, each of the signatory states
will agree on some sort of enforcement mechanism to see that the IIA
is upheld.34
These agreements are often criticized for the roles that foreign gov-
ernments play in the domestic issues of developing nations. For ex-
ample, following the 1994 APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation)
meeting, the United States encouraged its firms to invest in Indonesia
at suspiciously favorable terms. When that Indonesian government
was overthrown, in part due to widespread corruption, the United
States pressured the new regime to fulfill the original contract.35
1. Bilateral Investment Treaties
Bilateral Investment Treaties (“BITs”) are agreements negotiated
between two nations—usually developed and developing countries.
BITs were developed to address foreign investors’ fears of losing
their investments without compensation in developing countries
which had launched large expropriation programs following World
32. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for Investment, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J.
427, 427 (2010).
33. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Treatification of International Investment Law, 13 L. &
BUS. REV. AM. 155, 175 (2007) (citing Patrick Juillard, L’Évolution des Sources du Droit des
Investissements, 250 RECUEIL DES COURS DE L’ACADÉMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 21, 74 (1994)).
34. Salacuse, supra note 32, at 428.
35. STIGLITZ, supra note 2, at 71.
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War II.36 By providing this protection to foreign investors, it also
allowed developing nations to gain a new-found credibility to foreign
investors, helping these new nations attract and gain more access
to more foreign investment.37
Today, BITs are the dominant form of regulation between coun-
tries engaged in international trade. There are currently over 2,500
BITs affecting the property rights of both foreign investors and host
governments.38 Further, almost every country is involved in at least
one BIT.39
The content of BITs are usually distinct from each other, based
on the needs and realities of the relationships of the two countries.
However, there are usually similar provisions amongst them which
usually address a few common topics: the treatment to be afforded
to the property of foreign investors; that this treatment should be in
accordance with international law standards; the relaxation of re-
strictions regarding capital transfers in and out of the host country;
forum selection clauses which allow disputes to be subject to inter-
national binding arbitration; and—channeling the Hull Rule—that
direct or indirect expropriation should be given prompt, adequate and
effective compensation.40 However, the most important provision of
every BIT is protection against expropriation.41 BITs commonly re-
quire host nations to provide compensation for expropriation.42
36. For example, in 1951 Iran expropriated British petroleum assets. In 1955, Libya expro-
priated American petroleum assets. In 1956, Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal to the dismay
of its original Anglo-French owners. In 1959 Cuba nationalized a number of foreign-owned
investments. From 1960 to 1972, 875 acts of expropriation occurred in 62 countries. The threat
of expropriation continues to this day, as recent expropriations (both regulatory and direct) have
occurred in Chad and Russia. Amnon Lehavi & Amir N. Licht, BITS and Pieces of Property,
36 YALE J. INT’L L. 115, 121 (2011) (citations omitted).
37. Guzman, supra note 19, at 642 (finding that, ironically, BITS, despite being favored by
developing nations, tend to provide more protection to foreign investors than the traditional
Hull Rule ever did).
38. Jose E. Alvarez, Contemporary Foreign Investment Law: An “Empire of Law” or the
“Law of Empire?”, 60 ALA. L. REV. 943, 958 (2009).
39. Every country in the world except for Monaco is a party to a BIT. See United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development, The Role of International Investment Agreements in
Attracting Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries, at 2, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/
IA/2009/5, (Jan. 12, 2009).
40. Alvarez, supra note 38, at 957–58 (citations omitted).
41. Hober, supra note 24, at 380 (noting that “[f]rom the perspective of a foreign investor
the most important provisions in any international treaty for the protection of foreign invest-
ment are the provisions dealing with protection against expropriation. These provisions do in
fact constitute the heart and soul of every BIT. The ultimate purpose of every BIT is to protect
against expropriation.”).
42. Jordan C. Kahn, Investment Protection Under the Proposed ASEAN-United States Free 
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2. Free Trade Agreements
Free Trade Agreements (“FTAs”) are agreements between two or
more nations or regions that seek to open up economic activity be-
tween the participating countries. FTAs began to appear with more
frequency during the late 1980s and early 1990s.43 There are currently
over 300 FTAs worldwide.44
Generally, FTAs address and build upon standards of interna-
tional trade.45 However, some FTAs go so far as to address expropri-
ation. For example, Section 1110 of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (“NAFTA”) restricts expropriation, allowing it only when
the host country acts with a public purpose and provides just com-
pensation in the form of fair market value.46 NAFTA further applies
this expropriation language to expropriation which “directly or in-
directly” occurs.47
D. International Institutions
International organizations have long been strong proponents of
“well-defined and well-protected property rights” as a means of encour-
aging investment and overall economic prosperity.48 These organiza-
tions believe that effective articulation, protection, and enforcement
of property rights are a fundamental characteristic of a strong econ-
omy.49 The three main international institutions affecting property
rights, whom are often the target of scorn around the world, are the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (otherwise
known as the World Bank), and International Monetary Fund, and
the World Trade Organization.50
Trade Agreement, 33 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 225, 230 (2010).
43. Id. at 243.
44. Jose E. Alvarez, A BIT on Custom, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 17, 20 (2009).
45. For example, the World Trade Organization. See Trade Agreements, OFF. U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements (last visited June 24, 2012).
46. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.–Can.–Mex., art. 1110, Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 289 (“Compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated
investment immediately before the expropriation took place (‘date of expropriation’).”).
47. Id.
48. Amnon Lehavi & Amir N. Licht, BITS and Pieces of Property, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 115,
139 (2011).
49. Id.
50. STIGLITZ, supra note 2, at 3, 10. (noting that “[v]irtually every major meeting of the
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization is now the
scene of conflict and turmoil”).
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1. World Bank and International Monetary Fund
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”)
were established in 1944 by the United Nation’s Monetary and
Financial Conference in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire.51 The World
Bank was created with the primary purpose of rebuilding Europe
after World War II.52 The IMF, on the other hand, was created to
prevent future international economic depressions.53 Currently, each
of these institutions lends money and provides economic guidance
to developing nations, although many of these loans are subject to
these nations taking and implementing the advice of both the IMF
and the World Bank.54 In some cases loans from the World Bank to
developing nations are conditioned on approval from the IMF, which
often lobbies for developing nations to adopt certain policies involv-
ing rapid privatization of markets55 and discouraging government
interference to trade barriers56—sometimes before these new coun-
tries have an adequate regulatory framework in place.57 The World
Bank has supported and provided financial incentives for developing
countries to both formalize property rights and create titling systems.58
Both the IMF and the World Bank have been criticized for their belief
in strong property rights systems and a means to encourage economic
growth. All five nations discussed in Part II have voting power in
the IMF.59
51. Id. at 11.
52. Id. at 11.
53. Id. at 12.
54. Id. at 13.
55. Id. at 54.
56. Id. at 59 (emphasizing the importance of noting that the IMF has acknowledged that
some of its policies have ultimately done more harm than good. However, it is important to
keep these factors in mind when considering the legacy they may have, if any, in the property
regimes of these developing nations.).
57. Id. at 73–74.
58. Michael Trebilcock & Paul-Erik Veel, Property Rights and Development: The Contin-
gent Case for Formalization, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 397, 400 (2008) (citing WORLD BANK, WORLD
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005: A BETTER INVESTMENT CLIMATE FOR EVERYONE 2, 80–84 (2004)),
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2005/Resources/complete_report.pdf;
see also Ahmed Galal & Omar Razzaz, Reforming Land and Real Estate Markets 20–21 (World
Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 2616, 1999), available at http://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=636201.
59. IMF, IMF Members’ Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of Governors, http://
www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.aspx (last visited June 24, 2012).
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2. World Trade Organization
The World Trade Organization (“WTO”) was established in 1995
as a result of international trade negotiations under the Uruguay
Round Agreement Act and the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (“GATT”).60 The WTO currently has 153 member nations, who
account for approximately ninety percent of the world’s trade,61 and
further includes all five nations discussed in this paper.62 The WTO
is run by the member nations, operates as a forum for trade negotia-
tion among nations, and further has a system of trade rules.63 The
trade rules of the WTO cover agreements for the basic areas of trade
(goods, services and intellectual property), dispute settlement, and
reviews of governments’ trade policies.64 The rules, which are actually
agreements among the member nations, are renegotiated periodically
among member nations.65 However, the WTO rules do not give for-
eign investors a cause of action for compensation when governments
expropriate their property.66
II. PROPERTY REGIMES AND EMINENT DOMAIN
THROUGHOUT THE WORLD
In addition to the myriad of international factors, there are a vari-
ety of intranational factors which also can affect the property rights
of citizens, as well as foreign investors. Property rights throughout
60. World Trade Org., Annual Report 2 (2011), available at http://wto.org/english/res_e
/booksp_e/anrep_e/anrep11_e.pdf (last visited June 24, 2012).
61. Id.
62. World Trade Org., Members and Observers, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e
/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited June 24, 2012).
63. World Trade Org., Annual Report 2, supra note 60.
64. World Trade Org., Understanding the WTO: The Agreements, http://wto.org/english
/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm1_e.htm (last visited June 24, 2012).
65. Id. (demonstrating that many have been in the process of being negotiated since 2001,
in the Doha Development Agenda).
66. Bradly Condon, Smoke and Mirrors: A Comparative Analysis of WTO and NAFTA
Provisions Affecting the International Expansion of Insurance Firms in North America, 8 CONN.
INS. L.J. 97, 122 (2001–2002); see also Victor Mosoti, The WTO Agreement on Trade Related
Investment Measures and the Flow of Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: Meeting the Develop-
ment Challenge, 15 PACE INT’L L. REV. 181, 191–92 (2003) (“The TRIMS Agreement does not
explicitly address performance requirements falling outside Articles III and IX of the GATT
1994, such as export requirements per se, de-linked from imports. Nor does it deal with foreign
investment per se and its protection such as minimum standards in respect of expropriation.”).
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the world can be guaranteed, or merely licensed to property holders
through an applicable constitution, statute, custom, or a mix of the
above. As already discussed, the property rights afforded through
these legal regimes are a result of a variety of factors, although many
nations have begun to give at least the statutory appearance to what
American practitioners would recognize as eminent domain.
The five nations selected for review herein make different provi-
sions for what constitutes a “public use” and “just compensation.” As
demonstrated below, some countries provide in-depth explanations
and procedures for both terms, some only deal with one term, while
other nations purposefully either have left them undefined or unac-
counted for. It is important to note that different historical, political,
cultural and/or economic factors influence each country, and these
have all contributed to that nation’s past or current interpretations
of property rights.67 As with the thirteen mostly European Union
(“EU”) countries studied by Professor Alterman, our findings also
conclude that there is no universal approach or a dominant approach
when it comes to comparisons on property rights laws.68 Alterman’s
study organized the countries into clusters representing degrees of
compensation rights and in rank order she reported on countries with
minimal compensation rights (Canada, the UK, Australia, France and
Greece); countries with moderate or ambiguous compensation rights
(Finland, Austria, and the United States); and countries with exten-
sive compensation rights (Poland, Germany, Sweden, Israel and the
Netherlands).69 Rather than trying to neatly fit the five countries dis-
cussed below into any category, we highlight the practical problems
facing these regimes and how those and other factors have not only
shaped the relevant constitutional property provisions but also the
application of these provisions in practice. With respect to application,
many of the “takings clauses” look to provide strong protection on
paper, but in reality these governments either have been unwilling,
or unable to keep their end of the bargain when it comes to interpre-
tation or enforcement of these provisions.
67. Professor Alterman reminds those who engage in comparative property rights analysis
that, “Transplantation of laws, is of course, neither possible nor desirable. Laws are grounded
in legal systems and institutions and reflect public policies. The latter are grounded in socio-
political and cultural milieus that cannot—and should not—be replicated.” Alterman, supra
note 7, at 8.
68. Id. at 13.
69. Id. at 23.
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A. South Africa
The government of South Africa (“GOSA”) and the property rights
regime established there is continually measured against the progress
it has made in shedding the unfortunate legacy of Apartheid. Apart-
heid, however, has been exceptionally influential in terms of land own-
ership and the governmental attitude towards eminent domain.
By the end of Apartheid, white people owned 87% of all land, de-
spite only making up 15% of the population.70 Not surprisingly, the
inequitable distribution of land ownership made the redistribution
of wealth—specifically through land reform—an obvious goal for the
new post-Apartheid government, as land reform was believed to be
the “bedrock of any true social transformation in South Africa.” 71
Consequently, a new Constitution was to be adopted by this new gov-
ernment. The question of including a provision on property rights
became one of the most contentious issues during its drafting.72
The general public opposed any property clause in their new
Constitution, fearing that a constitutional property guarantee would
protect the rights of apartheidian land owners, or significantly ham-
per any land reform policies that the incoming government would
seek.73 These concerns, if realized, would leave the new Constitution
and its government without credibility and the object of scorn for the
general population.74
Inside the actual constitutional debates the property issue was
similarly contentious, although most delegates agreed that a property
clause was necessary for the new Constitution.75 It was the exact
formulation of the clause that garnered significant attention.76 The
National Party (“NP”), largely representing the interests of the white
70. See Zola Skweyiya, Towards a Solution to the Land Question in Post-Apartheid South
Africa: Problems and Models, 21 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 211, 213 (1989).
71. GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, THE GLOBAL DEBATE OVER CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY:
LESSONS FOR AMERICAN TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE 155 (2006).
72. Id. at 155–56.
73. Id. at 155.
74. Id. at 156.
75. Id. at 155 (noting “[t]hat there would be a property clause in the new constitution was
virtually a foregone conclusion. Even the staunchest opponents conceded as much, directing
their energies instead on content.”) (citations omitted).
76. Id. at 155–56.
2012] INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE PROPERTY RIGHTS 55
minority, sought a high degree of protection for property rights, hoping
to prevent any land redistribution.77 The African National Congress
(“ANC”) similarly sought a property clause; however, it wanted one
which provided for a limited protection for property rights, one which
made private property rights subject to the public interest and social
obligations of the new nation.78
These debates eventually led to the modern property clause, one
which was criticized by both sides as being the product of compromises
and “sheer exhaustion.”79 Although neither the NP nor the ANC was
satisfied with the final property clause, both realized “that they had
run out of time and energy.”80 The only compromises achieved were
the provisions dealing with deprivations and expropriations, the rest
would be left to the resolution of the Constitutional Court.81
Drafted in 1996, Section 25 is the property clause of the current
South African Constitution. Section 25 provides detailed treatment
of the protections afforded to property, as well as the government’s
power of eminent domain.82 Section 25 of the Constitution prohibits
the deprivation of property “except in terms of law of general appli-
cation and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property.”83
The section puts familiar restrictions on the usage of expropriation;
allowing it only “for a public purpose or in the public interest”; and
“subject to compensation.”84
77. Id. at 156–57 (stating that “[t]he NP justified a high degree of protection for property
rights by claiming that ‘the prospect of acquiring property is the principal incentive to hard
work, thrift, responsibility and the development of the individual’s full potential.’ ”) (quoting
Matthew Chaskalson, Stumbling Towards Section 28: Negotiations over the Protection of
Property Rights in the Interim Constitution, 11 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 222, 224 (1995)).
78. Id. at 157.
79. Id. at 159 (finding that “[n]either side, those favoring a strong entrenched property
right and those opposing anything that threatened fundamental land reform, was happy with
the final product, but, pragmatically acceding to the twin realities that some kind of property
clause was inevitable and that some room for land reform had to be created, both sides ap-
parently could agree that they had run out of time and energy.”).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Hanri Mostert, Engaged Citizenship and the Enabling State as Factors Determining
the Interference Parameter of Property: A Comparison of German and South African Law, 127
S. AFRICAN L.J. 238, 239 (2010) (stating that “[a]ccordingly, the South African property clause
is characterized by an inherent tension between its dichotomously protective and reformative
aspects”).
83. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 25(1).
84. Id. § 25(2).
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1. Public Purpose
Section 25(2) of the South African Constitution states that expropri-
ation can only be done “for a public purpose or in the public interest.”85
This is informed by Section 25(4) which defines the public interest
as including a social obligation on current property owners by stating
that “the public interest includes the nation’s commitment to land
reform, and to reforms to bring about equitable access to all South
Africa’s natural resources.”86 By defining the “public purpose” provi-
sion in their property regime, the South African Constitution does
not leave an uncertain interpretation to be adopted by their judiciary,
and further “leave[s] no doubt that private property rights are subject
to the social needs for a land [reform]” policy in South Africa.87
The public purpose provision of Section 25 is further bolstered
by the socioeconomic rights provisions in the South African Bill of
Rights.88 These provisions plainly mandate that the new govern-
ment engage in the redistribution of wealth, which illustrates the
intent of the drafters that the South African Constitution be trans-
formative in character.89 As part of this constitutionally sanctioned
public interest, the GOSA has committed to redistributing up to
thirty percent of farmland to black citizens by 2014 under this emi-
nent domain power.90
2. Compensation
Compensation is specifically addressed in Section 25(3) of the
South African Constitution, which uses a factor based test to deter-
mine the amount of compensation due to anyone whose land is ex-
propriated. Section 25(3) reads:
The amount of compensation and the time and manner of pay-
ment must be just and equitable, reflecting an equitable balance
85. Id.
86. Id. § 25(4) (continuing to state that property is not limited to land).
87. ALEXANDER, supra note 71, at 161.
88. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 25(6)–(9).
89. ALEXANDER, supra note 71, at 161.
90. U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs, 2011 Investment
Climate Statement—South Africa, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2011/157358.htm (last
visited June 24, 2012).
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between the public interest and the interests of those affected,
having regard to all relevant circumstances, including—(a) the
current use of the property; (b) the history of the acquisition and
use of the property; (c) the market value of the property; (d) the
extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition
and beneficial capital improvement of the property; and (e) the
purpose of the expropriation.91
Subsection (b) is directly addressed to parcels of land which are
remnants of Apartheid, as it allows the government to consider how
the land was acquired and can thus discount the compensation due.
Section 25(3), as a multifactor provision, shows that the fair market
value of the land should be merely the beginning of what compensa-
tion is owed to the landowner, which should then be discounted or
enhanced by the factors outlined in section 25(3). The factors laid out
in 25(3) have been used with relative frequency by the courts, who
often consider matters outside of the fair market value of the property
when valuing a taking.92 South African courts have gone further,
and even applied the multifactor compensation test of Section 25(3)
to expropriated property which was unrelated to Apartheid—not giv-
ing market value compensation where it might be expected.93
3. Judicial Interpretation
Given the GOSA’s stated dedication to a land reform policy, on-
lookers have urged courts to “interpret section 25 in its broader social
and political context.”94 Further stating that “the only sensible and
legitimate interpretation of section 25 is therefore one that allows
(and actually obliges) the courts to strike an equitable balance be-
tween the protection of existing rights and the public interest (which
includes land reform goals.)”95 Currently, there is sparse case law,
91. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 25(3).
92. ALEXANDER, supra note 71, at 150 (citing Khumalo v. Potieter, 2000 (2) All SA 456 (LC);
Ex parte Former Highland Residents; In re Ash v. Development of Land Affairs, 2000 (2) All
SA 26 (LCC)).
93. Tom Allen, Property as a Fundamental Right in India, Europe and South Africa, 15
ASIA PAC. L. REV. 193, 217 (2007) (stating that “the South African courts have been remarkably
willing to go along with arguments that full compensation for expropriation is not required,
even where there is no connection with the correction of apartheid laws.”).
94. Id. at 216.
95. A.J. VAN DER WALT, CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY LAW 26 (2005).
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both in lower courts and the Constitutional Court, which interprets
Section 25.96 However, the Constitutional Court has set out an analy-
sis for any constitutional property challenge under Section 25 in First
National Bank of SA Ltd. V. Commissioner, South African Revenue
Service 97 (“FNB”).
Although FNB dealt with commercial property, its holding is still
relevant to most, if not all property rights in South Africa. In FNB,
a car importer (debtor) had taken a loan out with First National Bank
(creditor) and used the cars he imported as collateral on the loan.
Complicating this, the debtor also owed a large amount of unpaid
customs and duties to the South African Revenue Service (“SARS”).
To secure payment, SARS put a lien on the motor vehicles—the same
ones which were collateral for the creditor’s loan. The motor vehicles
which SARS had put a lien on were unrelated to the outstanding
debts, and the bank challenged that the statute which authorized the
lien was an unconstitutional interference with the bank’s property.98
Before analyzing the question, the Court noted that “[t]he purpose
of section 25 has to be seen both as protecting existing private prop-
erty rights as well as serving the public interest, mainly in the sphere
of land reform but not limited thereto, and also as striking a propor-
tionate balance between these two functions.”99
The Court then answered the question by laying out a six-step
analysis for constitutional property challenges under Section 25.100
First, the court must find whether the affected interest is actually
“property.” Although the Court did not define property in the FNB
case, it still noted that property would clearly include chattel and
land.101 Second, the court must find whether there has been a depri-
vation of property by the state.102 The court again did not define depri-
vation in FNB, but has, in subsequent case-law, given a wide reading
96. ALEXANDER, supra note 71, at 150.
97. First National Bank of SA Ltd. t/a Wesbank v. Commissioner, 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC),
available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2002/5.html.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. See also ALEXANDER, supra note 71, at 162.
101. First National Bank of SA Ltd. t/a Wesbank v. Commissioner, 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC)
§ 51 (noting that “[a]t this stage of our constitutional jurisprudence it is, . . . practically im-
possible to furnish—and judicially unwise to attempt—a comprehensive definition of property
for the purposes of section 25. Such difficulties do not, however arise in the present case.”).
102. Id. at § 57.
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to what constitutes a deprivation.103 The third and biggest step is that
the court must determine whether the deprivation was arbitrary per
Section 25(1). The court found that the meaning of “arbitrary” is “when
the ‘law’ referred to in section 25(1) does not provide sufficient rea-
son for the particular deprivation in question or is procedurally un-
fair.”104 Accordingly, the court set out a multifactor analysis to help
other courts determine the arbitrariness of the law, a step which
leaves considerable judicial discretion.105 However, even if the court
finds an arbitrary deprivation in step three, under step four courts
are allowed to justify the arbitrary deprivation under section 36 of
the Constitution. This step is considered to be redundant, as a court’s
analysis here would focus on the same factors as in step three, and
103. ALEXANDER, supra note 71, at 166 (citing Mkontwana v. Nelson Mandela Metropolitan
Municipality 2005 (1) SA 530 CC).
104. First National Bank of SA Ltd. t/a Wesbank v. Commissioner, 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC)
§ 100.
105. Whether a law is arbitrary depends on:
(a) It is to be determined by evaluating the relationship between means employed,
namely the deprivation in question, and ends sought to be achieved, namely the
purpose of the law in question.
(b) A complexity of relationships has to be considered.
(c) In evaluating the deprivation in question, regards must be had to the relation-
ship between the purpose for the deprivation and the person whose property is
affected.
(d) In addition, regard must be had to the relationship between the purpose of
the deprivation and the nature of the property.
(e) Generally speaking, where the property in question is ownership of land or a
corporeal moveable, a more compelling purpose will have to be established in order
for the depriving law to constitute sufficient reason for the deprivation, than in the
case when the property is something different, and the property right something
less extensive. This judgment is not concerned at all with incorporeal property.
(f ) Generally speaking, when the deprivation in question embraces all the
incidents of ownership, the purposes for the deprivation will have to be more
compelling than when the deprivation embraces only some incidents of
ownership and those incidents only partially.
(g) Depending on such interplay between variable means and ends, the nature of
the property in question and the extent of its deprivation, there may be circum-
stances when sufficient reason is established by, in effect, no more than a mere
rational relationship between means and ends; in others this might only be estab-
lished by a proportionality evaluation closer to that required by section 36(1) of
the Constitution.
(h) Whether there is sufficient reason to warrant the deprivation is a matter to
be decided on all the relevant facts of each particular case, always bearing in mind
that the enquiry is concerned with “arbitrary” in relation to the deprivation of
property under section 25.
Id.
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“if a measure is held to be arbitrary because it is procedurally unfair
or provides insufficient reason for the property deprivation, it will not
meet the requirement of section 36.”106 Next, under step five, the court
must determine if the deprivation constitutes an expropriation under
Section 25(2).107 Again, this step is considered redundant, because the
FNB court noted that expropriations are a narrower class of depriva-
tions, and thus any law which takes property without compensating
the owner will be found to be arbitrary under Section 25(1) (already
addressed in step three) and Section 36 (already addressed in step
four).108 Finally, the analysis concludes with step six: assuming the
taking constitutes an expropriation, it will be justified so long as it is
for a public purpose or in the public interest and is subject to compen-
sation per Section 25(2); further, the amount of compensation must
be just and equitable subject to Section 25(3).109
The FNB decision, although leaving room for questions, has been
applauded for its analysis of the property clause in the respect that it
“leave[s] possibilities for future decisions with transformative poten-
tial open rather than close them down.”110 FNB is still “the most com-
prehensive consideration to date of the structure and application of
[section] 25 to particular disputes. . . . As such, it remains . . . a valu-
able account of the framework for constitutional property protection
and regulation in South Africa.”111
106. ALEXANDER, supra note 71, at 169.
107. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 25(2) (explaining that “[p]roperty may be expropriated only
in terms of law of general application—(a) for a public purpose or in the public interest; and
(b) subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner of payment of which
have either been agreed to by those affected or decided or approved by a court”).
108. ALEXANDER, supra note 71, at 170 (noting that this leaves less certainty to how courts
in South Africa will deal with “inverse condemnations”).
109. The amount of compensation and the time and manner of payment must be
just and equitable, reflecting an equitable balance between the public interest
and the interests of those affected, having regard to all relevant circumstances,
including—
(a) the current use of the property;
(b) the history of the acquisition and use of the property;
(c) the market value of the property;
(d) the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and
beneficial capital improvement of the property; and
(e) the purpose of the expropriation.
See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 25(3).
110. A.J. van der Walt, Striving for the Better Interpretation—A Critical Reflection on the
Constitutional Court’s Harksen and FNB Decisions on the Property Clause, 121 S. AFRICAN
L.J. 854, 877–78 (2004).
111. Mostert, supra note 82, at 242.
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4. Eminent Domain in Practice
Despite the sophisticated and progressive approach to property in
South Africa, in practice the GOSA rarely uses its power of eminent
domain. This hesitancy is due to both domestic and international
factors.112 Domestically, government representatives—particularly
those who represent rich white farmers—have lobbied against the
use of expropriation, and instead favor the use of private compensa-
tion agreements if any land must be taken at all.113 This is in stark
contrast with the majority of poor blacks and colored people, who
would like a more aggressive eminent domain policy by the GOSA.114
Although as the majority the poorer population does have notable
political power, the GOSA has tended to side with the considerable
economic power of the lobbyists and their wealthy constituents who
are important for continued local investment—a source of economic
well-being which the GOSA would not care to upset.115
Internationally, the World Bank continues to discourage the use
of an expropriation-based land reform policy by the GOSA, and instead
also favors the continued use of private compensation agreements.116
Cumulatively, the use of private compensation agreements has de-
layed the GOSA’s goal of redistributing thirty percent of farmland
112. Smith, supra note 4, at 267 (finding that “[l]and reform efforts in South Africa are
essential in moving away from an apartheid state, but are caught between protecting civil or
economic rights.”).
113. Bernadette Atuahene, Property Rights and the Demands of Transformation, 31 MICH.
J. INT’L L. 765, 786 (2010).
114. Id. at 788.
115. Id. at 788, n.104 (pointing out that this arrangement of appeasing the rich minority in
South Africa is notable—the ANC (the dominant political party in South Africa) faces no real
electoral threat, so their continued compliance to negotiated land reform despite the wishes
of the majority of the public shows a conscious policy choice on their part).
116. Id. at 786 (stating that “economists [from the World Bank] have set the tone for what
other foreign donors and investors view as acceptable land reform policies. Since Southern
African countries require foreign assistance and investment to complete their land reform
programs, the governments are somewhat constrained by the neoliberal views of these influ-
ential economists.”). See also KLAUS DEININGER, MAKING MARKET ASSISTED LAND REFORM
WORK: INITIAL EXPERIENCE FROM COLOMBIA, BRAZIL, AND SOUTH AFRICA, IN AGRICULTURE AND
THE ENVIRONMENT: PERSPECTIVES ON SUSTAINABLE RURAL DEVELOPMENT 156, 169 (Ernst Lutz
ed. 1998) (noting that “[t]he choice of land redistribution rather than expropriation (which, as
in Colombia, can still be used as an instrument of last resort) was based on the need to main-
tain public confidence in the land market and more generally to affirm the government’s re-
spect for individual property rights. It also reflects the recognition that expropriation in other
countries has been neither rapid nor cheap.”).
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by 2014. By 2010, the GOSA had approved approximately 10% of the
land required for this goal but the actual amount of land actually
taken has been less.117 More troublingly, 90% of the farms located
on redistributed farmland have failed, sometimes resulting in that
same land being sold back to its original owners at a discount.118 From
the inception of land reform until 2010, the GOSA has spent approx-
imately $4 billion on the private compensation policy, which is now
believed to require another $10 billion dollars as well as an addi-
tional decade to be completed.119
However, in the rare instance the GOSA does use its eminent
domain power, it is still not done in the manner envisioned by the
Constitution. Most notably, the compensation paid is usually just the
fair market value of the taking, instead of the pragmatic consider-
ations outlined in Section 25(3) of the Constitution. This is the result
of a variety of practical shortcomings. Frequently, property assessors
in South Africa valuate property inaccurately—plainly forgetting to
take into account the factorial framework of Section 25(3) and dis-
count the price.120 However, even when the assessors do value prop-
erty correctly, the government is often forced to pay fair market value
anyway, or else be forced to litigate in a court system that is “slow,
understaffed, underfunded and overburdened.”121 As one govern-
ment official put it, “[the government] doesn’t like to refer disputes
around price to the court because it will take forever. It can drag on
for over two years before the matter is resolved.”122
However, it is good news for foreign investors that the threat
of expropriation remains low in South Africa. The United States
Department of State has taken notice that the GOSA rarely uses its
eminent domain powers and instead continues to use compensation
agreements with private landowners before any expropriation is
117. Annual Report (1 April 2009–31 March 2010), S. Africa Dep’t of Rural Dev. and Land
Reform 27, available at http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=133156.
118. See Robyn Dixon, Failure of South African Land Reform, LOS ANGELES TIMES
(Nov. 21, 2010), available at http://articles.latimes.com/2010/nov/21/world/la-fg-south-africa
-farms-20101121.
119. Id.
120. Atuahene, supra note 113, at 786.
121. Heritage Foundation, South Africa, in 2011 Index of Economic Freedom, available at
http://www.heritage.org/index/Country/SouthAfrica. See also Atuahene, supra note 113, at 786.
122. Atuahene, supra note 113, at 790 (citing Interview with Blessing Mphela, Acting Chief
Lands Claims Comm’r, Dep’t of Land Aff., in Johannesburg, S. Afr. (May 15, 2008)).
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formalized.123 The GOSA has only twice used expropriation to get
land—each time to take possession of farmland—and in each in-
stance paid the owners the fair market value of the takings.124
B. India
India, upon gaining independence, set out with a similar set of
reform-oriented goals as South Africa, including land reform and the
redistribution of wealth. Under the Indian Constitution, all funda-
mental rights, which are found in Part II of the Constitution, are guar-
anteed and protected by the Indian Supreme Court. Any law which
offends a fundamental right is to be voided by the Court, which is po-
litically insulated through both the Constitution and civil law system
of India.125 However, Part IV of the Constitution contains “Directive
Principles of State Policy” which directed the Government of India
(“GOI”) to raise the quality of life in India through social reform.126
Part IV’s aim for social reform was directed to the legislature and
the executive branches of the GOI, and were “not . . . enforceable by
any court.”127 Together, these two sections created an uncomfortable
tension in India’s original property regime.
Property was originally dealt with in Part II of the Indian Consti-
tution, notably Articles 19 and 31 of the original constitution which
provided that:
19(1) All citizens shall have the right—(f) to acquire, hold and
dispose of property, and . . .
31(1) No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority
of law.
31(2) No property, movable or immovable , including any interest
in, or in any company owning, any commercial or industrial under-
takings, shall be taken possession of or acquired for public pur-
poses under any law authorizing the taking of such possession
123. U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs, 2011 Investment
Climate Statement—South Africa, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2011/157358.htm (last
visited June 24, 2012).
124. Id.
125. John Armour & Priya Lele, Law, Finance and Politics: The Case of India, 43 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 491, 511 (2009).
126. Tom Allen, Property as a Fundamental Right in India, Europe and South Africa, 15
ASIA PAC. L. REV. 193, 194 (2007).
127. Id. at 194–95 (citing INDIA CONST. art. 37 (1947)).
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or such acquisition, unless the law provides for compensation for
the property taken possession of or acquired and either fixes the
amount of the compensation, or specifies the principle on which,
and the manner in which the compensation is to be determined
and given.128
By placing property in Part II of the Constitution, it was designated
as a fundamental right, giving it both the protection of the Indian
Supreme Court as well as providing for compensation for expropria-
tions.129 However, this protection was in stark contrast with some of
the Constitution’s social reform policies in Part IV, which among other
things provided the GOI with the goal of land reform and economic
restructuring, creating a tension of the GOI’s attitude towards prop-
erty and land rights.130
Surprisingly, this was not a drafting oversight by an overanxious
new nation. Including property as a fundamental right was by design
of the Indian Prime Minister, who intended that including property
as a fundamental right would give judicial protection for only small
expropriation projects, and “would apply only to limited government
expropriations and not to large-scale social engineering programs.”131
This would not be the case, leading to years of contention between
the judiciary and GOI.132 The Indian Judiciary, per Part II of the
Constitution, immediately began treating all property as a funda-
mental right, often upending new legislation, even laws which were
passed in the name of land reform133 and for the economic improve-
ment of the nation.134 The legislature, desirous of engaging in redis-
tributive land reform policies, per Part IV of the Constitution, grew
frustrated by the judiciary’s zealous protection of property rights. This
began a pattern of constitutional “one-upmanship” over the course
128. INDIA CONST. art. 31 (1947).
129. See Armour & Lele, supra note 125, at 511; Manoj Mate, The Origins of Due Process in
India: The Role of Borrowing in Personal Liberty and Preventive Detention Cases, 28 BERKELEY
J. INT’L L. 216, 218 n.7 (2010).
130. Allen, supra note 93, at 195.
131. ALEXANDER, supra note 71, at 50.
132. Id. (noting that “[m]any commentators believe that it was precisely the undemocratic
consequences of judicial review [of land reform measures in India] that led to the eventual de-
mise of constitutional property in India.”). For a full history, see generally A.J. VAN DER WALT,
CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY CLAUSES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 192–206 (1999).
133. See Kameshwar Singh v. State of Bihar [1951] A.I.R. Patna 91.
134. ALEXANDER, supra note 71, at 50.
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of the next three decades, where Supreme Court decisions about the
property clause would be met with legislation, and vice versa.135
For example, after the Court found that it could review the com-
pensation provided after expropriation,136 the legislature amended
the constitution to put compensation outside the realm of judicial
review.137 Even after this amendment, the Supreme Court continued
to review compensation, finding that although they no longer had the
power to review compensation, they still did had the power to strike
down laws which either didn’t provide, or provided only illusory com-
pensation.138 Eventually after years of going back and forth the issue,
the GOI, frustrated with the judiciary’s “status-quoist [sic] and over-
protective approach toward property rights”139 passed the Forty Forth
Amendment to the Constitution in 1978, which completely deleted
property as a fundamental right.140 Critics argued that during the
thirty or so years that property was a fundamental right in India,
“no meaningful progress was made in redistributing land.”141 The
replacement statute, which is the current embodiment of India’s prop-
erty regime, is found in section 12 of the Constitution.142 The current
constitutional property provision in India simply reads “[n]o person
shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.”143
There are a variety of laws which govern the Indian takings
process in addition to the constitutional provisions for property in
India. Among these laws are: the Land Acquisition Act of 1894,144 the
National Highways Act, and the Indian Railways Act. Additionally,
various states in India have their own takings legislation.145
135. See Armour & Lele, supra note 125, at 511.
136. Id. (citing State of West Bengal v. Bela Banerjee (1954)).
137. Id. at 512 (citing Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act (1955)).
138. Id. (citing Vajravelu v. Special Deputy Collector (1965)).
139. ALEXANDER, supra note 71, at 50 (quoting K.N. Goyal, Compensation: Down but Not
Out, 38 J. INDIAN L. INST. 1, 2 (1996)).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 51 (citing John Murphy, Insulating Land Reform from Constitutional Impugnment,
8 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 362, 382–83(1992)).
142. INDIA CONST. art. 300A.
143. Id.
144. Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (India) (amended 2007).
145. Ashwin Mahalingam & Aditi Vyas, Comparative Evaluation of Land Acquisition and
Compensation Processes Across the World, 46 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 94, 94–102 (Aug. 6, 2011).
Recently, various state governments in India have begun to compete over the inclusion of re-
settlement and rehabilitation policies for those affected by land acquisitions with the goal of
garnering political support in the state and national elections. See also E-mail from Dr. Anil
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However, the primary law that still governs land acquisition in
India is the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 (“LAA”).146 The LAA is a
statutory vehicle that allows the government to exercise its eminent
domain power for public purposes in exchange for fair and reason-
able compensation.147 The LAA has undergone periodic revisions,
including a comprehensive amendment in 1984.148 The LAA sets forth
four steps to accomplish expropriation. First, the GOI must make a
determination that the property is required for a public purpose; sec-
ond, the GOI must identify the affected parties; third, there must be
a fair process where the affected parties are to be notified and given
an opportunity to express their concerns about the project; and fourth,
the GOI must negotiate with the affected party to reach an acceptable
compensation agreement.149
1. Public Purpose
The Land Acquisition Act (“LAA”) includes explicit provisions for
when an expropriation may be done in accordance with the public
purpose;150 or even a private purpose.151 The LAA defines a public pur-
pose broadly, allowing for the inclusion of many proposed projects to
have a sufficiently public purpose.152 Notably, this definition states
Kashyap, University of Ulster, Belfast, to Patricia Salkin, Raymond & Ella Smith Distinguished
Professor of Law, Associate Dean and Director of the Government Law Center of Albany Law
School (discussing the State of Haryana’s (located in India’s capital region) development of policy
initiatives for those affected by takings, notably paying market value for the taking, with
further compensation incentives for those who forgo litigation over the taking; additionally,
these benefits may include employment, tax exemptions, and replacement land for the affected
landowner) (Oct. 4, 2011) (on file with the author).
146. Saptak Sanyal & Aditya Shankar, Property Rights and Sustainable Development in
India, 22 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 235, 243 (2009).
147. Id. at 239.
148. Bhaskar Majumder, Land Acquisition for Industrialization in India: Displacement of
People and the Role of the State, in DEVELOPMENT AND CONFLICT IN THE 21ST CENTURY 36
(Otto F. von Feigenblatt, ed.) (2010).
149. Mahalingam & Vyas, supra note 145, at 94–102.
150. The Land Acquisition Act, No. 1 of 1984; India Code (1993) § 3(f).
151. Id. § 40.
152. (f ) [T]he expression “public purpose” includes:
(i) the provision of village sites, or the extension, planned development or im-
provement of existing village-sites.
(ii) the provision of land for town or rural planning;
(iii) the provision for land for planned development of land from public funds
in pursuance of any scheme or policy of Government and subsequent disposal
2012] INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE PROPERTY RIGHTS 67
that the acquisition of land for companies is not considered a public
purpose.153 Instead, for private companies, the LAA provides a sepa-
rate set of requirements for private companies seeking to acquire
land under Part VII of the Act, mostly involving the acquisition of
land to provide housing for employees.154 However, the distinction
between public and private purposes under the LAA remains vague,
even with judicial interpretation.155
In practice, the distinction between a public and private purpose
has become even vaguer. Despite the LAA’s promulgation that ex-
propriation for a private company is not a public purpose, there have
been many instances where the GOI has expropriated land on behalf
thereof in whole or in part by lease, assignment or outright sale with the object
of securing further development as planned;
(iv) the provision of land for a corporation owned or controlled by the State;
(v) the provision of land for residential purposes to the poor or landless or to per-
son residing in areas affected by natural calamities, or to persons displaced or
affected by reason of the implementation of any scheme undertaken by Govern-
ment, or any local authority or a corporation owned or controlled by the State;
(vi) the provision of land for carrying out any educational, housing, health or slum
clearance scheme sponsored by Government or by any authority established by
Government for carrying out such scheme, or with the prior approval of the ap-
propriate Government, by a local authority, or a society registered under the
societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 1860), or under any corresponding law for
the time being in force in a state, or a co-operative society within the meaning of
any law relating to co-operative societies for the time being in force in any State;
(vii) the provision of land for any other scheme of development sponsored by the
Government or with the prior approval of the appropriate Government, by a
local authority;
(viii) the provision of any premises or building for locating a public office, but
does not include acquisition of land for companies.
Id.
153. Id. § 3(f)(viii).
154. The Land Acquisition Act, No. 1 of 1984; India Code (1993) § 38-44B. See also § 40.
Public Enquiry: (1) Such consent shall not be given unless the [appropriate
Government] be satisfied. [either on the report of the Collector under section 5A,
sub-section (2), or] by an enquiry held as hereinafter provided:
(a) that the purpose of the acquisition is to obtain land for the erection of
dwelling houses for workers employed by the Company or for the provision
of amenities directly connected therewith, or
[(aa) that such acquisition is needed for the construction of some building or
work for a Company which is engaged or is taking steps for engaging itself in
any industry or work which is for a public purpose, or]
(b) that such acquisition is needed for the construction of some work, and that
such work is likely to prove useful to the public.
155. Sanyal & Shankar, supra note 146, at 244, n.47 (citing Devinder Singh v. State of
Punjab, (2008) 1 S.C.C. 728; Pratibha Nema v. State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. 2003 S.C. 3140).
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of private companies under the broad language of subsection (iii),
which allows the expropriation of land for a public purpose as long
as it is sponsored by, or has the approval of the GOI.156 As long as the
GOI provides some revenue towards the expropriation, it will qualify
as a “public purpose” under the Act, allowing private companies to
acquire land under the tenuous guise of a public purpose.157
The expropriation of land on behalf of private, for profit companies
is a controversial subject in India.158 For example, in October 2010 the
state government of Himachal Pradesh was accused of acquiring land
on behalf of a power corporation seeking to clear a forest for the con-
struction of a Dam. These land acquisitions were alleged to have con-
tinued even though the application for the project had been rejected
by the Union Ministry of Environment and Forests and despite un-
popularity among the public who feared displacement.159
2. Compensation
Landownership is source of prestige and reputation in Indian
society; it is seen as both a wise investment, as well as a source of
societal standing. Therefore, compensation is especially important
to expropriated landowners in India.160 Despite not defining “com-
pensation,”161 the LAA includes several considerations for determin-
ing the compensation of takings, including the market value of the
land, assets present on the land, income made from the land, as well
as giving government officials the discretion to raise the amount of
compensation.162
However, compensation is often discounted by a number of practical
factors in the expropriation process. Often, the GOI will only identify
a minimum number of affected parties to the taking, completely bar-
ring sharecroppers, encroachers and laborers from any compensation
on the land.163 This is problematic as in India the majority of people,
156. Id. at 244, n.45 (citing The Land Acquisition Act, No. 1 of 1984; India Code (1993)
§ 3(f)(iii)).
157. Id. at 245.
158. Id. at 239 (citations omitted).
159. ASIAN CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, India Human Rights Report Quarterly, 31–32
(October–December 2010), available at http://www.achrweb.org/ihrrq/issue2/ihrrq-oct-dec
-2010.pdf (last visited June 24, 2012).
160. Mahalingam & Vyas, supra note 145, at 94–102.
161. Sanyal & Shankar, supra note 146, at 247.
162. Mahalingam & Vyas, supra note 145, at 94–102.
163. Id.
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especially the aforementioned sharecroppers, encroachers, and labor-
ers who live in areas which are prone to expropriation, will usually
not have legal title to their land, and will be passed over from receiv-
ing any compensation at all.164
The required negotiations under the LAA can also take a long
amount of time, in some cases up to three years even if the affected
landowner has no objections to the taking. Further, the assessor of
the land has up until two years after notifying the landowner of the
taking on deciding on what compensation will be awarded.165 However,
in most cases no negotiation happens at all, as there is often little
attempt by the GOI to engage in meaningful negotiation with the
landowner.166 Local officials are given a lot of discretion to value the
property under the LAA, as there is no formula for determining com-
pensation, which often leads to a subjective, and often undervalued,
assessment of the property.167 Further, although the LAA requires
affected landowners to be paid before or during the taking,168 that is
rarely, if ever the case.169 A landowner who is dissatisfied with their
compensation can go to the judiciary, where courts often take years
to issue decisions.170 In the unlikely event a landowner does have
the patience to take a claim to court, the court will apply a number
of factors in determining the compensation owed, including the fair
market value of the property (from when the landowner was notified
of the expropriation), damages sustained by the landowner resulting
from the expropriation, and the reasonable costs associated with
moving.171 Cumulatively, compensation is often much lower than the
fair market value.172
164. R. Rangachari et al., Large Dams: India’s Experience, in WORLD COMMISSION ON DAMS
CASE STUDY 111 (2000); see also Mahalingam & Vyas, supra note 145, at 94–102.
165. The Land Acquisition Act, No. 1 of 1984; India Code (1993) § 11.
166. Mahalingam & Vyas, supra note 145, at 94–102.
167. Sanyal & Shankar, supra note 146, at 245; Mahalingam & Vyas, supra note 145, at
94–102.
168. The Land Acquisition Act, No. 1 of 1984; India Code (1993) § 17.
169. Sanyal & Shankar, supra note 146, at 247. See also Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of
Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 2517 (finding that “eighty percent of the estimated compen-
sation was not paid to the appellants although [the LAA] required that it should have been paid
before possession of the said land was taken but that does not mean that the possession was
taken illegally or that the said land did not thereupon vest in the first respondent.”).
170. Heritage Foundation, India, in 2011 Index of Economic Freedom, available at http://
www.heritage.org/index/Country/India.
171. The Land Acquisition Act, No. 1 of 1984; India Code (1993) § 11.
172. Mahalingam & Vyas, supra note 145, at 94–102.
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3. Recent Developments
Recently, the GOI has begun to adopt a national policy for reha-
bilitation and resettlement for people who are negatively affected
by the involuntary dispossession of their land, in addition to other
reforms in their use of eminent domain.173 With this in mind, in 2007
the GOI drafted the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, which ac-
knowledges the need for resettlement procedures, as well as increased
compensation to disposed landowners. This includes additional forms
of compensation, including replacement land, annuities, transporta-
tion allowances, and replacement housing in some instances.174 Addi-
tionally, the Bill provides an expanded definition for “public purposes”
relative to the LAA.175 The bill remains highly controversial, both to
private landowners concerned with both resettlement procedures and
the giving of land to a private company as a public purpose, as well
as with private corporations who find the bill to be impractical and
anti-development.176
In terms of foreign investment, although there have been few
instances of direct expropriation since the 1970s, the GOI has been
accused of having “a poor track record of honoring and enforcing
agreements with U.S. investors in the energy sector.”177 In 2006 the
Supreme Court of India awarded a decision in favor of a U.S. firm
which had done work in India during the 1980s.178 However, because
the judiciary in India is notoriously backlogged, many foreign inves-
tors use alternative dispute resolution.179
173. Majumder, supra note 148, at 36. See also The National Rehabilitation and Resettlement
Policy (2007), Government of India, Ministry of Rural Development.
174. Maitreesh Ghatak & Parikshit Ghosh, The Land Acquisition Bill: A Critique and a
Proposal, 2 (Center for Development Economics at Delhi School of Economics, Working Paper
204, September 2011).
175. Majumder, supra note 148, at 36–37.
176. Jason Overdorf, India Proposes New Bill for Eminent Domain, THE GLOBAL POST
(Boston) (Sept. 7, 2011), available at http://www.globalpost.com/dispatches/globalpost-blogs
/the-rice-bowl/india-proposes-new-bill-eminent-domain (last visited June 24, 2012).
177. U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs, 2011 Investment
Climate Statement—India, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2011/157294.htm (last visited
June 24, 2012).
178. Id. (noting that the GOI eventually paid a settlement that was “significantly less than
the amount awarded under the Court’s order”).
179. See Heritage Foundation, India, in 2011 Index of Economic Freedom, available at
http://www.heritage.org/index/Country/India (last visited June 24, 2012).
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C. Chile
Chile has been hailed as “the benchmark and model for growth in
Latin America” containing constitutional stability as well as a “solid
property rights regime.”180 Chile offers sound protection for private
property and contract rights, and enforces this through an “efficient
and transparent” judiciary.181 Although an ideologically diverse set
of rulers presided over Chile during the twentieth century, the legal
basis for its property regime has remained comparatively consistent.
Chile gained its independence permanently in 1818.182 The time
period following independence was marked by political instability
until the early 1830s.183 Various presidents took power and drafted
their own constitutions, none of which lasted until the Constitution
of 1833184 which gave the Chilean Constitution “modern” protections
to its property clause, restricting the governmental power of expro-
priation unless it was done for a public purpose decided by law, and
provided “indemnification” for the aggrieved party.185 However, the
late nineteenth and early twentieth century saw Chile surrounded
in a governmental system that was stalled in political stalemates, a
politically active military, and a substantial labor and social unrest
which was leading to a rapidly unionizing population.186 Military
coups in 1925 led to the drafting of a new constitution, a task which
focused on property as well as issues related to it.187
180. Rafael X. Zahralddin-Aravena, Chile: Free Trade Agreements, Chile and the Entrepreneur,
5 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 273, 296, 322 (1998).
181. Heritage Foundation, Chile, in 2011 Index of Economic Freedom, available at http://
www.heritage.org/Index/Country/Chile (last visited June 24, 2012).
182. M.C. Mirow, Borrowing Private Law in Latin American: Andres Bello’s Use of the Code
of Napolean in Drafting the Chilean Civil Code, 61 LA. L. REV. 291, 293 (2000–2001).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. CHILE CONST. (1833), art. 12(5).
The inviolability of every description of property, without distinction, whether
belonging to Individuals or to Communities; no one being liable to be deprived
of his property, except by virtue of a Judicial Sentence; unless the service of the
State, duly declared by a Law, shall require the use or appropriation of such
property; in which case the party shall be previously indemnified, either by a
Special Agreement with the Government or by the Award of a Jury.
186. M.C. Mirow, Origins of the Social Function of Property in Chile, 80 FORDHAM L. REV.
1183 (2011).
187. Id. at 1187–88 (providing an example of the socioeconomic impact of the nitrate industry
in Chile).
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By the time of drafting the Chilean Constitution of 1925, the atti-
tude towards property rights in Chile had changed. The constitu-
tional debates focused on the need for strong property protections, yet
acknowledged the public’s disapproval of large land estates and un-
cultivated land. The new property provision hoped to provide strong
security to property rights, while at the same time limiting it to ac-
commodate the necessary progress required for the country.188 The
1925 Constitution reflected this attitude towards property through
its inclusion of second section in the property provision. The new
provision, Article 10(10), still provided for the classic public purpose
and compensation framework, but additionally provided that prop-
erty ownership was subject to “the maintenance and property of the
social order.”189
By including this new “social order” provision, new and previously
unheard of land projects were now possible under the new Consti-
tution. These projects, undertaken by the government over the course
of the next forty years, were characterized by growing socialist gov-
ernment policy towards property, which included a large scale land
and agrarian reform legislation during the 1960s.190
Socialism was explicitly adopted as a platform by the incoming
Chilean government from 1970 to 1973. During this time, President
Salvador Allende engaged in Chile’s most aggressive policy of state
ownership towards property, nationalizing industry and expropriat-
ing millions of hectares of land yearly.191 However, this aggressive
188. Id. at 1200–05.
189. Chilean Constitution (1925), art. 10(10).
The inviolability of all properties, without any distinction.
No one can be deprived of his property, or of a part of it, or of the right that he
should have to it, except by virtue of a judicial sentence or of expropriation for
reasons of public utility, qualified by law. In this case the indemnification that
is arranged with him or that is determined in the corresponding trial will be
previously given to owner.
The exercise of the right to property will be subject to the limitations or rules that
the maintenance and the progress of the social order require, and in that sense, the
law can impose obligations or impositions of public utility in favor of the general
interests of the State, of the health of the citizens and of public welfare.
190. Mirow, supra note 186, at 1208 (explaining that “[Article 10(10)] led to proposals to
limit large land estates, to ensure the exploitation of agricultural lands, and to direct urban
development. The social-function norm of property had won the day.”).
191. Id. at 1211–12.
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governmental takings policy would last until the successful military
coup of 1973, led by General Pinochet.
The incoming Pinochet regime was noted for its economically
liberal attitude towards property, and would have an economic leg-
acy in Chile noted for its “neo-liberal, free-market reforms.”192 Most
believed that the ideological philosophy of Pinochet, combined with
the aggressive takings agenda by the previous government, would lead
the new Pinochet-led government to frame property in a new consti-
tution as “unassailable, absolute, natural right,” and do away with the
“social order” provision of the 1925 Constitution.193 Surprisingly, that
was not the case. When drafting a new Constitution the Pinochet gov-
ernment instead embraced the social order provision of the previous
constitution. Ironically, the Pinochet government went even further
than the previous property provision, defining a “social function”194
in the new Constitution, and further giving a more detailed provision
for property, allowing the government close to complete control over
property if necessary.195 The democratic governments which followed
Pinochet, taking power in the 1990s, have in large part continued with
this traditional Chilean property model.196
1. Public Purpose
As discussed above, the current Chilean Constitution goes into
greater depth than the classic notion of what constitutes a public
purpose, by combining it with the “social function” concept born in
the 1925 Constitution. The text of the 1980 Constitution gives a broad
articulation on property rights, providing for intellectual as well as
real property.197 Further, the Constitution gives the Chilean govern-
ment “absolute, exclusive, inalienable and permanent domain” over
192. Id. at 1212 (noting that evidence of this attitude can be found in the current constitution,
for example, article 19(21) of the Chilean Constitution guarantees all citizens “[t]he right to
develop any economic activity which is not contrary to morals, public order or national security,
respecting legal norms which regulate it.”).
193. Id. at 1214.
194. CHILE CONST. (1980) art. 19(24) (stating that “[o]nly the law can establish the manner
to acquire property and to use, enjoy and dispose of it, and the limitations and obligations which
derive from its social function. This comprises all which the general interests of the Nation, the
national security, public use and health, and the conservation of the environmental patrimony,
require.”).
195. Mirow, supra note 186, at 1213–14.
196. Id. at 1214.
197. CHILE CONST. (1980), art. 19(24).
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all mineral, fossil fuel and hydrocarbon on its territory,198 which can
be subsequently licensed out by the government.199
Under Section 19(24) of the Constitution no one can “be deprived
of his property, of the assets affected or any of the essential facilities
or powers of ownership, except by virtue of a general or a special law
which authorizes expropriation for the public benefit or the national
interest, duly qualified by the legislator.”200 However, the social func-
tion obligation of the Constitution broadens the scope of what is con-
sidered a public purpose in Chile, and states that:
[o]nly the law may establish the manner to acquire property and
to use, enjoy and dispose of it, and the limitations and obliga-
tions derived from its social function. Said function includes all
requirements of the Nation’s general interests, the national secu-
rity, public use and health, and the conservation of the environ-
mental patrimony.201
Further, Section 19(24) provides the government with exclusive
dominion over a majority of the nation’s natural resources, giving
the State “absolute, exclusive inalienable, and imprescribable do-
main over all mines, including guano deposits, metalliferous sands,
salt mines, coal and hydrocarbon deposits and other fossil substances,
with the exception of superficial clays, despite the ownership held by
individuals or [corporations] over the land which the above should
be contained.”202 A person who suffers an expropriation will find sim-
ilar depth in the due process they are afforded by the constitution.203
2. Compensation
Compensation is also guaranteed, and outlined in great detail un-
der the Chilean Constitution. Under section 19(24), “[the aggrieved
198. Id.
199. Larry B. Pascal, Summary of Oil and Gas Developments in South America (2006), 13
L. & BUS. REV. AM. 521 537 (2007).
200. CHILE CONST. (1980), art. 19(24).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. (providing that “[t]he expropriated party may protest the legality of the expropriation
action before the ordinary courts of justice. . . . In case of protest regarding the justifiability of
the expropriation, the judge may, on the merit of the information adduced, order the suspension
of the material possession.”).
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party] shall, at all times, have the right to indemnification for patri-
monial harm actually caused, to be fixed by mutual agreement or by
a sentence pronounced by said courts in accordance with the law. In
the absence of an agreement [to sell the property], the indemnification
shall be paid in cash.”204 Section 19(24) further provides that compen-
sation is to be determined, if an agreement cannot be reached between
the landowner and the government, the compensation provided “shall
be provisionally determined by experts in the manner prescribed for
by law.”205 Section 19(24) further holds that expropriated property
can only be conveyed once compensation, in the form of an advance
cash payment, is made.206
Despite the extensive treatment that the Chilean Constitution gives
to property protection, expropriation is extremely rare.207 Foreign
investors should be especially confident to know that both the mili-
tary regime, which ruled from 1973–1990, as well as the subsequent
democratic governments have not nationalized industries, “and noth-
ing suggests that any form of expropriation is likely in the foresee-
able future.”208
D. Singapore
Singapore is one of the most densely populated countries in the
world, with 7,126 people per square kilometer.209 Additionally, the
total amount of land which makes up Singapore is less than three
hundred square miles, making it only about three times the size of
Washington D.C.210 Given the scarcity of land, land acquisition in
204. Id. (continuing to mandate that the government may not take possession of the expro-
priated property until “total payment of the indemnification”).
205. Id.
206. Id. See also Edward A. Fallone, Latin American Laws Regulating Foreign Investment,
in Going International: Fundamentals of International Business Transactions , ALI-ABA Course
of Study Materials, July 8, 1996.
207. Heritage Foundation, Chile, in 2011 Index of Economic Freedom, available at http://
www.heritage.org/Index/Country/Chile (last visited June 24, 2012).
208. U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs, 2011 Investment
Climate Statement—Chile, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2011/157257.htm (last visited
June 24, 2012).
209. See, Singapore Dep’t of Statistics, Statistics, http://www.singstat.gov.sg/stats/keyind
.html (noting that there are over 5 million people residing on an area of land that is 712.4
sq. km.).
210. U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs, Background
Note: Singapore, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2798.htm (last visited June 24, 2012).
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Singapore is viewed as “a necessity to facilitate development for eco-
nomic progress.”211 The Government’s landholding in Singapore has
steadily risen since its modern inception; in 1969 the state owned 49%
of land, in 1975 the state owned 65% of land.212 Today, close to 90% of
households in Singapore reside in structures that were built and once
owned by the government.213
Singapore was part of Malaysia from 1963 until 1965, when it sepa-
rated over political friction with the central Malaysian government
to form its own country.214 Upon separation, one of the largest con-
cerns became whether or not to constitutionally guarantee property
rights for its citizens, as was the case in Malaysia.215 Ultimately, the
government decided against it, primarily concerned about litigation
resulting from disputes over compensation in eminent domain cases.216
In particular, the government was concerned with certain compen-
sation issues and drafted what would become the Land Acquisition
Act (“LAA”) in light of these concerns. These concerns, articulated
below, would set the tone for the Singaporean attitude towards prop-
erty ownership throughout the course of its history:
Firstly, that no landowner should benefit from development which
has taken place at public expense and secondly, that the price paid
on the acquisition of land for public purposes should not be higher
than what the land would have been worth had the Government
not carried out development generally in the area . . . .217
Singapore’s languor for constitutionally guaranteed compensation
reflected its belief that, given the scarcity of land, the public interest
211. Bryan Chew et al., Compulsory Acquisition of Land in Singapore: A Fair Regime?, 22
SINGAPORE ACAD. L.J. 166, 187 (2010).
212. NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, Ch. 1A, § 1C.10 (Matthew Bender, 3d ed).
213. Jianlin Chen, Curbing Rent-Seeking and Inefficiency with Broad Takings Powers and
Undercompensation: The Case of Singapore from a Givings Perspective, 19 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y
J. 1 n.359 (2010) (citation omitted).
214. U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs, Background
Notes: Singapore, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2798.htm (last visited June 24, 2012).
215. NICHOLS, supra note 212.
216. Id. (noting that “[a Constitutional guarantee to property would] leave open the door
for litigation and ultimately for adjudication by the Courts as to what is or is not to be ade-
quate compensation.”) (citing Singapore Parliamentary Debates, vol. 25, col. 1051).
217. Chew et al., supra note 211, at 169 (quoting Singapore Parliamentary Debates,
Official Report (22 June 1966) vol. 25 at col. 133 (EX Barker, Minister for Law and National
Development)).
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of the nation would be best served by limiting the costs of development
and infrastructure.218 The LAA reflected this policy of frugality, and
originally determined compensation for expropriated landowners to be
either: the market value on the notice date of the taking, or the mar-
ket value on a statutorily determined date—November 30th, 1973—
whichever was lowest.219 This led to problematic compensation for
landowners, as Singapore’s property values steadily increased in the
1970s, before exploding in value into the 1980s.220 By the 1980s the
statutory date was completely outdated, and resulted in inequitable
compensation being paid to landowners.221 Finally, in 1986, the LAA
was revised to update compensation values—although “after a number
of major acquisitions had been [given notice they would be taken], as
large tracts of lands were needed for infrastructure development such
as the construction of the mass rapid transit system, drainage im-
provement, road widening and urban redevelopment in various parts
of Singapore.”222 However, had the LAA updated the compensation
due earlier, it could have resulted in vast fiscal problems for a young
nation trying to acquire scarce lands to further the public interest.223
The compensation provisions of the LAA would continue to be up-
dated, and in shorter intervals, up until 1995.224 The LAA underwent
no review between 1995 and 2007 due to the 1997 financial crisis in
Asia, and the outbreak of SARS in 2003—each of which forced prop-
erty values to below their 1995 values.225
It is important to note that during the 1980s and 1990s, despite
what the Act provided, many landowners were able to get closer to
fair-market value when their property was taken by the Government.
The Government of Singapore did relieve a majority of inequitable
218. Id. at 170.
219. See id. at 170–71; NICHOLS, supra note 212.
220. Chew et al., supra note 211, at 171.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 172.
223. Id. (stating that “[c]learly the compensation regime in the early years was structured
in favor of the tax-paying public, who had to bear the cost of public development rather than a
small group of individual landowners. Although this was obviously unfair from the landowners’
point of view, it was nevertheless reasonable from the State’s perspective.”).
224. Id. (noting that “[t]he interval between the revision in 1973 and 1986 was 13 years. The
interval between the review in 1986 and 1992 was a short period of six years. The 1992 and 1995
reviews were only three years apart. This showed a change over time to compensate at a value
closer to the value at the date of [notice].”).
225. Id. at 173.
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compensations by making ex gratia payments to aggrieved land-
owners, giving them additional compensation for their taking, which
usually made up the difference between the statutory compensation
and the market value compensation due for the property.226 Ex gratia
payments originally began to help small landowners whose compen-
sation was insufficient to find replacement housing; however, the con-
cept was often progressively used to reflect changing circumstances.227
By 2001, ex gratia payments were given to all types of properties and
a cap on the amount given was gradually increased to deal with any
inequities resulting from statutory dating on compensation.228
In 2007, the government of Singapore officially abolished their
compensation provision in the LAA. The reason for this, per the gov-
ernment was that “Singapore today has become more developed and
urbanized. Land acquisitions now affect far more people than those
carried out in 1970s or 1980s. Today many more Singaporeans own
private properties. It is often that Singaporeans sink a major portion
of their life savings and future earnings into their property.”229
1. Public Purpose
Under the LAA, the President of Singapore may expropriate land
when it is needed “(a) for any public purpose; (b) by any person, corpo-
ration or statutory board, for any work or an undertaking which, in
the opinion of the Minister, is of public benefit or of public utility or in
the public interest; or (c) for any residential, commercial or industrial
purposes.”230 This provision gives the President broad discretion in the
use of eminent domain power, and once a notification is entered in
compliance with the LAA, it is considered to be “conclusive evidence
that the land is needed for the purpose specified therein.”231 This pro-
vision leaves little room for judicial review of a “public purpose” in
Singapore,232 though the state’s eminent domain power is subject to
stringent procedural oversight at the executive level.233
226. Id. at 176.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 173 (quoting Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (11 April 2007)
vol. 83 at col. 500 (Prof. S. Jayakumar, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Law)).
230. Land Acquisition Act, c. 152, § 5(1)(a)–(c) (1985) (amended 2007) (Sing.).
231. Id. § 5(3).
232. NICHOLS, supra note 212.
233. Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (11 April 2007) vol. 83 at cols. 377
and 378 (Prof. S. Jayakumar, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Law) (stating that “all
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The judiciary is compliant with this broad grant of statutory power
to the executive branch, and has acknowledged that “[t]he Govern-
ment is the proper authority for deciding what a public purpose is.
When the Government declares that a certain purpose is a public
purpose, it must be presumed that the Government is in possession
of facts which include the Government to declare that the purpose
is a public purpose.”234 When it has had opportunity to comment, the
Singaporean judiciary has supported a broad reading of a “public
purpose” under the LAA. Specifically, the judiciary has found that
a “public purpose” under subsection (5)(a) of the LAA was meant
to have an expansive reading according to legislative intent, and
“might conceivably include the acquisition of land for resale to pri-
vate developers.”235 In practice, the government of Singapore has
used its expropriation power on numerous occasions to give property
over to private development.236 Despite the broad power given to the
state in determining what would constitute a public purpose, it has
spurred close to no litigation in Singapore.237
2. Compensation
As discussed above, compensation has spurred plenty of controversy
in Singapore. Compensation is currently determined by a multistep
process, in which the government must first identify and notify all
“persons interested” of the impending expropriation, and then nego-
tiate an offer for the property before a taking may occur. After the
President publishes the notification of an impending taking, “persons
interested” are those who may seek compensation, and are defined as
“every person claiming an interest in compensation to be made on
proposals for land acquisition are carefully considered. Government agencies that initiate
acquisition must provide full justifications on why the acquisition is necessary. They would
also have to ensure that prior approval is obtained for the intended use before requests for
acquisition can be considered. For major acquisitions, the proposals will also have to be pre-
sented to a Ministerial Committee compromising the Minister of Law, Minister for National
Development and which sometimes can include other Ministers like the Minister for Transport
if it concerns land acquisition related to MRT or major expressway development. Finally every
proposal for land acquisition must be submitted to Cabinet for approval.”).
234. Galstaun v. Attorney-General (1981) 1 M.L.J. 9 at 10, per Chua J.
235. Teng Fuh Holdings v. Collector of Land Revenue, 2006-3 Sing. L. Rep. 507, 523–24
(Sing. High Ct.).
236. See Chen, supra note 213, at 9, n.47 (giving examples of the government of Singapore
taking land for private development).
237. NICHOLS, supra note 212.
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account of the acquisition of land under [the LAA], but does not in-
clude a tenant by month or at will.”238 Practically speaking, it includes
“anyone with a legal or beneficial interest in the land.”239 All of the
designated “persons interested” must appear before collectors within
21 days of receipt of notice, and give their own valuation of their own
land.240 Based on this, collectors will issue awards of compensation.241
Compensation is determined under the LAA using a multifactorial
approach which not only show factors which should be considered in
the valuation, but also promulgates factors which should not be con-
sidered in the valuation. Compensation should only take into account:
damages which may result from severing a piece from the land; dam-
ages from the taking which affect other property; the “market value”
of the expropriated property;242 whether the party has to move his
residence or place of business as a result of the taking; moving costs
associated with a forced move; and increases in value to other land
of the interested party which will result from the taking—not the in-
creases in the taking itself.243 In some instances, the compensation
has deducted from the compensation due based on what the expro-
priated land would be used for.244 On the other hand, compensation
cannot take into account: the urgency of the taking; “any disinclina-
tion of the person interest to party with the land acquired”; damages
sustained which would not support a valid cause of action against
a private party; damage likely to be caused to the taking after the
notice date; increases in the value of the land taken, improvements
238. Land Acquisition Act, c. 152, § 2(1) (1985) (amended 2007) (Sing.). See also id. § 2(2)
(including trustees and guardians acting in their fiduciary capacity).
239. NICHOLS, supra note 212 (requiring that anyone designated as a “person interested”
must appear before the collector within 21 days of notice).
240. Land Acquisition Act, c. 152, § 8(3)(b)(i)–(ii) (1985) (amended 2007) (Sing.).
241. Id. § 8(4).
242. See id. §§ 33(1)(a), 33(5)(e) (noting that market value is not defined, but instead deter-
mined by either the date of the acquisition of land, if made after 2/12/07 pursuant to § 33(1)(a)
or the price which a bona fide purchaser would pay for the land, “after taking into account the
zoning and density requirements and any other restrictions imposed [by law].”); Chew et al.,
supra note 211, at 174–75.
243. Land Acquisition Act, c. 152, § 33 (b)–(f) (1985) (Sing.).
244. Chen, supra note 213, at 11 (relating that “[i]n a land acquisition exercise for the con-
struction of a mass transit station, the government acquired a small plot of land originally used
as a car park on private residential property. A nominal S$1 was paid as compensation since the
gains in the property value from the eventual construction of the mass transit station (estimated
by industry sources to be $18,000,000) are much more than the value of the 220 square meters
of land acquired.”) (internal citation omitted).
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made to the land after notice of the taking was given; liens, assign-
ments and other dispositions affecting the land unless registered with
the government; and evidence of the value of comparable properties,
unless they are from bona fide sales.245 Taken together, the compensa-
tion due usually is “the price that a bona fide purchaser might reason-
ably be expected to pay for the land on the basis of either its existing
use or the purpose designated by post-acquisition zoning, again which-
ever is the lower figure.”246
Once compensation is determined by the collector, in practice it
is treated as an offer—one which can be accepted or rejected by the
landowner. The government of Singapore recommends that any agen-
cies which are planning to expropriate property should attempt to
negotiate with the landowner, and only then, when negotiations fall
through, the agency may use its eminent domain power.247 If the land-
owner rejects the offer, he may take his valuation to an Appeals Board
which can increase, reduce or confirm the initial compensation award
based on the factors discussed above.248 The Appeals Board’s subse-
quent decision on the amount of compensation owed is final and bind-
ing.249 Once compensation is determined and paid to the landowner,
the government of Singapore may take possession of the expropri-
ated property.250
As previously noted, because Singapore’s property rights are found
in legislation and are not protected by their Constitution, the judiciary
has not recognized regulatory takings.251 As precarious as the statu-
tory property rights system in Singapore may seem, Singapore has
been a haven for foreign investment. Singapore has not expropriated
foreign owned property, and further has no laws which mandate that
foreign investors must hand ownership over to local interests. Further,
Singapore has signed many Bilateral Investment Agreements with a
245. Land Acquisition Act, c. 152 § 34 (1985) (Sing.).
246. Id. § 33(5)(e).
247. Mahalingam & Vyas, supra note 145, at 94–102.
248. Land Acquisition Act, c. 152 § 23 (1985) (Sing.).
249. Id. §§ 29–30 (noting that there is a right to appeal to a court on a point of law, but
otherwise this is the end of the inquiry for an aggrieved landowner).
250. Id. § 16.
251. Chen, supra note 213, at 12 (citing TAKING LAND: COMPULSORY PURCHASE AND
REGULATION IN ASIAN-PACIFIC COUNTRIES 4 (Tsuyoshi Kotaka & David L. Callies eds., 2002))
(noting that Japan and Korea are the only Asian Pacific nations which have doctrine similar
to regulatory takings).
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wide range of countries, which promote and protect nationals and com-
panies of countries—specifically prohibiting against expropriation for
an initial fifteen year period, which is continued unless terminated.252
Additionally, the judiciary of Singapore is noted to be efficient and pro-
vides relatively good protection for private property.253
E. Ghana
Today, Ghana is experiencing a period of relatively strong economic
growth.254 However, this growth has illustrated to the rest of the world
the problems of property ownership—particularly land ownership—
in Ghana.255 Examinations of the country suggests that “getting clear
title to land [in Ghana] is often difficult, complicated and lengthy,”256
and the process for getting title “includes six government offices, and
three to four years.”257 Litigation over who has rightful title to land
“has become so common that sellers make a point of emphasizing in
their advertisements when a plot of land is for sale and its ownership
is not contested.”258 Further complicating matters is the presence of
customary law. In Ghana today, 80% of land is held on a customary
basis and is not titled.259
In pre-colonial Ghana, land rights included elements of economic,
political and even religious standing.260 Land rights were viewed as
a community asset, and the central authority of these communities
rested with their chiefs, who distributed the land as they saw fit.261
252. U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs, 2011 Investment
Climate Statement—Singapore, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2011/157355.htm (last
visited June 24, 2012).
253. Heritage Foundation, Singapore, in 2011 Index of Economic Freedom, available at
http://www.heritage.org/index/Country/Singapore (last visited June 24, 2012).
254. SANDRA F. JOIREMAN, WHERE THERE IS NO GOVERNMENT: ENFORCING LAND RIGHTS
IN COMMON LAW AFRICA 112 (2011) (stating that from 1995 to 2008 Ghana has consistently
had annual economic growth rates around 5%).
255. Id.
256. Heritage Foundation, Ghana, in 2011 Index of Economic Freedom, available at http://
www.heritage.org/index/Country/Ghana (last visited June 24, 2012).
257. JOIREMAN, supra note 254, at 113.
258. Id. at 112, 114 (noting that “land cases are being filed at a rate higher than that at
which they are decided, and the backlog in proceedings means that it may take five or six years
to hear a case.”).
259. Id. at 113 (stating that the remaining 20 percent is owned by the government for develop-
ment purposes, which has been further allocated to individuals).
260. Id. at 34.
261. Id. at 34, 114 (explaining that chiefs in Ghana have a responsibility to allocate land to
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Upon the colonization of Ghana, however, these chiefs negotiated
directly with the colonizing British settlers. With no central land reg-
istry, a number of problems ensued: chiefs often sold land they had no
right to, or would pocket the proceeds of the sale rather than share
it with the community, or would sign agreements which they did not
understand.262 Regardless, property rights in Ghana took a major hit
under this colonial system: chiefs were incentivized to continue the
sale of land to the British, who not only paid them, but supported and
propped up the chiefs as the central power in their communities.263
The strong customary authority of both chiefs in Ghana has persisted
into the present day.264
Ghana’s property regime, notably its land law, continues to be
heavily influenced by this customary law system, despite the appear-
ance of a relatively simple constitutional and statutory framework.265
Traditional customary law has dominated the development of prop-
erty rights in Ghana, instead of a more formal rule of law.266 Today
customary law operates as a separate property rights regime over
approximately 75% of the land in sub-Saharan Africa, and 80% of
land in Ghana.267 Although customary law varies regionally within
Ghana,268 customary law in western Africa generally views land from
those who need it, as well as for community projects, and that chiefs also resolve disputes around
land ownership in their communities and have the right to sell land).
262. Id. at 35.
263. Id. at 36 (emphasizing that “[i]n adopting a system of indirect rule [the British] but-
tressed up the authoritarian aspect of the power of chiefs who frequently abused it in a way that
they could rarely have done in traditional society without deposition.” (citations omitted)).
264. Id. at 113.
265. George A. Sarpong, Improving Tenure Security for the Rural Poor, Ghana—Country
Case Study, Report for the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2 (2006),
available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/sd/sda/SDAR/sard/Ghana%20case%20(final%20publica).pdf (last
visited June 24, 2012). See also Ronald C. Griffin, Ghana Journey: Private Investment, Public
Funding, and Domestic Reforms, 6 FLA. A & M U. L. REV. 109, 116 (2010) (noting that “[i]n
Ghana, nobody owns real estate. Fee simple is a foreign concept. Vast stretches of land are
soaked with spiritual and religious properties. A bunch belongs to the President of the Republic.
The rest belongs to national tribes. Uncultivated and unoccupied land belongs to stools (tribal
trusts managed by chiefs). Strangers can hold stool land and cultivate some, provided they pay
the chiefs one third of their harvested crop.” (citations omitted)).
266. Ryan Bubb, States, Law, and Property Rights in West Africa 3 (March 21, 2011) (find-
ing that de facto property rights on either side of the border between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire
were extremely similar, especially in comparison with the property rights in different regions),
available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/events_media/States_Law
_and_Property_Rights_in_West_Africa.pdf (last visited June 24, 2012).
267. JOIREMAN, supra note 254, at 113.
268. Joseph Blocher, Note, Building on Custom: Land Tenure Policy and Economic Develop-
ment in Ghana, 9 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 166 (2006).
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a communal viewpoint.269 Not surprisingly, with this heavy influence,
the Government of Ghana (“GOG”) has incorporated customary law
into the Ghanaian land regime.270
Customary law can be viewed as both a positive and negative attri-
bute to the land rights of its constituents. As a flexible and dynamic
system, customary law is beneficial to environmental conservation
efforts in Africa.271 However, the use of customary law has emphasized
the differences in regional land systems across Ghana, especially those
governed by statute and those governed by customary law.272 Perhaps
most problematically, customary law is unwritten, and is “defined
by those who administer it, often for their own benefit”; leading to the
enrichment of those few who possess the authority to interpret law
and make land transactions.273 This has resulted in outbreaks of vio-
lence for these positions of power in customary law systems.274 This
violence is further perpetuated by different ethnic groups seeking
land ownership. The statutory and constitutional regime of Ghana is
founded on notions of equality across the entire citizenship of Ghana,
whereas customary law merely “was formed to organize and control
ethic groups; it is rooted in place and ethos.” Customary law there-
fore favors those with some form of ties to the community, disad-
vantaging and prejudicing land ownership among poorer or migrant
classes in Ghana.275 The mixture of all of these competing influences
has resulted in difficulty in the enforcement of land rights in Ghana,
particularly among the poorer classes.276
In addition to the challenge of a customary law system, Ghana
has many practical problems with its statutory and constitutional
law for managing property, particularly land. Reported problems in-
clude: ineffective land administration, indeterminate boundaries of
land, inadequate land security, land racketeering.277 “[L]and records
can be incomplete or non-existent and, therefore, clear title may be
269. See Bubb, supra note 266, at 3.
270. See id.
271. JOIREMAN, supra note 254, at 41.
272. Id. at 42.
273. Id. at 40.
274. Id. at 42 (stating that “[i]n 2008, struggles over succession in a Ghanaian chieftainship
resulted in 20 deaths as well as a greater number of wounded people.”).
275. Id. at 43.
276. Sarpong, supra note 265, at 5.
277. Id.
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impossible to establish.”278 The Ghanaian judiciary, due to resource
constraints and inefficiencies, is slow and ineffective at enforcing
decisions,279 and has “not been given, nor do they consider that they
need a precise definition of customary law” and instead generalize
customary law.280 However, “[t]he most telling evidence of [Ghana’s]
statutory land law’s failure is the fact that most people ignore it when-
ever possible.”281
In light of the institutional shortcomings of the Ghanaian prop-
erty regime, many landowners in contemporary Ghana instead pro-
tect their property privately, through the use of “Land Guards.” Land
Guards are simply individuals or groups of individuals—often former
security or police officials—who are paid by landowners to protect
their land.282 Land Guards protect land from encroachment by squat-
ters and trespassers—often through the illegal use or threat of force.283
Despite its illegality, the use of force is considered “critical” to the
Land Guards’ ability to protect the landowners property interest, yet
there have been numerous reports of Land Guards using force against
police, citizens, and even the Land Guards of neighbors.284 More prob-
lematically, some citizens with competing claims to land will some-
times hire Land Guards to protect their disputed land—Land Guards
don’t care who the rightful owner of the land is, but who is paying
them.285 Despite these problems, public opinion in Ghana is split on
Land Guards: most people consider them necessary to the protection
of land claims, yet they are also considered a threat to local govern-
ments, and the well-being of the nation.286
278. U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs, 2011 Investment
Climate Statement—Ghana, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2011/157283.htm (last visited
June 24, 2012). See also Sarpong, supra note 265, at 5 (noting that “several groups are affected
by land tenure . . . stool who have customary freehold but not written agreement confirming their
interest in the land; women, whose rights are usually secondary to those of their husbands,
fathers, brothers or sons; and migrants without firm written claims to land.”).
279. Heritage Foundation, Ghana, in 2011 Index of Economic Freedom, available at http://
www.heritage.org/index/Country/Ghana (last visited June 24, 2012).
280. Blocher, supra note 268, at 166 (citing GORDON WOODMAN, CUSTOMARY LAND LAW IN
THE GHANAIAN COURTS 40 (1996)).
281. Id. at 189.
282. JOIREMAN, supra note 254, at 115.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 112.
286. Id. at 116–18 (explaining that police in Ghana are traditionally thought of as corrupt
and untrustworthy, although the Government has begun anti-corruption programs, especially
among the police force. Regardless, it will take time to restore the public trust.).
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However, even with the difficulties in the Ghanaian property re-
gime, the GOG has prioritized attracting foreign investment through
the use of domestic and international tools. To attract international
investment, the GOG has passed and enforced a number of invest-
ment laws aimed at protecting foreign investment from expropria-
tion. Although there have not been any recent cases of expropriations
by the GOG, there have been a few instances where foreign investors
have either filed for international arbitration against the GOG or
agreed to sell investments to the GOG.287 Domestically, the GOG has
guaranteed the protection of property rights in their Constitution.
The current Ghanaian Constitution guarantees the private owner-
ship of land, and “[e]very person has the right to own property either
alone or in association with others. . . .”288 The government may only
interfere with this right “in accordance with land and as may be nec-
essary in a free and democratic society for public safety or the eco-
nomic well-being of the county, for the protection of health or morals,
for the prevention of disorder or crime or for the protection of the
rights or freedoms of others.”289 The 1992 constitutional guarantees
on property rights are meant to act as limits on previous legislation
which empowered the GOG’s use of eminent domain. The GOG still
maintains power to take land under a variety of previous legislation
however, including the 1962 Administration of Lands Act, the 1962
State Lands Act, the 1963 Lands Act and the 1965 Public Conveyance
Act, so long as the taking complies with the constitutional require-
ments of a public purpose and compensation.290
1. Public Purpose
Under Section 20(1), property cannot be taken by the government
unless two conditions are satisfied:
(a) the taking of possession or acquisition is necessary in the
interest of defence, public safety, public order, public morality,
public health, town and country planning or the development or
287. U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs, 2011 Investment
Climate Statement—Ghana, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2011/157283.htm (last visited
June 24, 2012).
288. GHANA CONST. (1992) § 18(1).
289. Id. § 18(2).
290. Sarpong, supra note 265, at 5.
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utilization of property in such a manner as to promote the public
benefit; and
(b) the necessity for the acquisition is clearly stated and is such
as to provide reasonable justification for causing any hardship
that may result to any person who has an interest in or right over
the property.
Section 20(1)(a) gives detailed, and rather broad language for govern-
mental justifications which would be sufficient for a “public purpose”
for the government to use its eminent domain power. If the GOG does
not end up using the land in the public purpose, the former landowner
is given the first option to purchase the property for the price of the
original compensation or an amount which is “commensurate with
the value of the property at the time of the reacquisition.”291
2. Compensation
Compensation is addressed in section 20(2) which provides that
the GOG can only use its eminent domain power if done under a law
which provides for “(a) the prompt payment of fair and adequate com-
pensation; and (b) a right of access to the High Court by any person
who has an interest in or right over the property. . . .” Further, under
20(3), if anyone is displaced by the taking, the GOG needs to “resettle
the displaced inhabitants on a suitable alternative land with due re-
gard for their economic well-being and social and cultural values.”292
These provisions were adopted in response to the pre-constitutional
state of takings in Ghana where no compensation was paid.293 How-
ever, there is still concern that some takings have continued to occur
in Ghana without any compensation being provided.294 Further, there
is concern regarding the GOG’s use of its eminent domain power, spe-
cifically in the mineral rich mine towns.295 It has been reported that
291. GHANA CONST. (1992) § 20(6).
292. Id. § 20(3).
293. Sarpong, supra note 265, at 4–5.
294. Id. at 5.
295. Adjei Agyei-Baah, Govts and Power of Eminent Domain: An Infringement of Peoples
Rights, Ghanaian CHRON. (Aug. 13, 2009), available at http://www.modernghana.com/blogs
/232694/31/govts-and-power-of-eminent-domain-an-infringement-.html (last visited June 24,
2012). See also GHANA CONST. (1992) § 257(6) (stating that “[e]very mineral in its natural state
in, under or upon any land in Ghana, rivers, streams, water courses throughout Ghana, the ex-
clusive economic zone and any area covered by the territorial sea or continental shelf is property
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almost 80% of those affected by the GOG’s use of eminent domain
were dissatisfied with the rendered compensation given.296
III. DOMESTIC FACTORS AFFECTING PROPERTY RIGHTS
The five nations highlighted above are each at different points in
their development and each face different and significant challenges
in the enforcement and implementation of their property rights re-
gime. The unique domestic and international characteristics of these
nations, however, may influence their approach to property rights.
Some of these factors may be idiosyncratic, and others may be applica-
ble to other nations throughout the world. It is interesting, and per-
haps a point worthy of further research, when these factors—however
idiosyncratic they may seem—appear to affect other countries in sur-
prising ways. Based on only the five nations briefly described above,
a number of factors appear to influence their property rights regime,
including the application and enforcement of property rights, the
constitutional guarantee of compensation for takings, the impact of
each country’s judiciary, any stated governmental land policies, the
history and tradition of that country or the people who reside there,
as well as the social attitude towards property rights. Interestingly
some of these factors have cross-national significance, affecting a
number of nations in different ways; some factors, on the other hand,
may be completely idiosyncratic. These factors are in no way to be
considered exhaustive—even among the five countries discussed
above—as they are in many ways a subjective observation based on
a small sample size.
A. The Application and Enforcement of Property Rights
The application and enforcement of property rights is perhaps the
broadest of these factors, and in some cases, the least transparent.
Each of these countries has their own prerogatives and policies for
spurring economic growth through both domestic and international
sources. Each of these nations has done this through the protection
of property in different ways, often faced with the practical realities
of the political systems they have inherited.
of the Republic of Ghana and shall be vested in the President on behalf of, and in trust for the
people of Ghana.”).
296. Agyei-Baah, supra note 295 (citations omitted).
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For instance, the consistency of a compensation policy has been an
issue of contention in both South Africa and India. In South Africa
the government is prone to pay fair market value for any expropri-
ated property because of the variety of pressures it faces, including
the amount of time litigation takes in the country, domestic and in-
ternational political pressure, and even things as trivial as the fre-
quently inaccurate valuation of property by property assessors.297 In
India, its government is prone to pay well below market value because
of the lack of oversight in the takings process, the amount of discre-
tion government officials are given in determining compensation, as
well as the futility of a landowner engaging in a meaningful appeal.298
Singapore, on the other hand, operates in a society where it is able to
not only omit any constitutional guarantee, but where it is usually
statutorily required to pay less than fair market value. However, the
effectiveness of ex gratia payments to placate former landowners is
certainly open to interpretation and further research.
On the other end of the spectrum, in Ghana the governmental
shortcomings in the application and enforcement of private property
rights at any level has been so profound it has spurred its own indus-
try. The incomplete reach of the government, along with an ineffective
judiciary, has led to the phenomena of many landowners paying for
Land Guards to prevent encroachment and has put landowners in the
uncomfortable position of paying for this necessary service, despite
the social unrest they cause.299 Additionally, the legacy of customary
law continues to transcend the population, further complicating prop-
erty ownership.
B. Compensational Guarantee in the Constitution
The promise of compensation in a constitution was a similarly
transcendent issue across a number of the countries examined. Three
of the countries discussed have had the protection of their property
rights influenced by the governmental decision of whether or not to
guarantee the right to compensation in their constitutions. This has
often been tied to that country’s concept of what a “public purpose”
should include. For example, Singapore purposefully left a property
clause out of their Constitution because of the belief that leaving out
297. See supra notes 116–26 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 166–74 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 286–90 and accompanying text.
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compensation was in the best interest of the small country.300 The
government had a simple fear of the escalating costs associated with
the constitutional guarantee to compensation301 as well as concern
with private landowners being unjustly enriched by governmental in-
frastructure development which was essential to the tiny nation.302
Singapore’s concern over the compensation clause appears to be
somewhat vindicated by the Indian experience with their property
clause. Each was concerned over spurring efficient growth in their
country, and India’s guarantee of property rights arguably obstructed
its ability to take as many meaningful steps in development as it
would have liked.
Ghana, on the other hand, consciously sought to include the guaran-
tee of compensation in its recent Constitution in order to address the
lack of compensation which originally characterized its takings law.
The new Ghanaian Constitution went even further, including a pro-
vision that required displaced residents to be resettled on land which
considers “their economic well-being and social and cultural values.”303
C. Judicial Impacts
The role of the judiciary can significantly influence the strength of
property rights protection. The judiciary, in most of the nations ex-
amined, has impacted the development of property rights, even when,
in some cases, they can no longer reach many issues surrounding the
right to property.
The most well-known example occurred in India, where the courts’
prolific attempts at championing the right to property eventually led
to the legislature shutting them out of the property arena by amend-
ing the constitution.304
In other nations, like Singapore, where the judiciary’s influence on
property rights has been restricted, the judiciary has been largely com-
pliant with the government, even when called upon to give their opin-
ion. The Singaporean judiciary’s accommodating nature is probably
surprising to many American readers, as the Singaporean government
300. Chew et al., supra note 211, at 170.
301. Singapore Parliamentary Debates, (22 June 1966) vol. 25, col. 1051.
302. Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (22 June 1966) vol. 25, col. 133 (EX
Barker, Minister for Law and National Development).
303. GHANA CONST. (1992) § 20(3).
304. See supra notes 136–47 and accompanying text.
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makes extensive use of its eminent domain power.305 Still in other
nations, like South Africa, the courts have, for the most part, been on
the same page as the legislature, tempering the property rights af-
forded to their citizens with the important land reform policy there.306
Even in countries where the judiciary lacks many resources and
is largely inaccessible to much of the population, it still affects prop-
erty rights. For instance, in Ghana, the population’s reliance on Land
Guards and customary law reflects the efficiencies of the judicial
system.
D. Government Land Policy
Countries that had land policies often (unsurprisingly) saw these
policies impact all of the property rights of that country. The rationale
behind these land policies were not always the same. For some, it was
focused on post-colonial social justice; for others, economic develop-
ment and smart-growth were at the forefront of the land policy. The
governments of four highlighted counties had an overt land policy:
two based on social and economic reform through land distribution
(Chile, India and South Africa) and the other largely focused on eco-
nomic development (Singapore).
Of all the factors, a land reform policy is perhaps the most polar-
izing topic among the populace of the respective countries examined.
As demonstrated through the South African, Chilean and Indian
experiences, the constitutional debate surrounding property rights
in these countries led to their modern concept of property.
Interestingly, South Africa and India, two nations with similar
land reform policies and goals, each saw the constitutional protec-
tion of their property rights go in completely opposite ways. South
Africa, a country concerned with shedding the shadow of Apartheid,
framed property not only as a right but a social obligation. To avoid
being tied to the legacy of Apartheid, they went further, giving a
broad and detailed treatment to their property provision, making
305. Teng Fuh Holdings v. Collector of Land Revenue, 2006-3 SING. L. REP. 507, 523–24 (Sing.
High Ct.). Further, the Singaporean judiciary, like most Asian-Pacific countries, does not even
recognize regulatory takings. See Chen, supra note 213, at 12 (citing TAKING LAND: COMPULSORY
PURCHASE AND REGULATION IN ASIAN-PACIFIC COUNTRIES 4 (Tsuyoshi Kotaka & David L. Callies
eds., 2002) (noting that Japan and Korea are the only Asian Pacific nations which have doctrine
similar to regulatory takings)).
306. First National Bank of SA Ltd. t/a Wesbank v. Commissioner, 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC).
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sure that a “public purpose” was defined to include the land reform
policy.307 India, although similarly devoted to a land reform policy,
eventually ended up removing the guarantee of property rights from
their Constitution. Already nervous about including a property rights
guarantee because of their desire to implement land reform, the orig-
inal Indian Constitution defined property as a fundamental right only
because the Prime Minister at the time had indicated to the legisla-
ture that a property guarantee would not interfere with their land re-
form policy.308 However, when the judiciary began to strike down land
reform legislation based on the property clause of the Constitution,
the legislature eventually removed property as a fundamental right,
and stripped it down to the bare-bones constitutional provisions that
exist today.309
Similarly, in Chile, land reform was discussed during constitutional
debates. The Chilean government and people had taken issue with
the large estates of land ownership throughout the country in its early
days. This was among the concerns which drove Chile to include the
“social function” in its property provision, and similarly gave future
governments the ability to engage in widespread land and agrarian
reform in the 1960s.
Singapore, on the other hand, was only interested in a land use pol-
icy that would ensure its rapid development. Like India, Singapore
avoided including compensation—or a right to property at all—in its
Constitution.
E. History and Tradition
All nations and governments are shaped by their history and tra-
dition which influence property rights afforded to the citizens of that
country. Although relatively recent government regimes have been
highlighted in this article, it has illustrated that in some cases new
traditions can be borne affecting a nation’s property regime, such as
in Chile; while in other cases tradition can be so engrained, it can
resist any change to property rights, such as in Ghana.
In the case of Chile, although it has adopted a relatively recent “so-
cial function” obligation in property rights, this policy has continued.
307. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 25(4).
308. ALEXANDER, supra note 71, at 50.
309. See INDIA CONST. art. 300A.
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Despite the vast economic ideological differences controlling govern-
ments have had in Chile—Socialism to laissez faire—each has con-
tinued the historical broad “social function” clause of the Constitution.
On the other hand, in Ghana property rights have been influenced
by customary law for thousands of years. Customary law appears to
be so engrained that it has been a source of conflict for property rights;
over 80% of Ghana has included customary law in its property rights
regime.310 Unfortunately, the influence of customary law in its prop-
erty rights regime has still not completely melded with the current
needs of a rapidly modernizing country, leading to many problems in
urbanizing areas.311
Landownership can also be a source of social and economic privilege.
In Indian society, landownership is a source of standing and respect.312
Similarly, in Ghana landownership signals economic, political, and
religious good standing.313
F. The Social Obligation of Property
Many of the countries examined in this paper have gone notice-
ably far in their property rights regime, establishing “an overriding
obligation” on the ownership of property.314 This social obligation
has been a noticeable trend in constitutional law, one which arguably
traces its roots to the German Basic Law.315 Under the German Basic
Law, or German Grundgesetz, property rights, as well as land use,
are subject to a social obligation which balances the interests of the
general population against the individual and can allow the govern-
ment more broad powers to use their eminent domain power.316
For example, the Constitutions of South Africa and Chile have ex-
plicitly acknowledged the social obligation of property ownership.317
Each of these clauses originated, at least in part, with the call for land
310. JOIREMAN, supra note 254, at 113.
311. See supra notes 200–06 and accompanying text.
312. Mahalingam & Vyas, supra note 145, at 94–102.
313. JOIREMAN, supra note 254, at 34.
314. ALEXANDER, supra note 71, at 7.
315. See Mostert, supra note 82, at 245, 255 (citing Grundgesetz fur die Bundesrepublik
Deutschland, art. 14).
316. Gregory Alexander, Property as a Fundamental Constitutional Right? The German
Example, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 733 (2003).
317. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 25(4); Chile Const. (1980), art. 19(24).
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reform as an influential issue during the drafting of each nation’s re-
spective constitution. In South Africa in particular, the social obliga-
tion concept of German property law has been particularly influential,
in both the actual constitutional text of property, as well as the devel-
oping jurisprudence of property cases in the South African Judiciary.318
Singapore, despite lacking a constitutional protection of property,
appears to have somewhat taken notice of this social obligation to
property, as the people and judiciary have largely been compliant with
the government’s broad grant of authority and extensive use of emi-
nent domain.319
CONCLUSION
There are many factors that influence the property rights regime
in a given nation, making it difficult to conduct meaningful compar-
ative analysis if the purpose of such inquiry is to determine whether
concepts and protections may be portable from one jurisdiction to
another. However, an examination not just of the words that comprise
constitutional and statutory property rights protections in develop-
ing countries, but also an awareness of the domestic and international
influences leading to certain protection policies, can aid practitio-
ners in better assessing the strength and weaknesses of the not only
the protections afforded but the available enforcement mechanisms
and the potential for likely fiscal compensation when appropriate, to
best advise clients who possess global marketplace interests. Most
of all, however, property rights are a fascinating combination of
social ambitions tempered by practical realities. The property rights
of every country are forged from traditions that are often older than
the country itself, yet are still molded to accommodate the future
of a society. As the world grows smaller and practitioners face the
increased pressure to be aware of the cultural influences that can
shape a property regime, all must be aware that the essence of a
given society’s property regime is often made from a complex array
of socioeconomic factors.
318. For more detailed treatment on the social obligation of property in South African
jurisprudence, see Mostert, supra note 82, at 255, 268.
319. See NICHOLS, supra note 212, at Ch. 1A, § 1C.10; Galstaun v. Attorney-General (1981)
1 M.L.J. 9 at 10, per Chua J.
INCORPORATION OF THE RIGHT TO JUST COMPENSATION:
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT VS. THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
ALAN T. ACKERMAN*
INTRODUCTION
The Fourteenth Amendment, the most litigated and arguably
important amendment to the U.S. Constitution, was drafted during
Reconstruction by a select committee of six senators and nine repre-
sentatives called the Committee of Fifteen.1 While the Committee’s
secret meetings were not transcribed, a record of their proposals and
their votes survived in a clerk’s journal.2 Before the Committee ap-
proved the final version of the Fourteenth Amendment as it stands
today,3 Representative John Bingham of Ohio offered an addition,4
which mirrored the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause5:
[N]or shall any state deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws, nor take private property for
public use without just compensation.6
The Committee rejected this construction by a seven-to-five vote.7
Notably, Bingham offered this amendment by itself, not as part of
a larger provision, which the Committee may have rejected for other
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and at Michigan State University College of Law since 2004. Michigan State University, B.A.,
1968, MLIR 1971; University of Michigan Law School, 1972. Mr. Ackerman is a member of
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1. See BENJAMIN B. KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON
RECONSTRUCTION: 39TH CONGRESS, 1865–1867 134 (1914).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 82.
4. Id. at 82, 85.
5. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.”).
6. KENDRICK, supra note 1, at 82–85.
7. Id. at 106.
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reasons.8 The Committee then adopted the Fourteenth Amendment
as it stands today, without a specific “takings clause.”9
What does this rejected addition say about the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and eminent domain jurisprudence? Does the Committee’s re-
jection indicate its belief that the right to just compensation did not
bind the states? Or did the Committee assume that since the Four-
teenth Amendment incorporated the entire Bill of Rights, the Fifth
Amendment’s taking clause would have applied to the states anyway,
making a separate clause in the Fourteenth redundant? Many still
debate whether the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment adhered
to this “total incorporation” theory.10 Perhaps the Committee believed
that because the right to just compensation was so fundamental, it
was part of “natural rights” that need not be enumerated.
Unfortunately, we can only speculate as to the true mindsets of
these framers. Nonetheless, while the rejection of the Bingham
Amendment seems like a curious historical footnote, it warrants re-
examining. Confusion over the framers’ intentions and the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments has
caused a “muddling”11 of substantive due process and the Takings
Clause, leading to confusing Supreme Court precedent. In modern
eminent domain cases, most courts cite the Takings Clause, the part
of the Fifth Amendment which reads: “[N]or shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.”12 However, the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ Due Process Clauses also men-
tion “property,” stating, that no person shall be deprived of “life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”13 Which of these
two clauses governs eminent domain? Are they reconcilable?
Over the years, the Supreme and inferior courts have produced a
confusing eminent domain doctrine that draws on substantive due
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. For a variety of views on the issue, see RAOUL BERGER, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1989); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193 (1992); Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment
Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN L. REV. 5 (1949); Earl
M. Maltz, Fourteenth Amendment Concepts in the Antebellum Era, 32 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
305 (1988).
11. See Bradley C. Karkainnen, The Police Power Revisited: Phantom Incorporation and
the Roots of the Takings “Muddle,” 90 MINN. L. REV. 826 (2006).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
13. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV (emphasis added).
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process in some situations and the just compensation principle in
others. The simplest interpretation is that the Due Process Clause
requires process, i.e., notice and hearing, while the Takings Clause
requires just compensation, even after adequate notice and a fair
hearing.14 However, after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the Supreme Court began to enforce “substantive due process,”
which enforces substantive rights, not merely the right to notice and
hearing. Professor Kanner, factoring in substantive due process,
believes a proper reading of these provisions is that the Due Process
Clause restricts the police power, which is “regulatory and noncom-
pensable,” while the Takings Clause restricts eminent domain, which
is “acquisitory and compensable.”15 However, this has not been the
Court’s practice. The Due Process Clause was used in its substantive
form to enforce the right to compensation against state action, at least
until 1978. The Bill of Rights originally restricted only the federal
government, as stated in the 1833 case Barron v. City of Baltimore.16
As Professor Bradley C. Karkainnen aptly points out,17 until the 1978
decision in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,18
most Supreme Court cases striking down state “takings” actions
cited the Due Process Clause, not mentioning the Takings Clause. Cit-
ing an 1897 case, Chicago, B. & Q. Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago,19
the Supreme Court held that the Takings Clause was “of course”
applicable to the states.20 The trouble with this statement is that
Chicago, B. & Q. did not even mention the Takings Clause. It relied
on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, as did most
cases until Penn Central’s definitive incorporation. The Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause served as the vehicle through which
the “natural right” protecting property was enforced, at least until
1978, when Penn Central definitively incorporated the Takings
Clause against the states. Additionally, the fact that the public use
component of the Takings Clause “was originally understood to be
14. See Gideon Kanner, Kelo v. New London: Bad Law, Bad Policy, and Bad Judgment,
38 URB. LAW. 201, 210–11 (2006) (citing ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY
AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 546–47 (1904)).
15. Id. at 211.
16. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
17. Lawrence Berger, Public Use, Substantive Due Process and Takings—An Integration,
74 NEB. L. REV. 843 (1995); Karkainnen, supra note 11.
18. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
19. 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
20. 438 U.S. at 122.
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merely descriptive and impose no independent limit on legislative
authority”21 also indicates that until the late twentieth century,
American courts primarily applied the natural right to just compen-
sation through substantive due process. The public use clause—the
one element that sets the Takings Clause apart from due process—
has never been substantive in eminent domain jurisprudence. Re-
cently, in Kelo v. City of New London, the Supreme Court confirmed
the public use clause as nullity. While many criticize this ruling, it
merely comports with centuries under which only the common law
right to just compensation applied to the states.
Adding to the confusion, the Court has recently breathed new life
into the Takings Clause, allowing it to fill the void left when the
Court retreated from “economic” substantive due process in the wake
of the New Deal.22 The Takings Clause has been used to restrict the
police power since Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon23 in 1922, the first
“regulatory takings” case. “Regulatory takings” are regulations that
limit use of land, but do not take title from the original owners.24
This contrasts with occupations of land, which are per se takings no
matter how small the impact.25 Today, the Takings Clause has a broad
scope, encompassing takings of land, zoning, wetlands, and other land
use and environmental restrictions, and even regulations affecting
non-real property, such as intellectual property26 and a law compelling
21. Shaun A. Goho, Process-Oriented Review and the Original Understanding of the Public
Use Requirement, 38 SW. L. REV. 37, 39 (2008) (citing Matthew P. Harrington, “Public Use” and
the Original Understanding of the So-Called “Takings” Clause, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1245, 1249
(2002)).
22. See discussion of substantive due process and Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905), at infra Part III.
23. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
24. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512
U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447
U.S. 255 (1980); 438 U.S. 104; Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
25. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (even a de
minimis physical occupation is still a “taking” under the Fifth Amendment). However, this
rule is not as clear-cut as it seems. In Yee v. City of Escondido, California, 503 U.S. 519
(1992), the Court refined the line between physical invasions and regulatory takings. The
petitioner was a mobile home park who argued a rent control ordinance was a “physical
occupation” because it prevented them from evicting delinquent tenants. Id. at 523. However,
the Court wrote: “The government effects a physical taking only where it requires the land-
owner to submit to the physical occupation of his land. ‘This element of required acquiescence
is at the heart of the concept of occupation.’” Id. at 527 (quoting FCC v. Fla. Power Corp., 480
U.S. 245, 252 (1987)).
26. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
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corporations to pay into a pension fund (which was found to consti-
tute a taking).27 Some call for the Supreme Court to reconcile the two
clauses and form a unified doctrine;28 others call for a “decoupling.”29
Indeed, the Court’s willingness to strike down almost any regulation
of “property,” real or otherwise, as an uncompensated “taking,” is
almost a resurrection of the infamous Lochner v. New York era, in
which the Court used the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause
to strike down virtually any state regulation of economic activity.30
Considering that the Court’s modern Takings Clause jurisprudence
stems from substantive due process, it is unsurprising that after the
repudiation of Lochner, the Court now applies the Takings Clause to
so wide a swath of police power actions. When the Supreme Court
interprets the Takings Clause against state action, it is really ap-
plying substantive due process to restrict police power. The Court
should begin viewing its eminent domain jurisprudence through this
lens, to avoid making the Takings Clause something it is not. It is
impossible to “decouple”31 the condemnation aspects of the Takings
and Due Process Clauses because they both originated from common
law “natural rights” principles dating back centuries before the fram-
ing of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
While many scholars have generated vigorous discussion about the
implications of the Supreme Court’s mingling of due process and the
Takings Clause,32 this paper examines the historical context that
allowed this muddling to happen. In pre-colonial America and in
England, the right to just compensation when property was taken
was a fundamental “natural right,” predating both the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Bill of Rights. No doubt this fact influenced the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, who may not have adhered
to the “total incorporation” theory of the Bill of Rights but at least
recognized a fundamental right to just compensation when property
was taken. So fundamental was the right that enumerating it sep-
arately in the Fourteenth Amendment was unnecessary. Bingham’s
27. See Eastern Enter. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
28. Roderick E. Walston, The Constitution and Property: Due Process, Regulatory Takings,
and Judicial Takings, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 379 (2001).
29. Mark Tunick, Constitutional Protections of Private Property: Decoupling the Takings
and Due Process Clauses, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 885 (2001).
30. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Expropriatory Intent: Defining the Proper Boundaries of
Substantive Due Process and the Takings Clause, 80 N.C. L. REV. 713 (2002).
31. See Tunick, supra note 29.
32. See Karkkainen, supra note 11; Krotoszynski, supra note 30; Tunick, supra note 29.
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proposal to include the takings analogue may have been simply a
misstep from a man whose thoughts on the Fourteenth Amendment
were often unclear and jumbled. Another interpretation is that reg-
ulation of property had always been an issue of state police power,
and the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not want to dis-
turb this precept. However, considering how willing the framers were
to restrict state power after the Civil War, it may be they recognized
the right to compensation as a fundamental natural right.
This article will examine the pre-colonial and antebellum period
in Part I, to determine the genesis of the just compensation princi-
ple in American law, and to determine what may have inspired the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. Part II will analyze the
drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment itself, and exactly what
the framers had on their minds when they considered a takings
clause analogue. Part III will examine takings cases following the
Fourteenth Amendment up to Penn Central in 1978, and will conclude
that until that case, natural rights principles were predominant.
Finally, Part IV will analyze the impact of the Penn Central decision
and its progeny, and whether they accord with what the framers
may have intended.
I. JUST COMPENSATION BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR:
INFLUENCES ON THE COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN
From the founding of the country, the right to just compensation
was woven into the fabric of natural law. It is hard to believe this
fact did not influence John Bingham and his colleagues on the
Committee of Fifteen. Prior to the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, two broad themes emerged in American law. First, the
Takings Clause of the federal constitution was not a source to re-
strict state infringements on property rights. Second, the common
law “natural right” to just compensation was a justification to re-
strain state exercises of eminent domain. The prevailing force in
restricting state condemnations in the nineteenth century was sub-
stantive due process. However, whether “natural rights” or the spe-
cific language of the Takings Clause should govern eminent domain
has been the subject of debate. In fact, the importance of natural
rights in constitutional law has been questioned since early American
legal history. The debate on the significance of “natural rights” in
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constitutional law dates back at least to Calder v. Bull,33 in which
Justices Chase and Iredell famously debated whether the Court had
the power to overturn a statute based on “natural justice.” Referring
to the Social Compact, Justice Chase stated,
There are acts which the Federal, or State, Legislature cannot
do, without exceeding their authority. There are certain vital
principles in our free Republican governments, which will deter-
mine and over-rule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative
power; as to authorize manifest injustice by positive law; or to
take away that security for personal liberty, or private property,
for the protection whereof the government was established. An
ACT of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the
great first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered
a rightful exercise of legislative authority.34
Justice Iredell responded that
The ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard:
the ablest and the purest men have differed upon the subject;
and all that the Court could properly say, in such an event,
would be, that the Legislature (possessed of an equal right of
opinion) had passed an act which, in the opinion of the judges,
was inconsistent with the abstract principles of natural justice.35
Nonetheless, Iredell agreed that a legislative act violating the Con-
stitution would be void.36 In essence, the debate between Chase and
Iredell continues to this day, especially in the context of eminent
domain. Since Calder v. Bull, the Supreme Court has struck down
state and federal exercises of eminent domain under both natural
law principles and with specific reference to the Fifth Amendment’s
Takings Clause.
To examine this issue, it is necessary to explore the historical or-
igins of “natural rights” and limitations on eminent domain. The
power of eminent domain emerged in the Roman Empire, possibly
earlier.37 In early history, the sovereign had ultimate dominion over
33. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
34. Id. at 388.
35. Id. at 399 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
36. Id.
37. Glen H. Sturtevant, Jr., Note, Economic Development as Public Use: Why Justice
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all property. Aristotle believed the State was “the highest form of
community, existing to achieve the highest good for its citizens.”38
His republican ideas migrated to England, where scholars such as
Grotius argued that sovereign states had original and absolute own-
ership of property, prior to possession by citizens.39 Grotius coined
the term dominium eminens.40 As England colonized America in the
seventeenth century, republican ideals prevailed. Individual posses-
sion of property came only by grants from the State, which implic-
itly reserved the right to resume ownership of property.41
The principle of just compensation for eminent domain emerged
with the philosophy of John Locke, a contemporary of Grotius Locke,
whose liberal theories advocated individual property rights. How-
ever, the idea of an individual, “natural” right to property ownership
saw its genesis much earlier. In 1215, the Magna Carta limited the
sovereign’s power by granting inalienable individual rights, among
them the right to possess property:
NO Freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or be disseised of his
Freehold, or Liberties, or free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled,
or any other wise destroyed; nor will We not pass upon him, nor
condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his Peers, or by the Law
of the Land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to
any man either Justice or Right.42
This clause, the genesis of “substantive” due process, influenced the
legal philosophers Blackstone and Coke. They recognized the exis-
tence of certain “natural rights” that limited the power of govern-
ment whenever its actions conflicted with the common law or the
laws of “the Creator.”43 Notions of unwritten “natural” or “universal”
Ryan’s Poletown Dissent Provides a Better Way to Decide Kelo and Future Public Use Cases, 15
FED. CIR. B.J. 201, 204 & n.21 (2005) (citing Harrington, supra note 21, at 1249 & nn.9–10).
38. Justice Philip A. Talmadge, The Myth of Property Absolutism and Modern Gov-
ernment: The Interaction of Police Power and Property Rights, 75 WASH L. REV. 857, 861
(2000); see also BERTRAND RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 186 (1945) (quoting
ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, para. 1280b).
39. Sturtevant, supra note 37, at 204 & n. 22.
40. Id. (citing Harrington, supra note 21, at 1249).
41. Id.
42. Magna Carta art. 29 (1297).
43. See, e.g., Dr. Bonham’s Case, in 4 THE REPORTS OF SIR EDWARD COKE, KNT. 355, 375
(John Henry Thomas & John Farquhar Fraser eds., London, Joseph Butterworth & Son 1826)
(“And it appears in our books, that in many cases, the common law will controul acts of
2012] INCORPORATION OF THE RIGHT TO JUST COMPENSATION 103
rights would form the basis for “substantive” due process in American
constitutional law.44 John Locke expanded “natural rights” to protect
an individual’s right to hold property. He rejected the notion that all
property ultimately belonged to the sovereign,45 postulating that
individuals had an absolute right to hold property; governments could
only take land with the owner’s consent.46
Scholars debate the degree to which Locke’s liberalism usurped
traditional republicanism in the minds of the Founding Fathers and
post-Revolution American states. William Michael Treanor argues
that two competing schools of thought both contributed to the devel-
opment of early American law. He summarized the two schools:
Liberalism begins with the belief that individuals are motivated
primarily, if not wholly, by self-interest and with the belief that
rights are prepolitical. Government exists to protect those rights
and the private pursuit of goals determined by self-interest.
Republican thinkers, in contrast, see the end of the state as the
promotion of the common good and of virtue. Rights, rather than
being prepolitical, are created by the polity and subject to limi-
tation by the polity when necessitated by the common interest.
Whereas liberals are comfortable with economic self-interest,
republicans have a profoundly ambivalent stance toward pri-
vate property.47
English eminent domain law split the difference between the liberal
and republican approaches. Customarily, courts awarded compensa-
tion for total takings of property, though not for property damaged
parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void: for when an act of parliament is
against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common
law will controul it, and adjudge such act to be void”); see also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *39–41 (“Man . . . must necessarily be subject to the laws of his Creator . . . .
This will of his Maker is called the law of nature . . . . This law of nature . . . is of course
superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at all
times: no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid
derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original.”).
44. See discussion of substantive due process and Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905), at infra Part III.
45. DAVID ANDREW SCHULTZ, PROPERTY, POWER, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 24 (1992).
46. Id.; William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH L. REV. 553,
567 (1972).
47. William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and
The Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 821 (1995) [hereinafter Treanor, The Original
Understanding].
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by state activities.48 Further, litigants could not challenge the govern-
ment’s determination that property was needed for a “public use.”49
Thus, while the law protected the individual right to property to
some extent (liberalism), the law also forced individuals to sacrifice
to the greater good (republicanism).
In contrast, American colonial and early state governments drifted
more toward republicanism. No pre-Revolution colonial charter or
document included any compensation for takings, except John Locke’s
1669 Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina, which the state never
fully implemented.50 Some colonial laws required a judicial or admin-
istrative procedure, but without guaranteed compensation.51 These
trends continued after the Revolution. Only a handful of state docu-
ments mandated compensation requirements: The Vermont Consti-
tution (1777), Massachusetts Constitution (1780), and Northwest
Ordinance (1787).52 In one scholar’s words, “The first round of state
constitutions had given legislatures virtually absolute power. The cor-
ollary was that the executive branch was left with very little power.
In the context of takings, most state constitutions required only legis-
lative consent—a limit on the executive, not the legislature.”53 States
confiscated and redistributed the estates of loyalists, expropriated
goods and services without payment, and upset “commercial relation-
ships through paper money schemes and debtor-relief legislation.”54
Undeveloped property was taken and transferred to other private
properties, or private, unimproved property was simply taken to
build roads or to otherwise promote economic growth.55 Use of prop-
erty was not always reserved for the “public.” Private property was
taken to build private “mills, private roads, and [for] the drainage
of private lands.”56 One historian estimates divestment acts and bills
48. SCHULTZ, supra note 45, at 25–26; see William Michael Treanor, The Origins and
Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J.
694, 698–99 (1985) [hereinafter Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance].
49. Id.
50. Treanor, The Original Understanding, supra note 47, at 785–86.
51. Id.
52. SCHULTZ, supra note 45, at 25–27; Treanor, The Original Understanding, supra note 47,
at 790–91.
53. Goho, supra note 21, at 64.
54. Michael B. Kent, Jr., From “Preferred Position” to “Poor Relation”: History, Wilkie v.
Robbins, and the Status of Property Rights Under the Takings Clause, 39 N.M. L. REV. 89, 94
(2009).
55. Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance, supra note 48, at 695–96.
56. Sturtevant, supra note 37, at 206 & n.37 (citing 2A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN
§ 7.01[3], at 7–17).
2012] INCORPORATION OF THE RIGHT TO JUST COMPENSATION 105
of attainder confiscated twenty million dollars of real estate, which
was ten percent of the total real estate in the country.57 State legis-
latures and courts made clear that it was the state’s right to seize
land.58 Citizens “were bound to contribute as much [land], as by the
laws of the country, were deemed necessary for the public conve-
nience.”59 Compensation was merely a “bounty given . . . by the State”
out of “kindness.”60 Uncompensated takings were justified by “ancient
rights and principles” and the “supreme authority of the state.”61
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment sat largely idle dur-
ing the first 150 years of the United States’ existence and did noth-
ing to limit these state excesses in the antebellum period. Chiefly
concerned with the federal government’s tyranny, the framers of the
Constitution were content leaving disputes over improper exercises of
states’ taking power to their internal political processes.62 The Fifth
Amendment restricted only the national government, as the Supreme
Court made clear in the 1833 case Barron v. City of Baltimore.63 It was
the first “anti-incorporation” case, and held that the Bill of Rights ap-
plied only to the federal government. The case bolstered state auton-
omy by dismissing a Fifth Amendment Takings Clause challenge
against the City of Baltimore, holding that the clause only applied
against the federal government.
If these propositions be correct, the fifth amendment must be
understood as restraining the power of the general government,
not as applicable to the states. In their several constitutions,
they have imposed such restrictions on their respective govern-
ments, as their own wisdom suggested; such as they deemed
most proper for themselves. It is a subject on which they judge
exclusively, and with which others interfere no further than they
are supposed to have a common interest.64
Perhaps motivated by the slavery controversy, the Court in Barron
v. Baltimore ensured that states had almost plenary power over all
57. Treanor, The Original Understanding, supra note 47, at 790 & n.44 (citing FORREST
MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION
91–92 & n.71 (1985)).
58. Treanor, The Original Understanding, supra note 47, at 824.
59. M’Clenachan v. Curwen, 3 Yeates 362, 373 (Pa. 1802).
60. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 1 Pen. & W. 462, 465 (Pa. 1830).
61. Lindsay v Commn’rs, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 38, 50, 57 (S.C. 1796).
62. SCHULTZ, supra note 45, at 25–26.
63. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
64. Id. at 247–48.
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property within their borders. This created a strongly federal policy
on property rights, serving as a precursor to later cases upholding
slavery and segregation such as Dred Scott v. Sandford.65 Barron v.
Baltimore and other “anti-incorporation” cases66 reinforced the strong
police powers guaranteed by States under the Constitution and Tenth
Amendment of the Bill of Rights. Kent points out that Barron v. Bal-
timore and other reasons meant the Takings Clause had little im-
pact on states in the nineteenth century.
Unfortunately, there is little direct application of the Takings
Clause by the courts of this era for two reasons. First, in Barron
v. Baltimore, the Supreme Court held that the Clause applied
only to the federal government, and not to the states. Second,
until the late nineteenth century, the federal government nor-
mally had the states condemn on its behalf or else paid com-
pensation by private-bill legislation. As such, there was little
opportunity to develop a body of thorough precedent regarding
the Takings Clause.67
Thus, the Takings Clause sat largely unused, and states were rel-
atively free to abuse the power of eminent domain. It was equally
unused against the federal government. Treanor identifies only a
handful of Supreme Court cases (besides Barron v. Baltimore) involv-
ing Takings Clause claims, all against the property owner’s interest.68
Indeed, the Takings Clause appears to have been a low priority, and
the reason for its inclusion in the Bill of Rights is a mystery. Neither
the framers of the Constitution nor state legislatures seemed con-
cerned that the federal government would unjustly seize property:
So far as we know, no delegate to the Constitutional Convention
in 1787 made any mention of the need for protecting against the
government’s taking power. Similarly, although the state ratify-
ing conventions proposed over eighty different amendments to be
incorporated into the Bill of Rights, not a single request was made
for the Takings Clause or any equivalent measure. In light of
65. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
66. See Livingston’s Lessee v. Moore, 32 U.S. 469 (1833); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1,
53–54 (1824).
67. Kent, supra note 54, at 93.
68. Treanor, The Original Understanding, supra note 47, at 794–97 & nn.69–81 (citing
Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269 (1897); Transportation Company v. Chicago, 99 U.S.
635 (1879); Smith v. Corporation of Washington, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 135 (1858)).
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these facts, one scholar famously has wondered “how [the Clause]
got into our constitutions at all.”69
Kent notes that the Takings Clause “seems entirely to have been the
product of James Madison . . . . But Madison left no documentary
evidence to explain his reasons for the provision, nor did the provi-
sion produce any meaningful discussion in Congress or the state
legislatures.”70 It seems that Revolution-era lawmakers believed
that a specific enumerated right to just compensation was unnec-
essary, or at least not a high priority. Of course, they may have
thought that at that time, the right to just compensation had become
so “fundamental” and “natural” that its inclusion in the Bill of Rights
warranted little discussion. Professor Richard A. Epstein argues, how-
ever, that the Founding Fathers were guided by Lockean Liberalism’s
affection for property rights because “the founders shared Locke’s and
Blackstone’s affection for private property, which is why they inserted
the eminent domain provision in the Bill of Rights.”71 Additionally,
Otterstedt notes that the Declaration of Independence is essentially
a Lockean document, highly protective of property rights.
Having considered Lockean rights and the Lockean theory of
government, let us turn to their expression in the “central docu-
ment of American history,” the Declaration of Independence:
We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Li-
berty and the Pursuit of Happiness—That to secure these
Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving
their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed . . . .
Viewed through a Lockean lens, the Declaration’s meaning seems
clear: all people have equal, natural rights pre-existing the state
by virtue of their common humanity; government’s purpose is to
protect these pre-existing rights. Furthermore, at least two re-
quirements must be met for a government to be just: its primary
69. Kent, supra note 54, at 92 & n.33 (quoting Stoebuck, supra note 46, at 595).
70. Id.
71. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 29 (1985).
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function must be the protection of natural rights, and it must be
a government formed by the consent of the governed.72
Nonetheless, Treanor maintains that the Takings Clause was es-
sentially James Madison’s pet project. He attributes the remaining
Founders’ lack of concern for property rights to the people’s faith
in legislatures because “[a]s the voice of the people, the legislature
could be trusted to perceive the common good and to define the limits
of individual rights.”73 Additionally, “[t]he absence of a just compen-
sation clause in the first state constitutions accorded with the faith
in legislatures that was a central element of republican thought and
with the position held by many republicans that the property right
could be compromised in order to advance the common good.”74 It is
not to say that either is correct. Nathan Alexander Sales offers alter-
native reasons for why state legislatures were so wanton regarding
private property rights.
Several possible explanations exist as to why the compensation
requirement was not enshrined in early state constitutions. First,
the notion that the government necessarily owed compensation
when it took real property was so fundamental that it may have
been thought unnecessary to express it. The absence of compen-
sation requirements would thus be symmetrical with the lack of
express constitutional grants of eminent domain power. Just as
state constitutions did not enumerate the power of eminent do-
main because it was deemed an inherent attribute of sovereignty,
neither did they provide for compensation, which was assumed
due as a matter of natural law. Second, early Americans were
not accustomed to relying on constitutions, charters, or other foun-
dational legal documents to protect the people’s rights. Instead,
popularly elected legislatures were deemed competent to do so.
Finally, the British had not abused their eminent domain power,
and Americans therefore saw no need expressly to restrict that
of their representatives.75
72. Paul J. Otterstedt, A Natural Rights Approach to Regulatory Takings, 7 TEX. REV. L.
& POL. 25, 35–36 (2002) (citing THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776)).
73. Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance, supra note 48, at 701.
74. Id. at 695.
75. Nathan Alexander Sales, Note, Classical Republicanism and the Fifth Amendment’s
“Public Use” Requirement, 49 DUKE L.J. 339, 360–61 (1999).
2012] INCORPORATION OF THE RIGHT TO JUST COMPENSATION 109
Thus, the inaction of state legislatures did not necessarily indicate
that early Americans did not ascribe to a Lockean, liberal frame-
work that supported a natural right to just compensation.
After a brief period of state excesses, in the early nineteenth cen-
tury states began gradually adopting compensation requirements
through constitutional amendments and statutes.76 However, the
majority of such protections came through the courts.77 The Takings
Clause or its state analogues were not bases for these protections.
Rather, to justify these new limits on state power, judges relied on
concepts of “natural” and “universal” laws—self-evident fundamental
limitations on state power.78 In Gardner v. Village of Newburgh,79 for
example, New York statute allowed a village to establish a water sys-
tem using a spring. The statute mandated compensation for the own-
ers of the spring and the land upon which the village laid pipes, but
not for the landowners upstream who lost riparian rights. The chan-
cellor voided the statute without citing the state constitution, which
did not mandate compensation.80 He merely stated that “natural eq-
uity” demanded compensation for those who sacrifice their property.81
Similarly, in another eminent domain case, a New Jersey court man-
dated compensation despite the lack of a specific statute or constitu-
tional provision. In Sinnickson v. Johnson,82 the court stated:
This power to take private property reaches back of all constitu-
tional provisions; and it seems to have been considered a settled
principle of universal law, that the right to compensation, is an
incident to the exercise of that power: that the one is so insepa-
rably connected with the other, that they may be said to exist
76. J. A. C. Grant, The “Higher Law” Background of the Law of Eminent Domain, 6 WIS.
L. REV. 67, 71, 75–77 (1930–31).
77. Treanor, The Original Understanding, supra note 47, at 792–93.
78. See, e.g., Sinnickson v. Johnson, 17 N.J.L. 129, 145 (N.J. 1839) (“This power to take
private property reaches back of all constitutional provisions; and it seems to have been
considered a settled principle of universal law, that the right to compensation, is an incident
to the exercise of that power: that the one is so inseparably connected with the other, that
they may be said to exist not as separate and distinct principles, but as parts of one and the
same principle”); Gardner v. Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. Ch. 1816) (even if
statute authorizing taking power was constitutional, “natural equity” demanded compen-
sation for those who lost riparian rights to state water system).
79. 2 Johns. Ch. at 162.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. 17 N.J.L. at 129.
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not as separate and distinct principles, but as parts of one and
the same principle.83
None of these antebellum cases cited the Takings Clause as a direct
source of law, although Treanor argues that “the Takings Clause
proved immensely influential . . . . In particular, it influenced state
court decisions to impose a compensation requirement on state ac-
tions in the absence of state takings provisions.”84 Further, “[l]awyers
representing individuals whose property had been taken by a state
without payment contended that the Fifth Amendment was a na-
tional declaration of respect for property rights.”85 Treanor notes
that in Gardner v. Newburgh, the presiding chancellor quoted the
Fifth Amendment:
But what is of higher authority, and is absolutely decisive of the
sense of the people of this country, it is made a part of the consti-
tution of the United States, “that private property shall not be
taken for public use, without just compensation.” I feel myself,
therefore, not only authorized, but bound to conclude, that a pro-
vision for compensation is an indispensable attendant on the due
and constitutional exercise of the power of depriving an individ-
ual of his property.86
Nevertheless, Treanor also notes that James Madison, the driving
force behind the Takings Clause, “intended the clause to apply only
to direct, physical taking of property by the federal government.”87
Thus, while the Takings Clause was not specifically applied in state
courts, it may have served as inspiration to state courts to enforce
a “natural” right to just compensation, which was simply fair.
Whatever the source of their inspiration, “[b]y 1868, every state
but North Carolina had a takings clause in its state constitution.”88
As the Civil War approached, most states recognized a common law
natural right to just compensation, either through constitutions,
83. Id. at 145 (citations omitted).
84. Treanor, The Original Understanding, supra note 47, at 840.
85. Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance, supra note 48, at 714.
86. Id. at 715 (citing 2 Johns. Ch. at 167).
87. Id. at 711.
88. Treanor, The Original Understanding, supra note 47, at 840 (citing NICHOLS, THE LAW
OF EMINENT DOMAIN, §§ 1.80–83 (3d ed. 1995)); see Grant, supra note 76, at 71; Treanor, The
Origins and Original Significance, supra note 48, at 714–15.
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statutes, or the courts. Steven G. Calabresi and Sarah E. Agudo set
out to determine which rights most Americans recognized when the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868 by surveying the law
in each state. They found that thirty-three of thirty-seven states had
takings clauses in their constitutions, meaning ninety-one percent,
a “huge supermajority,” lived in states with takings clauses.89 Inter-
estingly, they note: “Of course, the other states may just have as-
sumed that it was obvious that takings for private use were forbidden
and that there was no need to state it explicitly.”90 Regarding regula-
tory takings, while there were no specific measures, constitutions did
allow recourse to the courts. “Seventy-three percent of all Americans
in 1868—slightly less than three-fourths—lived in states that had
provisions of this sort in their state constitutions.”91 They agree their
study “suggests that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment may
have believed in natural law” rather than positive law.92
Meanwhile, the right to a judicial determination of “public use,”
which the Supreme Court considers an essential part of the Takings
Clause,93 varied greatly from state to state.94 Of course, it is not sur-
prising that state law focused mainly on the common law right to
just compensation, and not the specifically enumerated right that
property only be taken for public use. The Supreme Court has de-
scribed the Takings Clause as consisting of two requirements: that
the state provides just compensation, and that takings are only ex-
ercised for proper “public” uses.95 While the just compensation right
dates back to common law England, the determination of public use
was generally left to the legislative branch. As one would expect, in
antebellum America courts did not enforce a right to a judicial deter-
mination of public use.
The Mills Acts, statutes for building roads and bridges,96 and state
constitutions all defined public use differently or not at all.97 Some
89. Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Constitutions
When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights Are Deeply Rooted in
American History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7, 72 (2008).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 74.
92. Id. at 91.
93. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005).
94. See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 89.
95. See 545 U.S. at 477.
96. Id. at 480 n.8.
97. See SCHULTZ, supra note 45, at 27.
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courts mentioned public use in the mid-nineteenth century. However,
none held that “public use” was an inalienable natural right, like
the right to just compensation.98 Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Kelo
v. City of New London noted that some states required public use,
while other “early state legislatures tested the limits of their state-
law eminent domain power. Some States enacted statutes allowing
the taking of property for the purpose of building private roads.”99
Some courts implied public use for these statutes, others did not;
there was significant disagreement among courts and legislatures
regarding the nature and extent of “public use.”100 There are few
examples of state courts applying a strict “actual use by the public”
test,101 but generally, the presence of a valid “public benefit” justified
transfers to private owners.102 The Mill Acts and the private road
acts, both of which delegated taking power to private individuals,
were “crucial evidence that the founding generation accepted the
public-benefit theory.”103 Reluctant to interfere with states’ internal
political processes, this test essentially reduces the “public use” in-
quiry to a rational basis evaluation of state action.104
One seeming exception to this trend is demonstrated by Missouri
Pacific Railway Co. v. Nebraska,105 in which the state compelled a
railroad to grant a group of private individuals the right to build a
grain elevator on the railroad’s right of way. The Court, referring to
Davidson’s A. to B. language,106 found that this violated the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause because
This court, confining itself to what is necessary for the decision
of the case before it, is unanimously of opinion that the order in
98. Id. at 28–29. The debate among these courts divided two schools of thought: (1) the
public or some portion of it must have a use or right of use over the property or; (2) there must
be a judicial determination that they are equivalent to the public benefit, utility, advantage
or what is productive of public benefit. JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT
DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES 221 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1900).
99. 545 U.S. at 513 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
100. Id.
101. See Sales, supra note 75, at 346–47 (citing Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson R. R. Co.,
18 Wend. 9 (N.Y. 1837)).
102. 545 U.S. at 480 (citing Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 531
(1906); Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158–64 (1896)).
103. Sales, supra note 75, at 366.
104. SCHULTZ, supra note 45, at 25–26; see Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance,
supra note 48, at 698–99.
105. 164 U.S. 403 (1896).
106. Davidson v. City of New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 102 (1877).
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question, so far as it required the railroad corporation to surren-
der a part of its land to the petitioners for the purpose of building
and maintaining their elevator upon it, was, in essence and effect,
a taking of private property of the railroad corporation for the
private use of the petitioners. The taking by a state of the pri-
vate property of one person or corporation, without the owner’s
consent, for the private use of another, is not due process of law,
and is a violation of the fourteenth article of amendment of the
constitution of the United States.107
However, the Court indicated this was an extreme situation, where
there was no
taking of private property for a public use under the right of emi-
nent domain. The petitioners were merely private individuals
voluntarily associated together for their own benefit. They do not
appear to have been incorporated by the state for any public pur-
pose whatever, or to have themselves intended to establish an
elevator for the use of the public.108
Overall, public use only factored in where the most extreme state
actions, vastly lacking in justification, were at hand.
One can debate endlessly the degree to which the Founding Fathers
were inspired by Lockean Liberalism or whether the Takings Clause
was merely a pet project of James Madison. One can also debate the
exact reasons why states initially seized property excessively but then
gradually adopted just compensation requirements. The point of the
above discussion is that, when Reconstruction congressmen set out
to draft the Fourteenth Amendment, they lived in a legal world where
the right to just compensation was universally accepted. At the same
time, however, that legal world strongly accepted the notion that
states, rather than the national government, were supreme in their
domain concerning the disposition of property. This framework would
guide the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.
II. THE AFTERMATH OF THE CIVIL WAR AND THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Fundamentally, the Civil War was fought over states’ rights. The
right to keep slaves was long protected by a weak federal government
107. 164 U.S. at 417.
108. Id. at 416.
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and a Bill of Rights that, since Barron v. Baltimore, did not apply to
state regulation of property. The aftermath of the War saw a much
more powerful federal government that limited state police power
to prevent future rebellion. The Fourteenth Amendment was largely
the vehicle that accomplished this goal. It also had large implications
for eminent domain jurisprudence and other areas of the law. This
section explores why this is so, considering that eminent domain was
likely a low priority issue for the framers.
The Fourteenth Amendment is the most litigated amendment in
the Constitution and has been the source of numerous famous cases,
which gradually increased the body of civil liberties to which all
citizens are entitled. Section 1 of the Amendment states:
[1] No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; [2] nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; [3] nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.109
The Equal Protection Clause, though very important in integration
of minorities and women’s rights, is not pertinent to the present
incorporation discussion.110 The Privileges and Immunities Clause,
as will be discussed, has largely been rendered meaningless by the
Supreme Court.111 This leaves the Due Process Clause an analogue
of the same clause in the Fifth Amendment, which ended up stand-
ing for more than merely procedural due process (i.e., notice and a
hearing). The Clause was essential to fundamental or “natural” rights
in two respects. First, the Due Process Clause allowed the Supreme
Court to reverse Barron v. Baltimore by “incorporating” provisions
109. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The remaining four sections are Civil War–specific,
dealing with apportionment and voting rights of freed slaves, readmission to the Union, and
so forth. They are not relevant in this paper.
110. This clause, also found in U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, states “No State shall . . . deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” For a case testing the
limits of the Equal Protection Clause, see United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
153 n.4. (1938) (noting that racial and religious groups are protected, but that other “discrete
and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the opera-
tion of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities,” and may
also be subject to protection under the Clause).
111. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872) (rejecting that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause applies the Bill of Rights against the states). This case, for most purposes,
is still good law today.
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of the Bill of Rights. However, the Court slowly incorporated the
first eight Amendments piecemeal over a long period. In fact, the
Second Amendment’s right to bear arms was only incorporated in
2010 in McDonald v. City of Chicago.112 Three other provisions have
not yet been incorporated: the right to a grand jury hearing (Amend-
ment VII);113 the right against housing of soldiers (Amendment III);114
and the right against excessive bails and fines (Amendment VIII).115
The debate on incorporation continues today. The Supreme Court
admits it has not adopted one perspective on incorporation to the
exclusion of any other.116 The incorporation debate is discussed in
detail later.
Second, the Due Process Clause limited state power through “sub-
stantive” due process, which protects “natural” or “universal” rights—
unwritten but fundamental protections of the law.117 Potentially, any
time state activity places “life, liberty, or property” in jeopardy, sub-
stantive due process is implicated. So far, the Supreme Court has
indicated that the following rights, though not explicitly protected
by the Constitution, are protected through the general notion of sub-
stantive due process: the right to privacy,118 the right to abortion,119
and the right to marry.120 Additionally, in a much-derided era of the
Supreme Court’s history, it also found that substantive due process
protected “freedom of contract” through the “liberty” portion of the
Fourteenth Amendment.121 This prevented states from enacting al-
most any regulation of economic activity. However, Lochner has
112. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
113. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
114. But see Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957 (2d. Cir. 1982) (holding that the Third
Amendment was indeed incorporated against the states).
115. While the portion of the Eighth Amendment dealing with excessive bail and fines has
not yet been incorporated, the Court has incorporated the Amendment’s prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishments. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Louisiana ex rel.
Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
116. 130 S. Ct. at 3033–34 & n.9 (2010) (Supreme Court has not adopted one perspective
on incorporation to the exclusion of any other); see RAOUL BERGER, supra note 10; Amar, supra
note 10; Fairman, supra note 10; Maltz, supra note 10.
117. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (holding that rights that are “of the
very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty” may not be abolished because to do so is to
“violate ‘a principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental’”).
118. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
119. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
120. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
121. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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since been overruled and the Court is normally only strict with
regulation that affects fundamental civil rights. However, as some
scholars point out, the Takings Clause is now being invoked when-
ever property—real or otherwise—is affected, leading to decisions
bearing “disturbingly close resemblance to Lochner-era substantive
due process review.”122
This multifaceted nature of the Fourteenth Amendment led to the
conflation of substantive due process and the Takings Clause that
we see today. This conflation arose partially because of the Supreme
Court’s reliance on the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, pri-
marily the Committee of Fifteen. Their uncertain position leads one
today to question their intentions in passing the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. In fact, it is unclear whether the Committee of Fifteen in-
tended any “incorporation” of the Bill of Rights. Some evidence
indicates the Committee only intended the Fourteenth Amendment
to enforce “natural” rights and provide a constitutional backbone for
a civil rights bill that the President had vetoed, not to directly incor-
porate the Bill of Rights against the states. This indicates that the
Takings Clause was not properly incorporated by the Fourteenth
Amendment. In addition, there is the issue of the Bingham amend-
ment, which would have added a specific takings clause analogue to
the Fourteenth Amendment. The history and deliberations of the
Committee are examined in detail below.
President Andrew Johnson and his allies in Congress hoped to
carry out a swift Reconstruction, requiring only that Southern states
ratify the Thirteenth Amendment abolishing slavery, repudiate all
war debts, and void ordinances of succession.123 However, the Radi-
cal Republicans, led by the “Dictator of Congress,” Representative
Thaddeus Stevens,124 wanted to grant freed slaves full civil rights,
both out of moral sentiment and to create a Republican power base
in the South.125 Apportioning votes based on the black population
but not extending blacks the franchise would have given the South a
disproportionate amount of Democratic seats in Congress.126 Some
122. Karkainnen, supra note 11, at 908.
123. KENDRICK, supra note 1, at 134.
124. He was also the chair of the House Ways and Means Committee and a leader of
the effort to impeach President Johnson. See HANS L. TREFOUSSE, THADDEUS STEVENS:
NINETEENTH-CENTURY EGALITARIAN (1997).
125. KENDRICK, supra note 1, at 134.
126. Id.
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radicals also wanted to consolidate power in Congress and limit
the expansive power the President had obtained during wartime.127
Southern states did not intend to welcome the newly freed black
populations into their midst. They passed laws that sustained
slavery in all but name. The “Black Codes” required freed blacks to
enter unconscionable farm labor contracts, with imprisonment and
corporal punishment as penalties for breaking them or refusing to
work.128 Other laws hindered the movement of freedmen and denied
them entry into states.129 Meanwhile, Supreme Court precedent fa-
voring states’ rights regarding slavery and segregation still stood as
good law.130
The conduct of Southern states infuriated the Radicals, especially
Stevens, who felt the rebels should be punished.131 However, mod-
erates forced a more relaxed solution.132 First, President Johnson
rebuked even moderate Republicans by vetoing a bill in February
1866 that would have extended the life of the Freedmen’s Bureau.133
Further, to combat the Black Codes, the Radicals passed a civil rights
bill,134 which President Johnson also swiftly vetoed.135 This may have
been President Johnson’s biggest blunder, as it only infuriated the
127. Id. at 136–37.
128. Id. at 213; WILLIAM A. DUNNING, RECONSTRUCTION, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC, 1865–
1877 54–59 (Harper & Row 1962); ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION, 1863–1877 198–210 (Perennial 2002).
129. Philip Hamburger, Privileges or Immunities, 105 N.W. L. REV. 61, 83–86, 115–19 (2011).
130. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856); Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land
& Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
131. FONER, supra note 128, at 228–39.
132. Id.
133. Earl M. Maltz, The Fourteenth Amendment as Political Compromise—Section One in
the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 933 (1984).
134. An Act to Protect All Persons in the United States in Their Civil Rights, and Furnish
the Means of Their Vindication (Civil Rights Act of 1866), ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006)). The Act protected “such citizens, of every race and color,
without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same
right, in every State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue,
be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and per-
sonal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment,
pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom,
to the contrary notwithstanding.” This Act would later become influential in the drafting of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
135. President Johnson’s Veto of the Civil Rights Act, 1866 (Mar. 27, 1866), available at
http://wps.prenhall.com/wps/media/objects/107/109768/ch16_a2_d1.pdf.
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Radicals and encouraged them to impeach him.136 The bill passed
over the President’s veto.137 Further, the Radicals introduced another
bill138 to bolster the federal government’s ability to enforce the Comity
Clause.139 However, after Johnson’s veto, it was clear that Congress
would need a constitutional mandate to protect civil rights. Further,
an amendment would ensure that a future Democratic Congress
would not repeal any civil rights acts.140 The Radicals, using a clever
concurrent resolution that did not require Presidential approval,
formed a joint Committee of Fifteen—nine representatives and six
senators—to oversee Reconstruction.141 The resolution’s passage
usurped control from the President and gave the Radicals signifi-
cant influence on the nation’s progress following the Civil War and
on what would become the Fourteenth Amendment.142 At this point,
there was no talk of an amendment to extend the Bill of Rights to
the states, nor any talk of eminent domain. Rather, the debate thus
far had revolved around whether blacks would get the franchise and
other issues relating to war debt and punishment of Southern states
for the rebellion.
The Committee’s secret meetings became public after a clerk’s
journal was discovered in the early twentieth century by political
science professor Benjamin Kendrick of Columbia University Law
School.143 The clerk’s minutes are terse and mostly document at-
tendance and the language of drafts presented and their subsequent
revisions. Members of the Committee offered draft constitutional
amendments for an up or down vote, which the journal recorded.144
Unfortunately, the journal does not record any of the debate among
Committee members. Nonetheless, the proceedings still offer some
useful information regarding incorporation of the Bill of Rights and
the Takings Clause. It appears the Committee’s initial focus was on
securing rights for freed slaves, not expanding individual liberties in
136. FONER, supra note 128, at 247–51.
137. Id.
138. H.R. 437, 39th Cong. § 1 (1866).
139. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (also known as the Privileges and Immunities Clause:
“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in
the several States.”).
140. FONER, supra note 128, at 251–54.
141. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 4–6 (1865).
142. KENDRICK, supra note 1, at 140–41, 144–45.
143. Id. at 17–21.
144. Id. at 37–129.
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general as the Fourteenth Amendment eventually would do. Rather
than citing the Bill of Rights, the first drafts of the Fourteenth
Amendment mirrored language in the recently passed Civil Rights
Act of 1866.145 Subsequent drafts spoke in terms of individual and
equal rights, giving Congress the power to “make all laws necessary
and proper to secure to all persons in every state within this Union
equal protection in their rights of life, liberty and property,”146 to
secure “to all citizens of the United States in any State the same
immunities and also equal political rights and privileges,”147 and
providing that “[a]ll laws, state or national, shall operate impar-
tially and equally on all persons without regard to race or color.”148
Eventually, however, the Committee then shifted its focus from
“natural” rights to specific enumerated rights in the Constitution,
drawing inspiration from the Bill of Rights. Representative John
Bingham of Ohio offered a new draft:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each state all
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states (Art. 4,
Sec. 2); and to all persons in the several States equal protection
in the rights of life, liberty and property (5th Amendment).149
This draft reveals the specific constitutional protections the Drafters
sought to enforce against the states. “Art. 4 Sec. 2" refers to the
Comity Clause of the U.S. Constitution.150 “5th Amendment” of course
refers to the Fifth Amendment in the Bill of Rights. The Committee
rejected this draft and went on to draft the final version of the
Fourteenth Amendment on April 21, 1866.
145. An Act to Protect All Persons in the United States in Their Civil Rights, and Furnish the
Means of Their Vindication (Civil Rights Act of 1866), ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2006)) ( “All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States
shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue,
be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.”).
146. KENDRICK, supra note 1, at 46.
147. Id. at 56.
148. Id. at 46.
149. Id. at 61.
150. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”). The Privileges and Immunities
Clause is also commonly known as the Comity Clause.
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After the Committee drafted the final version of the Fourteenth
Amendment,151 Representative John Bingham of Ohio offered an ad-
dition,152 which mirrored the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause153:
[N]or shall any state deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws, nor take private property for
public use without just compensation.154
The Committee rejected this construction by a seven-to-five vote.155
Notably, Bingham offered this amendment by itself, not as part of
a larger provision, which the Committee may have rejected for other
reasons. The Committee then adopted the Fourteenth Amendment as
it stands today, without a specific “takings clause.”156 Thus, while the
Fourteenth Amendment lacked a specific takings clause enforceable
against the states, it still enforced the rights to “due process,” which
eventually would come to include property protections. The Supreme
Court would refer specifically to the Committee’s rejection of the
Bingham amendment in Davidson v. City of New Orleans,157 where
the Court held the Takings Clause was not incorporated against
the states.
We can only speculate as to why the Committee rejected Bingham’s
takings clause. With a country torn apart, it may seem eminent do-
main was the last issue on the minds of Reconstruction Congress.
However, property rights did come into play. Treanor addressed the
Committee’s rejection of Bingham’s analogue. He attributes the in-
troduction of Bingham’s amendment to a desire for protection of
unionist property.
During the course of the committee meetings about the Four-
teenth Amendment, Bingham proposed imposing on the states
just compensation and equal protection requirements (and not
due process or privileges and immunities), and the support for
this unsuccessful proposal reflected this perceived need to safe-
guard Unionist property after former rebels returned to power.
151. KENDRICK, supra note 1, at 82.
152. Id. at 82, 85.
153. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.”).
154. KENDRICK, supra note 1, at 85.
155. Id. at 106.
156. Id.
157. 96 U.S. 97 (1877).
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But, of course, this version was not passed. It was rejected by a
vote of seven to five, and the committee opted instead for the
broader language of Section One. Incorporationist scholarship
indicates the framers adopted this language in order to subject
the states to the same restraints as the federal government.
Thus, passage of the Fourteenth Amendment does not reflect a
separate consideration of what specific property interests needed
protection from the government. Incorporationist scholarship
therefore leads to the same conclusion as non-incorporationist
scholarship: The period in which the Fifth Amendment’s Takings
Clause was proposed and ratified is the only time at which the
nation considered which property rights needed protection from
the government. The translator should therefore focus on the
concern with process failure animating the Fifth Amendment’s
Takings Clause. Having determined that the Takings Clause was
originally intended to remedy certain kinds of process failure,
she should offer a reading of the clause that serves the same ends
in today’s society.158
Treanor relied heavily on Earl M. Maltz, who suggested that Bingham
had the protection of unionist property in mind. Maltz notes that
Bingham was the primary force behind the rejected amendment,
which would have given Congress authority to “‘make all laws which
shall be necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each state
all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states; and
to all persons in the several States equal protection in the rights of
life, liberty and property,’” in addition to the takings clause ana-
logue attached to this proposed amendment.159
The Radicals suggested confiscation of Southern property, with
redistribution to freedmen or administration under the authority
of the Freedmen’s Bureau.160 The discussion over what to do with
seized property may have informed the rejected takings clause amend-
ment to the draft Fourteenth Amendment. Perhaps the Committee
felt the Fourteenth Amendment would “totally incorporate” the en-
tire Bill of Rights, and thus an additional takings clause would have
been redundant to the Fifth Amendment. On the other hand, the
Committee may have assumed that because the right to just com-
pensation was such a well-settled part of common law, it was in
158. Treanor, The Original Understanding, supra note 47, at 862–63.
159. Maltz, The Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 133, at 945.
160. FONER, supra note 128, at 158–59.
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inherent in the “due process” portion of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A third possibility: the Committee may have been concerned with in-
fringing upon states’ rights to control property within their borders.
Bingham may have offered the takings clause in response to Radical
plans to confiscate property from former Confederates.161
Equally uncertain is whether the Committee intended the Four-
teenth Amendment to “incorporate” any parts of the Bill of Rights
at all, or any type of “substantive” due process. However, the com-
ments of congressmen, and John Bingham in particular, have been
the source of academic controversy. There is abundant evidence that
the framers intended the Fourteenth Amendment to incorporate the
Bill of Rights, and evidence that they intended the Amendment only
as a mechanism to enforce the Civil Rights Bill. Perhaps seeking to
allay concerns of states’ rightists, some remarks indicate Congress
did not intend to incorporate the Bill of Rights. Senator Lyman
Trumbull of Illinois explained that Section 1 was a “reiteration of
the rights set forth in the Civil Rights Bill.”162 Thaddeus Stevens
described Section 1 as being derived from the Declaration of Inde-
pendence and organic law, not the Bill of Rights.163 The bills would
grant Congress power to ensure that the “law which operates upon
one man shall operate equally upon all.”164 Section 1 would not se-
cure any new rights beyond the Civil Rights Act, but was needed to
ensure that a future Democratic Congress would not repeal the
statute.165 On the other hand, Senator Jacob M. Howard of Michigan
declared on the Senate Floor that the “privileges and immunities”
in the Fourteenth Amendment would include “the personal rights
guarantied [sic] and secured by the first eight amendments of the
Constitution.”166 Bryan H. Wildenthal notes that there was “little
doubt” that the Fourteenth Amendment, albeit through the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause, would incorporate the Bill of Rights,
“and not a single member of either House of Congress, throughout
all the debates, ever contradicted [Bingham and Howard’s] plainly
161. Id. at 235–36.
162. JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 161 (Univ. of Ill.
Press 1965).
163. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 2459 (1866).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise: Reassessing the Early Understanding in
Court and Congress on Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment, 61
OHIO ST. L.J. 1051, 1074 (2000); see CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 2765–66 (1866).
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expressed understanding.”167 Wildenthal dismisses the fact that
“[t]he anti-incorporationists contend that . . . applying the Bill of
Rights to the states would supposedly have been shocking and in-
conceivable to Americans of the day.”168 But it is possible that in a
world where the Bill of Rights was held to clearly apply to the
federal government, the widely accepted notion was that the Bill of
Rights in no way bound the states.
The most contentious and often-cited source in the incorporation
debate is the remarks of John Bingham. His draft became Section 1,
and his rejected amendment contained the analogous takings clause.169
Unfortunately, Bingham has been called a “muddled thinker”170 due
to the inconsistency of his statements on incorporation. Charles
Fairman, writing in 1949, espouses that by “Bill of Rights” Bingham
meant the Fifth Amendment and Article IV’s Privileges and Immu-
nities Clause. Richard L. Aynes argues, however, that Fairman de-
rived this theory from “a single speech that Bingham gave before
the House of Representatives . . . the shortest of all Bingham’s
speeches on the Fourteenth Amendment, barely filling one and one-
half columns of the Congressional Globe.”171 However, there is evi-
dence supporting Fairman’s position. Bingham explained before
Congress that Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was an at-
tempt to codify the Civil Rights Act’s assurance of interstate equal-
ity and certain natural rights that had existed for some time.172
When asked what “due process” meant in Section 1, he responded
without reference to the Bill of Rights, saying “courts have settled
that long ago.”173 Regarding property rights, Bingham clarified that
Section 1 left acquisition and transmission of property to “the local
law of the States.”174 The Fourteenth Amendment only ensured that
167. Wildenthal, supra note 166, at 1074.
168. Id. at 1074–75 (citing RAOUL BERGER, supra note 10, at 82–87; Fairman, supra note 10,
at 68–126, 137–38; Charles Fairman, A Reply to Professor Crosskey, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 144,
154–55 (1954)).
169. KENDRICK, supra note 1, at 82–85.
170. RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT 145 (1977).
171. Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103
YALE L.J. 57, 67 (1993) (citing Fairman, supra note 10, at 25–26 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39TH
CONG., 1ST SESS. 1034 (1866))).
172. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1089 (1866).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1089 (“As to real estate, every one [sic] knows that its acquisition and
transmission under every interpretation ever given to the word property, as used in the
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any person who had “acquired property not contrary to the laws of
the State, but in accordance with its law” should be “equally pro-
tected in the enjoyment” of his property.175 Congress first debated
whether the Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities Clause would
incorporate the Bill of Rights. The wording eventually came to re-
flect the Privileges and Immunities Bill introduced earlier.176 John
Bingham described the clause simply as “that part of the amend-
ment which seeks the enforcement of the second section of the fourth
article [the Comity Clause] of the Constitution of the United States.”177
He cited Oregon and Missouri laws, which denied entry to black cit-
izens, and did not mention any provision of the Bill of Rights.178
Responding to Fairman’s argument, Aynes argues Bingham es-
poused “compact theory,” which
holds that even before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the Constitution prohibited states from abridging the first
eight amendments. According to Bingham, Article IV, Section 2
applied the provisions of the Bill of Rights against the states, but
the absence of an express clause granting Congress enforcement
authority meant that while a compact existed that bound the
states to comply with Section Two, no remedy was available when
the states breached this obligation.179
Bingham did say that the Fourteenth Amendment would “arm the
Congress . . . with the power to enforce the bill of rights as it stands
in the Constitution today.”180 Bingham said in a speech,
The fourteenth amendment, it is believed, did not add to the
privileges or immunities before mentioned, but was deemed
necessary for their enforcement as an express limitation upon
the powers of the States. It had been judicially determined that
the first eight articles of amendment of the Constitution were
Constitution of the country, are dependent exclusively upon the local law of the States, save
under a direct grant of the United States.” The Fourteenth Amendment only ensured that any
person who had “acquired property not contrary to the laws of the State, but in accordance
with its law” should be “equally protected in the enjoyment” of his property).
175. Id. Bingham would later retract his statements and claim that the clause included the
first eight Amendments.
176. Hamburger, supra note 129, at 61.
177. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1089 (1866).
178. Id.
179. Aynes, supra note 171, at 71 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 2542 (1866)).
180. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1088 (1866) (emphasis added).
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not limitations on the power of the States, and it was appre-
hended that the same might be held of the provision of the sec-
ond section, fourth article.181
In a footnote, Aynes states “Bingham did not refer to specific ‘judi-
cial[ ] determin[ations]’ but was undoubtedly referring to Barron v.
Baltimore . . . and Livingston v. Moore . . . . In his February 28,
1866, speech, Bingham cited these cases when asserting the same
position.”182 Further, William Crosskey, a critic of Fairman, “described
Bingham as an able person whose theories were ‘the common faith’
of the Republican Party and argued that the historical evidence re-
veals that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended the
Amendment to enforce the Bill of Rights against the states.”183 Fur-
ther, “[p]rominent judges, lawyers, and members of Congress shared
Bingham’s conviction that the Constitution prohibited the states
from abridging the privileges and immunities protected by Article IV,
Section 2, but that Congress could not enforce the provision.”184
Nevertheless, if Bingham truly believed the compact theory, why
did he say in 1871, “These eight articles I have shown never were
limitations upon the power of the States, until made so by the four-
teenth amendment”?185 More importantly, if he believed the Bill of
Rights had always applied to the states (compact theory) or would
apply through the Fourteenth Amendment (incorporation theory),
why would he have proposed adding an analogue to the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which would have been redundant?
Was he attempting to literally overrule Barron specifically? Further,
if the Committee of Fifteen espoused total incorporation, the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would also have been
redundant with the same clause in the Fifth Amendment. While it
is difficult to discern exactly what the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment intended, in the eminent domain context the rejection
of Bingham’s proposed takings clause analogue and statements
181. Aynes, supra note 171, at 73 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 22 (1871), reprinted in THE
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES 466–67 (Alfred Avins ed., 1967)).
182. Id. at 73 n.93 (citing 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833); 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 469 (1833); CONG.
GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1089–90 (1866)).
183. Id. at 59 (citing William W. Crosskey, Charles Fairman, “Legislative History,” and the
Constitutional Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1954)).
184. Id. at 78.
185. Id. at 74.
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espousing states’ rights indicated the Committee probably did not
intend to incorporate the Takings Clause against the states.
III. POST-RECONSTRUCTION: CHICAGO, B. & Q.
TO LOCHNER TO PENN CENTRAL
The Supreme Court quickly decided against incorporation and
compact theory. In 1873, the Slaughter-House Cases186 rendered the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
nearly a dead letter, struck down as a means of enforcing civil rights,
and held that these were the province of state law. The Court held
that the Clause only protected narrow “federal” rights such as the
right to protection on the high seas. This five-to-four decision has
been widely criticized, but the Privileges and Immunities Clause is
still largely dormant to this day.187 Attempts to raise these argu-
ments through the Due Process Clause also failed.
The Court also dismissed the Due Process Clause as a means
of incorporation. In fact, the Committee of Fifteen’s rejection of
Bingham’s takings clause analogue clearly influenced the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the incorporation debate. In Davidson v. City
of New Orleans,188 the Supreme Court specifically cited the Committee
of Fifteen’s rejection of the Bingham amendment in striking down a
challenge to a state taking based on the Fourteenth Amendment.
[The taking] may violate some provision of the State Constitu-
tion against unequal taxation; but the Federal Constitution
imposes no restraints on the States in that regard. If private
property be taken for public uses without just compensation, it
must be remembered that, when then fourteenth amendment
was adopted, the provision on that subject, in immediate juxta-
position in the fifth amendment with the one we are construing,
was left out, and this was taken.189
186. 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
187. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999). Saenz v. Roe held that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause protected a right to relocate to another state and become a citizen of that
case, but besides this the Supreme Court has relied on the Due Process Clause to enforce
individual rights against the States.
188. 96 U.S. 97 (1877).
189. Id. at 105 (emphasis added).
2012] INCORPORATION OF THE RIGHT TO JUST COMPENSATION 127
Rather, the Fourteenth Amendment enforced due process against
the states, meaning
those settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the
common and statute law of England before the emigration of our
ancestors, and which are shown not to have been unsuited to
their civil and political condition by having been acted on by
them after the settlement of this country.190
While the Fourteenth Amendment gave courts the opportunity to
enforce these “settled usages and modes” against the states, the
Court made clear that the Bill of Rights was not necessarily part of
these “usages and modes.” The Court ruled similarly in Hurtado v.
California,191 where it held that the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth
Amendment was not part of these “settled usages and modes.” The
Court expressed frustration at the feeding frenzy of litigation stem-
ming from the recently passed Fourteenth Amendment:
[T]here exists some strange misconception of the scope of this
provision as found in the fourteenth amendment. In fact, it would
seem, from the character of many of the cases before us, and the
arguments made in them, that the clause under consideration is
looked upon as a means of bringing to the test of the decision of
this court the abstract opinions of every unsuccessful litigant in
a State court of the justice of the decision against him, and of the
merits of the legislation on which such a decision may be founded.
If, therefore, it were possible to define what it is for a State to
deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law, in terms which would cover every exercise of power thus
forbidden to the State, and exclude those which are not, no more
useful construction could be furnished by this or any other court
to any part of the fundamental law.192
Davidson seems to indicate the Court did not believe that the right
to just compensation was not a “natural right.” However, the subject
190. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 528 (1884) (citing Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken
Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 277 (1855)).
191. 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
192. 96 U.S. at 104. “It is proper now to inquire whether the due process of law enjoined
by the fourteenth amendment requires compensation to be made or adequately secured to the
owner of private property taken for public use under the authority of a state.” Chicago, B. &
Q. Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235 (1897).
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matter was not a traditional taking. The Court upheld a state tax
assessment for draining of swamplands. The Court retained funda-
mental due process notions, holding that a statute could not declare
“that the full and exclusive title of a described piece of land, which
is now in A., shall be and is hereby transferred in B.”193 This “natural
rights” basis would lead to the “incorporation” of the right of just
compensation against the states, and this would pave the way for
the Court to apply substantive due process principles to eminent
domain about fourteen years later. Thus, the natural right to just
compensation had survived Reconstruction and the Court’s interpre-
tation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In 1897 the Supreme Court decided Chicago, B. & Q. Railroad Co.
v. City of Chicago,194 which according to Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. City of New York held the Takings Clause “of course” applicable
to the states.195 In reality, Chicago, B. & Q. did not come close to over-
turning Barron v. Baltimore, failing to even mention the Takings
Clause or the Fifth Amendment. It was a purely substantive due pro-
cess decision, building on the dicta of Davidson and the fact that the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment specifically rejected a tak-
ings clause analogue. Further, it reaffirmed that state police power
is free from interference by federal courts.
Chicago passed an ordinance authorizing the opening and widen-
ing of certain streets, which required condemning a portion of land
owned by the railroad upon which it operated rail tracks.196 The Court
upheld the jury’s nominal award of one dollar, because the differ-
ence in value had not changed; the railroad could continue operating
its tracks.197 On the Takings Clause issue, the Court noted,
There is no specific prohibition in the federal constitution which
acts upon the states in regard to their taking private property
for any but a public use. The fifth amendment which provides,
among other things, that such property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation, applies only to the federal
government, as has many times been decided.198
193. 96 U.S. at 102.
194. 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
195. 438 U.S. 104, 122 (1978).
196. 166 U.S. at 230–32.
197. Id. at 256–58.
198. Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158 (1896) (emphasis added).
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The Court did state just compensation was a universal natural right,
which demonstrates why substantive due process and the Takings
Clause would become entangled in the future. After reviewing the de-
cisions of state and federal courts,199 and legal commentary,200 that
just compensation was an essential and historic due process limita-
tion on state power.201 The Court in Chicago, B. & Q. stated that
The requirement that the property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation is but “an affirmance of a great
doctrine established by the common law for the protection of pri-
vate property. It is founded in natural equity, and is laid down
as a principle of universal law. Indeed, in a free government,
almost all other rights would become worthless if the govern-
ment possessed an uncontrollable power over the private fortune
of every citizen.”202
However, the Court held this principle did not apply in the matter
at hand, which was a legitimate exercise of state police power. The
Court disregarded the railroad’s alternative arguments that Chicago
should at least have to pay the cost of maintaining a required railroad
crossing and flagmen, holding that the state does not need to com-
pensate owners for losses suffered due to exercises of police power:
And as all property, whether owned by private persons or by cor-
porations, is held subject to the authority of the state to regulate
its use in such manner as not to unnecessarily endanger the
lives and the personal safety of the people, it is not a condition
199. 166 U.S. at 229, 235–39 (citing Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S. 380, 398 (1895); Searl v.
School Dist., 133 U.S. 553, 562 (1890); Davidson v. City of New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 102
(1877); Mt. Hope Cemetery v. City of Boston, 158 Mass. 509, 519 (Mass. 1893); Sinnickson v.
Johnson, 17 N.J.L. 129, 145 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1839); Gardner v. Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns.
Ch. 162 (N.Y. Ch. 1816)).
200. Id. at 236 (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *138–39; THOMAS COOLEY,
A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER
OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 559 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1868); 2 JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1790 (Boston, Hilliard,
Gray & Co. 1833)).
201. Id. at 241. Of course, Chicago, B. & Q. did cite Scott v. City of Toledo, 36 F. 385, 396
(C.C.N.D. Ohio 1888), which mentioned that the Fourteenth Amendment was “clearly in-
tended to place the same limitation upon the power of the states which the fifth amendment
had placed upon the authority of the federal government.” 36 F. at 395. However, the breadth
of both decisions is dedicated to due process.
202. Id. at 236 (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *138–39; COOLEY, supra
note 200, at 559).
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of the exercise of that authority that the state shall indemnify
the owners of property for the damage or injury resulting from
its exercise. . . . The expenses that will be incurred by the railroad
company in erecting gates, planking the crossing, and maintain-
ing flagmen, in order that its road may be safely operated—if all
that should be required,—necessarily result from the mainte-
nance of a public highway under legislative sanction, and must
be deemed to have been taken by the company into account
when it accepted the privileges and franchises granted by the
state. Such expenses must be regarded as incidental to the ex-
ercise of the police powers of the state.203
This comported with previous decisions such as Mugler v. Kansas,204
which held that exercises of police power, such as nuisance abate-
ment, do not require compensation. Indeed, Chicago, B. & Q. cited
Mugler and similar cases.205 Chicago, B. & Q. also failed to question
the Court’s decision one year earlier in Fallbrook Irrigation District
v. Bradley.206 There, the Court rejected landowners’ due process chal-
lenges to a state irrigation tax, partly on the ground that the irriga-
tion program would confiscate land for the benefit of private parties.
The Court did find exercises of police power were compensable where
they lacked a legitimate objective, such as in Pumpelly v. Green Bay
& Mississippi Canal Co.207 There, the Court held that when a state
statute authorized the permanent flooding of a landowner’s property
so that it was unusable, this constituted a taking for which compen-
sation had to be paid. Lawrence Berger distinguished this case from
Mugler: “Thus Mugler stood for the proposition that though a value-
destroying regulation could not be a taking requiring compensation,
it could be a deprivation of property without due process of law if it
did not have a legitimate police power objective, such as the suppres-
sion of a nuisance.”208
The only link between Chicago, B. & Q. and the Takings Clause
is tenuous at best. In Scott v. City of Toledo,209 a case on which the
203. Id. at 252–55.
204. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
205. 166 U.S. at 255.
206. 164 U.S. 112 (1896).
207. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
208. Lawrence Berger, supra note 17, at 854–55 (citing Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the
Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964)).
209. 36 F. 385 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1888).
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Chicago, B. & Q. court relied, a U.S. District Court struck down a
condemnation on due process grounds.210 However, the majority of
Justice Jackson’s opinion reiterated the same natural law concepts
rife in Chicago, B. & Q. itself. “In a general sense, ‘due process of
law’ is identical in meaning with the phrase, ‘law of the land,’ as
used in the constitutions of the several states.”211 Justice Jackson
called Ohio’s action a “defect in the supreme organic law of the
land,” stating that212
The conclusion of the court on this question is that since the adop-
tion of the fourteenth amendment compensation for private prop-
erty taken for public uses constitutes an essential element in “due
process of law,” and that without such compensation the appro-
priation of private property to public uses, no matter under what
form of procedure it is taken, would violate the provisions of the
federal constitution.213
Like Chicago, B. & Q., Justice Jackson did not mention the Fifth
Amendment.
Essentially, Chicago, B. & Q. stated that there had been no tak-
ing, merely an exercise of police power that caused the railroad to
spend additional money on the crossing and flagmen. However, the
Court did note that the principles of Davidson, taking property
from A. to give to B.,214 would be compensable under substantive due
process—an extreme situation—as would damage to property with
no legitimate objective.215 As Karkainnen points out,
Chicago B & Q thus perfectly mirrored the well-established
nineteenth-century understanding that the state’s powers, as
constrained by due process, were bifurcated. When it exercised
the eminent domain power, it owed just compensation. When it
enacted a valid police power regulation, however, there was by
definition no deprivation of property because all property rights
were held subject to the inherent police power limitation, and no
compensation was owed. In subsequent years, Chicago B & Q
210. 166 U.S. at 238–39.
211. 36 F. at 393 (citing COOLEY, supra note 200, at 432).
212. Id. at 395.
213. Id. at 396 (emphasis added).
214. 166 U.S. at 235.
215. Id.
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would be cited as frequently for this latter proposition as for the
companion holding that due process did require compensation in
cases of eminent domain.216
This pro-states’ rights logic may have been the same force behind
the Committee of Fifteen’s rejection of Bingham’s takings clause
analogue. Chicago, B. & Q. left the federal courts in a difficult po-
sition. The Fourteenth Amendment gave them the power to restrict
state exercises of eminent domain through substantive due process,
but this power was to be used sparingly. Indeed, it did not even ap-
ply in cases where the government physically and permanently
occupied property and provided a single dollar in nominal compen-
sation. Further, this power to restrict state takings did not appear
to stem from the Takings Clause of the Constitution, but rather
from evolving notions of natural rights, whatever those were.
The Court also showed broad deference to state police power on
decisions regarding appropriate “public uses.” While Scott v. City of
Toledo stated, “the sovereign right of eminent domain involves these
two essential elements, viz., that the property must be taken for the
public benefit, or for public purposes, and that the owner must be
compensated therefor,”217 Chicago, B. & Q. did not reference this
language. In the period after Davidson, the Court often repeated
that “taking the property of one man for the benefit of another . . .
is not a constitutional exercise of the right of eminent domain.”218
However, these cases never defined the contours of public use and
nearly all of them upheld state decisions to condemn as valid public
uses. While Fallbrook held that the Fifth Amendment applied only
to the federal government,219 it noted that the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment raised “the question whether private
property has been taken for any other than a public use becomes
material in this court, even where the taking is under the authority
of the state, instead of the federal, government.”220 But the Court
was chiefly concerned that citizens have access to fair procedural
due process, satisfied “when the ordinary course is pursued in such
proceedings . . . that has been customarily followed in the state, and
216. Karkainnen, supra note 11, at 850.
217. 36 F. at 394.
218. Kaukauna Water–Power Co. v. Green Bay & M. Canal Co., 142 U.S. 254, 273 (1891).
219. 164 U.S. 112, 158 (1896).
220. Id.
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where the party who may subsequently be charged in his property has
had a hearing, or an opportunity for one, provided by the statute.”221
Nonetheless, this due process review was strictly limited, and the
Court offered the agency great deference and upheld the taking.
[W]hat is a public use frequently and largely depends upon the
facts and circumstances . . . [and although] the irrigation of
lands in states where there is no color of necessity therefor
[might be invalid], . . . in a state like California, which con-
fessedly embraces millions of acres of arid lands, an act of the
legislature providing for their irrigation might well be regarded
as an act devoting the water to a public use, and therefore as a
valid exercise of the legislative power.222
Subsequent decisions followed Fallbrook ’s deference to state defini-
tions of public use, from the early twentieth century to the present.223
221. Id. at 168.
222. Id. at 159–60.
223. See, e.g., Joslin Mfg. Co. v. City of Providence, 262 U.S. 668, 678 (1923) (the necessity
and expediency of taking property for public use is a legislative determination and “not a
judicial question”); Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles Cnty., 262 U.S. 700, 706 (1923) (upholding con-
demnation of land for private road and regarding “with great respect the judgments of state
courts upon what should be deemed public uses in any state”); Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (dicta stating that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments merely
“presuppose” that takings are for public use, and mandate only compensation); Green v.
Frazier, 253 U.S. 233 (1920) (rejecting Fourteenth Amendment taking challenges to taxation,
which was based on the grounds that the taxes benefitted private economic development);
Hendersonville Light & Power Co. v. Blue Ridge Interurban Ry. Co., 243 U.S. 563 (1917)
(rejecting public use challenge based on railroad using surplus power from condemned river to
sell as electricity); Mt. Vernon–Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Ala. Interstate Power Co., 240
U.S. 30 (1916) (rejecting public use challenge to condemnation by power company); Union Lime
Co. v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 233 U.S. 211, 218 (1914) (upholding condemnation, stating: “The
state, through its highest court, declares the use to be a public one, and we should accept its
judgment unless it is clearly without ground.”); Hairston v. Danville & W. R.R. Co., 208 U.S.
598, 606–07 (1908) (in upholding condemnation for a private spur track, the Court stated that
although determining public use “is ultimately a judicial question,” recent decisions “show
how greatly we have deferred to the opinions of state courts on this subject, which so closely
concerns the welfare of their people)”; Offield v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co.,
203 U.S. 372 (1906) (upholding condemnation of shares of railroad stock despite public use
challenge); Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 530–31 (1906) (rejected
a public use challenge, concluding that so long as state law authorized a taking, there was no
violation of due process); Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361, 369 (1905) (citing 164 U.S. at 159)
(rejecting a public use challenge because “the people of a state, as also its courts, must, in the
nature of things, be more familiar with such facts, and with the necessity and occasion for the
irrigation of the lands, than can any one be who is a stranger to the soil of the state, and that
such knowledge and familiarity must have their weight with the state courts”).
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This included Wight v. Davidson, in which the Court rejected the no-
tion that Fifth Amendment decisions applied to Fourteenth Amend-
ment takings analysis.224 It was not until 1930, in City of Cincinnati
v. Vester,225 that the Court struck down a condemnation on public
use grounds, holding “it is well established that . . . the question [of]
what is a public use is a judicial one.”226 However, in Vester the City
Council’s ordinance and resolution stated no purpose for excess tak-
ings and thus did not comply with the authorizing statute.227 The
Court’s decision would violate the rational basis standard the Court
uses today in economic substantive due process cases.228
While Chicago, B. & Q. indicated that a weak substantive due
process empowered federal courts to restrict state exercises of emi-
nent domain, other exercises of state police power were treated less
leniently. The Court may not have been inclined to apply the Bill of
Rights, but it went wild with substantive due process after Chicago,
B. & Q., taking notions of “life, liberty, and property” to extremes
and turning Davidson on its head. In fact, in the same year Chicago,
B. & Q. was decided, the Court held in Allgeyer v. Louisiana229 that
the Fourteenth Amendment prevented the state from interfering with
“freedom of contract.” This idea was taken to an extreme in Lochner
v. New York in 1905,230 where the Court held maximum working
hours law violated the “liberty of contract” as protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Regarding incorpora-
tion, however, the Court reaffirmed Barron v. Baltimore in 1908. In
Twining v. New Jersey,231 the Court rejected an argument that the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights, specifically
the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment. In Adkins v.
Children’s Hospital of the District of Columbia,232 the Supreme Court
held that minimum wage laws violated substantive due process.
Prior to 1900, there is very little mention of regulatory or inverse
condemnations. After Mugler the Court made clear that the police
224. 181 U.S. 371, 384 (1901).
225. 281 U.S. 439 (1930).
226. Id. at 446.
227. Id. at 449.
228. See supra note 110 (discussing Carolene Products).
229. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
230. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
231. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
232. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
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power generally won over property rights, except concerning actual
physical invasions of property. This began to change with Mahon. In
1922 the Court issued Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,233 in which
it interestingly struck down the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s
attempt to force coal companies to shore up property under which
they held easements. While it is not surprising that the Court struck
down an exercise of police power during this time, it is interesting
that the Court referred to the Takings Clause instead of substantive
due process. Before the decision, the Takings Clause—or at least
just compensation principles—had only applied to physical confis-
cations or invasions of land, a “taking” in the most literal sense.
Once Mahon opened the door to regulation as takings, almost any
government activity was subject to the Takings Clause if it involved
what could be considered “property.”234 This added another layer of
confusion—in cases like Chicago and Davidson, which clearly in-
volved the government taking title to real property, only substantive
due process was at issue. But in cases where property was merely
regulated instead of confiscated, the Takings Clause would apply.
The much-derided Lochner era was short-lived, ending unofficially
with Nebbia v. New York235 in 1934 and with West Coast Hotel v.
Parrish236 in 1937, which expressly overruled Adkins. In 1955,
Williamson v. Lee Optical237 definitively stated that the Court would
not return to this era. Additionally, in 1925 in Gitlow v. New York238
the Court definitely stated a provision of the Bill of Rights, in this
case the First Amendment, applied to the states.239 The Court found
that “we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the
press—which are protected by the First Amendment from abridg-
ment by Congress—are among the fundamental personal rights and
‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment from impairment by the States.”240 A 1937 case, Palko
v. Connecticut,241 refined the standard for which rights in the Bill of
233. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
234. See Kent, supra note 54; Krotoszynski, supra note 30.
235. 29 U.S. 502 (1934).
236. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
237. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
238. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
239. The petitioner’s conviction was still upheld, as the right to free speech did not include
the right to advocate violent overthrow of the government. Id.
240. Id. at 666.
241. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
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Rights would be incorporated: only those that embody “the very es-
sence of a scheme of ordered liberty.”242 The Palko rule contrasted
with “total incorporation,” the idea that the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporated the entire Bill of Rights wholesale. Today, the Supreme
Court has yet to create a bright-line test for incorporation. There is
little consensus on whether “total incorporation,”243 Frankfurter’s
“fundamental fairness and ordered liberty,”244 Brennan’s “selective
incorporation,”245 or any other theory is correct.246 The issue is largely
moot, because as mentioned, nearly the entire Bill of Rights has
been incorporated.247
Justice Douglas wrote,
The process of the ‘selective incorporation’ of various provisions
of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment, although
often provoking lively disagreement at large as well as among
the members of this Court, has been a steady one. It started in
1897 with Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago . . . in which the
Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment precluded a State
from taking private property for public use without payment of
just compensation, as provided in the Fifth Amendment.248
However, clearly this is a misconception, as Chicago, B. & Q. did not
mention incorporation or any part of the Bill of Rights. With the ex-
ception of Mahon and its progeny, up to 1978, the Court’s interpre-
tation of the Fourteenth Amendment comported with long-standing
natural rights theory and the likely intentions of the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held there was a substantive
due process right to just compensation, but only in the most egre-
gious circumstances: the rest was left to states’ internal processes.
242. Id. at 325.
243. See Duncan v. La., 391 U.S. 145, 162–71 (1968) (Black., J., concurring); Adamson v.
Cal., 332 U.S. 46, 68–123 (1947) (Black., J., dissenting); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 474–75
(1942) (Black, J., dissenting).
244. See 332 U.S. at 59–68 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Felix Frankfurter, Memorandum
on “Incorporation” of the Bill of Rights Into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 746 (1965).
245. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 154–60 (1961)
(Brennan., J., dissenting); Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 274–76 (1960) (separate
opinion of Brennan., J.).
246. For a detailed discussion of these perspectives, see Amar, supra note 10.
247. See supra notes 110–16 and accompanying text.
248. Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y.C., 397 U.S. 664, 701–02 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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The Takings Clause was not incorporated, in accord with the framers’
vote against the Bingham amendment.
IV. PENN CENTRAL TO PRESENT: IS THERE REALLY AN “OVERLAP”?
Penn Central “officially” incorporated the Takings Clause, but
it did not have much effect regarding appropriation of land. The
strong deference to state police power, to which the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment largely adhered, remained in place. On reg-
ulatory takings, however, the decision had a profound effect, allowing
the Court to resurrect a back door Lochnerism, as aptly described by
a number of scholars.249 The vast majority of Supreme Court decisions
on traditional state exercises of eminent domain, i.e., appropriations,
spoke in terms of substantive due process250 until Penn Central in
1978, a fact Justice John Paul Stevens acknowledged in a recent
case.251 This makes sense because as discussed above, it was never
really the intent of the framers to incorporate the Takings Clause
against the states. In 1978, however, Penn Central tersely stated,
The issues presented by appellants are (1) whether the restrictions
imposed by New York City’s law upon appellants’ exploitation of
249. See Karkainnen, supra note 11; Tunick, supra note 29; Walston, supra note 28.
250. Interestingly, an 1894 case seems to indicate that the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Takings Clause. In Reagan v. Farmers’ Loan and
Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894), the Court decided a case regarding tariff rates for carriages.
The Court stated that
[W]hile it is not the province of the courts to enter upon the merely admin-
istrative duty of framing a tariff of rates for carriage, it is within the scope of
judicial power, and a part of judicial duty, to restrain anything which, in the
form of a regulation of rates, operates to deny to the owners of property invested
in the business of transportation that equal protection which is the constitu-
tional right of all owners of other property. There is nothing new or strange in
this. It has always been a part of the judicial function to determine whether the
act of one party (whether that party be a single individual, an organized body, or
the public as a whole) operates to divest the other party of any rights of person or
property. In every constitution is the guaranty against the taking of private
property for public purposes without just compensation. The equal protection of
the laws, which, by the fourteenth amendment, no state can deny to the indi-
vidual, forbids legislation, in whatever form it may be enacted, by which the
property of one individual is, without compensation, wrested from him for the
benefit of another, or of the public.
Id. at 399.
251. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 406 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing
Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235, 236–41 (1897)).
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the Terminal site effect a “taking” of appellants’ property for a
public use within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, which of
course is made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment, see Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago.252
Justice Rehnquist’s dissenting opinion was similarly brief on the
issue of incorporation.
The guarantee that private property shall not be taken for pub-
lic use without just compensation is applicable to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Although the state “legis-
lature may prescribe a form of procedure to be observed in the
taking of private property for public use, . . . it is not due process
of law if provision be not made for compensation.”253
Justice Stevens later explained why Penn Central was in error,
and that Chicago, B. & Q. was not an incorporation case, but a
Lochner esque application of substantive due process:
The Court begins its constitutional analysis by citing Chicago,
B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago . . . for the proposition that the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment is “applicable to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment.” That opinion, however,
contains no mention of either the Takings Clause or the Fifth
Amendment; it held that the protection afforded by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment extends to matters
of substance as well as procedure, and that the substance of “the
due process of law enjoined by the Fourteenth Amendment re-
quires compensation to be made or adequately secured to the
owner of private property taken for public use under the author-
ity of a State.” It applied the same kind of substantive due pro-
cess analysis more frequently identified with a better known
case that accorded similar substantive protection to a baker’s
liberty interest in working 60 hours a week and 10 hours a day.
See Lochner v. New York.254
Interestingly, Justice Stevens does not explain how the Court
came to look at Chicago, B. & Q. as an incorporation case, stating
252. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y.C., 438 U.S. 104, 122 (emphasis added).
253. Id. at 142 n.3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting 166 U.S. at 236).
254. 512 U.S. at 406 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citing Chicago, B. & Q., 166
U.S. at 235, 236–41).
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only: “Later cases have interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment ’s
substantive protection against uncompensated deprivations of pri-
vate property by the States as though it incorporated the text of the
Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.”255
Several scholars blame Penn Central for causing a confusing
muddling of due process and the Takings Clause.256 Tunick proposes
a “decoupling” of due process from takings jurisprudence,257 and
Lawrence Berger notes that “the Court has failed to maintain clear
lines of demarcation between the substantive due process and tak-
ings rules and has introduced some unnecessary overlap and confu-
sion in their application.”258 He noted that:
Had the Court never held that the Takings Clause applies to
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, state regulations
of private property would be permissible—even if they took
property—so long as they were not arbitrary or capricious, as-
suming that, as economic regulations, they would be evaluated
under minimal scrutiny.259
Nevertheless, despite Penn Central’s definitive though brief incor-
poration of the Takings Clause, it did not fundamentally change the
Court’s analysis of appropriations of land—the “traditional” taking.
The Court’s decisions continued to comport with Reconstruction-era
ideas about state sovereignty and decisions after the Fourteenth
Amendment, which only limited state power where egregious viola-
tions of rational basis occurred. In other words, land appropriations
have been “evaluated under minimal scrutiny.” This is especially
evident in the Court’s “public use” challenges. As discussed above,
with the exception of Vester260 in 1930, the Court has universally
deferred to state interpretations of what uses count as “public.” This
trend continued in 1984 with Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,261
where the state of Hawaii attempted to break up a land oligopoly
through its takings power. The Court upheld the program, stating
255. Id. (citing Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 481, n. 10
(1987)).
256. See Berger, supra note 17; Karkainnen, supra note 11; Tunick, supra note 29.
257. See Tunick, supra note 29.
258. Lawrence Berger, supra note 17, at 844.
259. Tunick, supra note 29, at 891.
260. City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439 (1930).
261. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
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that “[t]he ‘public use’ requirement is thus coterminous with the
scope of a sovereign’s police powers”262 and that “where the exercise
of the eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable
public purpose, the Court has never held a compensated taking to
be proscribed by the Public Use Clause.”263 As with all exercises of
state police power not concerning non-fundamental rights, the anal-
ysis was similar to that of rational basis. Midkiff cited a number of
non-condemnation decisions relating to rational basis in holding that
“‘whether in fact the provision will accomplish its objectives is not the
question: the [constitutional requirement] is satisfied if . . . the . . .
[state] Legislature rationally could have believed that the [Act] would
promote its objective.’”264 Midkiff was very similar to Vester 265 and
other cases of that era in its reluctance to strike down state exer-
cises of police power based on public use.
The contentious decision Kelo v. City of New London266 validated
Midkiff by treating a state condemnation as any other exercise of
police power not affecting fundamental rights. Kelo attempted to
backtrack from Midkiff, but ultimately indicated the Takings Clause
and substantive due process are redundant. Although the “question
presented is whether the city’s proposed disposition of this property
qualifies as a ‘public use’ within the meaning of the Takings Clause
of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution,”267 the Court’s analysis
looked suspiciously like simple rational basis.
The disposition of this case therefore turns on the question
whether the City’s development plan serves a “public purpose”.
Without exception, our cases have defined that concept broadly,
reflecting our longstanding policy of deference to legislative judg-
ments in this field. . . . Our earliest cases in particular embodied
a strong theme of federalism, emphasizing the “great respect”
that we owe to state legislatures and state courts in discerning
local public needs . . . . For more than a century, our public use
262. Id. at 240 (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31–33 (1954)).
263. Id. at 241.
264. Id. at 242 (quoting Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451
U.S. 648, 671–72 (1981) and citing Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466
(1981); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 112 (1979)) (emphasis added). The rational basis test
for “public use” is the approach Justice Kennedy advocated for in his Kelo concurrence. Kelo
v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 490 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
265. 281 U.S. 439 (1930).
266. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
267. Id. at 472 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V) (emphasis added).
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jurisprudence has widely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive
scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in deter-
mining what public needs justify the use of the takings power.268
Kelo referenced Davidson ’s prohibition on transferring property
from A. to B., but did not find that egregious situation present in the
case.269 The Court implied that it was merely applying a due process
rational basis test. It cited Vester,270 which held that a taking was
invalid for lack of a reasoned explanation, and Midkiff ’s application
of rational basis.271
The City has carefully formulated an economic development plan
that it believes will provide appreciable benefits to the commu-
nity . . . [g]iven the comprehensive character of the plan, the
thorough deliberation that preceded its adoption, and the limited
scope of our review[.]272
Further, the property owners’ proposed test of a “reasonable cer-
tainty” that public benefits accrue from a taking represented an
even greater departure from our precedent. “When the legisla-
ture’s purpose is legitimate and its means are not irrational, our
cases make clear that empirical debates over the wisdom of
takings—no less than debates over the wisdom of other kinds
of socioeconomic legislation—are not to be carried out in the
federal courts.”273
This is a textbook application of substantive due process that dates
back to Davidson. The Kelo majority did identify two takings that
would never pass constitutional muster: “purely private” takings274
and takings under the “mere pretext of a public purpose.”275 But
these types of takings would be excludable under due process anyway.
268. Id. at 480, 482–83, 483 n. 11 (citing Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200
U.S. 527, 531 (1906); Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361, at 367–68 (1905)).
269. Id. at 487.
270. 281 U.S. 439 (1930).
271. 545 U.S. at 487–88 (citing Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242–43 (1984)).
272. Id. at 483–84.
273. Id. at 487–88 (quoting 467 U.S. at 242).
274. Id. at 477–78, 478 n.5 (citing Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Neb., 164 U.S. 403 (1896); Calder
v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798)).
275. Id. at 478. The Court did not offer any exemplary cases regarding “pretextual” takings.
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The latter situation is an example of the type of condemnation the
Court struck down in Vester.276 In other words, the Takings Clause
is essentially meaningless—except perhaps for the fact that it in-
cludes the compensatory right. However, the right to just compensa-
tion, as discussed earlier in this article, was a fundamental “natural”
right, which we would expect substantive due process to protect.
The Kelo dissenters believed the Supreme Court had reduced the
Public Use Clause to “little more than hortatory fluff.”277 Justice
Thomas’s vigorous dissent argued that the majority’s broad defer-
ence to legislative judgment was “effectively to delete the words ‘for
public use’ from the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”278
History seems to be on the majority’s side, however, as one struggles
to find a Supreme Court case that struck down a condemnation—
either state or federal—so long as the agency had a mere rational
basis for its decision to condemn. Justice Thomas acknowledged that
the Court had been applying this deference test since the nineteenth
century, but that all such decisions were simply wrong.279 Justice
Thomas’s vigorous dissent, railing against cases dating back to
Fallbrook, argued that Kelo was “simply the latest in a string of our
cases construing the Public Use Clause to be a virtual nullity, with-
out the slightest nod to its original meaning.”280 Arguing that “[t]he
Court adopted its modern reading blindly,”281 Justice Thomas rea-
soned that Fallbrook and its progeny were simply wrong.282 “Berman
and Midkiff erred by equating the eminent domain power with the
police power of States.”283 But the ultimate federalist seems to have
forgotten that even after the Fourteenth Amendment was passed,
the Court retained essential federalism principles that began with
Barron v. Baltimore. Justice Thomas’s dissent ultimately fails to
point out where the Court had not equated eminent domain power
with the police power of the states.
276. Id. at 487 n.17. The Court noted this taking was invalid for “lack of a reasoned
explanation” and that “[t]hese types of takings may also implicate other constitutional
guarantees.” Id. The Court cited Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (per
curiam) (taking invalid on equal protection grounds).
277. 545 U.S. at 497 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
278. Id. at 494.
279. See id. at 505–23 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
280. Id. at 506 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
281. Id. at 515 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
282. Id. at 515–16 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
283. 545 U.S. at 519 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S.
229, 240 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)).
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Justice O’Connor, in contrast, struggled to distinguish Midkiff
and Berman from the facts of Kelo. Like the majority, she believed
the “public use” went further than normal due process limits on
police power. Justice O’Connor wrote in dissent,
To reason, as the Court does, that the incidental public benefits
resulting from the subsequent ordinary use of private property
render economic development takings “for public use” is to wash
out any distinction between private and public use of property—
and thereby effectively to delete the words “for public use” from
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.284
Looking at history, however, the Kelo majority was simply applying
stare decisis, following centuries of case law in which the Supreme
Courts defer to the states and the legislative and executive branches
to determine what constitutes a valid public use. The only instances
where the Court has struck down takings are where government
behavior was so egregious it constituted a violation of fundamental
due process, such as a taking with no stated purpose whatsoever, let
alone a public purpose.285 Justice O’Connor’s dissent tried to find a
middle ground that would not render “the Public Use Clause redun-
dant with the Due Process Clause, which already prohibits irrational
government action.”286 Noting that Midkiff made “[t]he ‘public use’
requirement . . . coterminous with the scope of a sovereign’s police
powers,”287 she stated:
Berman and Midkiff simply did not put such language to the con-
stitutional test, because the takings in those cases were within
the police power but also for “public use” for the reasons I have
described. The case before us now demonstrates why, when de-
ciding if a taking’s purpose is constitutional, the police power and
“public use” cannot always be equated.288
O’Connor tried to distinguish those cases as eliminating a harm-
ful use of land, whereas Kelo was taking property from productive
owners.289 Ultimately, however, her opinion failed to consider that
all these cases were part of a long line of precedent deferring to states
284. Id. at 494 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
285. See City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 439 (1930).
286. 545 U.S. at 503 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544
U.S. 528 (2005)).
287. 467 U.S. at 240 (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31–33 (1954)).
288. 545 U.S. at 501–02 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting 467 U.S. at 240; 348 U.S. at 32).
289. Id.
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on public use, and that contrary to Justice O’Connor’s opinion, Kelo
did not “delete the words ‘for public use’ from the Takings Clause.”290
O’Connor cannot reject Kelo and try to uphold Midkiff. “While Justice
O’Connor is correct that the majority removed the Public Use Clause
from the Fifth Amendment, her attempt to distinguish Berman and
Midkiff does not hold up under close analysis.”291
The Kelo majority delivered an opinion that conformed to the fram-
ers’ intention that the Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate
the Takings Clause against the states, leaving the power to dispose
of property to states’ internal processes. Penn Central ’s fleeting in-
corporation did little to change the law concerning takings involv-
ing appropriation of land. Regulatory takings, on the other hand, do
not fit neatly into this model. Penn Central was a regulatory takings
case, and it merely expanded on Mahon’s pronouncement decades
earlier. However, this citation to Mahon may have been misguided.
In discussing the “the substantive due process origins of ‘regulatory
taking’ theory,” Patrick McGinley concludes that in Mahon, Justice
Holmes was not in fact construing the Takings Clause.292 Rather,
Justice Holmes was making a “metaphoric illusion[ ] to the Due Pro-
cess Clause.”293 “Commentators who support this theory suggest that
the source of confusion in constitutional ‘taking’ analysis has been
the judicially fueled doctrinal convergence and intertwining of the
Due Process and Just Compensation/Eminent Domain Clauses.”294
“Then, like Chicago, B. & Q., Mahon was plucked from relative ob-
scurity and anachronistically recast as a Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause precedent by Penn Central and its progeny. In that guise, it
came to serve as one of the pillars of contemporary regulatory tak-
ings jurisprudence.”295
Tunick is correct, however, that a “decoupling” is necessary where
regulatory takings are involved. Notably, Penn Central deferred to
the condemning agency, once again respecting state exercise of po-
lice power. New York was allowed to prevent the building expansion
290. Id. at 494.
291. Sturtevant, supra note 37, at 240.
292. Patrick C. McGinley, Regulatory “Takings”: The Remarkable Resurrection of Economic
Substantive Due Process Analysis in Constitutional Law, 17 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10369 (1987).
293. Id.
294. Id. (citing Williamson Cnty Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,
105 S. Ct. 3108, 3122–23 (1985)).
295. Karkainnen, supra note 11, at 865.
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without providing just compensation. However, it set a precedent
that allowed a resurrection of Lochner’s economic substantive due
process, as well-documented by Karkainnen:
Thus it fairly may be said that every major element in the
Court’s modern Fifth Amendment regulatory takings jurispru-
dence, with the possible exception of Loretto, was founded in
whole or in part on Fourteenth Amendment substantive due pro-
cess precedents, and reflects substantive due process concepts
and principles. Penn Central’s phantom incorporation of the
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause against the states effected, in
fact though not in name, a “reverse incorporation” of Lochner-
era substantive due process jurisprudence into modern Fifth
Amendment takings law.296
Karkainnen further argues that Penn Central had two major effects:
(1) eliminating the “police power defense,” i.e., depriving states of
their right to define property; and (2) allowing “‘reverse incorpora-
tion’ of substantive due process concepts and principles into Fifth
Amendment takings law.”297 Both of these effects apply exclusively
to regulatory takings. As an example, the Court recently struck
down a federal law that required coal companies to pay medical
benefits to miners in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel.298 Of course, this
case was not exactly analogous to Lochner in that it involved fed-
eral law, not state police power. But the fact that the Court was
willing to find an uncompensated taking in a law that required
relinquishing money, not property, indicates it was willing to go far
to protect property rights. Apfel shows that one consequence of the
Court’s “incorporation” is a resurrection of extreme substantive due
process, in the regulatory takings context. Judging from the public
use decisions cited above, however, this extreme position does not
apply where more “traditional” takings, i.e., appropriation of land,
are involved.
There is an indication, however, that the Court is moving toward
a “decoupling.” The Court recently addressed the overlap between
the two clauses and attempted to make some distinctions. In Lingle v.
Chevron,299 the Court addressed whether a Hawaii statute aimed at
296. Id. at 888 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427
(1982)).
297. Id. at 831–32.
298. 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
299. 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
146 PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE JOURNAL [Vol. 1:095
protecting independent gas station owners amounted to an unconsti-
tutional taking. The law prevented oil companies from converting
independent and lessee-operated stations to corporate-owned and
-operated stations. The law also limited the rent an oil company
could charge lessee-operators. The lower courts held the statute
failed to substantially advance a legitimate state interest and there-
fore was an unconstitutional taking. The Supreme Court reversed,
holding the “substantially advances” test applied only to due pro-
cess, and was thus not a valid test to determine the presence of a
taking.300 This was one of the first times when the Court clearly
distinguished between the Takings and Due Process Clauses.
CONCLUSION
Justice Stevens, in his Dolan dissent, stated: “There was nothing
problematic about that interpretation in cases enforcing the Four-
teenth Amendment against state action that involved the actual
physical invasion of private property.”301 In other words, substantive
due process against physical takings is okay, but against regulatory
takings it is wrong because it risks a return to Lochnerism. Rather
than as a muddle of substantive due process and the Takings Clause,
we should think of land appropriations and regulatory takings as
developing along separate tracks. The Supreme Court got every-
thing right concerning appropriation of land by largely deferring to
states and respecting their ability to regulate property. This accords
with prevailing notions about state power that existed at the time
the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. In addition, the same
framework would have existed had the Supreme Court not “incor-
porated” the Takings Clause in Chicago, B. & Q. or Penn Central.
Substantive due process would have led to similar outcomes, and in
fact it did until 1978. Things went awry in regulatory takings juris-
prudence when the Supreme Court adopted an expansive notion of
what a “taking” is. What would the Committee of Fifteen have made
of this? The trouble was, there really was no such thing as a regula-
tory taking in the nineteenth century. Zoning and land use regula-
tions were sparsely used. At that time, a “taking” was only the most
fundamental exercise of eminent domain: the appropriation of land.
300. Id.
301. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 406 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
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If a taking was still defined as such, then the Court has adhered to
the Reconstruction idea that substantive due process provides mini-
mal protection to property owners, and that state law is the primary
source to limit eminent domain.
On the other hand, even in land appropriations, the Takings Clause
must mean something. After all, “it would be ‘incongruous’ to apply
different standards ‘depending on whether [a constitutional] claim
was asserted in a state or federal court.’”302 In U.S. ex rel. Tennessee
Valley Authority v. Welch,303 the Court gave legislative determina-
tions of public use “near[ ] immunity from judicial review”304 when
it held that determinations of Congress and legislatures are binding.
If even “traditional” takings protections only extend to the limit of due
process, why have a Takings Clause at all? Is this the fact that the
Committee of Fifteen recognized when it voted against a takings
clause analogue in the Fourteenth Amendment? It may simply be
that the Takings Clause has always been redundant with substan-
tive due process or “natural” rights. The truth is, we will never know.
Studying the Fourteenth Amendment is much like a traditional read-
ing of the Five Books of Moses that comprise the Torah. One can
read the Five Books in so many different ways and discern so many
different meanings that there is no “correct” interpretation found
thus far. A reading of the Fourteenth Amendment, even through the
perspective of those who were there at its drafting, does not resolve
the uncertainty. The comments of individuals involved with the
drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment, frequently unsupported by
the written record, change our attitude about the intent and mean-
ing of the Amendment. Reading the Fourteenth Amendment through
the framers’ eyes helps to some extent, but it really does not alleviate
the confusion. Was it simply to support and propagate the Republican
party by granting blacks suffrage? Was it out of a genuine concern to
protect freed slaves? Was it to protect scalawags and carpetbaggers
who had seized power in the South? Did Congress simply want to
destroy states’ rights and empower the federal government by over-
turning Barron v. Baltimore?
302. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3035 (2010) (quoting Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1964)).
303. 327 U.S. 546 (1946).
304. Id. at 557.
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In the realm of eminent domain, it is unfortunate that a more
clear meaning behind the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be dis-
cerned since it is central to protecting property rights. The fact is,
natural law protection for individual property rights should form
the basis of eminent domain, and protection should be much broader
than what the Takings Clause itself would allow. It is likely that
Kelo may be revisited in the future. Our society’s anger toward that
decision, whether well-founded or not, is heard by the courts. This
will lead to a very interesting decision in the future. Whatever the
case, it is clear that the Fourteenth Amendment contains a natural
law limitation that protects property rights to some degree.
TWO CHEERS FOR JUSTICE O’CONNOR
JAMES W. ELY JR.*
This essay assesses the performance of Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor with respect to the constitutional rights of property
owners, and argues that her property jurisprudence was an as-
sortment of different and contradictory elements. In short, the
O’Connor legacy is more complex than her vigorous dissent in Kelo
v. City of New London (2005)1 might suggest.
Curiously, Justice O’Connor’s property rights decisions are a
relatively underexplored dimension of her Supreme Court career.
Even admiring studies of her work on the Court give scant attention
to property-related issues.2 Certainly there is much to applaud in
O’Connor’s record on this topic. She often joined with the majority of
the Rehnquist Court as it cautiously sought to strengthen the rights
of property owners. Although O’Connor helped property rights make
a modest comeback in constitutional law, her overall voting pattern
was somewhat ambivalent and left ample room for the regulatory
state. Moreover, O’Connor’s interest in property seemed to wax and
wane over her years on the bench.
I consider in Part I decisions by Justice O’Connor that point
toward a strengthening of the rights of property owners. In Part II
I examine judicial opinions by O’Connor which cut in the opposite
direction, minimizing property rights. I probe in Part III her seem-
ingly inconsistent thinking about the “public use” limitation on the
exercise of the eminent domain power.
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this essay.
1. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
2. See, e.g., JOAN BISKUPIC, SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR: HOW THE FIRST WOMAN ON THE
SUPREME COURT BECAME ITS MOST INFLUENTIAL JUSTICE (2005); ANN CAREY MCFEATTERS,
SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR: JUSTICE IN THE BALANCE (2005). See also NANCY MAVEETY, QUEEN’S
COURT: JUDICIAL POWER IN THE REHNQUIST ERA (2008) (providing an analysis of O’Connor’s
role on the Rehnquist Court but, aside from a brief treatment of Kelo, ignoring her property
rights jurisprudence).
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I. DECISIONS SUPPORTIVE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
A. Takings Jurisprudence
Over the course of American history both the contract clause and
the due process clause have played important roles in protecting the
rights of property owners.3 In the post–New Deal era, however, the
takings clause of the Fifth Amendment has been the principal vehi-
cle for the vindication of property rights. That Amendment provides
in part: “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.” Therefore, the bulk of Justice O’Connor’s prop-
erty decisions turn upon interpretations of this language.
Many of the cases in which she participated focused on the ques-
tion of what governmental actions, short of outright acquisition,
amounted to a taking of property within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment ban on taking private property without just compen-
sation. For example, early in her tenure on the Supreme Court,
O’Connor was called upon to decide whether a minor but permanent
physical occupation of an owner’s property under governmental
authorization amounted to a taking. The Court had long viewed a
physical invasion by government as a particularly serious matter.4
In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATA Corp. (1982),5 Justice
O’Connor joined the majority opinion which affirmed “the tradi-
tional rule that a permanent physical occupation of property is a
taking,”6 even if only a small portion of the owner’s property was
occupied. In other words, O’Connor was prepared to endorse a cate-
gorical rule governing physical incursions on land.
O’Connor’s record with respect to regulatory takings was more
complicated. She supported the decision in Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission (1987).7 In that case the Supreme Court, for the
first time since the 1920s, invalidated a land use regulation. At
issue was the practice of local governments to condition the grant
of building permits to developers upon exactions, such as the
3. See, e.g., JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITU-
TIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 59–141 (3d ed. 2008).
4. See, e.g., Pumpelly v. Green Bay Company, 80 U.S. 166 (1871) (holding that perma-
nent flooding of land constituted a taking of property).
5. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
6. Id. at 441.
7. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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dedication of land to the public or the payment of impact fees. The
Nollan case arose when a state agency conditioned a permit to re-
build a beach house upon the owners’ grant of a public easement
across the beachfront. O’Connor joined with the majority to hold that
the imposition of such a condition constituted a taking because the
requirement was unrelated to any problem caused by the proposed
development. The Court also indicated a willingness to scrutinize
more carefully the connection between the purpose and the means of
regulation. In Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994),8 with O’Connor’s sup-
port, the Court overturned another exaction scheme. A local zoning
agency approved the building plans of a store owner conditioned on
the owner’s dedication of part of her land to the city for a public
greenbelt and a bicycle path. The Court insisted that there must be
a “rough proportionality” between the imposed exactions and the
burdens expected from the proposed building development. It also
ruled that the local government had the burden of justifying the
regulation. Because the city in Dolan failed to meet its burden, the
Court held that the exactions amounted to a taking of private prop-
erty without compensation.
Indeed, O’Connor made clear that she was prepared to place a
broad reading on the Dolan test governing exactions. There was un-
certainty among lower courts as to whether the Dolan test applied
only to cases in which the exaction was imposed by administrative
decision or also extended to legislative enactments. In Parking Asso-
ciation of Georgia v. City of Atlanta (1995),9 a case involving a munici-
pal ordinance requiring parking lot owners to undertake extensive
and costly landscaping, the Supreme Court declined to resolve the
issue. However, O’Connor joined Justice Clarence Thomas in a dis-
sent from the denial of certiorari. They cogently argued:
It is not clear why the existence of a taking should turn on the type
of governmental entity responsible for the taking. A city council
can take property just as well as a planning commission can. More-
over, the general applicability of the ordinance should not be rel-
evant in a takings analysis. . . . The distinction between sweeping
legislative takings and particularized administrative takings ap-
pears to be a distinction without a constitutional difference.10
8. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
9. 515 U.S. 1116 (1995).
10. Id. at 1117–18.
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As Thomas and O’Connor correctly perceived, it is difficult to see
why a different standard should apply depending upon the charac-
ter of the state action. The takings inquiry should instead focus on
the impact of the regulation upon the property owner.
In addition to scrutinizing exactions, the Rehnquist Court demon-
strated concern about land use regulations that drastically reduce
the value of property. At issue in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council (1992)11 was a South Carolina total ban on beachfront de-
velopment. Designed to prevent beach erosion and preserve a valu-
able public resource, the law prevented the owner of the last two
residential lots from building any permanent structure on his land.
O’Connor once again joined the majority opinion, which found that
regulations denying an owner “all economically beneficial or produc-
tive use of land” amount to a per se taking, notwithstanding the pub-
lic interest advanced to justify the limitation. The Court reasoned
that the total deprivation of economic use is the practical equivalent
of physical appropriation of land. It expressed concern that controls
preventing economic use “carry with them a heightened risk that
private property is being pressed into some form of public service
under the guise of mitigating serious public harm.”12
Most takings cases have involved land use regulations, but a
number of governmental policies have been challenged as unconsti-
tutional takings of property. One such challenge concerned a con-
gressional statute imposing a retroactive financial obligation on a
former mining employer to bolster the solvency of a coal industry
retirement and health fund. Writing for a plurality of the Court in
Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel (1994),13 O’Connor determined that the
statute as applied constituted an unconstitutional taking. She noted
generally that an economic regulation could effect a taking. Stressing
that retroactive laws are disfavored, O’Connor pointed out that the
statute divested Eastern Enterprises of property and imposed a
severe financial liability long after the company had ceased coal
mining operations. She concluded that when a legislative remedy
“singles out certain employers to bear a burden that is substantial in
amount, based on the employers’ conduct far in the past, and unre-
lated to any commitment that the employers made or to any injury
11. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
12. Id. at 1017.
13. 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
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they caused, the governmental action implicates fundamental prin-
ciples of fairness underlying the Takings Clause.”14 Given the splint-
ered opinion in Eastern Enterprises, the importance of the decision
is unclear. Still, it is noteworthy that O’Connor invoked the regulatory
takings doctrine in the context of a general regulatory measure.15
In several concurring or dissension opinions, O’Connor took po-
sitions that would strengthen the constitutional protection of prop-
erty owners in takings cases. In Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v.
DeBenedictis (1987),16 the Supreme Court rejected a takings challenge
to a Pennsylvania statute prohibiting certain coal mining to protect
surface structures from subsidence. O’Connor joined, together with
two other justices, in a dissenting opinion by Chief Justice William
H. Rehnquist. The dissenters maintained that the act extinguished
all rights in an identifiable segment of property—millions of tons of
coal—and effected a taking for which compensation was required.17
A year later O’Connor evidenced a degree of skepticism about rent
control schemes. In Pennell v. City of San Jose (1988),18 the Court
brushed aside an attack on a municipal rent control ordinance that
mandated consideration of a tenant’s “hardship” status in determin-
ing a reasonable rent. The Court concluded that a taking challenge
was premature because there was no evidence that the hardship pro-
vision had ever been applied to reduce the amount of a rent. O’Connor,
joining a dissenting opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia, insisted that
the tenant hardship provision effected a taking of property. They
stressed the purpose behind the takings clause was to prevent gov-
ernment from singling out particular individuals from bearing costs
that should be placed on the public as a whole. Scalia and O’Connor
charged that the city “is using the occasion of rent regulation . . . to
establish a welfare program privately funded by those landlords who
happen to have ‘hardship’ tenants.” They added that the prescrip-
tion of the takings clause was grounded upon “the unfairness of
making one citizen pay, in some fashion other than taxes, to remedy
a social problem that is none of his creation.”19
14. Id. at 537.
15. For a helpful treatment of Eastern Enterprises, see Steven J. Eagle, Substantive Due
Process and Regulatory Takings: A Reappraisal, 51 ALA. L. REV. 977, 981–89 (2000).
16. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
17. Id. at 506–21.
18. 485 U.S. 1 (1998).
19. Id. at 23.
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O’Connor also reflected property-conscious views in Preseault
v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1990),20 a case arising under
congressional legislation to promote the conversion of abandoned
railroad rights-of-way to recreational trails.21 Such conversions were
challenged as a taking of the property of servient landowners. Ar-
guably the act enlarged the burden on landowners by indefinitely
delaying the termination of the railroad easemenst by abandon-
ment under state law. The Supreme Court determined that, even if
a taking occurred by virtue of a trails conversion, the landowners
could seek compensation in the Claims Court under the Tucker Act.
O’Connor authored a concurring opinion in which she emphasized
that a takings claim could arise from the rails-to-trails legislation.
She opined “that state law determines what property interest peti-
tioners possess and that traditional takings doctrine will determine
whether the Government must compensate petitioners for the bur-
den imposed on any property interest they possess.”22 O’Connor
maintained that regulatory oversight of railroad abandonments by
Congress was a distinct question from whether the exercise of such
power amounted to a taking. Indeed, she went further, declaring
that “the Fifth Amendment and well-established doctrine indicate
that in certain circumstances the Government must compensate
owners of those property interests when it exercises that power.”23
Of particular interest is the opinion by Scalia, in which O’Connor
joined, dissenting from the denial of certiorari in Stevens v. City of
Cannon Beach (1994).24 At issue were decisions of the Supreme Court
of Oregon declaring that the doctrine of custom applied to all dry-
sand beaches in the state, and that the public enjoyed a customary
right to use such beaches for recreational purposes. When the owner
of a beachfront lot was denied a building permit for construction of a
seawall, the owner brought an inverse condemnation action against
the city. The owner asserted that the doctrine of custom was a new-
found fiction, and that in any event the facts did not support its
application to the owner’s property. The Supreme Court declined
20. 494 U.S. 1 (1990).
21. For the background of the rails-to-trails controversy and the Preseault litigation,
see JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN LAND,
§ 12:8 (2012).
22. Preseault, 424 U.S. at 20.
23. Id. at 23.
24. 510 U.S. 1207 (1994).
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to review the ruling of the Oregon court dismissing the complaint.
Scalia and O’Connor, however, persuasively argued that the petition
for certiorari should have been granted, and in so doing broke new
ground in Fifth Amendment jurisprudence.
The two justices strongly intimated that the Supreme Court of
Oregon was creating a novel doctrine rather than describing an al-
ready existing doctrine. They insisted:
As a general matter, the Constitution leaves the law of real
property to the States. But just as a State may not deny rights
protected under the Federal Constitution through pretextual
procedural rulings, . . . neither may it do so by invoking nonex-
istent rules of state substantive law. . . . No more by judicial
decree than by legislative fiat may a State transform private
property into public property without compensation. . . . Since
opening private property to public use constitutes a taking, . . .
if it cannot be fairly be said that an Oregon doctrine of custom
deprived Cannon Beach property owners of their rights to ex-
clude others from the dry sand, then the decision now before us
has effectuated an uncompensated taking.25
This prescient opinion contemplated the possibility that a judicial
decision could constitute a taking of property. Under this analysis,
the invocation of novel doctrines, or the reversal of long-standing
rules governing property, to defeat established rights of owners
might well run afoul of the Fifth Amendment.26
In Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of
Environmental Protection (2010),27 a case decided after O’Connor’s
retirement, a plurality of the Supreme Court endorsed the concept
of a judicial taking of property. Scalia, writing for the plurality,
drew heavily upon his opinion with O’Connor in Cannon Beach. He
asserted: “It would be absurd to allow a State to do by judicial
25. Id. at 1334.
26. The Supreme Court wrestled inconclusively with issue of judicial takings in Muhlker
v. New York and Harlem R.R. Co., 197 U.S. 544 (1905). For thoughtful discussions of this
topic, see David J. Bederman, The Curious Resurrection of Custom: Beach Access and Judicial
Takings, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1375 (1996) (arguing that expansion of the doctrine of custom
in Oregon constitutes a judicial taking); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA.
L. REV. 1449 (1990) (advocating that takings protection should extend to courts as well
as legislatures).
27. 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010).
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decree what the Takings Clause forbids it to do by legislative fiat.”28
Scalia amplified his reasoning:
In sum, the Takings Clause bars the State from taking private
property without paying for it, no matter which branch is the
instrument of the taking. To be sure, the manner of state action
may matter: Condemnation by eminent domain, for example, is
always a taking, while a legislative, executive, or judicial restric-
tion of property use may or may not be, depending on its nature
and extent. But the particular state actor is irrelevant. If a leg-
islature or a court declares that what was once an established
right of private property no longer exists, it has taken that prop-
erty, no less than if the State had physically appropriated it or
destroyed its value by regulation.29
Although the concept of a judicial taking has gained traction, the
doctrine raises complex issues that are outside the scope of this
essay.30 Suffice it to say that, on its face, the text of the Fifth Amend-
ment draws no distinction between the branches of government in
terms of legal change that affect property ownership. Therefore the
basic notion seems sound, even though many issues remain to be
resolved.31 For our purposes, it is important to recall O’Connor’s con-
tribution to the formulation of judicial takings doctrine.
In addition, O’Connor addressed the contested role of transferable
development rights in takings analysis. In Suitum v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency (1997),32 the owner of an undeveloped lot near Lake
Tahoe was not permitted to develop her land, but was entitled to re-
ceive allegedly valuable transferable development rights (“TDRs”)
which she could sell to other owners. It was a matter of dispute
whether the TDRs had any actual value in the market. The owner
brought suit, claiming a regulatory taking of her property. The
28. Id. at 2601.
29. Id. at 2602.
30. See D. Benjamin Barros, The Complexities of Judicial Takings, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 903
(2011).
31. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Stop the Beach Renourishment and the Problem of Judicial
Takings, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 91, 106 (2011) (“Judicial takings are fundamen-
tally similar to other takings. The fact that judges, rather than legislators or executive branch
officials, enact them is irrelevant under the Constitution. No one doubts that judges are for-
bidden to violate other constitutional rights. Property rights protected by the Takings Clause
are no different.”).
32. 520 U.S. 725 (1997).
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Supreme Court found the case ripe for judicial review, and re-
manded the case without a decision on the merits. Scalia, joined by
O’Connor and Thomas, concurred in an opinion treating TDRs. They
stressed that the ability of the owner to sell TDRs was not related
to the existence of a taking.33 The three justices declared that the
availability of TDRs was relevant only to the question of compen-
sation, and did not bear on the issue of whether there had been a
taking. As they framed the question, “the relevant issue is the ex-
tent to which use or development of the land has been restricted.”34
The existence of TDRs simply did not pertain to this issue, but could
be part of the full compensation for a taking.
O’Connor’s reluctance to fashion hard and fast rules in the con-
text of regulatory takings was evident in her concurring opinion in
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island (2001).35 She agreed with the Court that
a takings claimant was not necessarily barred where the claimant
acquired the regulated property after the state-imposed restrictions
were enacted. In her view, the timing of the regulation’s enactment
was simply one of a number of factors to be considered in a regula-
tory takings inquiry.36 O’Connor indicated a preference for ad hoc
factual investigations. She tellingly observed: “The temptation to
adopt what amounts to per se rules in either direction must be re-
sisted. The Takings Clause requires careful examination and weigh-
ing of all the relevant circumstances in this context.”37 Such an
approach, however, leads to highly subjective decision-making and
unpredictable results.
B. Remedies for a Taking
Individuals pursuing a regulatory takings claim in federal court
face a virtual stone wall. Not only must they bear legal fees and
transaction costs, but procedural hurdles make it almost impossible
to bring such claims in federal scourt. Under the ripeness doctrine set
forth in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Ham-
ilton Bank (1984),38 an opinion which O’Connor joined, a claimant
33. Id. at 747–49.
34. Id. at 749.
35. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
36. Id. at 632–36.
37. Id. at 636.
38. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
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must satisfy a two-prong test before instituting a federal court chal-
lenge to an alleged regulatory taking. Claimants must first obtain
a “final decision” from the appropriate local government agency on
a land use application, and must then seek and have been denied
compensation in state court. As a practical matter, the Williamson
County ripeness test has virtually shut the door on the ability of
claimants to seek a remedy for a regulatory taking in federal court.
In addition, the federal courts are barred by the federal full faith
and credit statute from relitigating issues that have been resolved
in state court actions.39 Consequently, regulatory takings claimants
are commonly left with no access to a federal forum. The Williamson
County rule has long been the subject of criticism.40 It clearly sug-
gests the Supreme Court’s lack of interest in enforcing property
rights. No other important right is treated in such a shabby manner.
In San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San Francisco (2005),41
the Supreme Court rejected the argument that courts should not ap-
ply the preclusion rules under the federal full faith and credit stat-
ute when a claimant was forced into state court first in order to meet
the Williamson County ripeness test. Justice John Paul Stevens,
speaking for the Court, was untroubled by the acknowledged fact
that takings claimants could not present their federal claims under
the Fifth Amendment in a federal forum.
Justice O’Connor, however, joined with three other justices in a
concurring opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist.42 He urged the Court
to revisit the second prong of the Williamson County test, requir-
ing takings claimants to seek state court review before bringing a
federal court action. Rehnquist questioned the justification for the
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (providing that “judicial proceedings . . . shall have the same full
faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions
as they have by law or custom in the courts of such State . . .”).
40. See, e.g., Thomas E. Roberts, Ripeness and Forum Selection in Fifth Amendment
Takings Litigation, 11 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 37 (1995) (discussing the implications of
Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton on ripeness and forum selection re-
quirements); Stephen E. Abraham, Williamson County Fifteen Years Later: When Is a Taking
Claim (Ever) Ripe?, 36 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 101, 104 (2001) (“Williamson County is re-
garded as posing formidable hurdles because of its two-part ripeness requirement, finality and
compensation, that ultimately may block takings claims.”); Max Kidalov & Richard Seamon,
The Missing Pieces of the Debate Over Federal Property Rights Litigation, 27 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 1, 5 (1999) (“The U.S. Supreme Court has developed rules that make it almost impossible
for federal courts to remedy violations of the Just Compensation Clause.”).
41. 545 U.S. 323 (2005).
42. Id. at 348–52.
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state-litigation requirement, and pointedly commented that claim-
ants challenging land use regulations on First Amendment grounds
could come directly to federal court. Rehnquist was perplexed “why
federal taking claims in particular should be singled out to be con-
fined to state court, in the absence of any asserted justification or con-
gressional directive.”43 By joining this concurring opinion, O’Connor
signaled her unhappiness with the restrictive Williamson County
test, and her willingness to enlarge the ability of takings claimants
to have their cases heard in a federal forum.
II. DECISIONS DISMISSIVE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS CLAIMS
A. Takings Jurisprudence
Despite the above discussion, O’Connor was by no means sup-
portive of all takings claims. We now turn to a consideration of those
cases in which she found no property rights violation. Of course,
even the most property-conscious judge would not necessarily decide
every case in favor of property owners. Still, one should assess the
total record in order to correctly gauge the extent of O’Connor’s de-
fense of property rights.
At issue in Yee v. City of Escondido (1992)44 was the validity of a
local rent control ordinance when joined with a state law severely lim-
iting the power of property owners to terminate mobile home tenants.
The ordinance prohibited any rent increase without the approval of
the city council. Mobile park owners alleged that the rent control
ordinance effectuated a physical occupation of their premises, and
amounted to a per se taking of their property under Loretto.45 They
argued that the effect of the ordinance, when coupled with the state
law, was to confer a right on mobile home tenants to remain indefi-
nitely on their property at below-market rents.
O’Connor, writing for the Court, ruled that the rent control ordi-
nance, seen in conjunction with the state law, did not compel the
landowners to submit to physical occupation. She pointed out that the
owners voluntarily rented their property and retained the right to
change the land use and evict the tenants with notice. Revealingly,
43. Id. at 351.
44. 503 U.S. 519 (1992).
45. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
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O’Connor emphasized: “A different case would be presented were the
statute, on its face or as applied, to compel a landowner over objec-
tion to rent his property or to refrain in perpetuity from terminating
a tenancy.”46 Finding no compelled physical occupation of property,
she ruled that the ordinance was a regulation of use and did not
amount to a per se taking. O’Connor declined to pass upon a regula-
tory taking claim as improperly presented, but noted that states
have broad authority to regulate landlord–tenant relationships.
The outcome in Yee was problematic. O’Connor’s insistence that
“no government has required any physical invasion of petitioners’
property” was misleading.47 The landowners initially invited the mo-
bile home tenants to enter their premises for a limited time deter-
mined by a lease. But the state statute greatly limited the power of
the landowners to terminate such leases, thereby in effect converting
the lease term into one of indefinite duration. It is certainly arguable
that the state government had indeed sanctioned a physical occu-
pation of the landowners’ property.48 Moreover, Yee was the harbin-
ger of a gradual shift in O’Connor’s thinking about property rights.
By the early twenty-first century she was increasingly inclined to
restrict application of the regulatory takings doctrine and to uphold
governmental regulations of property.
In this regard, consider O’Connor’s curious role in the cases
arising from the use of interest payable on lawyers’ trust accounts
(“IOLTAs”). Starting in the 1980s, most states established IOLTA
programs under which attorneys were required to deposit nominal
client funds in special bank accounts. The interest earned on such
pooled IOLTA accounts was paid to legal foundations that funded
legal assistance for low-income individuals. The program was chal-
lenged as a taking of property—the interest on IOLTA accounts—
that rightfully belonged to the clients.49 The threshold question was
whether the interest on IOLTA accounts was private property. In
46. Yee, 503 U.S. at 528.
47. Id.
48. Nonetheless, Yee has remained a barrier to finding a physical taking in the context of
rent control. See Harmon v. Markus, 2011 WL 782233 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding that tenancy of
indefinite duration under rent control laws does not amount to a physical taking of property).
49. Kevin H. Douglas, IOLTAs Unmasked: Legal Aid Programs’ Funding Results in
Taking of Clients’ Property, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1297, 1333 (1997) (discussing legal background
of IOLTA programs, and concluding that “IOLTAs result in an unconstitutional taking of
clients’ property”).
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Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation (1998),50 a 5–4 majority of
the Supreme Court, joined by O’Connor, declared that the existence
of a property right was determined by reference to an independent
source such as state law. Applying Texas law, the Court ruled that the
interest earned on IOLTA accounts belonged to the lawyers’ clients.
It adhered to the traditional rule that “interest follows principal.”
The case was remanded for consideration of whether IOLTA interest
has been taken by the state. The decision in Phillips raised doubts
about the constitutionality of the IOLTA scheme.
In Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington (2003),51 the Court
unanimously found that IOLTA rules amounted to a physical tak-
ing of property but determined, by another 5–4 vote, that clients
suffered no loss and were therefore not entitled to compensation.
O’Connor now voted to reject the claim for compensation, thereby
weakening Phillips and leaving the clients with no meaningful
remedy for the conceded deprivation of their property. The decision
turned upon question of how to measure just compensation. The ma-
jority’s curious reasoning can only be sketched here. The majority
invoked the time-honored norm that the compensation should be
“measured by the property owner’s loss rather than the govern-
ment’s gain.”52 In other words, the government must pay the fair
market value of the property taken, and not for whatever advantage
the acquisition might bring to the government. Although IOLTAs
generated substantial funds for the state, the Court remarkably
concluded that the owners of the principal had suffered no loss.53
The salient point for our purpose is that O’Connor joined an opinion
that seemed more concerned to sustain IOLTA programs than to
vindicate the right of property owners. At the very least there is
substantial tension between her positions in the two IOLTA cases.
The owners of the principal were left with little more than lip ser-
vice about their private property rights.
The same pattern—backing away from earlier actions in defense of
property rights—was apparent when O’Connor joined the majority in
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
50. 524 U.S. 156 (1998).
51. 538 U.S. 216 (2003).
52. Id. at 235–36.
53. Ronald D. Rotunda, Found Money: IOLTA, Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington,
and the Taking of Property Without the Payment of Compensation, 2002–2003 CATO SUP. CT.
REV. 245 (sharply criticizing the Court’s reasoning with regard to determining the owner’s loss).
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Agency (2002).54 At issue was a thirty-two-month moratorium im-
posed on all land development in the Lake Tahoe basin while a reg-
ulatory agency fashioned a land use program. The moratorium was
challenged as a deprivation of all economically viable use and thus
a per se taking of property under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council. The majority concluded that the categorical Lucas rule was
inappropriate to resolve whether a temporary ban on development
constituted a taking of property. Instead, the Court looked to the ad
hoc balancing test of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New
York (1978)55 as the most suitable framework to determine the
existence of a taking. It reasoned that regulations temporarily deny-
ing all use of property might not constitute a taking if the delay was
part of a state plan to enact safety or zoning laws. Moreover, the
Court insisted that property could not be divided into temporal seg-
ments when considering the impact of a temporary regulation. With
a temporary regulation, the property would always have future value.
The dissenters in Tahoe-Sierra disputed whether there was a mean-
ingful distinction between a temporary and permanent prohibition
on development.56 They pointed out that the claimants were forced
to leave their property economically idle for years. The dissenters
maintained that the Lucas rule should govern, and that the morato-
rium was the practical equivalent of a forced lease to the govern-
ment. Here again O’Connor joined in a decision that weakened the
protection afforded property owners and underscored her growing
preference for ad hoc examination of facts instead of clear rules. Her
vote was also seemingly at odds with the Lucas opinion, which she
had joined a decade earlier.
O’Connor further narrowed the regulatory takings doctrine in
Lingle v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. (2005).57 Some background may be
helpful in placing the Lingle litigation in context. In Agins v. City of
Tiburon (1980),58 the Supreme Court ruled that a land use regulation
“effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests . . . or denies an owner economically viable
use of his land.”59 This language was repeated in a number of later
54. 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
55. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
56. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 343–54.
57. 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
58. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
59. Id. at 260.
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takings decisions by the Court, and was invoked by lower federal
courts to invalidate local rent control ordinances.60
At issue in Lingle was a Hawaii statute that imposed ceilings on
the rent that gasoline companies could charge dealers who leased
company-owned service stations. The expressed legislative purpose
behind this measure was to reduce gasoline prices. Yet Chevron re-
tained the right to raise wholesale gasoline prices to offset any loss
arising from the rent regulation, and did not challenge the statute
on grounds that the company could not earn a reasonable return on
investment. Rather, the company argued that Hawaii’s law did not
“substantially advance” its purpose of reducing gasoline prices and
thus constituted a regulatory taking. Upholding this contention,
lower federal courts held that the act would not lower gasoline
prices for consumers and amounted to a taking.
Speaking for the Supreme Court in a troublesome opinion, Justice
O’Connor reversed. Reasoning that the efficacy of a regulation had
nothing to do with the burden that it placed on property owners, she
jettisoned the “substantially advances” formula as not germane to
a regulatory takings analysis. O’Connor maintained that a regula-
tory takings inquiry
aims to identify regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent
to the classic taking in which government directly appropriates
private property or ousts the owner from his domain. Accordingly,
each of these tests focuses directly upon the severity of the bur-
den that government imposes upon private property rights.61
She added: “the notion that such a regulation nevertheless ‘takes’
private property for public use merely by virtue of its ineffectiveness
or foolishness is untenable.”62 In short, O’Connor restated and lim-
ited takings jurisprudence. While regulatory takings analysis should
concentrate on the severity of the imposed burden, the irrationality
of a regulation might be relevant to the degree of burden.63
60. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 334; Cashman v. City of Cotati, 374 F.3d 892–93, 896
(9th Cir. 2004).
61. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539.
62. Id. at 543.
63. See R. S. Radford, Of Course a Land Use Regulation That Fails to Substantially
Advance Legitimate State Interests Results in a Regulatory Taking, 15 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.
REV. 353 (2004).
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Unfortunately, the Lingle opinion contained some dubious history
and perpetuated the second class status of property rights in consti-
tutional law. O’Connor repeated the erroneous proposition that until
the landmark opinion in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon (1922),64 it
was thought that the takings clause did not cover regulations at all.
In fact, commentators and jurists had long considered whether reg-
ulations might be so severe as to have the practical effect of a physi-
cal taking.65 The modern regulatory takings began to take shape in
the late nineteenth century. In 1888, for instance, John Lewis, the
author of a treatise on eminent domain, stated that when a person
was deprived of the possession, use, or disposition, “he is to that ex-
tent deprived of his property, and, hence . . . his property may be
taken in the constitutional sense, though his title and possession
remain undisturbed.”66 Clearly the regulatory takings doctrine did
not originate in 1922.
Having rejected Chevron’s takings claim, O’Connor suggested
that an attack on an arguably irrational statute should be heard
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But
this is almost certainly a dead end. The Supreme Court has not
struck down an economic regulation as a violation of due process
since 1937.67 Her notion that Chevron could secure meaningful con-
sideration of a due process claim is fanciful as federal courts do not
provide even cursory review of property rights claims under due
process. Indeed, O’Connor emphasized judicial deference and main-
tained that courts “are not well suited” to scrutinize economic regu-
lations.68 She added that “we have long eschewed . . . heightened
scrutiny when addressing substantive due process challenges to gov-
ernment regulation.”69 She never explained why courts are suited to
resolve a wide variety of other value-laded individual rights claims
64. 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (Holmes, J.).
65. David J. Brewer, Protection to Private Property from Public Attack, 55 NEW ENGLANDER
AND YALE REV. 97, 102–05 (1891). See also Bent v. Emery, 137 Mass. 495, 496, 53 N.E. 910,
911 (1899) (Holmes, J.) (“It would be open to argument at least that an owner might be stripped
of his rights so far as to amount to a taking without any physical interference with his land.”);
CARMAN F. RANDOLPH, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES 24–26 (1894).
66. JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN 40–46 (1888).
67. James W. Ely, Jr., The Enigmatic Place of Property Rights in Modern Constitutional
Thought, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN MODERN AMERICA 110–12 (David J. Bodenhamer & James
W. Ely, Jr., eds., rev. ed. 2008).
68. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 544.
69. Id. at 545.
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under the heading of due process. O’Connor’s Lingle opinion demon-
strates the continuing impact of New Deal constitutionalism, which
fashioned a dichotomy between the rights of property owners and
other personal rights. Property rights were reduced to secondary
status, and were thus entitled to little judicial solicitude.70 This de-
velopment served the political needs of the New Deal by facilitating
the extension of governmental controls. O’Connor even cited Ferguson
v. Skrupa (1963),71 a notorious expression of New Deal constitution-
alism. In that case the Supreme Court upheld a blatant special in-
terest law and virtually abdicated any judicial review of economic
legislation under the due process norm. Absent a signal change in
the law, O’Connor’s suggestion that Chevron seek due process re-
view is simply not credible.
Finally, in Lingle, O’Connor made it plain that in most situations
the standard for determining whether a taking has occurred contin-
ues to be the multifactor balancing test set forth in Penn Central.
This is regrettable because the Penn Central test is fraught with
problems.72 Not only are the various factors—i.e., “economic impact
of the regulation,” interference with “distinct investment-backed ex-
pectations,” “the character of the governmental action”—vague, but
there is no indication of how each factor is to be weighed or how
they related to each other. Much depends on the weight one subjec-
tively assigns to the different factors to be balanced.73 As O’Connor
herself has pointed out, the Penn Central factors have “given rise to
vexing subsidiary questions.”74 Yet she made no attempt to clarify
the confusion. Consequently, we are left with a uncertain and mallea-
ble test that can be manipulated to justify almost any outcome but
is most commonly utilized to favor the government over individual
70. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); ELY, supra note 3, at
139–41.
71. 372 U.S. 726 (1963). At issue in Williamson was a state law barring an optician from
fitting or duplicating eyeglass lenses into new frames without a prescription from an op-
tometrist. It was a classic example of a law enacted to serve the interests of a narrow group
at the expense of the general public.
72. Gideon Kanner, Making Law and Sausages: A Quarter-Century Retrospective on Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 679 (2005).
73. Anthony B. Sanders, Of All Things Made in America Why Are We Exporting the Penn
Central Test?, 30 Nw. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 339, 354 (2010) (observing that under the Penn
Central approach “courts are free to range just about as widely as they please in determining
whether the government has taken property without providing just compensation”).
74. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539.
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owners. Speaking of Penn Central, Stuart Banner has correctly
noted: “The only clear implication was that victories for property
owners adversely affected by regulation would be very rare indeed.”75
The Lingle opinion demonstrates O’Connor’s preference for ad hoc
decision-making on a case by case basis, rather than the articulation
of a general norm.
B. Remedies for a Taking
Just as her analysis in takings cases was uneven, so O’Connor
sometimes took a crabbed view of the remedies available for indi-
viduals whose property was taken. She dissented in two cases where
the Court majority enhanced the means of enforcing property rights.
In neither case did O’Connor manifest a robust commitment to prop-
erty rights.
In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles (1987),76 the Court majority ruled that property owners may
be entitled to compensation for the temporary loss of land use when
the governmental controls are later invalidated. The mere invali-
dation of the restriction was not deemed a sufficient remedy for the
period during which the temporary taking was in effect. O’Connor
joined the three dissenters in an opinion that questioned whether
the temporary deprivation of all use amounted to a taking, and which
stressed deference to state interest in controlling land development.77
Similarly, O’Connor dissented in City of Monterey v. Del Monte
Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. (1999),78 the first case in which the Supreme
Court sustained an award of monetary damages for a regulatory
taking. Of greater significance, the Court majority found that the
question of liability on a regulatory claim under section 1983 was
properly submitted to a jury. It ruled that a landowner had a consti-
tutional right for a jury trial to determine whether he or she had
been deprived of all economically viable use of property. O’Connor,
however, joined a dissenting opinion which insisted that there was
no right to a jury trial in an inverse condemnation action.79
75. STUART BANNER, AMERICAN PROPERTY: A HISTORY OF HOW, WHY AND WHAT WE OWN
267 (2011).
76. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
77. Id. at 322–41.
78. 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
79. Id. at 733–55.
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C. Contract Clause
Article 1, section 10 of the Constitution provides in part: “no state
shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”
During the nineteenth century, the contract clause was among the
most litigated provisions in the Constitution, and was the principal
limitation on state authority.80 The clause, for example, was central
to the jurisprudence of the Marshall Court.81 The contract clause,
however, steadily declined in importance in the twentieth century.
This process cannot be traced in detail here.82 The provision received
a near-fatal blow in Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell
(1934),83 which became the basis for modern understanding of the
contract clause. This highly controversial decision upheld a two-year
moratorium, enacted during the Great Depression, on the foreclo-
sure of mortgages. Although susceptible of a narrow reading that
restricted valid impairments of contracts to emergency situations,
the Court opinion also suggested that, under its police power, a
state’s interest in economic regulations could justify interference
with contractual arrangements. The triumph of New Deal consti-
tutionalism, with its stress on judicial deference to legislative judg-
ments about economic matters, virtually eviscerated the once-mighty
contract clause.
In the 1970s, the Supreme Court showed a fleeting interest in rein-
vigorating the contract clause, sparking speculation that the provision
might regain some of its former importance.84 In practice, however,
the contract clause is usually subordinated to the Court’s deference
to legislative policy. In United States Trust v. New Jersey (1977),85 a
case in which the Court actually found a contract clause violation,
80. BENJAMIN FLETCHER WRIGHT, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION xiii
(1938).
81. CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE RULE OF
LAW 72–110 (1996); James W. Ely, Jr., The Marshall Court and Property Rights: A Reappraisal,
33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1023, 1029–47 (2000).
82. See James W. Ely, Jr., Whatever Happened to the Contract Clause?, 4 CHARLESTON L.
REV. 371 (2010).
83. 290 U.S. 398 (1934). For sharp criticism of Blaisdell, see Douglas W. Kmiec & John
O. McGinnis, The Contract Clause: A Return to the Original Understanding, 14 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 525, 541–44 (1987); Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract
Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 735–38 (1984).
84. ELY, supra note 3, at 153–55.
85. 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
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the justices nonetheless declared that usually “[s]tates must possess
broad powers to adopt general regulatory measures without being
concerned that private contracts will be impaired, or even destroyed,
as a result.”86 Thereafter, the Court has adhered to a sort of balanc-
ing approach which defers heavily to a state’s determination of
when legislation impairing contracts is reasonable. Such a minimal
test is at odds with the language and purpose of the contract clause,
but goes far to explain the emaciated nature of the provision in cur-
rent constitutional law.
In fairness, then, it is apparent that the contract clause had been
drained of much vitality before O’Connor joined the bench in 1981.
Nonetheless, she never demonstrated much interest in the provi-
sion, and even joined opinions that made contract clause doctrine
still worse. For example, O’Connor voted in Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton
(1983)87 to reject an attack on an Alabama statute that prohibited
the pass-through of a severance tax to consumers, notwithstanding
contractual provisions permitting producers to do so. The Eagerton
Court adopted an understanding of the police power so broad as to
uphold any type of state economic regulation affecting contracts.
Similarly, in Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & Light Com-
pany (1983),88 O’Connor and her colleagues upheld a state law that
imposed a ceiling on the contractual right of natural gas suppliers
to increase prices.
O’Connor’s one contract clause opinion for the Court added little to
the virtual collapse of the clause as a meaningful restraint on state
authority to rearrange contractual obligations. At issue in General
Motors Corp. v. Romein (1992)89 was a change in state law requiring
employers to refund workers’ compensation benefits previously with-
held. The company challenged the statute mandating retroactive
payments on contract clause grounds. It argued that the workers’
compensation law was an implied term of a collective bargaining
agreement, and that a retroactive requirement to pay the benefits
impaired the obligation of contract. O’Connor began her opinion by
affirming the long-standing rule that the existence of a contract was
a question for the independent judgment of federal courts and was
86. Id. at 22.
87. 463 U.S. 176 (1983).
88. 459 U.S. 400 (1983).
89. 503 U.S. 181 (1992).
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not determined by state law. She then found that there was no con-
tractual arrangement regarding workers’ compensation benefits,
and hence no violation of the contract clause. O’Connor maintained
that state laws were implied into private contracts only when such
measures affect the enforcement of agreements. A change in state
law affecting the remedies that make contracts enforceable, she
noted, is subject to contract clause analysis because a change in
remedies may weaken the binding force of agreements. But the
clause does not bar all changes in law, O’Connor observed, because
such a construction “would severely limit the ability of state legisla-
tures to amend their regulatory legislation.”90
III. THE “PUBLIC USE” IMBROGLIO
Eminent domain is among the most intrusive powers of govern-
ment because it compels owners to transfer their property to the
government or government-sponsored enterprises. The framers of
the Fifth Amendment curtailed the exercise of eminent domain by
imposing conditions that private property could be acquired for
“public use” and upon payment of “just compensation.” Yet in the
twentieth century the Supreme Court has largely deferred to legis-
lative determinations of “public use,” and has been unwilling to
reign in the increasingly aggressive exercise of eminent domain by
state and local governments.91 The prevailing interpretation of the
“public use” requirement has been guided by the leading case of
Berman v. Parker (1954).92 Property owners challenged the taking
of their land under a comprehensive urban renewal project in the
District of Columbia for redevelopment by a private agency. They
argued that property could not be taken from one owner and trans-
ferred to another for private use. Dismissing this contention, the
Supreme Court declared that “[t]he role of the judiciary in determin-
ing whether [eminent domain] power is being exercised for a public
purpose is an extremely narrow one.”93 The Court not only equated the
concept of “public use” with the broader notion of “public purpose,”
90. Id. at 190.
91. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DO-
MAIN 161–81 (1985); Comment, The Public Use Limitation of Eminent Domain: An Advance
Requiem, 58 YALE L. J. 599 (1949).
92. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
93. Id. at 32.
170 PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE JOURNAL [Vol. 1:149
but likened eminent domain to the very different police power to
protect public health, safety, and morals. Finding that the “concept
of the public welfare is broad and inclusive,”94 it stressed judicial
deference to legislative judgments about the need for eminent do-
main. Berman signaled the almost complete abandonment by the
federal courts of the public use clause as a meaningful constraint on
governmental authority to acquire private property.
In the first of her two Court opinions addressing the “public use”
requirement, O’Connor followed in the footsteps of Berman, and up-
held the far-reaching exercise of eminent domain in sweeping terms.
At issue in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff (1984)95 was a land
redistribution scheme that entailed the transfer of the fee simple
title of family residences from landowners to tenants under long-
term leases in order to overcome the perceived problem of concen-
trated land ownership. The legislature entertained the fanciful hope
that conversion of leaseholds into freeholds would somehow decrease
housing costs.96 This program was assailed as an illegitimate use of
eminent domain to take land from one private party and immedi-
ately turn it over to other private hands. Writing for the Court,
O’Connor reaffirmed the policy of judicial deference to legislative
determinations regarding “public use.” She did not mention that the
targeted landowners were charitable trusts who operated to assist
native Hawaiians. Brushing aside the objection that the land redis-
tribution scheme essentially employed eminent domain to serve pri-
vate interests, O’Connor repeated the dubious proposition that the
“public use” requirement was “coterminous” with the police power.97
In an attempt to demonstrate some historical support for the Hawaii
land redistribution program, O’Connor made an inapposite reference
94. Id. at 33.
95. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
96. The plan was fatally flawed from the outset. See Debra Pogrund Stark, How Do You
Solve a Problem Like in Kelo?, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 609, 624–30 (2007) (stressing that the
beneficiaries of the takings in Midkiff were wealthy tenants and speculators, and that the
land redistribution scheme at issue did not reduce the cost of buying homes); Gideon Kanner,
Do We Need to Impair or Strengthen Property Rights in Order to “Fulfill Their Unique Role”?
A Response to Professor Dyal-Chand, 31 U. HAW. L. REV. 423, 429–33, 456 (2009) (pointing out
that Midkiff “resulted in a dramatic escalation of home prices in Hawai’i, contrary to its stated
goal of housing cost reduction”). An astute jurist early realized that the likely effect of the
statute was to aggravate the shortage of fee simple residential land and inflate land prices.
Midkiff v. Tom, 702 F.2d 788, 805–06 (9th Cir. 1983) (Poole, J., concurring).
97. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240.
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to Revolutionary-era statutes abolishing quitrents.98 These measures
are of questionable value in sustaining her opinion. Quitrents were
paid to the crown or a colonial proprietor and are best understood
as a form of taxation.99 O’Connor’s invocation of statutes eliminating
quitrents was in the nature of an historical fig leaf.
O’Connor concluded that the Court would sustain any exercise of
eminent domain “rationally related to a conceivable public purpose.”100
What exercise of the condemnation power would not meet such as re-
laxed standard? This needlessly expansive language would come back
to haunt O’Connor a few years later. In the wake of Berman and
Midkiff, many observers felt that, as a practical matter, the Supreme
Court had eliminated “public use” as a check on when government
can take property.
Justice O’Connor’s next opinion addressing “public use” suggested
a dramatic change of heart on her part. In the highly controversial
case of Kelo v. City of New London (2005),101 a 5 to 4 majority of the
Court upheld the exercise of eminent domain for purposes of econom-
ic development by private enterprise. Not surprisingly, in reaching
this result the majority relied heavily on Berman and Midkiff.102
O’Connor would have none of it, authoring a blistering dissent.
She now sought to carve out some room for judicial review of “pu-
blic use.” “Under the banner of economic development,” O’Connor
insisted, “all private property is now vulnerable to being taken
and transferred to another private owner, so long as it might be
upgraded. . . .”103 She argued that if incidental public benefits aris-
ing from economic development amounted to “public use,” then
the majority had in effect removed “the words ‘for public use’
98. Id. at 241, n. 5.
99. See ALVIN RABUSHKA, TAXATION IN COLONIAL AMERICA 24–25 (2008). The colonists
greatly resisted the payment of quitrents, and they were collected only with difficulty. Hence,
the abolition of the quitrent system may well have been of more symbolic than practical
significance. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 24–25 (3d ed. 2005).
In any event, the elimination of quitrents did not entail a massive transfer of title to land, but
actually strengthened the legal position of the current owners.
100. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241. O’Connor further asserted: “Redistribution of fees simple to
correct deficiencies in the market determined by the state legislature to be attributable to
land oligarchy is a rational exercise of the eminent domain power.” Id. at 243.
101. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 469.
102. For my assessment of Kelo, see James W. Ely, Jr. “Poor Relation” Once More: The
Supreme Court and the Vanishing Rights of Property Owners, 2004–2005 CATO SUP. CT. REV.
39, 53–65.
103. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 494.
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from the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”104 According to
O’Connor, the “public use” and “just compensation” requirements
put distinct limits on the taking of property in order to “ensure
stable property ownership by providing safeguards against exces-
sive, unpredictable, or unfair use of the government’s eminent
domain power—particularly by those owners who, for whatever
reason, may be unable to protect themselves in the political process
against the majority’s will.”105 She expressed concern that the ma-
jority opinion “significantly expands the meaning of public use” and
imposes no restraint on eminent domain.106 Of particular interest
was O’Connor’s sharp critique of the “errant language” both in
Berman and her own Midkiff opinion that equated “public use”
with the scope of the police power.107 In much-quoted language, she
asserted: “The specter of condemnation hangs over all property.
Nothing is to prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6 with a
Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a
factory.”108 O’Connor concluded by noting that the majority opinion
would likely benefit the powerful at the expense of the weak. “The
beneficiaries,” she noted, “are likely to be those citizens with dispro-
portionate influence and power in the political process, including
large corporations and development firms.”109
O’Connor’s powerful dissent in Kelo cheered property rights ad-
vocates and surely helped to spark the negative public reaction to the
decision. The outpouring of state laws to curb the taking of property
for economic development purposes, coupled with state court rulings
that reject the majority’s reasoning, strongly suggest that O’Connor
was closer to prevailing public opinion than was the majority.110 But
104. Id.
105. Id. at 496.
106. Id. at 501.
107. Id. There is room to question, however, whether the sweeping language to which
O’Connor belatedly objected was included in her Midkiff opinion by mistake. See D. Benjamin
Barros, Nothing ‘Errant’ About It: The Berman and Midkiff Conference Notes and How the
Supreme Court Got to Kelo with Its Eyes Wide Open, in PRIVATE PROPERTY, COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT, AND EMINENT DOMAIN 57–74 (Robin Paul Malloy ed. 2008) (arguing that the
justices in Midkiff, including O’Connor, were “aware of the risks of a broadly-written de-
cision”). This evidence supports the view that O’Connor in fact changed her mind about the
appropriateness of such language.
108. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 503.
109. Id. at 505.
110. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1849, 1880 (2007) (noting “unprecedented public opposition to the idea of taking of
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the question remains: can the Kelo dissent be squared with the
Midkiff opinion?
O’Connor sought to distinguish Midkiff by identifying three cat-
egories of takings that satisfied the “public use” norm: transfers of
private property to public ownership, as for roads or military bases;
transfers of private property to private parties, such as common car-
riers or public utilities, which have special duties to serve the public;
transfers to private parties in unusual circumstances where “the ex-
traordinary, precondemnation use of the targeted property inflicted
affirmative harm on society.”111 In her mind, Berman upheld emi-
nent domain to eliminate urban blight, and Midkiff sustained the
taking of property to eliminate an oligopoly in land ownership. Thus,
both fit into her third category.
Yet O’Connor’s efforts to distinguish Midkiff are unconvincing.
First, there is no clear line between the elimination of blight and
commercial development. Given the open-ended understanding of
what constitutes blight in many jurisdictions, blight takings could
be utilized to achieve economic development purposes.112 Indeed,
blight condemnations are often part of a redevelopment program.
The difference that O’Connor saw between blight takings and eco-
nomic development takings is elusive and likely untenable. She
might more profitably have revisited the question of whether the
elimination of blight constitutes “public use.”113 Second, one could
argue that the land redistribution scheme in Midkiff was a greater
threat to the security of private property than the economic develop-
ment taking in Kelo. It contemplated an overhaul of landownership
in the entire state, a move without precedent in American history.
On the other hand, the facts of the two cases are distinguishable.
The outcome in Kelo clearly moved beyond the factual basis for
private property for economic development,” and concluding that “we can take the anti-Kelo
position to be a more accurate statement of general sentiment about property rights than the
opposite position”); Ilya Somin, The Judicial Reaction to Kelo, 4 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 1, 23
(2011) (discussing a 2009 survey which showed that a large majority of Americans continued
to oppose economic development takings). For the legislative and judicial response to Kelo at
the state level, see James W. Ely, Jr., Post-Kelo Reform: Is the Glass Half Full or Half Empty?,
17 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 127 (2009) [hereinafter Ely, Post-Kelo Reform ]; Ilya Somin, The Limits
of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100 (2009).
111. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 497–500.
112. Ely, Post-Kelo Reform, supra note 110, at 134–36 (discussing elusive definitions of
“blight,” and noting that the distinction between “blight” and economic development is fuzzy).
113. Steven J. Eagle, Does Blight Really Justify Condemnation?, 39 URB. LAW. 833 (2007).
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Midkiff because the condemned homes in New London were not
blighted and did not, by any stretch of the imagination, constitute
an oligopoly. Moreover, the taking in Kelo obviously conferred im-
mediate benefits on powerful private interests, while any gains for
the public were indirect and speculative.
Perhaps O’Connor reconsidered the impact of free-wheeling emi-
nent domain and at least partially changed her mind. She may well
have been influenced by the trend among state supreme courts to
tighten the definition of “public use” even before the Kelo decision.114
In particular, the decision by the Supreme Court of Michigan in
County of Wayne v. Hathcock (2004) overruling a prior decision and
emphatically rejecting the economic development rationale for the
condemnation of land received widespread publicity.115 O’Connor
cited Hathcock in her dissent, and quite likely the increasing judi-
cial skepticism about an open-ended understanding of “public use”
caused her to rethink the question. She may also have become more
attentive to the actual impact of eminent domain upon communities.
Her comment about eminent domain serving the interests of the pow-
erful and politically connected point in this direction. Or perhaps,
given her penchant for ad hoc inquiry in takings cases, O’Connor
was simply more sympathetic to the middle class homeowners in
New London than she was to the large landlords in Hawaii. She
backed away from some aspects of Midkiff, expressly repudiating
her previous linking of “public use” and the police power. But she
also insisted that Midkiff was “true to the principles underlying the
Public Use Clause.”116 The result is a high degree of intellectual con-
fusion flowing from her tendency to eschew legal doctrine in favor
of ad hoc decisions. A takings jurisprudence that rests upon per-
sonal preference in particular cases is unlikely to produce either
consistent or workable rules. Ultimately O’Connor’s thinking re-
mains a puzzlement.117
114. A number of state courts invalidated the exercise of eminent domain for economic
development purposes by private parties prior to the Kelo decision. See, e.g., Bailey v. Myers,
206 Ariz. 224, 76 P.3d 898 (Ct. App. 2003); Southwestern Illinois Development Authority v.
National City Environmental, LLC, 199 Ill. 2d 225, 768 N.E.2d 1 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S.
880 (2002); Casino Reinvestment Development Authority v. Banin, 320 N.J. Super. 342, 727
A.2d 102 (1998); Karesh v. City of Charleston, 271 S.C. 339, 247 S.E.2d 342 (1978).
115. County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 471 Mich. 445, 648 N.W.2d 765 (2004) (overruling
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981)).
116. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 500.
117. For an insightful comparison of O’Connor’s opinions in Midkiff and Kelo, see Gideon
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CONCLUSION
For decades following the political triumph of the New Deal, the
Supreme Court generally ignored issues pertaining to the rights of
property owners. Critics charged that the Court had virtually de-
leted property rights from the Constitution. As the political and
intellectual ascendancy of the New Deal disintegrated, however, the
Court gradually expressed renewed interest in the subject.118 In the
1980s, and especially after Rehnquist became chief justice in 1986,
the Supreme Court became more solicitous of the rights of property
owners than at any time since the pre–New Deal Court of the 1930s.
O’Connor contributed significantly to this development. Certainly
she did much to help restore property rights to the constitutional
agenda. But her achievements were mixed, and fell short of what
her early opinions portended or what property rights advocates
hoped. O’Connor never formulated a consistent or muscular prop-
erty rights approach, and often sustained governmental power. Her
pragmatic jurisprudence—as in other areas of constitutional law—
did not lend itself to the fashioning of clear rules or providing guid-
ance for the future. In this regard, her abiding support for the mushy
Penn Central test for regulatory takings is revealing.
Still, a comparative look might be helpful to gain a perspective on
O’Connor’s property jurisprudence. For example, contrast Justice
O’Connor’s property decisions with those of Justice John Paul Ste-
vens, the author of the majority opinions in Kelo and San Remo
Hotel. Stevens compiled a very consistent record of hostility to mean-
ingful protection of property rights. Reflecting the continuing influ-
ence of statist liberalism emanating from the New Deal, Stevens
almost invariably rejected or minimized claims advanced by property
owners. He made clear his skepticism about the doctrine of regu-
latory takings.119 He repeatedly expressed great—some might say
Kanner, The Public Use Clause: Constitutional Mandate or “Hortatory Fluff”?, 33 PEPP. L.
REV. 335, 356–57 (2006) (“Justice O’Connor’s intellectual misadventure thus demonstrates
that she who lived by ad hocery dies by it.”).
118. ELY, supra note 3, at 142–43.
119. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 406–07 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens likened regulatory takings
to due process cases such as Lochner v. New York,198 U.S. 45 (1905). Stevens appears to
harbor a dated image of Lochner fashioned by the Progressives to serve their political and
legal goals. For a sharp attack on the conventional treatment of this case, see DAVID E.
BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER : DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE
REFORM (2011).
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naïve—confidence in local land use regulators. Indeed, in his Kelo
opinion Stevens seemed virtually mesmerized by the City of New
London’s supposedly comprehensive development plan,120 which,
in spite of his enthusiasm, turned out to be a failure. Thus, he
was prepared to allow local officials wide discretion over the rights
of owners.121 Fortunately, O’Connor did not always follow this su-
pine path.
In 1994, in an opinion joined by O’Connor, Chief Justice Rehnquist
proclaimed: “We see no reason why the Takings Clause, as much a
part of the Bill of Rights as the First Amendment, should be rele-
gated to the status of a poor relation.”122 By this measure both the
Rehnquist Court and O’Connor fell short. Despite its conservative
reputation, the Rehnquist Court never had a firm majority prepared
to uphold the rights of property owners in the face of governmental
regulations. The justices, including O’Connor, were unable to break
free of statist thinking about property.123 This is not to deny that
there were some positive steps to strengthen property as a consti-
tutional right. By O’Connor’s retirement, property owners enjoyed
somewhat more protection from government than they had in prior
decades. How much more protection, however, was a subject for de-
bate. But thanks to O’Connor and her colleagues both scholars and
the general public were talking more about property rights than
they had done in a generation. The full implications of this are yet to
unfold, and so a final assessment of O’Connor’s checkered property
jurisprudence is premature.
120. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Planning as Public Use?, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 443, 444
(2007) (noting the frequency with which the Stevens opinion in Kelo invoked the terms
“plan” or “planning”).
121. It is revealing that in his reminiscences about his tenure on the Court Justice Stevens
did not even comment on cases dealing with property and contractual rights. See JOHN PAUL
STEVENS, FIVE CHIEFS: A SUPREME COURT MEMOIR (2011).
122. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 392.
123. Eric A. Claeys, Takings and Private Property on the Rehnquist Court, 99 NW. U. L. REV.
127 (2005). See also TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION
101–26 (2000).
THE PROPERTY RIGHTS DECISIONS OF JUSTICE
SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR: WHEN PRAGMATIC
BALANCING IS NOT ENOUGH
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN*
INTRODUCTION: O’CONNOR’S FIDELITY TO TRADITION
Any search for two words to characterize Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor’s judicial work over her distinguished twenty-five-year
Supreme Court career would quickly hone in on “pragmatism” and
“balancing.” Justice O’Connor is “pragmatic” not because she dis-
plays any trace of personal opportunism, but because of her deep
institutional commitment to do what she can to promote the long-
term stability of American political institutions under law. She be-
lieves in “balancing” because of her strong conviction that constant
attention to the particular facts and circumstances of each individ-
ual case help restrain a Justice from pushing legal doctrine too far in
one direction or another—again, in ways that might destabilize the
legal system. So constrained, Justice O’Connor does not give pride of
place to overarching theories in working out her particular decisions.
It would, however, be a serious mistake to treat her as a constitution-
al “minimalist” who wants to situate every case on its own bottom,1
for she does have a consistent philosophy. Instead, her primary con-
cern is to preserve continuity with existing legal doctrinal structures,
which requires more fidelity to the past than any strong minimalist
view of constitutional law would require. The best way to think of
her work is as an effort to nudge the received judicial wisdom in her
preferred direction, without attacking the intellectual foundations
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and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution; James Parker Hall Distinguished
Service Professor of Law Emeritus and Senior Lecturer, The University of Chicago. My thanks
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search assistance. This article is an extended version of comments that I delivered on this topic
at Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference in Beijing, China, sponsored by William &
Mary Law School and Tsinghua University held in Beijing, China on October 14 and 15, 2011.
My thanks to the many participants of the New York University School of Law Faculty for
their valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper delivered on February 6, 2012.
1. For a discussion of this view, see, for example, CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME:
JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (2001).
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of the system as a whole. Put otherwise, she is comfortable—too
comfortable, in my view—with the United States’ modern social
democratic state that relies on a firm public/private alliance that
simultaneously works for both sustained economic growth and a fair
distribution of wealth. Her frame of mind represents an updated
judicial version of Pax Eisenhower, with its winning campaign slo-
gan of “Peace, Prosperity, and Progress.”2
There is much to be said for adopting this model. Its key trade-off
is to write off any large gains from major judicial intervention in
order to prevent major institutional shipwrecks borne of hasty and
irresponsible judicial intervention on matters in which courts have,
at most, imperfect knowledge. A former legislator, Justice O’Connor
is generally sympathetic to legislative schemes that memorialize
compromise settlements to complex problems. Her affection for bal-
ancing tests is like a gyroscope that prevents the ship of state from
lurching too far in one direction or the other. Put otherwise, Justice
O’Connor worked comfortably within the dominant tradition, with-
out seeking to overturn it. That view carries over to her work in
property law, which for these purposes, I construe to cover the law
of takings and the collateral doctrines dealing with deprivations of
due process and impairment of contracts. The question is how to
evaluate her performance.
The inquiry merits a split decision. Armed with this general ap-
proach, she has produced, without question, some of the strongest
and most thoughtful Supreme Court decisions in the past decade.
Her decision in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.3 offers
as careful a demolition of aggressive administrative action as one
could hope to read. Her decision in Minneapolis Star and Tribune
Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue 4 offers one of the best
defenses of the flat tax in the context of the First Amendment,
which easily could be generalized to cover all systems of taxation
on all forms of property.5 And her analysis of federalism in Gregory
2. See DWIGHT EISENHOWER, MANDATE FOR CHANGE: 1953–1956, 484–85 (Doubleday,
1963) (“The slogan ‘Peace, Prosperity, and Progress,’ which was applied to the first-term
years, and was used in the campaign of 1956 . . . .”).
3. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,529 U.S. 120 (2000).
4. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
5. I attempt the latter in RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 283–305 (1985).
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v. Ashcroft 6 offers perhaps the most thoughtful judicial commen-
tary on matters of federalism. Her thoughtful opinion in New York
v. United States7 breathed some much needed rigor into the vexed
relationship between the national and state sovereignty. That deci-
sion followed her powerful dissent in South Dakota v. Dole,8 which
turned on the distinction between encouragement and coercion in
the law of unconstitutional conditions and is a beacon of sense rela-
tive to the opinion for the Court prepared by Chief Justice Rehnquist.9
There are two common threads that link all these diverse opin-
ions together. At first look, they may seem to be unrelated, but in
fact they are closely connected The first point is that in her stron-
gest opinions Justice O’Connor was prepared to strike something
down. That simple task sharpens the intellect and allows her to use
her thinking cap. The reason these decisions work so well is that the
basic tradition in which she wrote calls for some higher level of scru-
tiny which allows her to turn her analytical powers to the hard ques-
tions put before her, without having to rock the Supreme Court’s
constitutional boat.
The second point is that she tends to use that power on those
issues for which she cares about as a constitutional matter. That
point seems more or less true with respect to her First Amendment
decisions, where she cares about the role of political speech in so-
ciety, and it is equally true in her administrative law opinions, where
she has some concern with the excess aggrandizement of adminis-
trative power. It is also evident in her federalism opinion, where her
history as a state legislator (who rose to be speaker of the Arizona
assembly) made her acutely aware of the dangers of the federal over-
reach with respect to matters that she thought rightly lay within
the control of the state, and which inspired some of her most incisive
and influential writing.
Yet exactly the opposite predilections are at work in the property
cases, where she tended (at least until Kelo) to give a large berth to
state and local government officials to regulate all aspects of local
land use law. Here the desire to respect these decisions of state and
6. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
7. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
8. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
9. I stoutly defend her federalism decisions in Judicial Engagement with the Affordable
Care Act: Why Rational Basis Analysis Falls Short, 19 GEORGE MASON L. REV. 931 (2012).
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local government officials leads her to embrace a world view in which
balancing is done in accordance with the rational basis test, where
the slightest state interest can resist the strongest private claims.
In this regard, Justice O’Connor’s fidelity to tradition often does more
harm than good. In making this statement, I am well aware that on
some key issues, she has aligned herself with what might be called
the conservative majority on the court. She has sided with Justice
Antonin Scalia and Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist in their joint
effort to put some constitutional limitations on the common practice
of state local governments to demand exactions as the price for per-
mitting new projects. For example, she concurred in Justice Scalia’s
decision in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,10 which intro-
duced the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions into the law of tak-
ings, and joined Chief Justice Rehnquist’s effort in Dolan v. City of
Tigard 11 to place proportionality limitations on these exactions in
such a way as to limit their insidious scope.12
Yet in the end, both of these efforts to constrain the machinations
of state and local governments proved to be failures as lower courts
have deployed a variety of devices to water down Nollan and Dolan,
so that today state and local governments routinely impose exac-
tions with little fear of judicial invalidation.13 The same is true with
respect to her decision to join Chief Justice Rehnquist in First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,14 where his
efforts to limit the scope of permanent partial takings did little or
nothing to tie the hands of local governments that sought to impose
strong delays on the development of property rights. Indeed, the
rule was largely eviscerated in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council,
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency.15 There, it seems likely that
10. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). For a generally supportive view
of Nollan, see Stewart E. Sterk, Nollan, Henry George, and Exactions, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1731 (1988).
11. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
12. For my discussion, see Richard A. Epstein, The Harms and Benefits of Nollan and
Dolan, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 479 (1995).
13. See, e.g., Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996) (upholding finan-
cial exaction to be paid for additional public amenities). And on the procedural side, see
Williamson v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
14. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304 (1987).
15. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302 (2002) (sustaining a succession of temporary land use ordinances against a First English
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Justice O’Connor joined the majority because the claimants raised
the bar so high as to say that any moratorium—no matter how short—
constituted a temporal taking for which compensation was required.16
The simple truth is that unless and until the Supreme Court revis-
its and reaffirms these decisions, lower courts will remain highly
deferential to state and local governments on all land use issues.
And that level of commitment on these issues is just not there.
This capsule summary helps identify the two systematic weak-
ness of Justice O’Connor’s pragmatic balancing. First, that approach
guarantees that she has no fire in the belly. Until her flawed-but-
inspired valedictory in Kelo v. City of New London,17 no property
rights case attracted her passion at the same level brought by the
Supreme Court in cases of racial segregation and police brutality
between, say, the New Deal Supreme Court and the early years of
the Burger Court, which are best understood as an extension of the
Warren Court.18
The second weakness of her position is ultimately more impor-
tant. Constitutional pragmatism and balancing all presuppose that
the correct way to address both legal doctrine and institutional prac-
tices is incrementally. But for that approach to make sense, the doc-
trine and practices have to be at or near the right place to begin with.
There are doubtless many areas of Supreme Court jurisprudence
that can regarded as more or less on the mark. I take that view on
the dormant commerce clause, which has done a world of good even
though it has somewhat porous textual foundations.19 I think that
the same can be said of First Amendment’s protection of public
attack). Justice O’Connor joined in Justice Stevens’s opinion, leaving Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas in dissent.
16. Id. at 320 (“For petitioners, it is enough that a regulation imposes a temporary
deprivation—no matter how brief—of all economically viable use to trigger a per se rule that
a taking has occurred.”). Indeed, there is no need to go that far. Another sensible reading
allows for “normal delays” that are commonly experienced, so long as these are cabined to a
relatively short time. See id. at 343 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). For a defense of that line,
see Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Taking Notes: Subpoenas and Just Compensation, 66 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1081 (1999).
17. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). See infra Part I.
18. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare benefits as property rights);
Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (recognizing disparate impact tests in civil rights
litigation); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (constitutional protection of abortion).
19. For a discussion, see, for example, Richard A. Epstein, Waste & the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 3 GREEN BAG 2d 29 (1999).
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dissenting voices.20 But takings law is not in any shape to command
a level of judicial respect that it has not earned.
Five major decisions shaped this field prior to Justice O’Connor’s
appearance on the Supreme Court. Block v. Hirsh21 bestowed exten-
sive power on the state to impose rent control systems on real estate
leases. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.22 immunized virtually all zon-
ing schemes from constitutional attack, except on some small-bore
issues.23 Home Mortgage Co. v. Blaisdell 24 used an expansive reading
of the police power to cope with emergencies to truncate the consti-
tutional protection from state regulation afforded to mortgagees,
chiefly banks and other financial institutions. Berman v. Parker 25
gave local governments a wide berth to institute comprehensive
planning schemes without running afoul of the public use limitation
found in the Takings Clause. Penn Central Trans. Corp. v. City of New
York26 relied on a famous three-part balancing test that softened
the protection that private property received against land use ordi-
nances—in this instance, a landmark preservation statute. The last
two loom very large in Justice O’Connor’s pantheon of decided cases.
There is one common element in all these decisions, which is their
willingness to show strong deference to the decisions of a govern-
ment regulator—even when it trenches strongly on the rights of
private property and voluntary contract. The great vice of Justice
O’Connor’s incrementalism is that she begins her deliberation, not
with a sound appreciation of how wrong these cases are as a matter
of first principle, but from her insistence on asking just how far she
can deviate from the current legal position without toppling the ap-
ple cart. The justices writing in the earlier cases were, of course, not
bound by any particular decision. Even if they were, they would
have been quite happy to move the yardstick in their preferred
direction without undue concern with stare decisis, constitutional
text, or constitutional theory. All these vices are evident in Justice
Brennan’s facile opinion in Penn Central. The effect, therefore, of
20. See, e.g., Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
21. Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 1325 (1921).
22. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
23. See, e.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
24. Home Mortgage Co. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
25. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
26. Penn Central Trans. Corp. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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Justice O’Connor’s position is to entrench the worst in the Supreme
Court precedent, which thereby makes it more difficult to undo a
bad status quo in the next iteration. This tendency is, of course, not
confined to the property cases broadly conceived. It is also exempli-
fied in Chief Justice Rehnquist’s commerce clause opinion in United
States v. Lopez27 which further insulated the gigantic over-reading of
the commerce power in Wickard v. Filburn28 from much-needed
further scrutiny.29
The intellectual root of our current judicial disarray starts with
the wretched status quo ante when Justice O’Connor took her seat on
the Court in 1981. The dominant approach toward takings issues is
summed up by two words that appear nowhere in the Constitution,
but which dictate its across-the-board application: rational basis.
That test represents one of three flavors of constitutional review.
The most exacting form involves strict scrutiny, where the key as-
sumption is that the error cost of letting bad legislation through is far
greater than the error cost of keeping good legislation off the books.
There are two types of error: the first can be termed Type I Error,
and the second is Type II Error. If Type I error is far more costly,
the law should opt for more Type II errors than Type I errors. We,
therefore, are trying to minimize the weighted sum of both types of
error, each with a distinctive weight n or m. The task is to mini-
mize n(Type I) + m(Type II) where both n and m can be less than or
greater than one. Divide both sides through by m, so that the task
is to minimize the sum of (n/m)Type I + Type II. In a strict scrutiny
system, it is plausible, and perhaps even generous, by way of nu-
merical illustration, to set n/m = 10. In intermediate scrutiny, that
ratio is surely lower. I think that it would not be a fair representa-
tion to assume that n/m = 1 in these cases, but is in fact greater than
1, which reflects the common perception that intermediate scrutiny
is closer to strict scrutiny than it is to the rational basis test, where
n/m < 1, which is to say, the error of keeping legislation off the books
is far greater than the error of letting it in. If that ratio equals 0.1,
strict scrutiny cashes out to be 100 times (10/0.1) as serious as
rational basis. No wonder it is a rare occasion when legislation is
27. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
28. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
29. For my views, see Richard A. Epstein, The Federalism Decisions of Justices Rehnquist
and O’Connor, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1793 (2006).
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upheld under strict scrutiny or struck down under rational basis. A
judicial chasm lies between the two approaches.
The Constitution is not explicitly equipped with any calipers that
indicate which standard of review should be used in which particu-
lar context. Those critical choices are left to the vagaries of constitu-
tional interpretation. The questions involved in this circumstance,
therefore, are as follows. The first is whether or not the Supreme
Court (which is the only court whose view truly matters on this
issue) should utilize a uniform standard of review across each class
of constitutional claims. If the answer to that question is yes, what
standard ought to be applied? If the answer is no, which is mani-
festly the choice today, the next question is which constitutional
provisions receive what level of scrutiny, and why. Thus, in the
takings area, it seems quite clear that courts give greater scrutiny
to the question of what compensation is “just” than they give to the
question of whether a taking is for a particular matter of public use.
This contrast is made explicitly in the following passage:
There can, in view of the combination of those two words [just
and compensation], be no doubt that the compensation must be
a full and perfect equivalent for the property taken, and this just
compensation, it will be noticed, is for the property, and not to
the owner. . . . This [verbal formulation] excludes the taking into
account as an element in the compensation any supposed benefit
that the owner may receive in common with all from the public
uses to which his private property is appropriated, and leaves it
to stand as a declaration that no private property shall be appro-
priated to public uses unless a full and exact equivalent for it be
returned to the owner. . . .
By this legislation, Congress seems to have assumed the right
to determine what shall be the measure of compensation. But
this is a judicial, and not a legislative, question. The legislature
may determine what private property is needed for public pur-
poses; that is a question of a political and legislative character.
But when the taking has been ordered, then the question of com-
pensation is judicial. It does not rest with the public, taking the
property through Congress or the legislature, its representative,
to say what compensation shall be paid, or even what shall be
the rule of compensation. The Constitution has declared that just
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compensation shall be paid, and the ascertainment of that is a
judicial inquiry.30
That persistent distinction, moreover, cannot be derived by any
textual inspection of the entire Takings Clause—“nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation”—
which reads, across the board, as a strict constraint on all govern-
ment officials.
So which particular constitutional provisions should receive what
level of scrutiny? In the end, I can envision only one sound approach
to that challenge. The underlying principle runs in its simplest form
as follows: the higher the level of legislative or administrative mal-
function, the greater the level of judicial scrutiny.31 That view was
articulated most forcefully in the late John Hart Ely’s 1980 book,
Democracy and Distrust, whose title reveals its thesis.32 As stated,
this proposition does not take into account the abilities of the Su-
preme Court to discharge its ultimate function. Surely if the Court
were universally regarded as a corrupt institution, say, incorrigi-
ble as an Argentinean or Russian court, no one would pay fealty to
it. But no one remotely thinks that this is the case, so the question
of its competence goes into the balance in the form of question of
whether the disputed issue falls within the Supreme Court’s insti-
tutional competence. At this point, the relative insulation of the ju-
diciary from political forces means that there are few systematic
30. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326–27 (1893). Several
points are worthy of note here. First, in Monongahela, there was never any real question of
whether the locks involved in that case were for public use, so that the sentence in question
only refers to the fact that the legislature has the power to decide which public works project to
initiate. The taking for private use issue is just not raised. Second, the reference that the com-
pensation is “for the property, and not to the owner” is used here to indicate that there is no
setoff to the amount paid a given owner for the return benefits received from the project that
are shared with the public at large. The point here is to preserve parity, which in turn reduces
the level of political machinations. On these risks, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH
THE STATE 98–103 (1993) on the preservation of the surplus. Note that Justice Brewer is also
correct when he observes that some setoffs may well be appropriate for any increased value
that goes uniquely to the party whose property is taken. That proposition in turn raises the
question of additional recovery for severance damages, an issue to which he alludes, but does
not resolve. See Monongahela, 148 U.S. at 326 (“We do not in this refer to the case where only
a portion of a tract is taken, or express any opinion on the vexed question as to the extent to
which the benefits or injuries to the portion not taken may be brought into consideration.”).
31. For a tantalizingly cryptic discussion of the issue, see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 97–98 (1980).
32. Id.
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fluctuations in its competence level. So the dominant inquiry re-
mains how well the Supreme Court can expect the legislature to
reform across different areas.
Historically, that legislative failure was immense on questions
of race in the period, between, say, 1890 and 1960,33 where disen-
franchisement and marginalization of minority groups rested on a
fashionable form of racial bigotry that all too often permeated leg-
islative and administrative action. Similarly, political dissent calls
for a high level of judicial scrutiny, given the inveterate danger that
incumbents will stack the deck in their favor. Moving on, there are
also high levels of scrutiny in dealing with state restrictions on the
flow of interstate commerce, precisely because of the well-known
tendency of states to favor their voters at the expense of out-of-state
parties who need not only the protection of diversity jurisdiction, but
also protection of a nondiscrimination provision so that they are not
treated more harshly than their local competitors.34
In dealing with these areas, one theme dominates the interpre-
tation of the case law: every juncture follows in rough contour the
principles not of the strong libertarian, but of the classical liberal.
It is important to state briefly both the similarities and differences
between these two positions.35 Both libertarian and classical liber-
al theories start with the view that individual autonomy, or self-
ownership, is the indisputable starting place for the analysis of any
system of individual rights. This includes those enshrined in the
Constitution, with its explicit guarantees, good against both the
state and the federal government, that no person should be deprived
of life, liberty of property, without due process of law.36 Clearly, these
items are placed on the list because they are the dominant interests
that are worth protecting; a proposition that follows easily from the
general Lockean proposition that speaks about the protection of
“lives, liberties, and estates”37 which compromise the only interests
that are protected under the name “property,” which clearly let the
33. For a discussion, see C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (3d
ed. 1974).
34. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
35. I develop this theme in RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD
(1995).
36. U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV.
37. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 222 (Thomas P. Peardon ed.,
1997) (1690).
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state afford police power protections against theft, rape and murder
in order to protect the autonomy of the person.
For the purposes of this paper, however, the key element is the
protection of property, which covers land and much else besides, in-
cluding water rights, air rights, chattels, and intellectual property.
To some libertarians, these rights are conceived of as “absolute” so
that they can be forfeited or otherwise lost only for two reasons: first,
to satisfy the losses attributable to aggression against others, and sec-
ond, to honor a prior contractual obligation made to others but not
discharged. In contrast, taxation in any form and eminent domain
find no secure place under an uncompromising libertarian approach
because both involve the state initiation of forced exchanges where
the state determines both whether the exchange shall take place
and the amount of compensation supplied for that property loss.38
The classical liberal position understands both the necessity for,
and the dangers of, the twin practices of taxation and eminent do-
main. As to need, without the insertion of state power, there is sim-
ply no way overcome the massive holdout and coordination problems
that stand in the path of organizing key social institutions. In this
context, I shall not rehearse the well-understood reasons for requir-
ing the collective provision of public goods.39 But it is important to
note that authorization of both the taxing and eminent domain pow-
ers is explicit in the Constitution.40 Accordingly, no credible case can
be made for reading the document as a hard-line libertarian tract.
But by the same token, the careful calibration of the rules that
govern both taxation and condemnation make it equally clear that
the Framers of the Constitution were painfully aware of the abuses
that often cropped up in the operation of these powers. Thus, where
the commitment to the right is firm, as with speech and free trade,
the explicit limitations against exploitation are found in a narrow
definition of the police power, such that the use of government force
without the payment of compensation is concentrated on activities
that involve the use or threat of force or fraud.41 The state can
38. For a powerful statement of this point of view, see ELLEN FRANKEL PAUL, PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND EMINENT DOMAIN (1987).
39. For the classic exposition, see MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
(1965).
40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, § 8, cl. 1, § 9, cls. 1, 4, 5.
41. For a systematic discussion, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY
AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 107–46 (1985).
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impose restrictions against firms that threaten the use of force
against potential customers that choose to do business with their
rivals. But it cannot introduce protectionist legislation that pro-
hibits fair competition—no force and fraud—in the marketplace
for goods any more than it can do so in the marketplace for ideas,
which was the point of the so-called labor exception to the police
power in Lochner v. New York.42 It is, in a word, no accident that the
concern for misleading statements marks the limits of state control
in dealing with advertisement and other forms of commercial speech.43
It is equally the case that the ability to prevent the shipment of goods
into another state depends on a clear showing that they pose a peril
to the animal and plant life located there.44 When there are no such
justifications, the restrictions on outsiders must be matched by simi-
lar restrictions on insiders, so that regulation does not create a home
court advantage to domestic firms.45
All those protections remain in place under any regime of strict
scrutiny because the Justices have understood the social gains that
come from protection of the underlying interests. But it is just that
conviction that fails when the discussion switches to the protection
of property rights under the Takings Clause. In modern times, prop-
erty is no longer regarded as the guardian of every other right. It is
often treated as though it were the bastion of privilege or that it
protects holdings that have some vague, dubious pedigree. Or that
there are a dizzying array of supposed externalities—visual and aes-
thetic ones easily come to mind46—that justify its regulation without
compensation. If that capacious definition of the police power were
applied to speech, it would allow anyone to plead their own adverse
reaction to deny the rights of others to burn the American flag,47
or, to push the claim even further, to resist saying the Pledge of
Allegiance.48 The point here is that there is no alternative to the
classical liberal theory on the limited scope of the police power, if
the central task of constitutionalism is to design a government that
42. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). For discussion of its collusive effects,
see DAVID BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST
PROGRESSIVE REFORM (2011).
43. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
44. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
45. Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
46. See Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909).
47. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
48. W. Va. State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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is strong enough to protect its catalog of individual rights without
letting an abuse of government power snuff out those same rights.
The adoption of the rational basis test therefore represents a key
surrender on this central point, by adopting a course of action that
literally offers the state vastly more running room than the classical
liberal position—by a factor of one hundred, as it were. It is this will-
ingness to let down the guard that marks in so many ways Justice
O’Connor’s jurisprudence in this area. It is instructive to go through
her major opinions on this area with this point in mind. In so doing
it is instructive to see how they build on all the earlier decisions
that were set out above. In Part I I look at the dramatic turn around
in her two public use decisions, Midkiff and Kelo. In Part II, I extend
the analysis to her two decisions that deal with the issue of regulatory
takings, Yee v. Village of Escondido 49 and Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A.
Inc.50 Part III looks at her opinions in Connolly and Eastern Enter-
prise in the context of retroactive legislation. The last Part concludes.
I. PUBLIC USE AND THE TAKINGS CLAUSE: OF MIDKIFF AND KELO
Hawaiian Housing Authority v. Midkiff 51 marked Justice
O’Connor’s first major opinion on property law. Writing for a unan-
imous 8–0 majority, she upheld the constitutionality of Hawaii’s
Land Reform Act of 1967,52 which created a scheme for the transfer
of a landlord’s interest in leased premises to the sitting tenant by
use of the state’s eminent domain power. The first salient feature of
this scheme is that the condemnation was not initiated by the state
for some public purpose. Instead, under the Act’s provision, any
group of sitting tenants could petition the local government for the
condemnation. Once the petition is made, the matter was referred
to the Hawaiian Housing Authority for a determination of whether
49. Yee v. Village of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1993). I have previously made my views
clear on the case, in Richard A. Epstein, Yee v. City of Escondido: The Supreme Court Strikes
Out Again, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 3 (1992).
50. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
51. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); see Thomas W. Merrill, The
Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61 (1986) (arguing that Midkiff illustrates that
“courts have no theory or conceptual foundation from which meaningful standards for judi-
cial review of public use issues might originate.”); see also H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for
Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659 (1987) (arguing that Midkiff was decided in accordance with
originalist principles because of “the difficulty of tying the hostility to redistribution directly
to the ‘public use’ language of the fifth amendment.”).
52. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 516-1 et seq. (2011).
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the condemnation is consistent with the provision of the Act. There-
after, the state was authorized to lend money to individual tenants
to help them finance the condemnation in question but could only
proceed with the particular condemnation once the financing was
arranged so that the state took no independent financial risk. In
dealing with this case, the Ninth Circuit held that this elaborate
scheme ran afoul of the Constitution because at root, it was nothing
more than “a naked attempt on the part of the state of Hawaii to
take the private property of A and transfer it to B solely for B’s
private use and benefit.”53
When the case reached the Supreme Court therefore, the public
use question was regarded as a live one by the lower courts. Affirming
that decision on the ground stated by the Ninth Circuit would have
done no obvious violence to the constitutional text or, as I shall show,
to the prior decisions of the Supreme Court. But Justice O’Connor
did not take that course. Instead she took her cue from the one ear-
lier decision, Berman v. Parker,54 which in good incremental fashion
she treated as the “starting point of our analysis.”55 That 1954 de-
cision reflected a strong academic consensus that the demands for
intelligent urban planning required a virtual nullification of the pub-
lic use requirement, such that the protection afforded individual prop-
erty owners was solely through the payment of just compensation.56
Those two factors put her immediately in her comfort zone. Her chal-
lenge was how to reach that result, where the outcome depended on
the choice of the constitutional standard of review. On that question,
she opted emphatically for the rational basis test by uttering one
sentence, with one key word, that largely charted the course of gov-
ernment takings (as opposed to regulations) in the United States for
the next 20 years or more. The key word is, of course, “conceivable.”
The larger passage in which it is embedded reads as follows:
To be sure, the Court’s cases have repeatedly stated that “one
person’s property may not be taken for the benefit of another
53. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 235 (quoting Midkiff v. Tom, 702 F. 2d 788, 798 (1983)).
54. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
55. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 239.
56. For discussion, see Note, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain, An Advance
Requiem, 58 YALE L. J. 599, 613–14 (1949). For my views, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS,
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN, 161–62 (1985). For a somewhat
different account of public use, see Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 61 (1986).
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private person without a justifying public purpose, even though
compensation be paid.” Thus, in Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Nebras-
ka, where the “order in question was not, and was not claimed
to be, . . . a taking of private property for a public use under the
right of eminent domain,” the Court invalidated a compensated
taking of property for lack of a justifying public purpose. But
where the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally
related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held
a compensated taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause.
On this basis, we have no trouble concluding that the Hawaii
Act is constitutional.57
The passage is highly suspect on a large number of grounds. The
first of these is textual. The Constitution does not say “nor shall
private property be taken for uses that the legislature find serve a
conceivable public purpose without just compensation.” The words
“public use” are narrower than the words “public purpose,” for there
are many government takings that might serve a public purpose
where the public makes no use of the land. Indeed, Midkiff is just
one of those cases, for once the process runs its course the tenant–
turned–fee owner has the outright fee interest indistinguishable
from that of any other property owner. The elastic nature of the
clause is made more palpable by the insertion of the word “conceiv-
able” in the passage, even though that term does not appear in any
of the cases that she cites in support of her new general proposition.
And with the insertion of that word, it looks as though the public
use clause does receive its final burial. It is without question the
case that virtually any comprehensive government program serves
multiple ends, some of which count as good public policy and others
of which count as bad ends. Adding the word “conceivable” makes it
highly likely that one of those other purposes, taken alone and out
of context, becomes sufficient to support the result. What started out
as a limitation on the power of government to take property has now
been eviscerated to allow the scheme in question.
So the issue then turns to the question of whether any such con-
ceivable purpose can be identified. On this score, Justice O’Connor
does not break stride. Spurred on by an ingenious argument by two
constitutional heavyweights, Laurence Tribe and Kathleen Sullivan,
Justice O’Connor concluded that the high concentration of land
57. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241 (internal citations removed).
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ownership in Hawaii creates a “land oligopoly,” which the Hawaii
legislature could, and did, create as an evil by imposing artificial
increases in rents.58 Arguments of this sort pass muster only be-
cause they are not meant to be subject to scrutiny, let alone refuta-
tion. The observation that land is concentrated in the hands of 72 or
22 landowners is consistent with intense competition in the rental
market, for these concentrations are far below the three or four firms
that attract attention under the antitrust law.59
At no point does she ask, however, a theoretical question of wheth-
er state intervention is needed to cure any market failure. On this
point, moreover, theory lines up squarely against her. The key in-
sight in this area is that the eminent domain power is primarily
needed to secure the assembly of many different parcels of land that
are needed to achieve a single integrated purpose, such as a railroad
that has to cut through the land of many owners. In a world without
eminent domain, there is a material risk that individual landowners
could hold out for large sums of money, such that the combined de-
mands could easily upend a project that it is in the interest of all to
go forward. The just compensation requirement insures that no in-
dividual is necessarily made worse off by the state action, at least
if the compensation is correctly calculated, which often today it is
not.60 The decision to go forward in the face of that cost thus allows
the state to achieve through coercion a positive collective that no set
of private contracts could hope to match.
In contrast, the situation presented in Midkiff is the antithesis of
the standard setting for invoking the eminent domain power. All
that is at stake in Midkiff is a large collection of individual bilateral
contracts, each of which could be renegotiated independent of the
others. Here is a case where private buyouts are simpler, cheaper,
58. See Midkiff, 46 U.S. at 241–42; see also HAW. REV. STAT. § 516 (2011).
59. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, § 5.3 (2010). “The
HHI [the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index] is calculated by summing the squares of the
individual firms’ market shares, and thus gives proportionately greater weight to the larger
market shares.” An HHI below 1500 normally attracts no attention. The HHI for a market
with 22 equal size firms is effectively zero. Any market in which the largest firm has only 10
percent of the market will usually have a HHI of under 200. Note that at best the HHI is only
a minimum condition for intervention. In some cases a merger between a strong and a weak
firm could be justified even if it increases concentration, by adding to the efficiency of the
combined firm.
60. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 115 (1985).
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and more accurate than the clumsy state administrative apparatus.
The individual difficulties in lease renegotiation cannot count as a
reason to justify forced condemnation under the aegis of the state,
for if they do so, then any lease, or indeed any other contract, could
be overridden on the ground that contract modification is a complex
process, which indeed it is. The simple truth is that the case for emi-
nent domain could not be at a lower ebb than it is in this setting,
especially since the Bishop Estate (which was the state’s largest
landlord) was seeking at the time to work out deals with tenants, in
the face of an all-too-evident sovereign risk, which is best combated
by diversifying assets across several different jurisdictions.
This theoretical explanation points as well to a strong cleavage
between Midkiff and Berman v. Parker on which Justice O’Connor
heavily relied.61 Berman was a land use case in which the question
was whether to condemn a perfectly viable department store in a
blighted neighborhood. On this score, Justice Douglas pointed to the
kinds of physical, aesthetic and monetary judgments that had to be
made, and claimed that none of these should be second-guessed by
the courts.62 That proposition is doubtful in Berman,63 but even if his
point were 100 percent correct, none of those considerations were
raised in Midkiff, where no change in land use of any type was
contemplated. Midkiff presents no issue of potential nuisances, no
issue of aesthetic compatibility. Berman and Midkiff could have
61. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
62. We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is or is not
desirable. The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values
it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary.
It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community
should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced
as well as carefully patrolled. In the present case, the Congress and its autho-
rized agencies have made determinations that take into account a wide variety
of values. It is not for us to reappraise them. If those who govern the District
of Columbia decide that the Nation’s Capital should be beautiful as well as
sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.
Berman, 348 U.S. at 33. Note that this particular passage was not quoted in Midkiff.
63. For my critique, see Richard A. Epstein, Public Use in a Post-Kelo World, 17 SUP. CT.
ECON. REV. 151 (2009); see also Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political
Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100 (2009) (arguing that Kelo has resulted in “a more
extensive legislative reaction than any other single court decision in American history”). But
see Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 90–99 (2005) (arguing
that neither the majority nor dissent in Kelo represent pragmatic decision-making, because
they do not consider the reason for eminent domain and New London’s reasons for invoking
eminent domain, and its consequences).
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been distinguished on perfectly sensible grounds if Justice O’Connor
had only been prepared to look closely at the different factual pat-
terns in the two cases.
Once again, the rational basis test is an open invitation for sloppy
analysis, where the acontextual use of language trumps any criti-
cal examination of the underlying differences, even though Justice
O’Connor well knew that the earlier cases did not line up well with
Berman. Why else would she begin the quoted passage with an apol-
ogetic, “[t]o be sure”? Indeed, any close examination of the other
cases that she cites reveals that none of them are remotely similar
to the outright private transfer in Midkiff. To give but one example,
in Rindge v. County of Los Angeles,64 the landowner alleged that the
state had made a sham taking of his ranchland for use as a public
highway near Malibu, California. The challenge admitted that the
road would be open to the public, but insisted that that public road-
way would not be connected to other public roads. What this has to do
with the situation in Midkiff is anyone’s guess. But the bottom line
is that the desire not to rock a political consensus dominated over
all three defensible grounds on which the case could be examined:
text, theory, and precedent.
The many mistakes and confusions in Midkiff proved a perfect foil
for the second of Justice O’Connor’s public use opinions, her notable
Kelo dissent.65 That opinion gave her some measure of redemption
by casting the rational basis test to the winds. Her most famous line
will have enduring appeal to both populists and defenders of property
alike. “Nothing is to prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6
with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any farm with
a factory.”66 The clear implication is that all sorts of high-handed
activities are possible without some explicit invocation of the emi-
nent domain power. At this point, she pounces on the risk of govern-
ment abuse that eluded her in Midkiff. Rindge, for example, re-enters
the picture, only now it stands not for the ability of government to
spread its tentacles broadly, but as a representative of “straightfor-
ward and constitutional” cases in which “the sovereign may transfer
private property to public ownership—such as for a road, hospital
or military base.”67 Berman also receives a rather different reading
64. Rindge v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700 (1923).
65. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 494–505.
66. Id. at 503.
67. Id. at 497.
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than it did in Midkiff, for now she has no patience with the general
proposition that the state enjoys carte blanche in dealing with land
development decisions. Thus in Kelo she describes in painful detail
the lack of adequate street and alleys, light and air, that prompted
the DC land use decision.68 At this point, she can show the powerful
difference between Berman and the plight of Wilhelmina Dery, who
is dragged from the “well-maintained house” where she had lived
with her husband since 1946. The term “conceivable” also gets a
complete makeover, which leaves rational basis in tatters. “Yet for
all the emphasis on deference, Berman and Midkiff hewed to a bed-
rock principle without which our public use jurisprudence would
collapse.”69 To drive that point home, she opens her opinion by quot-
ing the well-rehearsed language in Calder v. Bull with its natural
law overtones:
An Act of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to
the great first principles of the social compact, cannot be consid-
ered a rightful exercise of legislative authority . . . . A few in-
stances will suffice to explain what I mean. . . . [A] law that takes
property from A. and gives it to B: It is against all reason and
justice, for a people to entrust a Legislature with such powers;
and, therefore, it cannot be presumed that they have done it.70
It was of course just this trope that motivated the Ninth Circuit in
Midkiff v. Tom, which Justice O’Connor peremptorily tossed aside
in Midkiff.71 The wholesale (and welcome) retreat from her earlier
decision becomes clear when she notes that the seeds of the Kelo
debacle are found in the “errant language”72 found in Berman and
Midkiff. Midkiff’s devastating word “conceivable” does not appear in
her Kelo dissent, but it does appear in Justice Thomas’s dissent,
when he states that the Takings Clause authorizes “the taking of
property only if the public has a right to employ it, not if the public
realizes any conceivable benefit from the taking.”73 Note the great
leap backwards from rational basis to near-strict scrutiny in a single
68. Id. at 498.
69. Id. at 500.
70. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 494 (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798)) (emphasis deleted
in Kelo).
71. See discussion, supra.
72. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 501.
73. Id. at 510.
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sentence! Nonetheless, Justice O’Connor remains at a loss to distin-
guish Kelo from Midkiff, so she invokes a tired terminological ploy
in speaking about Berman and Midkiff : “Because each taking di-
rectly achieved a public benefit, it did not matter that the property
was turned over to private use.”74 The difficulty is that the state-
ment is false. All the benefits from Berman were indirect because
the department store had to be sacrificed for collateral goals. All the
long-term alleged benefits in Midkiff came from how fee ownership
could promote economic development. If those cases are direct ben-
efits, then so too the result in Kelo, whether those benefits pan out
or not.
The real sociological challenge does not lie in spinning fine tales
to distinguish Kelo from its predecessors. Rather, the challenge is to
find out why Kelo provoked a political uproar of the first magnitude,
while Midkiff passed by under the radar to large public silence. The
explanation cannot lie on the nature of the public use that was
advanced. Kelo, like Berman, was a land use case, while Midkiff was
a title-shifting affair, which is surely the weaker ground. Rather, the
big difference comes from the other side of the market, which in no
way enters into the formal eminent domain equation on public use.
Midkiff did not involve a change of possession of the subject once the
scheme was put into effect. Instead, it let sitting tenants take out land-
lords whose only interest in the property was in future cash flows.
Subjective value was of no concern in Midkiff because the properties
were always for sale at a price. But with Kelo, there was a forcible
dispossession of people who had lived their entire lives on the pre-
mises, with no desire to sell and no desire to hold out for a higher
price. They just wanted to be left alone. Yet they were swept aside
in an inexhaustible search for tax revenue, which is what prompted
Justice O’Connor’s telling Motel 6 to Ritz-Carlton example. Mind you,
this should be a powerful theme even if the houses were taken for
a road. But at that point, there is no obvious textual hook to block
the transaction by invoking the “for public use,” because in admitted
public use cases, the political processes alone decide whether to go
ahead, once the just compensation requirement is satisfied.
None of that mattered in this case, where the toxic combination
of unprincipled constitutional interpretation and illicit public pur-
pose gave rise to the backlash of the new millennium against Kelo.
74. Id. at 500 (italics in original).
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Justice O’Connor deserves abundant credit for raising the issue in
Kelo. But Justice Stevens’s thoughtless majority decision came out
in the wrong way, in part because Justice O’Connor never offered in
Midkiff the interpretation of Berman that she hit on in Kelo. Take
on that task early on, and it becomes possible to outline the major
factual differences between a plausible land use plan in Berman
and New London’s want of any coherent plan—where the city had
all the vacant land it needed for structures it never would build on
anyhow. Justice O’Connor’s personal redemption for her errors in
Midkiff brings too little and comes too late. Indeed it is clear that
the use of that dangerous term “conceivable” has guided the Court’s
deliberation in areas outside the narrow public use connection, lead-
ing it to uphold dubious real estate taxation schemes in a number
of other contexts.75
II. PHYSICAL AND REGULATORY TAKINGS: OF YEE AND LINGLE
Justice O’Connor’s next two major takings decisions deal not with
public use, but with the distinction between regulatory and physi-
cal takings. The problem here is a genuine one because the Takings
Clause has its clearest application in those cases where the govern-
ment swoops down in tyrannical fashion to seize private property for
itself. Everyone recognizes that this outright expropriation is caught
by the Takings Clause. But the issues become far more complex when
the government acts more gingerly in approaching property which
is subject to divided ownership, often by the creation of a landlord/
tenant relationship. These common arrangements obviously produce
gains from trade for the two parties, and a sound law of takings would
do little to jeopardize these arrangements by stripping away some
75. The latest manifestation of this regrettable world view is found in Justice Breyer’s
opinion in Armour v. City of Indianapolis, Indiana, in which Breyer thought that the appli-
cable standard was that “the ‘burden is on the one attacking the [classification] to negative
every conceivable basis which might support it.’” 132 S. Ct. 2073 (2012). In that case,
Indianapolis gave its residents two ways to pay for special assessments, one by a lump sum
and the other by periodic payments. When it changed the assessment system, it was prepared
to waive future payments from those who had only paid the initial installments, but not to
refund the unused portion of the prepaid expenses. The administrative burdens here are
trivial, and the distinction made thus penalizes one group that took one of two equivalent
economic offers. For critique, see Richard A. Epstein, Intellectual Laziness on the Supreme
Court: It’s Time to Scrap the Irrational “Rational Basis Test,” DEFINING IDEAS: A HOOVER
INSTITUTION JOURNAL, http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/119811.
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of the protection given to owners when they divide their property
interest. Nonetheless, in many of these cases, the level of protection
to partial interests in real property is given far less protection than
is afforded to the unified fee simple interest.
Two of Justice O’Connor’s opinions, Yee v. City of Escondido76 and
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,77 raise variations on this theme, in con-
nection with one of the central distinctions in the law of takings: what,
if any, is the line between physical and regulatory takings. Today’s
by-the-book Supreme Court doctrine rests on a bedrock distinction
between what are termed “physical” takings and “regulatory” takings.
The first and more important of these decisions is Yee. At stake was
a mobile home ordinance that the City passed pursuant to a California
authorization statute that allowed tenants who occupied mobile homes
to remain on the property of their landlords after the expiration of
their leases, at rents determined by the local government to be “just,
fair and reasonable,” in light of a variety of factors. All of the factors
related to the cost of providing the space and none of them related
to the increase in value attributable to a shift in market demand.78
Justice O’Connor approached this case within the general frame-
work. She understood full well that if this scheme were struck down,
the traditional systems of rent control for ordinary apartments would
come under increased scrutiny. Her decision dutifully applied a near
syllogism. There is a strong distinction between physical and regula-
tory takings, which is binding on the Court, and which subjected the
76. Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1993); see also Epstein, supra note 49, at 3.
77. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005); see also James W. Ely Jr., “Poor
Relation” Once More: The Supreme Court and the Vanishing Rights of Property Owners,
2004–2005 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 39 (arguing that Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Lingle “makes
some valid points” and yet must be a “setback for those interested in reviving constitutional
protection for the rights of property owners”); Dale A. Whitman, Deconstructing Lingle:
Implications for Takings Doctrine, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 573 (2007) (arguing that the
implication of Justice O’Connor’s Lingle opinion is that “governmental purposes and objectives
remain highly relevant in assessing whether a taking is justified by the ‘background prin-
ciples’ concept of Lucas . . .”).
78. See Yee, 503 U.S. at 524–25. The ordinance allows the rentals to be set:
after considering the following nonexclusive list of factors: (1) changes in the
Consumer Price Index; (2) the rent charged for comparable mobile home pads in
Escondido; (3) the length of time since the last rent increase; (4) the cost of any
capital improvements related to the pad or pads at issue; (5) changes in property
taxes; (6) changes in any rent paid by the park owner for the land; (7) changes in
utility charges; (8) changes in operating and maintenance expenses; (9) the need
for repairs other than for ordinary wear and tear; (10) the amount and quality
of services provided to the affected tenant; and (11) any lawful existing lease.
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government to only minimal scrutiny. This ordinance constituted a
regulatory not a physical taking so that the public utility model on
rate of return worked. The opinion is just flatly wrong on both
points. I shall take them up separately.
A. Physical Versus Regulatory Takings
The genesis of this distinction lies in two key Supreme Court cases,
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.79 and Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York.80 Loretto establishes a near–
per se compensation rule in physical takings cases, and Penn Central
authorizes a rational basis-like standard (though the phrase “rational
basis” is never used) in regulatory takings. In Loretto, the Court re-
quired compensation (which turned out to be very little indeed)81
when the government occupied private property or when it autho-
rized private parties to do so pursuant to its own legislative powers.
In Loretto, the application of that rule required compensation when
a private cable operator was allowed to install a cable box on the roof
of the landowner’s apartment building. On the other side of the line
fall those cases in which the government does not either enter or
authorize entry but instead imposes regulations that restrict the
uses that a landowner can make of his or her property. The paradig-
matic case on that issue in our law is Penn Central, which famously
held that in regulatory takings cases, the per se rule gave away to
“ad hoc” standards, such that the landowner could not recover the
diminution in land values without a clear showing that the govern-
ment actions had exceeded their proper scope.82 The case relies fa-
mously on a balancing test of the sort that Justice O’Connor gravitates
toward, and which she relied on in Yee.83 The ultimate question is
whether this hundred-or-so-fold difference in levels of scrutiny is
justified in Yee.
Justice O’Connor wrote again for a unanimous Court, which was
subject to only two short concurrences by Justices Blackmun and
Souter on points of no matter. As with Midkiff, Justice O’Connor
79. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
80. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
81. See Loretto v. Group W. Cable, 522 N.Y.S.2d 543 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (affirming a
denial of attorney’s fees, effectively upholding Loretto’s final amount of $1 in damages).
82. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. 104.
83. Yee, 503 U.S. at 523 & 531.
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was at her worst in dealing with this challenge, because she was
always within her comfort zone, and never felt obliged to grapple
with any of the tough conceptual issues that are raised by the
physical/regulatory taking distinction that has gained such a stran-
glehold over the judicial imagination. There are, of course, impor-
tant differences between takings by way of occupation that are
concentrated on one person and general regulations that bind large
groups. But these are polar opposites that have to be explained as
part of a general theory that also encompasses the many intermedi-
ate cases. On the one side, regulation can start to focus down until
the restrictions bind only one or very few properties. On the other, an
aggressive government program could result in the condemnation
of small holdings from a large number of people. An ideal theory
does not just deal with the polar opposites, but also has to deal with
the many intermediate cases. In these cases, the hard-edged line has
to be justified as a matter of first principle, and workable in fact.
The decisions in both Penn Central and Loretto fail to offer the
requisite conceptual foundation for this ostensible hard-edged dis-
tinction. At issue in Penn Central was whether a landmark designa-
tion for Grand Central Station allowed the City of New York to block
construction of a new office tower over the old station without com-
pensation.84 The first challenge asks why this should be treated as
though it is a mere regulatory taking, when in fact the decision meant
that the landowner was prevented from using his air rights which
were a fully protected interest under state law, capable of being sold,
mortgaged, leased and the like. For this inquiry, Justice Brennan
did not even seek to offer an answer, but only insisted that the prop-
er approach required “this Court [to focus] rather both on the char-
acter of the action and on the nature and extent of the interference
with rights in the parcel as a whole—here, the city tax block desig-
nated as the ‘landmark site.’”85 That approach marks an enormous
departure from the law of private property more generally, whose
signal achievement has been to develop a regime that allows for the
creation, transfer and protection of divided interests in property in
order to permit maximum gain from the use of a particular resource.
The process takes place in two steps. First, the transfer allocates the
rights between the two parties, where we are confident of a joint
84. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 115–19.
85. Id. at 130–31.
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gain that exceeds the transaction costs of putting the deal together,
for otherwise that deal would never have occurred in the first place.
The second is that the transaction between the two parties does not
increase their rights over that which the original landowner had
before the division. The creation of air rights squarely meets both
those tests, so the challenge is why the takings law does not follow
suit and apply to both interests in that private property at the same
time. That result would increase private wealth without blocking
the ability of state to acquire the air rights if it decided that the public
gain from open space exceeded the private gain from development.
The case thus falls exactly under a sensible account of public use so
sorely missing in Berman and Midkiff.
The avenue for that development was presented by the 1960 de-
cision of the Court in Armstrong v. United States with its oft and
justly quoted passage that the “Fifth Amendment’s guarantee . . . [is]
designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole.”86 In Penn Central, Justice Brennan pays lip
service to the passage, but then engages in the kind of dangerous
deconstruction of rules that dismisses the categorical command of
Armstrong with the general observation that “this Court, quite sim-
ply, has been unable to develop any ‘set formula’ for determining
when ‘justice and fairness’ require that economic injuries caused by
public action be compensated by the government, rather than re-
main disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.”87 Justice
Brennan couldn’t because he didn’t try. Instead, he retreated to “ad
hoc inquiries” tests, where the key trade-off asks whether the:
. . . economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, par-
ticularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant
considerations. So, too, is the character of the governmental ac-
tion. A “taking” may more readily be found when the interfer-
ence with property can be characterized as a physical invasion
by government, . . . than when interference arises from some
public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic
life to promote the common good.88
86. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
87. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
88. Id. (internal citations removed).
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But this passage does not contain a whiff of an explanation why the
loss of air rights does not count as a physical taking or why the
designation of a few buildings for special treatment counts as an
adjustment of benefits and burdens instead of a disproportionate
exaction on one side. The mystery, moreover, only deepens with
Loretto, where Justice Marshall affirms the weak holding of Penn
Central, but then concludes, along with Professor Frank Michelman
(also in attendance at our Conference), that the invariable rule for
physical takings, or more precisely, those that involve a “permanent
occupation,” is one that necessarily calls for just compensation. But
a reader can look in vain throughout Loretto to find anything more
than a recitation of cases that applied this distinction for an expla-
nation of how it fits into a comprehensive theory. At no point does
Loretto give a theoretical reason why a clause that on its face ap-
pears to apply to all forms of private property, including air rights,
should lead to such disjoint outcomes. At no point does it explain
why the political risks of faction are greater with occupations than
with regulations, given that political groups are all too eager to
impose regulations that give them enormous benefits while creating
social losses at the same time.
One reason why the physical/regulatory takings line is so vexed
is that it grew up long after the first rent control cases, which justi-
fied these statutes as a wartime effort to combat monopoly rents in
cases where there was a rapid increase in the demand for land.89
That regulation allowed tenants to stay on after the expiration of
their leases, but did not authorize them to stay on in perpetuity. But
as these statutes were renewed on a regular basis, their rationale
had to change, such that they became a form of tenant protection
against ostensible exploitation in real estate markets that are in
most locations intensely competitive. Once the physical/regulatory
distinction gained traction, it was no simple matter to fit the earlier
rental cases in it, given that the holdover tenant remained in pos-
session after the expiration of the lease. The common law view on
this question was that the holdover tenant remained in possession
only at the sufferance of the landlord.90 The landlord was entitled
to immediate eviction, or could hold the tenant to the fair market
value of the leased premises if that figure were greater than the
89. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
90. For discussion, see, for example, Crechale & Polles, Inc. v. Smith, 295 So.2d 275 (1974).
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stipulated rent in the lease, which was often in the case. In some
jurisdictions, the holdover tenant was liable for double rent.91 The
simple logic here was that the tenant was in the wrong, so that all
doubtful questions had to be resolved in favor of the landlord, which
is the best way to avoid difficulties when the tenant overstays his or
her welcome. The common law cases do not contain the slightest hint
that the holdover tenant could remain in possession at his own op-
tion for a rent set by the state.
It follows, therefore, that Loretto’s per se rule of just compensation
should apply to all holdover tenants. Since the rent control statutes
provided for a rent that was kept systematically below the appropri-
ate levels, the statutes were necessarily confiscatory unless the state
picked up the difference between statutory rent and market value.
Indeed, in strict logic, the just compensation issue needed not be ad-
dressed at all if Midkiff comes out the other way. The only difference
between the two cases is that under the Hawaiian statute at issue
in Midkiff, the reversionary interest was transferred to the tenant
in one closed transaction, while in the rent control cases, the trans-
fer takes place month by month, without a definite end. But the dif-
ferences between a perpetual lease and outright transfer of property
have no bearing on either the just compensation or the public use
question. In both cases, the statute should fail. Any return to first
principles of takings law, therefore, condemns all rent control stat-
utes on Loretto’s per se basis.
That condemnation is correct not only as a formal doctrinal mat-
ter. It also is critical from a social point of view, where the holdover
tenants at low rents lead to systematic and pervasive resource mis-
allocations. Tenants that should leave rent control premises stay on
for long periods of time, such that outsiders who could make better
use of the property are shut out by the system. The landlord, who is
constantly short-changed on revenues, now has little incentive to im-
prove the property. Social resources are wasted in the endless rate-
making proceedings that take place at city hall. Communities are
hurt by the mismatch of the tenants to the neighbor, as graying com-
munities have little use for the ball fields and other facilities that
are far more suitable to younger tenants. Nonetheless, the ability of
entrenched tenants to vote their preferences shows a difficult public
91. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.06 (2011) (providing double rent to the landlord when
the tenant refuses “to give up possession of the premises at the end of the tenant’s lease”).
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choice problem that makes it all too difficult to undo the damage
by legislation.
B. The Escondido Ordinance
The state of the general law at the time of Yee was so fixed that
only a Supreme Court decision that undid cases like Block v. Hirsh
could change the landscape. Indeed, a challenge to San Jose’s rent
control statute had just gone down in flames in Pennell v. City of San
Jose,92 notwithstanding the strong opinion of Justice Antonin Scalia
(both concurring and dissenting, joined only by Justice O’Connor),
which noted that the government could avoid expropriation of land-
lords by renting the property at market rates and reletting it at sub-
sidized rates, making up the difference out of general revenues.93
Faced with strong Supreme Court precedent, determined lower
court judges sought to escape the clutches of the rent control law by
engaging in what could only be described as an ingenious, but du-
bious, end run. In the typical rent control case, the tenant remained
in possession of the premises after the expiration of the lease. With
the typical mobile home, the vehicle remained on someone else’s land
after the expiration of the lease. In Hall v. City of Santa Barbara,94
Judge Alex Kozinski seized on that difference to move the Santa
Barbara ordinance to the physical takings side of the line. That re-
sult was supported by William Fischel,95 who claimed that the dif-
ferences in local politics were such that the concentrated force of
these mobile home tenants could dictate outcomes in small commu-
nities, but that rent control in larger cities required a solid measure
of larger community support.96 But the political economy point should
run in the opposite direction. As Madison’s definition of faction in
Federalist Number 10 makes clear, any constitutional order has to
attend to two different risks: majority expropriation of the minority,
and minority expropriation of the majority. The question of which
92. Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1985).
93. Id. at 21–22.
94. Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270, 1279 n.24 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 940 (1988).
95. William A. Fischel, Exploring the Kozinski Paradox: Why Is More Efficient Regulation
a Taking of Property?, 67 CHI.–KENT L. REV. 865 (1992), critiqued in Epstein, supra note 49,
at 11–15.
96. See Fischel, supra note 95, at 894–98.
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risk is greater cannot be answered in the abstract. Much depends
on the salience of the issue in general politics. But there is with the
Takings Clause no reason to predict the outcome in advance, for once
the politicians have done their work it should be clear in which direc-
tion the expropriation goes. That level of wealth transfer is apparent
in both settings, so in both the proper result is to invalidate the tak-
ing for the want of any serious effort to protect landlord interests.
The novelty of the situation, however, presents a problem for
Justice O’Connor because here the intrusion into space took a form
that made the physical invasion inescapable. But rather than deal-
ing with the issue head on, she resorted to a set of dubious judicial
techniques to avoid a serious analysis of the question. Her first ploy
was to insist that this was not really a physical takings case at all:
what was at stake in her view “. . . is a regulation of petitioners’ use
of their property, and thus does not amount to a per se taking.”97
The italicization of the term “use” does not do anything to save the
argument. There is no case in which someone enters land without
an intention to make use of it. To say that all entries are use cases
leaves the class of physical takings empty. The key issue here is that
the original entry under the lease was permissible only until the ex-
piration of the lease, so that the rules on physical takings have to be
adjusted to deal with future interests,98 which is what the law of
holdover tenants tries to do. Her astonishing proposition means that
it is now respectable to claim that a party who is admitted to land
for a year is entitled to stay forever because there is no need for a
fresh entry after the expiration of a term. That doctrine would be
the end of real estate law as we know it, because it would put in
jeopardy all standard commercial leases. But in this instance, the
point of this facile argument was to insist that the taking therefore
had to be treated under the more lenient balancing test of Penn
Central, which she then declined to do because that count had not
been raised below.99 Yet, true to form, when Judge Bybee tried to
revive that regulatory takings argument in Guggenheim v. Goleta,100
he was reversed en banc a year later.101 Yee had sealed its doom.
97. Yee, 503 U.S. at 532 (italics in the original).
98. See, e.g., Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
99. See Yee, 503 U.S. at 522–23.
100. Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 582 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2009).
101. Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 638 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
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The second part of Justice O’Connor’s argument was no more per-
suasive than the first. She argued that there was really no taking in
this situation because the landlord is entitled to regain possession of
the land so long as he was prepared to turn it to some alternative use.
She writes:
At least on the face of the regulatory scheme, neither the City
nor the State compels petitioners, once they have rented their
property to tenants, to continue doing so. To the contrary, the
Mobilehome Residency Law provides that a park owner who
wishes to change the use of his land may evict his tenants, albeit
with six or twelve months notice. Put bluntly, no government
has required any physical invasion of petitioner’s property.102
Put bluntly, this passage offers a classic illustration of how a local
government, with Supreme Court blessing, can protect its ordinance
by leaving the landowner with one useless stick in the bundle of
rights. The point here is made clear by running any valuation of the
landlord’s interest before and after the passage of the local ordi-
nance. Before, the value of the land for its use as a rental site re-
mains intact after the expiration of the lease. During the period of
that lease, the landlord’s interest is equal to the sum of the dis-
counted lease payments coupled with the discounted present value
of the reversionary interest when it falls into possession. For short-
term leases that are close to market value, the second term domi-
nates the first. Under the new arrangement, the landlord receives a
sum equal to the present discounted value of future payments under
the government lease, which are far less than those payments when
the property could be leased out again at market value.
To that, Justice O’Connor adds the value of the right to turn the
property to other use. But that right is close to worthless for two
reasons. First, in most cases the highest and best use of property lies
in its current use patterns. Thus the right to regain the premises
only applies to what is at best a small set of cases where major
changes in land use are contemplated. Second, that supposed right
is hemmed in by other land use regulations in the City of Goleta, for
any change in land use patterns requires the landowner to go through
102. Yee, 503 U.S. at 527–28 (internal citations removed).
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extensive administrative hearings that, given the local opposition,
are likely to block any projects for life, as it were. In these cases, the
correct measure is whether the compensation in question is a full
and perfect equivalent of the rights surrendered. Zero does not meet
that standard.
There is a close connection between the Justice O’Connor of
Midkiff and the Justice O’Connor of Yee. Both of these cases deal
with the transfer of the landlord’s reversion to the tenant in posses-
sion at below market prices. In both these cases, there is no need at
all for government intervention because there is no holdout problem
to be dealt with, which could not be countered by a term in the lease
that provides, for example, that if the tenant vacates the premises
and leaves the mobile home in place, the landlord must pay him the
fair market value for the (depreciated) property in question. There
is, moreover, no serious monopoly problem in either place, at least if
there were more than one mobile home site in the immediate envi-
ronment, even though that point was raised at the time by Joseph
Sax.103 And even if there were, the remedy is to make sure that the
rents in question are adjusted to competitive levels, which would
reflect the increase in the underlying value of the real estate. Those
rents would surely be recoverable if the landowner sold the property
to a new person for its fair market value, and they should be cap-
tured by the incumbent landlord without the interposition of an un-
necessary sale. To be sure, someone would have to take some measure
of the monopoly power, but if one takes a region that extends be-
yond Goleta, the HHI index, of relevance in Midkiff would be very
low, so that the radical restrictions on rates count much more as con-
fiscation of appreciation than the suppression of monopoly behavior.
Once again, Justice O’Connor’s effort to walk the fine line has ended
in shipwreck. Balancing does not work when the relevant prece-
dents are way off line.
103. Professor Sax wrote in a brief: “The property interest that petitioners claim was taken
by the Escondido Ordinance is the product of the park owner’s economic power over home-
owners. That power grows out of immobility, not out of the natural force of supply and de-
mand, and is thus a species of monopoly after the fact.” Brief of Golden State Mobilehome
Owners League, Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 6, Yee v. City of
Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992) (No. 90-1947), reprinted in 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1259, 1269
(1992), discussed in Epstein, supra note 49, at 7.
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The second of Justice O’Connor’s regulatory takings case is Lingle
v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.104 Lingle offers yet another window into the
vexed interaction between the law of leases and the law of takings.105
Lingle involved a constitutional challenge to Hawaii Act 257,106 which
was fortunately repealed shortly after the Supreme Court’s decision
came down.107 The Hawaii statute, which sustained an attack by lo-
cal gasoline station operators against Chevron and other out-of-state
oil companies, represented the worst in local protectionism. The care-
fully crafted ordinance imposed restrictions on the rent increases that
the Chevron could demand from its tenants; it removed the ability to
terminate a lessee at the expiration of a term, and it blocked Chevron
from putting in new gas stations near to those of an incumbent dealer.
First the District Court and then the Ninth Circuit struck down the
statute on the ground that it did not advance its stated purpose of
lowering the price of gasoline to Hawaiian consumers—this, on the
sensible conclusion that dealers who seek to entrench themselves
are not likely to pass along savings to consumers.
The basis for these lower court decisions is found in a single sen-
tence in Agins v. City of Tiburon,108 which states that a government
regulation of private property should be treated as though it “effects
a taking if [that regulation] does not substantially advance legiti-
mate state interests.”109 That proposition is clearly useless in the
form that it is provided, for at a minimum it does not distinguish
between cases that raise police power versus those that raise public
use issues. In Agins, moreover, the test was put to the worst possi-
ble purpose by validating an ordinance that set the minimum lot
size in Tiburon at five acres, thereby stripping from its owner the
substantial value that could be derived from subdividing the prop-
erty. In Lingle, however, the internal inconsistencies of the formula
were of little consequence because both courts below did the sensible
thing in striking down a statute that, in effect, stripped Chevron of
many of its negotiated rights under the lease, which constitutes a
clear taking of private property.
104. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
105. For a fuller account of the case, see Richard A. Epstein, From Penn Central to Lingle:
The Long Backwards Road, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 593 (2007).
106. HAW. REV. STAT. § 486H-10.4 (2006).
107. 2006 HAW. SESS. LAWS 78 (signed by the Governor on May 5, 2006).
108. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1979).
109. Id. at 260.
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In writing her opinion for a unanimous Supreme Court, Justice
O’Connor reversed and remanded the decision below for reconsider-
ation under the tripartite balancing test that Justice Brennan had
earlier developed in Penn Central. In her view, the central task was
to explain why asking only whether an ordinance substantially ad-
vances legitimate state interests does not capture the full range of
relevant considerations, including most critically the comparison of
benefits and burdens of the regulation that Penn Central requires.
Unfortunately, what is missing from her opinion is any willingness
to ask whether the Penn Central formula actually makes sense in a
case of this sort, where it decidedly does not.
As with Midkiff and Yee, the first question to ask is whether the
ordinance in question stripped the lessor of rights under the lease,
which of course it did. At this point, it hardly matters whether we
think of this case as a physical taking of the property or a mere
regulation of its operation, for in neither case is there any sensible
public-regarding justification for imposing these regulations. The
regulation is a straight wealth transfer between the two parties,
with negative consequences on consumers. It thus falls outside any
sensible account of the police power. What is totally unclear in this
instance is how the Penn Central formula would even apply to this
situation, with its elusive invocation of “investment-backed expec-
tations” that only deflects the inquiry for the constitutional question
of whether the government has taken private property. In the end,
therefore, this decision shows Justice O’Connor’s strengths and weak-
nesses. Working within the established tradition, she is able to de-
molish one useless strand of takings jurisprudence. But once that is
done, she refuses to make waves. Instead, she does not critique the
Penn Central formula; nor does she indicate how it might apply to
the question at hand. The law of takings faces its greatest chal-
lenges in dealing with the state reconfiguration of divided interests
in property—recall that Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon110 dealt with
the creation of an easement of subjacent support. A comprehensive
law of takings has to be able to treat these cases by something other
than the “ad hoc” Penn Central rules. But those larger theoretical
questions are, regrettably, passed by in silence.
110. Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (“while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”).
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III. RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION—
CONNOLLY AND EASTERN ENTERPRISES
The influence of the Penn Central decision has been felt not only
in leases and land use regulation, but also with the general area of
retroactive legislation. As a matter of general legal theory, retroac-
tive legislation has always been a keen concern because it imposes
obligations on individuals for which they were given no opportunity
to conform.111 The protection of individuals against that kind of
legislation imposes major limitations on what a government can do
to its citizens. Yet at the same time, the proposition limits the way
in which government can act in order to deal with what it regards
as its past mistakes. It should therefore come as no surprise that
the post–New Deal tendency has been to relax constraints on retro-
active applications.112 That issue first reached the Supreme Court
in Usery v. Turner Elkhorn,113 which dealt with new burdens im-
posed on employers to fund a black lung disease program. Justice
Marshall said, “[I]t may be that the liability imposed by the Act for
disabilities suffered by former employees was not anticipated at the
time of actual employment. But our cases are clear that legislation
readjusting rights and burdens is not unlawful solely because it up-
sets otherwise settled expectations.”114 That “solely” carries a lot of
weight. That same logic came to the fore in Connolly v. Pension Bene-
fit Guaranty Corp., where the Supreme Court faced a challenge to the
Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (“MPPAA”)115
and unanimously held that neither the due process nor the Takings
Clause prevented a bait and switch.116 Individual firms were lured
into membership in the PBGC with the promise that they could
withdraw at any time, no strings attached. Then when the financial
111. For discussion, see, for example, LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1966).
112. See, e.g., Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
113. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. 1 (1976) (effectively overruling Alton).
114. Id. at 16.
115. 94 Stat. 1208, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1381–1461 (1980).
116. Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986). See also Andrea L.
Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part II: Takings as
Intentional Deprivations of Property Without Moral Justification, 78 CAL. L. REV. 53 (1990)
(arguing that Justice O’Connor’s view in Connolly stands for the proposition that in takings
cases “A not only must establish that the generalization of wrongdoing was unreasonable, but
she also must establish that the lawmakers’ judgment of wrongdoing was unreasonable as
applied to her particular case . . . .”).
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obligations incurred by the Board ballooned, Congress amended the
original statute so as to allow withdrawal only upon payment of a
fee designed to reflect their “unfunded vested benefits” share of the
liabilities for the program. The Supreme Court gave great weight to
Turner Elkhorn, rejected the categorical test for compensation out-
lined in Armstrong v. United States,117 and applied the usual bal-
ancing test of Penn Central to the case.118 It then dismissed these
challenges on the ground that “[p]rudent employers then had more
than sufficient notice not only that pension plans were currently reg-
ulated, but also that withdrawal itself might trigger additional finan-
cial obligations.”119 To be forewarned is, therefore, to be forearmed.
Viewed as of the time of the new legislation, Congress only sought
to insulate the public at large from having to pay money to support
the worker claims to these pension benefits. But the decision not to
put this cost on the public at large rests on the view that they were
not accountable for the losses in question. Neither, of course, were
the companies who wanted to get out of the plan. The difficulty here
with the “notice” variation is that each round of legislation makes
it easier for the next to similarly renege on earlier promises. In the
end, this cycle demeans the credibility of the United States. There-
fore, in the future, it will become harder to get people to join govern-
ment programs. In addition, the operation of all these government
programs will become just that much less careful in light of the abil-
ity to go back to the industry to fund the excesses of the program’s
public administration.
To her credit, in her concurrence Justice O’Connor asked whether,
after Connolly, there were any limits that the arbitrary and capri-
cious standard imposed on the ability of Congress to so legislate. Her
discussion, however, starts with the odd concession that “the mere
fact that legislation requires one person to use his or her assets for the
benefit of another will not establish either a violation of the Taking
Clause or the Due Process Clause,”120 without explaining why this
117. Connolly, 475 U.S. at 227.
118. Id. at 225.
119. Id. at 227 (“We are far from persuaded that fairness and justice require the public,
rather than the withdrawing employers and other parties to pension plan agreements, to
shoulder the responsibility for rescuing plans that are in financial trouble.”). The source of the
trouble came from the highly dubious administration of the program.
120. Id. at 228 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (internal quotations removed).
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amounts to anything other than the once-forbidden taking from A
to B. She also noted that the “readjustments” that Justice Marshall
spoke of in Turner Elkhorn could justify the imposition of any fine
or obligation on any party who is on notice that governments misbe-
have. In theory, the notice argument should cut in exactly the oppo-
site direction. The foreseeability of government misbehavior explains
why strong constitutional protections are needed against govern-
ment chicanery because everyone is on notice that, left unchecked,
legislatures will make easy promises at one time, and then change
the rules midstream.
In her view, however, the major doubts about retroactive liability
did not suffice to raise a facial challenge of the withdrawal provisions;
that led her to voice doubts about plans that “impose substantial retro-
active burdens on employers in a manner that may drastically disrupt
longstanding expectations, and do so on the basis of a questionable
rationale that remains open to review in appropriate cases.”121 All
of this is sensible enough within Justice O’Connor’s balanced ap-
proach to these questions. But what is lacking is any plausible the-
oretical explanation as to why she resists the facial challenges to
statutes. There was no question that the legislation challenged in
Connolly did transfer wealth from mining companies to the pension-
ers beyond what they agreed to assume. The question then is why
the amount or timing of those transfers goes to anything other than
the amount and timing of the compensation that federal govern-
ment should have to provide the companies for the additional bur-
dens that they have, without question, been forced to bear. Justice
White had insisted that it was not fair to impose these obligations
on the public, who were not part of the dispute. But nowhere does
he explain why it makes sense to empower the public to use legisla-
tion to transfer wealth from one private party to another. A strong
theory of limited government would find that the tough-mined ap-
proach to pension modification has the great virtue of stopping the
regime of false promises before it begins, precisely by making the
public pay when it wants to take from A and turn it over to B.
Justice O’Connor was true to her word, however, in Eastern En-
terprises v. Apfel122 where she was able secure the concurrences only
121. Id.
122. Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998). See also Barton H. Thompson Jr.,
The Allure of Consequential Fit, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1261 (2000) (discussing Eastern Enterprises
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of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas. Writing
for that plurality, she struck down under the Takings Clause yet
another decision by Congress, this time in the Coal Industry Retiree
Health Benefit Act of 1992,123 to intervene yet again in the employer
union disputes that had been before Congress on a more or less con-
tinuous basis since 1947. The act sought to impose additional finan-
cial obligations on coal companies long after they left the coal mining
industry. In Eastern’s case, the 1992 Act sought to impose additional
liabilities for the company’s actions between 1946 and 1965. That
statute was obviously retroactive, but it is by no means crystal clear
that it cuts back on legitimate expectations in some distinctive way
that the earlier statutes approved by Justice Marshall did not.
Justice O’Connor therefore held that this statute so dashed legiti-
mate “investment-backed expectations” that Eastern was able to
overcome the presumption of validity that was set out in Turner
Elkhorn. But the distinction between the two cases was only with
respect to timing and extent of the obligations, so that all the intel-
lectual difficulties of drawing the line between different retroactive
schemes remained.
It is here where the differences in approaches matter. Under the
categorical approach that I defended above, the 1992 CIRHBA is
just a more egregious illustration of an unconstitutional practice. If
the state were intent on going through with the plan, its budgetary
allocation would have to be greater. But since the only question was
whether it could impose these burdens, an injunction should issue
in both cases, precisely because the federal government is not will-
ing to pony up the money from general revenues. Clearly the public
choice issues here are identical to those in Pennell. The compensa-
tion requirement attaches a price to government action and thus
induces more responsible deliberation. It is instructive to note that
Justice O’Connor could not carry the needed fifth vote, as Justice
Kennedy wrote his own due process analysis,124 which fractured the
Court and thus rendered its precedential value nugatory in future
years. There is a clear object lesson: balancing tests work well if
and Connolly in the context of the degree to which “courts use the takings protections or
due process clauses to scrutinize the way in which the government allocates the costs of its
actions . . .”).
123. Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992, 26 U.S.C. § 9701 et seq.
124. Eastern, 524 U.S. at 539 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting
in part).
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people are in fundamental agreement. But in these pension cases
dealing with black lung disease, no such agreement was around.
The liberal justices are quite comfortable in taking money from A
and giving it to B, and they have little difficulty and less guilt in
sticking with the original decision of Justice Marshall in Turner
Elkhorn. Eastern Enterprises is a case where Justice O’Connor’s dil-
igent and conscientious effort to get half a loaf was able to do that and
no more. The Coal Act was struck down, but the ability to impose
principled limitations in future cases became a notable failure, as
the lower courts, which have little or no patience with property rights
protection seized on the fact that O’Connor’s opinion commanded
only three other votes, and so was not a binding precedent.125
CONCLUSION
It is important to read these criticisms of Justice O’Connor’s
takings jurisprudence in light of the general trajectory of takings
decisions in the Supreme Court. During her term of office, she
usually, but not always, took a more property protective decision,
the one major exception being her decision to join a Stevens major-
ity in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council.126 Yet at the same time,
her two worst decisions, Midkiff and Yee, were written on behalf of
unanimous courts, which gives ample testimony to the low level of
protection that property interests receive from the Court. In the one
case in which she struck out boldly against the majority—Kelo —the
greatest obstacle that lay in her path was her own Midkiff decision.
125. See, e.g., Swisher Int’l, Inc. v. Schafer, 550 F.3d 1046, 1056 (2008) (“[T]he takings
analysis is not an appropriate vehicle to challenge the power of Congress to impose a mere
monetary obligation without regard to an identifiable property interest.”). Swisher involved
the imposition of taxes on manufacturers of tobacco goods to ease the costs of transition,
but its point surely does seem odd. Money must count as property, and the failure to pay
the obligation will surely result in the imposition of a judgment lien that can be levied against
specific property. The situation is not different from one in which the state says that the
private property owner need surrender only one of three parcels of property, or pay cash equal
to its amount. Note too that if there is no property interest here, how then can the due pro-
cess clause be implicated when it too applies only to the interest that any person has in
“life, liberty or property”? Swisher itself involved a set of transition payments for farmers
who were being stripped of their massive agricultural subsidies. Why anyone should receive
any subsidy for being forced to give up an undeserved benefit previously obtained is not made
clear in the opinion.
126. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302 (2002).
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My disappointment with Justice O’Connor thus applies to the en-
tire Supreme Court. The objections are both doctrinal and practical.
At the doctrinal level, there is simply no sustained effort to reconcile
three pairs of opposites that work their way through all the cases.
First, in some cases the Supreme Court follows the Armstrong
test so that disproportionate burdens are the measure of compen-
sation. The “Fifth Amendment’s guarantee . . . [is] designed to bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as
a whole.”127 In other cases, it follows the “ad hoc” exception to it
found in Penn Central. Invoke the first sentence, and compensation
follows. Invoke the second, and the compensation disappears.
Second, in some cases, the Supreme Court speaks of the wrong of
government taking from A and giving to B announced in Calder v.
Bull.128 In other cases, the key line is that of Usery stating “our cases
are clear that legislation readjusting rights and burdens is not
unlawful solely because it upsets otherwise settled expectations.”129
The only way to readjust burdens, of course, is to take from A and
give to B, a risk of which everyone is on notice.
Third, in Midkiff, any “conceivable” public purpose allows a tak-
ing to go forward, a proposition that she and the dissenters explic-
itly rejected in Kelo.
Take the more restrictive of each of these three propositions, and
the law of takings will be in pretty good shape. Take the more def-
erential half, and it is not. Unfortunately, the more an issue appears
to matter, the more likely it is that the Supreme Court will take the
wrong path unaware of the social dislocations that its decisions
create. Quite simply, its decisions have introduced a vast gulf be-
tween the system of private property that operates in private dis-
putes and the odd jumble of property rights that is fashioned to ease
the path to state domination in all manner of land use issues. Once
property is divided, the individual pieces consistently receive less
protection than does the whole. That weakened level of protection
allows courts to make the claim that a mere diminution in value
from the partial restriction on property rights does not give rise to
a compensable event.
127. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
128. Calder, 3 U.S. 386. See supra Part I.
129. Usery, 428 U.S. at 16.
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At this point, the Court supplies an instructional manual for
legislatures to destroy valuable interests in property without having
to own up to the financial consequences for their decisions. It is not
as though the protection of private property from all forms of regu-
lation is contrary to some larger social interest. Quite the contrary,
the only way to protect that social interest in prosperity is to protect
the private building blocks that make this possible. The many ar-
tifices that are used to defend rent control laws freeze property in
its current use, without taking into account the losses that are im-
posed on those who are not allowed to rent or buy property when it
is subject to what amounts to a perpetual lease in favor of the sit-
ting tenant. Those social losses reduce the wealth of the community,
the opportunities for advancement, and the size of the tax base. Yet
notwithstanding these serious allocative losses, the Supreme Court,
Justice O’Connor included, shows too much deference to political in-
stitutions whose capacity for misbehavior is all too apparent. It is
not that one asks the Justices to invent property protections where
none exist. It would be quite sufficient for them to enforce the pro-
tections that do, or at least, did exist, instead of whittling them away
with a set of distinctions that lack any intellectual coherence. In the
end, we are all losers from this sorry overall performance in the area
of the constitutional protection of property rights.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS
AND THE REASONS WHY: DISTRUST REVISITED
FRANK I. MICHELMAN*
INTRODUCTION
A country’s constitution, its body of “constitutional” or “higher”
law, may contain a “bill” or “charter” of “rights”—a compilation of
special guarantees respecting named aspects of personal and asso-
ciational freedom, authority, and social standing. Lists typically in-
clude guarantees respecting faith and conscience, communication
and expression, political franchise, security and privacy, equality, due
process, and so on. By special guarantees respecting such matters,
we mean assurances beyond the general ban a constitution may also
contain against interference into personal and social life by legisla-
tion that is utterly and incontestably void of any credible, public
justification. We do not, however, necessarily mean absolute and un-
conditional assurances. We may rather mean assurances against
non-trivial infringements by the state (or by others with the state’s
allowance) for which (or for the state’s allowance of which by others)
the state does not provide a sufficiently convincing justification, in
terms of some overriding moral or other social purpose that is served
by the infringement or by the law that authorizes or allows it.
Our topic of interest here is the inclusion of property rights among
those aspects of personal and associational freedom, authority (and
so on) that are covered by special constitutional guarantees. But
what, then, are “property” rights—as distinguished, say, from free-
dom, dignity, privacy, equality, and due process rights? In answer: I
use the term “property right” roughly to mean a legally supported
power and privilege of control over assets external to the embodied
self.1 Accordingly, when I speak of constitutional protection for prop-
erty rights, I mean supreme-law protection for (i) defensive claims
against (ii) disturbances of proprietary positions and prerogatives
that (iii) have been lawfully established under (iv) an extant legal
regime that supports private ownership.
* Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard University.
1. Externality to a self more expansively construed would be another question. See
Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
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We deal here, then, with negative (or “possessive”) as opposed to
positive (or “distributive”) rights respecting property.2 Our concern
is with constitutional guarantees respecting retention and control
of assets (and their values) currently recognized as yours, as opposed
to guarantees respecting what you will not be suffered at any time,
or for long, to go without.3 By “constitutional protection for property
rights,” I mean a trumping right of every person to be protected—
perhaps not absolutely and unconditionally, but not negligibly,
either—against state-engineered losses in lawfully acquired asset-
holdings or asset-values.
The question of constitutional protection for property rights is
obviously not identical to the question of support in a country’s legal
system for property rights and private ownership. Constitutional law
aside, a society or its leadership may be quite firmly and reliably com-
mitted to private property and market-based institutions, and there-
fore to providing and upholding the sorts of civil and regulatory laws
and transactional facilities required to support such institutions: laws
prohibiting theft and trespass, for example, in forms gross and subtle;
laws bestowing proprietary dignity on non-corporeal claims, or on
holdings divided by time or by use; facilities such as deeds registries,
land courts, and probate tribunals; and so on.
Consider, now, the case of New Zealand, which offers no higher law
protection at all for any personal rights; or of Canada, whose Charter
of Rights and Freedoms makes no mention of property rights. Or, for
that matter, of the United States, where nominal constitutional pro-
tection for property rights4 becomes, in the view of many, a paper
tiger under prevailing judicial constructions.5 Constitutional law
aside, no one doubts that the legal systems of these countries all
2. See Frank I. Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of
Property, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1319 (1987).
3. Of course, a constitution may also contain guarantees of the latter sort—see, e.g.,
SOUTH AFRICA CONST. §§ 25(5), 25(7), 26–28—but they are not the concern of this essay.
4. See U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV (providing guarantees against deprivations of prop-
erty without due process of law and against takings of property except for public use and with
just compensation).
5. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Property, Speech, and the Politics of Distrust, 59 U.
CHI. L. REV. 41, 46–47 (1992) [hereinafter Epstein, Distrust ] (referring to a “present state of
affairs . . . where there is essentially no constitutional protection of property” as “a mistake of
constitutional dimensions”). Epstein wrote that prior to the decision in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), but that decision supplies no reason for a change of
mind. See Frank I. Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1988).
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notably support private property and market-based institutions and
will continue to do so into an indefinite future.
Our question here is not about “reasons why” for a first-order
legislative policy (as we might call it) of cushioning owners against
a wide range of redistributive effects of state legislative and other
actions. So doing looks like a normal form of respect for private
property (the institution), and a legislative policy of respect for pri-
vate property can draw support from a well-known mix of reasons
of political morality and prudence. Our question, though, is about
“reasons why” for a second-order policy of embedding in supreme law
a trumping right of every individual to due respect, from first-order
(“ordinary”) lawmakers and officials, for the first-order policy of
respect and regard for private property. In response to that question,
one’s initial thought might be that the plainer and more compelling
are the reasons for the first-order policy, the less obvious—in a
democracy, anyway—will be reasons for the second-order policy of
constitutional-legal backup.
Parallel questions can be raised, of course, about any bill-of-rights
protection you might care to mention—be it for life or liberty or
dignity or expression or privacy or whatever—and parallel rejoin-
ders anticipated.6 The precise contents of the doubts and rejoinders
will vary from protection to protection and from country to country.
My undertaking here will be to provide a highly general typology of
rejoinders focused on property-rights protection. By calling the ty-
pology “general,” I mean that each rejoinder-type it mentions could
potentially be relevant for any country, although (as will become
obvious) the actual force of any one or any combination of the rejoin-
ders will vary sharply from country to country, depending on histori-
cal, economic, and legal-cultural situation.
All the rejoinders I will suggest to the constitutional protection
question for property rights can be brought together under one
highly abstract, unifying reason. It seems that any answer will have
to draw from the highly general idea that a specific entrenchment
in constitutional law, of everyone’s individual right against state-
engineered asset-value impairments, is a functional prerequisite (or
is at any rate a highly useful device) for securing the moral aims and
social benefits that private property and market-based institutions
6. The possible parallelism of rejoinders will become evident in Part III, below.
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are meant to capture. Relevant circumstances vary radically from
country to country, but—as we shall see—it may always be urged that
such is the case, more or less credibly in varying historical conditions.
As a closing introductory word, I note that a typology of “reasons
why” for constitutional protection of property rights may bear rele-
vance not only (and maybe not chiefly) for the work of those engaged
in the fashioning of constitutional texts, but also (and maybe some-
times mainly) for the work of judges and whoever else is called upon
from time to time to construe and apply what appear to be pertinent
constitutional texts. I proceed next to a tiny case study designed to
illustrate that point and thereby to lay some groundwork for the
typology to follow—and designed, as well, to give some attention to
the judicial work of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, the honoree at
our conference in Beijing.
I. THE LINGLE DECISION
The decision by Justice O’Connor that I want to highlight is the
judgment she wrote for a unanimous Supreme Court in 2005, in the
case of Lingle v. Chevron.7 That was a case in which a trial-level
court of the United States had decided, first, that a certain scheme
of price regulation imposed by the state was economically unsound,
and, second, that because of this economic error the state would be
required to pay cash compensation to those suffering private eco-
nomic losses as a result of the price regulations.8 The U.S. Supreme
Court disagreed. It held that the question of a state’s obligation to
compensate private parties for losses resulting to them from a
scheme of state regulation of the economy is not to be commingled
in that way with the question of the scheme’s economic wisdom.
Rather, these are to be approached by courts as entirely separate
questions, each subject to a different type of judicial oversight (and
the latter to very little of it). To my mind, this opinion for the Court
by Justice O’Connor stands as her single most telling contribution
to the field of constitutional protection for property rights.
7. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
8. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Caetano, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (2002); Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
v. Caetano, 57 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (1998). The details are summarized in Lingle, 544 U.S.
at 532–36.
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Whenever the state introduces a new scheme of economic regula-
tion, imposing special legal controls over trade in some economic
market, it is likely that some people’s private property holdings will
suffer a resulting loss in economic value. Let us call this kind of loss
to a property owner a “regulatory loss.” Our Constitution prohibits
the state from taking away anyone’s private property for public use,
without paying the owner for the property taken.9 So the question
arises: Does a regulatory loss count as a “taking” of property by the
state for which our Constitution requires the state to pay? Our
courts have said, in effect, that usually it does not, but in some spe-
cial cases it does.10 But then, of course, the question is: Which sorts
of cases are those special ones? By the light of what guiding values
or principles do we pick those special cases out? That is where the
Lingle decision comes in.
Over the years, our Supreme Court has explained our Constitu-
tion’s requirement of compensation to owners for property taken by
the state as concerned, at its core, with ensuring that costs occa-
sioned by the state’s activities will be spread fairly across the whole
society of citizens—thus as driven not by a value of economic effi-
ciency but by a value of civic fairness.11 In line with that idea, the
decisive factor for picking out those regulatory losses for which
the Constitution demands compensation would always have to be
something about the loss itself, whether measured absolutely or
relatively to the situations of others12: How heavy (acute, debili-
tating, degrading) is the burdensome effect sustained by the com-
plaining owner? How disproportionate is it to what others bear, or
9. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. This same guarantee has been held applicable to state
governments in the United States by force of U.S. CONST. amend XIV, see Chicago B. & Q. R.
Co. v. Chicago, 126 U.S. 226 (1897).
10. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City
of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
11. The routine citation is Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (affirming
the purpose of the taking clause to “bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole”).
See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537. Compare text accompanying note 11 with Richard A. Epstein,
Beyond the Rule of Law: Civic Virtue and Constitutional Structure, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
149, 169–70 (1987) (endorsing the civic rationale for the taking clause, but without suggesting
that it is the sole and exclusive, or even the dominant rationale).
12. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539 (remarking that the Court’s tests for treating a regulatory
loss as constitutionally demanding of compensation have converged on a focus on “the severity
of the burden that government imposes upon private property rights”).
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may normally expect to bear over a complete lifetime in a market-
regulatory political-economic environment?
The message seemed clear, but some confusion nevertheless arose
in our courts, owing to some incautiously worded dicta from our
Supreme Court, mainly in the year 1980 in a case called Agins v.
Tiburon,13 but also in a few other, earlier cases.14 Following the
Agins decision, some of our judges had clothed themselves with a
responsibility to treat as a taking of property, for which the state
must pay, any loss to an asset-holder resulting from a scheme of
regulation found by that judge to reflect a mistake (or perhaps it
would be a “clear” mistake) of economic policy in the ordinary sense
that the scheme (as the judge concludes from the evidence presented
in court) will not work out to any net public economic advantage.
According to this view, a judge so finding must treat any resulting
regulatory losses to property owners as “takings” of their property
for which they have a constitutional right to a monetary compensa-
tion from the state, and so must require the state to choose between
paying full compensation to all adversely affected property owners or
else withdrawing the new regulations from going into effect against
those owners.15
Justice O’Connor’s judgment for the Supreme Court in the Lingle
case has put a stop to that idea. The Lingle ruling sends clear direc-
tions to our courts, as follows: The Constitution assigns questions
of economic policy for decision by the government and the legisla-
ture, not by the judiciary. Therefore, when courts of law are weighing
a Constitution-based claim from property owners to compensation for
regulatory losses suffered by them, those courts must set aside com-
pletely any question about the economic wisdom of the regulation.16
The courts must focus strictly on the question of whether the losses
13. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). The Court wrote that “the application
of a [regulatory law] to particular property effects a taking if the [law] does not substantially
advance legitimate state interests, or denies an owner economically viable use of his land.”
Id. at 260 (citations omitted).
14. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 541–42 (recalling these earlier cases and dicta).
15. See, e.g., the lower-court decisions in the Lingle case, cited in note 8, supra.
16. The Lingle decision allows for the possibility of regulatory legislation that is shown
to be so plainly and totally devoid of a credible, public justification that it fails the test of “due
process of law” and is on that ground to be held unconstitutional. In such a case, however, the
sole remedy obtainable from a court would be nullification of the offending legislation. No
claim for compensation would arise. See Lingle, 544 U.S., at 542–43.
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or burdens to the complaining property owners are so large, acute,
and disproportionate that those owners cannot in all fairness and
justice be denied compensation for those losses.17
The Lingle ruling has obvious importance on a practical level. It
steers judges away from using the Constitution’s protections for the
rights of persons and associations as a basis for overruling the gov-
ernment’s judgments regarding economic policy.18 Additionally, it
gets in the way of litigants who might aim to use “takings” litigation
as a broad-gauged political strategy of opposition to state regulatory
activism.19 But the Lingle ruling also contains some deeper messages
from the Supreme Court about the general shape of our constitu-
tional law, and I want to mention two of those.
The first message is, again, about the Constitution’s reason for
laying down its safeguard against uncompensated takings of prop-
erty by the state. The reason, as the Lingle ruling teaches, does not
lie in the pursuit of a technical economic conception of welfare max-
imization. It rather lies in a concern for fairness, equity, and mutual
regard among citizens in their democratic political relations, that is,
in their relations as lawmakers to each other. Clarification of this
point—that our Constitution protects against privately held asset-
value losses (insofar as it does) for the sake of equitable relations
among citizens, not for the sake of social welfare maximization (an
echo, one might say, of the famous dissenting declaration by Justice
Holmes in the Lochner case that the Constitution “is not intended
to embody [an] economic theory”20) is an important recent marker
in the discourse of American constitutional law.
A second, larger message from the Lingle decision requires a bit
more in the way of explanation. The American Constitution’s bill of
rights is obviously concerned with protecting certain interests of citi-
zens against dangers of impairment by acts of the state. Now, we can
distinguish the general interest every person always has (whether or
not making use of privately owned assets) in the freedom to choose
17. See id. at 542 (calling the two inquiries “logically distinct” from one another).
18. The Lingle Court made plain its rejection of (and indeed its revulsion toward) any such
general policy-oversight role for the United States judiciary. See id. at 544–45.
19. Compare Lingle, supra at 537 (quoting from a prior decision the point that the taking
clause is “designed not to limit the governmental interference with property rights per se, but
rather to secure compensation in the event of an otherwise proper interference amounting to
a taking”).
20. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74, 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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and pursue his or her activities and projects without heavy-handed
interference from the state, from the interest, special to an owner of
property, in the security of the value of that ownership to her. Over
the past history of American constitutional law, the idea has some-
times arisen that our Constitution treats the latter sort of interest—of
an owner in the security of her ownership and its value—as excep-
tionally sacrosanct, especially strongly protected, beyond the level of
consideration accorded to the more generalized interest each person
has in freedom to choose and pursue her own projects and activities
in life.21 The Lingle decision is significant because it cuts strongly
against this idea of super-special protection for property and prop-
erty values. The decision puts the Constitution’s protection for a per-
son’s asset values back on the same level with protection for a person’s
general freedoms when this exercise is not directly connected to prop-
erty ownership.
The point is implicit, not explicit, in Justice O’Connor’s Lingle
opinion, and it may not be immediately self-evident. Therefore, I
offer illustration.
Suppose there is some kind of plant crop from which you can
manufacture a substance that produces a mild state of pleasurable
intoxication when eaten or smoked, and which also can serve as a
useful medication against certain human disease conditions. Call
this crop cannabis. Suppose this stuff—cannabis—is being widely
grown by farmers and sold on the market for a profit, and also is
being widely and profitably processed into consumable products by
manufacturers. Now suppose the state steps in and totally prohibits
any and all production or use of cannabis for any purpose, including
medicinal purposes. As a result, some owners of land that had been
used for growing crops of cannabis, and some owners of factories
where the material was processed for consumption, suffer substan-
tial losses in the economic values of their holdings of land and in-
dustrial hardware and software. Some other citizens, who have no
external assets or investments at stake but only their bodies and
21. Jennifer Nedelsky has written extensively on the property right’s special repre-
sentation, in American legal culture, of the normative separateness of persons and bound-
aries around them, most recently in her LAW’S RELATIONS: A RELATIONAL THEORY OF SELF,
AUTONOMY, AND LAW 91–96 (2011); see JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY
1–9 (1990).
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minds (that is, they had been using cannabis medicinally and recre-
ationally) will have to seek out replacement products. Assume that
any discoverable replacements turn out to be more expensive and
less effective or benign than the products of cannabis.
Now suppose both groups want to claim that the new law is un-
constitutional. The reason both groups give is that the state has not
shown—and has not, in all truth, got—any genuine public justifi-
cation for making the law. The demonstrable fact (so both groups
maintain) is that neither unrestricted cultivation of cannabis nor
unrestricted production and distribution of marketable manufac-
tures from cannabis causes any more in the way of social harm than
do cultivation, processing, and marketing of any of countless other
agricultural products (including but by no means limited to grapes
and grains grown as raw material for the production of alcoholic bev-
erages). Both groups stand ready with proof in the form of impres-
sive data studies and analyses, which they will present if allowed
into court with their claims. Indeed, each group plans to tender in
court the exact same studies and expert witnesses.
Now here is one, further fact about American constitutional law.
The chances of succeeding with such an evidentiary showing of the
regulation’s uselessness, when the only constitutionally protected
interest you can assert is the simple freedom to obtain products you
desire on the market (whether for recreational, medicinal, or any other
kind of use) are virtually zero. Any merely, barely, remotely plausible
claim by the state to have a genuinely public, regulatory purpose will
prevail.22 By contrast, under the doctrine stemming from the Agins
case (which the Supreme Court finally did away with in Lingle), the
very same evidence of the uselessness of the regulation would stand
a good chance of succeeding when presented by a property owner de-
manding compensation for a resulting regulatory loss to asset values.23
22. The point appears to hold quite generally, regardless of whether the use for which the
regulated or forbidden product is sought is one, such as the practice of one’s religion, that
enjoys special constitutional recognition. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 484 U.S. 872 (1990).
There is an apparently quite narrow exception when the use for which the product is required
is constitutionally protected expression and the regulation in question specially targets prod-
ucts required and acquired in the course of a publication activity. See Minnesota Star &
Tribune Co. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
23. That is how some American courts had been reading the remark from Agins (447 U.S.
255) that the Constitution requires compensation for regulatory losses whenever the causative
regulation has not been shown to “substantially advance” a legitimate state interest. See
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542 (“The ‘substantially advances’ formula suggests a means-ends test: It
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Thus, constitutional protection against losses to asset values would
be preferred to constitutional protection against losses to general
recreational and (so to speak) medicinal freedom.
Can you see any reason why a constitutional bill of rights should
be written or read to produce such an outcome? Any reason why the
state should be held to a stricter standard of justification for its reg-
ulatory laws when defending them against the claims of asset owners
who have suffered a loss in the market values of their assets, than
when defending them against the claims of sick people denied access
to a cheap and effective medicine, or healthy people denied access to
an irreplaceable recreational asset? Justice O’Connor’s judgment in
the Lingle case carries a strong suggestion that our Constitution is not
to be understood to have any such effect. And that is indeed a signifi-
cant development in the long history of American constitutional law.
II. A TYPOLOGY OF REASONS TO PROTECT DEFENSIVE PROPERTY
RIGHTS CONSTITUTIONALLY
Before starting on a typology of reasons to protect property rights
constitutionally, let us recall more or less exactly what the constitu-
tional protection is for which we want to lay out the possible reasons.
Here are the points to bear in mind:
• By “defensive property rights” we mean rights against state-
authorized impairments of the reach, security, and value of
rights, powers, and privileges attached to legal private own-
ership of identifiable assets, lawfully obtained.
• By “constitutional protection” for such rights we mean pro-
tection commanded by a country’s entrenched, “higher” or
“supra-legislative” (“constitutional”) laws, but furthermore we
mean protection that is special in the same sense in which
we would say that religious-freedom rights or free-expression
rights are specially protected by constitutional law: meaning
that the protection exceeds in force and rigor whatever pro-
tection the constitution prescribes generally and residually
(as a matter, say, of “legality” or “rationality” or “due process”)
against any and all regulatory lawmaking that is found to
lack even a shred of a plausible pretense to genuine public
motivation or justification.
asks, in essence, whether a regulation of private property is effective in achieving some
legitimate public purpose.”).
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• We do not, however, necessarily mean that the protection
must be the absolute or “hard” protection of a highly formal
and largely exceptionless rule against infringement (so that
all covered impairments are ipso facto unconstitutional), as
opposed to the “softer” form of protection suggested by a
“balancing” or “proportionality” regime (so that a showing of
a covered impairment puts the state to a burden of showing
a sufficiently convincing justification).
I place into three main categories the possible “reasons why” for
constitutional protection of property rights as thus defined. I call these
categories by the names of fundamental personal right, collective
good, and necessity. I have fashioned this threefold categorization
specifically with regard to the “reasons why” question for property
right protection. It turns out, though—as we shall soon start see-
ing—to bear a noticeable companionship to the “reasons why” that
American jurists have typically produced for our second-order policy
of constitutional protection for free-expression rights (as opposed,
that is, to the “reasons why” for a strong first-order legislative (and
common-law) policy of respecting freedom of expression).
Fundamental personal right. For a number of reasons (which
we do not have to sort out meticulously here), one might want to
insist that if a Constitution is going to name any specified aspects of
personal or associational freedom or authority for special protection,
that list ought to include whatever such aspects count as the funda-
mental rights (or interests, as some might prefer to say) of persons.
Thus, one reason that we regularly give for the U.S. Constitution’s
protection of expressive liberty is that the freedom to speak one’s
mind and thoughts to others counts for a great deal in putting to-
gether a worthy, fruitful, or respect-worthy human life.24 Something
similar might be proposed for the interest of a person in the reten-
tion, as against organized social invasion or impairment, of propri-
etary prerogatives, benefits, and values that compose one’s lawfully
acquired asset portfolio at any given time. (It is not my purpose here
to say whether such a proposition is philosophically or anthropologi-
cally supportable. For now, just suppose that it is.)
Collective good. In standard American constitutional legal dis-
course, free-expression rights are highly valued and protected not
24. See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6–8 (1970).
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only by reason of their widely perceived centrality to individual per-
sonal dignity and flourishing, but also because they enable and struc-
ture the collective good of the free flow and exchange of information
and ideas.25 Needless to say, private property rights may be similarly
valued and protected, on a widely shared understanding that private
property is constitutive of the collective good of a market-based eco-
nomic system, whose superiority to alternatives, in terms of both pro-
ductivity and freedom, is expected to work to everyone’s advantage.
Necessity. By a reason of “necessity” for some level of constitu-
tional protection against asset-portfolio impairments, I mean a per-
ceived risk, found unacceptable by a country’s constitutional
policymakers, that some group of actors will respond to a failure to
adopt that level of protection in ways damaging to the country’s
interests. The actors might be investors or lenders without whose
capital inputs the country’s economy will founder, or they might be
other governments or international organizations whose friendship
or cooperation will be imperiled by such a failure. (“Necessity” may
look like a subset of “collective good,” but we will notice below a
difference between them perhaps worth having in mind.)
I believe these three reason-types—“fundamental right,” “collective
good,” “necessity”—are sufficiently spacious to take in every rejoin-
der we might expect to hear to the question of reasons for constitu-
tional protection for defensive property rights (as opposed, that is,
to reasons for a first-order policy of legislative respect and regard for
private-property and market institutions and their supportive legal
software). And yet, despite the spaciousness and generality (or you
might call it the vagueness) of each of these three reason-types, a
typology dividing the “reasons why” space into those three sectors
can provide some guidance—as I now undertake to show—to those
charged with the making and implementation of constitutional law.
III. NON-CONFIDENCE IN ORDINARY POLITICS: VARIATIONS ON THE
THEME OF “DISTRUST”
How much (if any) and what forms of special constitutional pro-
tection, for which selected rights and interests, will make the overall
best of whatever we regard as the relevant values—including, I
25. Two standard citations are New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269–72 (1964),
and ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948).
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mean, whatever values we may (or may not) attach to popular self-
government, to social justice, to political legitimacy or identity—along
with, of course, the more technically amenable values of productive
efficiency? (To be clear: I do not mean to exclude the possibility that
our conception of “overall best” will require the assignment to some
values of a preemptive or “lexical” priority over others.26) The ques-
tion seems complex to the point of non-tractability—perhaps for any
given society at any given time, let alone for societies and times in
general. Even so, we can go some distance toward a generalizable
mapping of conceivable responses to it. Against constitutional pro-
tection for one or another right or interest, it seems the objection
must always reduce either to a denial that political regard for that
alleged right or interest can ever carry any positive value at all (say,
a zealot’s take on religious freedom), or else to a concern about legal
formality: a worry that overall good service to our full array of values
(including, remember, whatever values we attach to political iden-
tity, legitimacy, and democracy) demands a kind and degree of politi-
cal responsiveness to ever-changing social, economic, and cultural
conditions, not excluding resort to regulatory or redistributive state
activities that the presence in the picture of the protective constitu-
tional rules will sometimes inevitably block or distort. In favor of
constitutional protection, it seems the reasons will usually if not al-
ways boil down to deficits of confidence and trust in ordinary poli-
tics, for which constitutional protection is perceived to provide a
cure that is worth whatever losses to whatever values are expected
to result.
My rumination here thus follows in the track of Professor Richard
Epstein’s designation twenty years ago of distrust of government as
the “universal solvent” and “fundamental postulate” of constitutional
design.27 Just as with the case of the constitutional defense of speech,
Epstein wrote, “[T]he constitutional defense of property . . . rest[s] on
the sense that government . . . officials are . . . persons . . . subject to
a . . . presumption of distrust,” owing to the inevitable ravages on
judgment of self-interest and imperfection of knowledge.28 The uni-
versal constitutional solvency of distrust or non-confidence may come
26. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 43 (1971) (defining a “lexical order” as “an
order which requires us to satisfy [fully] the first principle in the ordering before we can move
on to the second . . . and so on”).
27. Epstein, Distrust, supra note 5, at 45–48.
28. Id. at 47.
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to seem a truth inescapable, once you pause to think about it. Present
purposes do not require any final verification of this thought, but it
is worth a moment’s reflection.
Here before us is a proposition (say) of the unique serviceability
to sovereign moral and other social ends of legislative due regard for
private property (or for free speech or free exercise of religion). You
either do or you do not hold that proposition to be self-evident, true
beyond fair and reasonable dispute. Only if you do hold it thus can
you possibly be excused for writing it into a law that inevitably must
interfere with—is designed to interfere with—forms of collective de-
cision you regard as ordinarily respect-worthy and maybe even as
ordinarily morally required. But if you do hold it thus, then you
ought not to invite the hampering, by rigid constitutional law, of the
state’s pursuit of those supposedly sovereign moral and social ends
by such regulatory and redistributive means as it from time to time
judges best—unless you think the likelihood is substantial that po-
litical decision-making in the ordinarily accepted modalities will de-
viate from a competent pursuit of values that (by hypothesis) reign
in your country as public values whose sovereignty as such cannot
reasonably be contested. Note that the force of this proposition does
not depend on any particular account of the causes of expected devi-
ation. They might be corruption, haste, excitement, distraction, gen-
eral incompetence, random unavoidable oversight or mistake. The
question in respect of each suspected cause will be whether you see
the problem as usefully correctable by the device of constitutional
protection for this or that named category of rights or interests.29
The point seems general and supple enough to cover conceptions of
the aims and functions of constitutions that are not facially straight-
line instrumentalist or calculative. Constitutions are often said to
serve expressive and identitarian aims: identifying ourselves to our-
selves and to others as a people who hold value V in the highest re-
gard. But why do it that way, with the attendant risks to the daily
pursuit of the very values we cherish, if we have perfect confidence
in our doing it simply by setting to the world and to ourselves a
vivid example of a people who do, in fact—and not under the lash of
a judicial guardianship—steadfastly maintain in their politics the
highest regard for V?
29. For an extended survey of possible reasons not to be too sure about this, see MARK
TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
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Well, we might believe that the general interest is best served by
getting some matters settled once and for all for the long term, so
that people can plan and proceed with their lives accordingly.30 Or
constitutional protections may be conceived to serve the function of
“gag rules,” of taking off the table for political consideration issues
that we fear will be dangerously socially and politically divisive.31
But the sovereignty of the values of social-normative stability and
of avoidance of excessive political division, as well as the proposition
(say) of the unique serviceability to those ends of an assurance of
the state’s non-involvement with religion, either are or not among
propositions you think any reasonable fellow citizen must share;
and then the general dilemma follows as sketched above.
But if distrust or non-confidence is thus the universal solvent, then
what boots it to sort out the general reasons for constitutional protec-
tion for property into that other series I have suggested: fundamental
right, collective good, necessity? The answer is that the dialectics of
non-confidence play out differently, with different players, for the
three reason-types, and those variations have implications for the
forms and degrees of constitutional protection that we may judge
most apt for the case of defensive property rights.
Start with collective good. As widely perceived by American
constitutional policymakers, a socially beneficial free market of
ideas depends on the willingness of people who have things to say
to say them, and thus also on people’s sense of safety against state-
organized retribution, overt or subtle, for saying the things they do
(thus our constitutional-legal doctrines of “overbreadth”32 and “chill-
ing effect”33). And so of course it is with property rights and their
perceived essential service to market structuring and to general
prosperity and freedom: Without adequate assurance of the safety
of lawful acquisitions against state-organized or authorized inva-
sions, effort and investment will flag and fail. At the point of con-
stitutional policy-making, the question (posed in terms of collective
good) will be how much of—or, better, how crucial—a contribution
toward a requisite level of assurance is to be expected from one or
30. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992).
31. See Stephen Holmes, Gag Rules or the Politics of Omission, in CONSTITUTIONS AND
DEMOCRACY 19–21 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988).
32. See, e.g., Erzoznick v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213–14, 216 (1975).
33. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965).
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another sort of constitutional protection for property. The answer
will depend as much on local political-cultural variables—which the
constitutional choices might themselves affect, in one direction or the
other, in the shorter and longer runs—as on anything like a culture-
independent real truth about the actual difference that constitution-
al law and judicial review will make to on-the-ground governmental
performance. (Thus, constitutional protection might be judged nec-
essary in the early years of a post-colonial state-formation, but not
later on, after a property-supportive political culture and track rec-
ord have become firmly established.)
Move now to “necessity.” The difference between a “necessity” rea-
son and a “collective good” reason for constitutional protection is the
difference between the force of an internal judgment of reason by
constitutional policymakers and the force of a judgment imposed on
them (they think unreasonably or exploitatively) by external powers.
We right here might judge that productive economic energy should
in all reason be sufficiently forthcoming here, given our historical
and political-cultural situation, without strong constitutional protec-
tion for portfolio values; but they out there might nevertheless con-
struct a credible threat of boycott if we do not meet their demands
for protection that would be excessive from some ideal, values-
optimizing standpoint. (Might the market for constitutional protec-
tion of property thus be open, so to speak, for rent-seeking? Compare
the market for state-subsidized industrial relocations between cities,
regions, and countries.) Of course, that would not make the neces-
sity any less of a necessity. So while the analysis for “collective good”
might be complex and subtle beyond any hope of determinacy, the
analysis for “necessity” might in practice be quite simple: We are
between a rock and a place that is even harder, so give them what
they demand.
The analysis for “fundamental rights” involves its own sort of com-
plication. We have to distinguish between the view that a due regard
for other rights or interests deemed fundamental—liberty, dignity,
privacy, due process, equality of political respect and regard—entails
some robust measure of legally backed security against ownership
disturbances, and the view that state authorship or tolerance of
disturbances of asset-holdings or asset-values counts as a funda-
mental right-violation just in and of itself, regardless of any further
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ramification to freedom, dignity, privacy, equality, or due process.
The former view, I have argued elsewhere, is no less comfortably
ensconced than the latter in liberal political thought.34
On the latter view, the move to constitutional protection for prop-
erty reflects a failure of confidence in the ability of ordinary politics
to resist temptation to violate directly a recognized fundamental
right. On the former view, the situation is more complex. Inclusion
of “property” in the list of specially protected aspects of individual
freedom, authority, and so on—when, say, “liberty,” “dignity,” “pri-
vacy,” “equality,” and “due process” have all already been included
by reason of the universal solvent of distrust—then seems to reflect
a failure of confidence not just in ordinary politics but in the ex-
traordinary forums and processes of constitutional-legal enforce-
ment, typically supreme or constitutional courts. “Property,” then
(in the sense of defensive rights against impairments or diminutions
of current holdings or their values) will have been added to the
specially protected list not because it is deemed in itself to be a
“dominant interest worth protecting,”35 but because we mistrust the
readiness of even those extraordinarily trusted forums and pro-
cesses to remember and give due weight to the dependencies of the
truly dominant interests—freedom, dignity, and so forth—on private
property in the background. (But then upon whom do we rely to
“enforce” the corrective reminder against them?)
IV. “HARD” AND “SOFT” CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
By way of suggesting what sort of payoff I would look for from our
foregoing breezy (or you might call it arm-waving) consideration of
the differing plays of the dialectics of distrust over our three broad
reason-types for constitutional protection of property, I now intro-
duce a distinction between “hard” and “soft” constitutional protec-
tion. A fairly dramatic hypothetical example—inspired by the recent
legislative and constitutional property law of South Africa36—will
make clear the distinction I have in mind.
34. See Frank I. Michelman, Liberal Constitutionalism, Property Rights, and the Assault
on Poverty, 22 STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 706 (2011).
35. Compare Richard A. Epstein, The Property Rights Decisions of Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor: When Pragmatic Balancing Is Not Enough, 1 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROPERTY RIGHTS
CONF. J. 177, 186 (2012).
36. See generally ANDRÉ VAN DER WALT, CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY LAW (3d ed. 2011).
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The case involves a law on eviction control.37 The law bars an
owner from evicting anyone from quarters occupied by that person
as his home, unless and until a court has determined that replace-
ment housing is available to that person, within his means and also
within practicable reach of that person’s established place of work,
if he has one, or of locations where work will be available for him if
he is capable of working. This statutory barrier to eviction is plainly
written to apply to any and all cases of attempted evictions of people
from their current homes, regardless of any conceded entitlement of
the applicant to immediate possession under basic and simple prop-
erty and contract law—say, the applicant is the owner and the lease
term has expired, or perhaps the occupation has been nakedly illegal
from the start.
Now suppose an owner of residential property, blocked by this law
from recovering possession following expiration of an express con-
tractual lease term, argues in response approximately as follows:
My owner’s title to this land is an asset, an item of property. The
law in question, as applied to this case, has created in the cur-
rent occupant a new asset, consisting of his legally protected,
indefinitely continuing privilege to occupy the space in question.
The law’s bestowal of that asset on him perpetrates a redistribu-
tion from me to him—thus, a withdrawal from my asset portfo-
lio, a contraction of its boundaries. The constitutional property
clause flatly prohibits withdrawals of assets from owners by the
state without just and equitable compensation, and no compen-
sation has been provided.
Where that line of argument would normally be expected to suc-
ceed, no further questions asked, constitutional protection is of the
kind I mean by “hard.”38 Owners stand assured of high prospects
of success from a strongly rule-formalist style of adjudication (no
“consequences” or “balancing” questions here), where “conceptual
37. Such laws and their constitutionality in South Africa are discussed in id. at 296–99.
38. Compare Epstein, supra note 35, at 202–03:
The common law view . . . was that . . . the landlord was entitled to immediate
eviction [of a holdover tenant], or could hold the tenant [either] to the fair
market value of the leased premises [or] the stipulated rent in the lease. . . . It
follows . . . that [a statute barring eviction and holding the rent to something
less] [is] confiscatory unless the state pick[s] up the difference between statutory
rent and market value.
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severance” (as we have learned to call it under tutelage from Pro-
fessor Radin39) is rampant.
By contrast, the constitutional protection would be “soft” where—
as in South Africa—the court would be expected to agree that a
constitutionally cognizable limitation (or “deprivation”) of property
rights has occurred, but then immediately proceed to weigh the ad-
equacy of the state’s justifications for the eviction-control law in
terms of its overall service to the achievement of universal freedom,
dignity, and equality, considering what might be the relatively mod-
est infringement (as the state would argue) on the owner’s freedom,
dignity, and so on.40 Owners might win some cases, but they would
lose a lot of them, too. Protection would also be “soft” where the pre-
dictable judicial response is denial that any “taking” of property has
occurred, considering that, after all, the owner has not been totally
stripped of either the asset’s economic value (she still gets the same
rent as before) or of her right to exclude the world once the current
occupant takes leave. (I leave nameless, for the moment, the country
where such would be the anticipated result.)
Let us now consider how the choice between hard and soft protec-
tion, or among forms and degrees of relative hardness and softness
of protection, plays out against our tripartite division of reasons for
constitutional protection for property. Under “collective good,” the
level of hardness will be set—and no doubt adjusted from time to
time by the appliers—pragmatically, in response to the consider-
ations roughly described in the first paragraph of Part III, above.
Under “necessity,” protection will be as hard as the makers and
appliers of the country’s constitutional law think is required to meet
the demands of the necessitating forces—but also presumably no
higher than that, except as independently supported by their own
internal considerations of collective good or fundamental rights.
Under “fundamental right,” the case is more interesting. Hard
formalistic protection seems relatively more congenial to the view
that security of asset holdings is a free-standing fundamental right
on its own, while soft-protection-only seems more congenial to the
39. See Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the
Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1668, 1676 (1988).
40. See, e.g., Theunis Roux, The “Arbitrary Deprivation” Vortex: Constitutional Property
Law After FNB, in CONSTITUTIONAL CONVERSATIONS 265 (Stu Woolman & Michael Bishop
eds., 2008). See generally VAN DER WALT, supra, note 36.
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view that property security is only—at most—secondary and sup-
portive of other rights such as liberty, dignity, equality, and so on.
On a secondary understanding of the place of “property” in the list of
constitutionally protected rights, a court would experience a stronger
push toward looking and seeing how the challenged law fits into an
overall program for securing to everyone what John Rawls calls a
“full and adequate scheme of equal basic liberties”41—pointing, then,
towards a test of proportional justification. Of course, that comparison
is not ironclad. On the one hand, in today’s world of constitutional-
legal discourses, we cannot claim to find any bald contradiction be-
tween an affirmation of the fundamental status of an interest or
right, and a subjection of constitutional protection for that right to
a universal principle of proportionally justified limitation;42 distrust
(of both ordinary lawmakers and constitutional reviewers) does not
necessarily stretch so far. But, on the other hand, it might. Distrust
might stretch far enough to dictate, to a given set of makers and
appliers of constitutional law, that defensive property rights need
strong and formalistic protection here and now, even allowing for
antiformalist objections and even believing that defensive property
rights lack a self-standing fundamental status of their own—just
because they are, after all, secondarily and crucially supportive of
rights and interests that are indeed fundamental, in ways that we
don’t trust either ordinary politics or judicial-balancing politics to
recognize or properly weigh.
Once again, we seemingly are left without much in the way of solid
ground to stand on. But this much, at least, we can confidently say—
recalling, now, my exemplary case of the eviction-control law: If you
happened upon a regime of nominal constitutional protection for
property rights, and found that it would not treat that law as highly
constitutionally suspect and calling for some beyond-cursory mea-
sure of justification, you would have to doubt that the authors of
that regime looked upon defensive property interests as first-line
fundamental. And that finally returns us to Justice O’Connor and
the Lingle case.
Because, of course, the regime I have in mind is that of the United
States of America. Extrapolating as any competent lawyer would
41. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 291 (1993).
42. See generally DAVID M. BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW (2004); ROBERT ALEXY,
A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (2002).
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from our Supreme Court’s decisions in the cases of Yee v. City of
Escondido,43 Fresh Pond Shopping Center v. Callahan,44 and Pennell
v. City of San José,45 there seems no chance at all that a landowner
here could prevail in our exemplary case. Can we catch a glimpse of
why not from Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Lingle?
Maybe not at first glance. O’Connor’s opinion establishes two
points about the American rationale for constitutional protection
for defensive property rights: focus on a concern for civic fairness
and of its rejection of a concern for economic theory. So far, that is
non-committal on the question of American recognition of a free-
standing, fundamental defensive right, against state-engineered
asset impairments or redistributions. But, as I have tried to sug-
gest, an answer to that question—and here Professor Epstein and
I come again together—seems detectible not far beneath the surface
of the opinion.46
43. Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992).
44. Fresh Pond Shopping Center v. Callahan, 464 U.S. 875 (1983) (appeal dismissed for
want of a substantial federal question).
45. Pennell v. City of San José, 485 U.S. 1 (1988).
46. Between Professor Epstein and me there are normative disagreements but none, I think,
about the correct description of the current state of American constitutional-legal doctrine.
OPTIONS FOR OWNERS AND OUTLAWS
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Property rights delegate control to owners and other possessors1
within a compass that is specified spatially, temporally, and func-
tionally.2 Within these confines, owners have choices. They can
decide where and how to engage in a particular use, and which of
the permissible uses to pursue at a given time. Within legal limits,
they may hold onto or dispose of the property interest, or a portion
of it. Drawing on analogies from finance, scholars have character-
ized these choices (and many others) as “real options.”3 An option
gives its holder the right, but not the obligation, to do a particular
thing, such as to sell or buy an entitlement at a given price.4 Real
options in land are not explicit—no financial instrument changes
hands—but rather are embedded in the structure of the entitlement
* Max Pam Professor of Law and Herbert and Marjorie Fried Research Scholar,
University of Chicago Law School. I am grateful to Yun-chien Chang, Ruoying Chen, Donald
Clarke, Christopher Fennell, Shitong Qiao, and participants in the June 2011 Conference on
Property Rights and China’s Development and Transformation, and in the 8th Annual Brigham-
Kanner Property Rights Conference for helpful comments and questions. Aaron Benson and Lea
Madry provided excellent research assistance, and the Stuart C. and JoAnn Nathan Faculty
Fund provided financial support. All errors are mine.
1. See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L.
REV. 965, 974–85 (2004) (explaining how exclusion-based property rules delegate decisions
about uses to owners). In this essay, I will use the term “owner” very broadly as a shorthand
term for legally recognized possessory rights in real property, regardless of the labels they are
given or the form that they take.
2. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 216 F. 3d 764, 774
(9th Cir. 2000) (“the dimensions of a property interest may include a physical dimension
(which describes the size and shape of the property in question), a functional dimension
(which describes the extent to which an owner may use or dispose of the property in question),
and a temporal dimension (which describes the duration of the property interest)”), quoted in
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 318 (2002).
3. See, e.g., Laura Quigg, Optimal Land Development, in REAL OPTIONS IN CAPITAL
INVESTMENT: MODELS, STRATEGIES, AND APPLICATIONS 265 (Lenos Trigeorgis ed., 1995); LENOS
TRIGEORGIS, REAL OPTIONS: MANAGERIAL FLEXIBILITY AND STRATEGY IN RESOURCE ALLOCATION
9–14 (1996). Options embedded in real estate ownership represent only one application of real
options analysis.
4. A call option gives its holder the right, but not the obligation, to purchase the en-
titlement at the strike price, while a put option gives its holder the right, but not the obli-
gation, to sell the entitlement at the strike price. See, e.g., RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART
C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 503–05 (10th ed. 2011).
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itself.5 I will refer to them here as “embedded real property options”
(“ERPOs”) to distinguish them from formal options to buy and sell
interests in land, which parties may also transact over.
ERPOs have four notable characteristics. First, they do not typical-
ly feature fixed exercise prices or well-defined exercise periods. For
example, an owner of a fee simple absolute may hold an option to de-
velop the land for an indefinite period of time, but the price of exercis-
ing that option will fluctuate with the prices of inputs to development.
Second, and closely related, ERPOs held by landowners and other
possessors are subject to a set of trumping options held by the gov-
ernment and by other parties. For example, zoning laws may change
in ways that eliminate particular options, or a neighbor may move
next door and engage in a use that falls short of an actionable nui-
sance but that nonetheless precludes certain sensitive land uses.
Third, the value of the option is tightly (if implicitly) tied to the
underlying rules about who shall receive gains and losses associated
with activity on the land. For example, a leaseholder may have the
option to modify her premises by, say, installing built-in bookcases,
but will not typically be entitled to any of the gains that come from
those changes.
Finally, possessors are often in a position to exercise what I will
here term “outlawed options”—the option to do something with the
land that falls outside of the legally prescribed compass. To exercise
an outlawed option, the actor pays the (implicit) strike price repre-
senting the expected repercussions from violating a prohibition or
otherwise moving outside of the law’s protection.
ERPOs interact with law and policy and with the options held by
other parties to dynamically construct the on-the-ground experience
of property. In this essay, I explore these interactions in three steps.
First, I lay out the basics of ERPOs and show how they operate in
the shadow of trumping options held by the government and other
parties. Second, I examine the special case of “outlawed options,”
using “small title” residential holdings in urbanizing areas of China
5. Legal scholars have explored embedded options in a variety of doctrinal areas. See,
e.g., IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS (2005); Robert E.
Scott & George G. Triantis, Embedded Options and the Case Against Compensation in Contract
Law, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1428 (2004); George S. Geis, An Embedded Options Theory of Indefinite
Contracts, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1664, 1686 n.114 (2006).
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as a motivating example. Finally, I consider what an option-centered
view means for property as an instrument of social policy. Because
an option-based approach can translate diverse mixes of legal enti-
tlements and extralegal moves into a common currency, it offers a use-
ful vehicle for drawing connections and lessons across legal regimes.
I. LEGAL OPTIONS FOR OWNERS
Owners and other entitlement holders derive value from a variety
of real options embedded in their property interests. The value of
these embedded real property options (“ERPOs”) depends on the
extent of the entitlement in time, space, and function, the operative
rules about who shall bear gains and losses, and the interaction of
these ERPOs with trumping governmental options and with the
ERPOs of other entitlement holders. The sections below examine a
non-exhaustive set of ERPOs often associated with ownership: the
option to develop, to remain on, and to dispose of the property.6 The
next Part will take up outlawed options.
A. The Option to Develop
The ownership of vacant land embeds an option to develop it, as
the real options literature has recognized.7 To take a simple example,
an owner of an empty parcel can decide whether to develop the par-
cel immediately, or to wait and develop it later. If developing now
for use A destroys or makes prohibitively expensive any possibility
of developing the property for use B, then there is an option value
associated with leaving the land undeveloped: the owner retains the
right to develop for either use A or use B at their respective prices.
In this context, the development prices for the uses are not preset as
they are in the case of financial options; instead, these development
6. Compare TRIGEORGIS, supra note 3, at 9–14 (detailing real options associated with an
oil drilling lease).
7. A foundational work is Sheridan Titman, Urban Land Prices Under Uncertainty, 75 AM.
ECON. REV. 505 (1985). See also Joseph T.L. Ooi, C.F. Sirmans, & Geoffrey K. Turnbull, The
Option Value of Vacant Land, Georgia State University, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies,
Urban and Regional Analysis Group, Working Paper No. 06-05 (March 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=952556 (presenting an empirical analysis in the context of Singapore’s
residential land market and discussing earlier work).
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options are “floating options” whose exercise or strike price is set by
the market conditions prevailing at the time the option is exercised.8
The option to develop is not unlimited. Property rights are crea-
tures of a political process. As such, they embody already-enacted
constraints and are subject to further change through governmental
action. Thus, any real options an owner or possessor of land holds
are themselves subject to a trumping set of governmental options.9
While these trumping options vary among jurisdictions, they gener-
ally include the right, but not the obligation, to take for public use
upon the provision of compensation.10 In addition, the government
retains the right, but not the obligation, to make many sorts of reg-
ulatory changes that diminish the value of property rights without
providing compensation.11 This latter set of options may extinguish
some of the owner’s options, including options to develop the prop-
erty at certain times, for certain uses, or along certain physical di-
mensions. To put it another way, the exercise period for the owner’s
option to develop can end without much warning.
Because of these conditions on the owner’s option set, the real
options held by owners might be regarded as “soft options” that exist
only at the government’s pleasure. However, owners who undertake
certain acts can vest their rights and thereby solidify the option to
continue along a planned development path.12 Moreover, once owners
8. See Eric Kades, Avoiding Takings “Accidents”: A Tort Perspective on Takings Law, 28
U. RICH. L. REV. 1235, 1255–56 (1994) (discussing “floating options”).
9. See Geoffrey K. Turnbull, Land Development Under the Threat of Taking, 69 S. ECON.
J. 290 (2002) (analyzing the impact on development of the threat of a governmental prohi-
bition or restriction on development).
10. The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides “nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.” The term “public use” has been equated
with “public purpose.” See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005).
Compare Article 13 of the 2004 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, translation
of The National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, http://www.npc.gov.cn
/englishnpc/Constitution/2007-11/15/content_1372963.htm (providing that “[t]he State may,
in the public interest and in accordance with law,” take “private property for its use and
make compensation”).
11. The line between compensable takings and non-compensable regulatory actions is
notoriously unclear and governed by a mix of per se rules and balancing factors. I will not
attempt to detail this complex area of law here, but these famous words of Justice Holmes
suggest the difficulty of the line-drawing challenge: “The general rule at least is, that while
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized
as a taking.” Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
12. See Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulations, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1222, 1238–40 (2009) (discussing the vested rights doctrine).
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actually develop property for a given use, the government is sig-
nificantly constrained both as a matter of law and politics from
making uncompensated inroads into the stream of benefits secured
by that option exercise.13 In this respect, some of the government’s
options (those to engage in uncompensated changes in use rights)
are themselves “soft options” that can be eliminated through the
prior exercise of options by owners. But the government’s right to
engage in compensated takings remains a “hard option” that trumps
all others, as long as doctrinal requirements as to compensation and
the purpose of the taking are met.
To see the interaction of these options, consider the following
example. Suppose an owner has a parcel of land that can be used for
either of two economically viable uses: use A, the development of a
single family home on a large lot; or use B, the development of a 30-
family dwelling unit on that same lot. On any plausible projection,
developing the property for a single-family use will require changes
to the land and investments in durable structures significant enough
to rule out redeveloping for the 30-family dwelling anytime within
the next 10 years, and, likewise, developing for the 30-family dwell-
ing will rule out for at least a decade redeveloping for single-family
use. At Time 1, the owner is not sure which alternative will turn
out to be more profitable. There is a 50% chance that use A (single-
family) will be twice as profitable as use B (30-family), and a 50%
chance that use B (30-family) will be four times as profitable as use
A (single-family).
If the owner were forced to make a decision now, the expected
value calculation is clear; use B dominates. But suppose the owner
is not forced to make a decision now and can instead delay the de-
cision by one year (to Time 2), when population trends will make
clear which of the two uses would be more profitable. Waiting comes
with an opportunity cost because it delays any stream of benefits
from either of the two uses. This opportunity cost can be understood
as part of the price of holding real options open on use A and use B
for the upcoming year. It is only part of the option price, however;
the expected losses from the governmental options outstanding on
the property represent another cost of waiting. Under current U.S.
13. But see id. at 1242–61 (questioning the basis of this well-accepted legal principle and
concluding that “current constitutional doctrine does not compel categorical protection for
existing uses”).
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law, a governmental entity might be able to eliminate either the
owner’s option to develop for use A or her option to develop for use
B without triggering a compensation requirement—although elim-
inating both would almost certainly amount to a taking if use A and
use B together represent the entire universe of economically viable
uses for the land.14
Finally, either before or after any development activity is under-
taken, the government could engage in a compensated taking. After
the land has been developed, however, the cost to the government
of exercising this option will be higher than before, to the extent
that compensation applies to the costs of the improvements on the
land as well as the land itself.15 Thus, one effect of developing more
quickly is to raise the government’s exercise price for a compensated
taking and hence render it less likely.16 Whether or not this will
actually have a pro-development effect depends on many factors,
such as whether compensation is inadequate, adequate, or excessive,
and how sensitive the government’s demand for property is to com-
pensation requirements.17
B. The Option to Remain (or Not)
The fact that property interests extend forward in time—
indefinitely, in the case of the fee simple—offers owners the option
to stay on the land long enough to collect on investments they have
14. See Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
15. The potential moral hazard associated with compensation for improvements has
been noted. See, e.g., Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings:
An Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 569, 619 (1984).
16. See THOMAS J. MICELI, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF EMINENT DOMAIN: PRIVATE
PROPERTY, PUBLIC USE 90–96 (2011) (noting that landowners may be able to influence the
probability of a taking through their investment decisions, and examining the resulting
incentives under different compensation rules and assumptions about government).
17. For example, undercompensation might be expected to reduce development, because
a landowner would fear multiplying the base to which the undercompensation would apply.
But enough development might ward off a price-sensitive but undercompensating condemning
authority. See id.; see also Thomas J. Miceli, Compensation for the Taking of Land Under
Eminent Domain, 147 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 354 (1991) (modeling the incentives for
landowners to overinvest or underinvest where their investment decisions can influence the
probability of a taking). The extent to which governmental entities respond to monetary incen-
tives is unclear. See generally Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics,
and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345 (2000).
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made.18 An important subspecies of this option is the residential
property occupant’s right to remain in place.19 A residential ERPO
holds special significance because of the often idiosyncratic value
placed on possession, and the potential for periods of possession to
add value in nonlinear ways.20 Residents often make site-specific
investments in the community and find themselves unable to repli-
cate certain aspects of the residential experience, such as thick com-
munity ties, in a new location. Yet the option to remain holds value
precisely because future payoffs are presently unknown; one is un-
der no obligation to stay if the community disappoints, or if better
opportunities become available elsewhere.
As with the option to develop, the occupant’s option to remain is a
“soft option” that may be trumped in any number of ways, including
through condemnation, foreclosure, or, in the case of rental property,
the landlord’s decision to withdraw the unit from the market. The
trumping options held by governmental entities, mortgagees, and
landlords are not costless to exercise, however, and the law can do
a variety of things to influence their strike prices.21
Exercising one’s residential possessory option also generally
requires making monetary payments at regular intervals—rent,
mortgage, or property taxes. These amounts can fluctuate. In-kind ex-
penditures may also be required, such as keeping the property up to
code and monitoring for interlopers.22 The larger these expenditures
18. As such, we might think of owners as possessing a kind of rolling option, in which
exercising the option to remain in any given period may (depending on the tenure form at
issue) generate an option to remain in a subsequent period.
19. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 350,
359–63, 368–70 (1986); Florence Wagman Roisman, The Right to Remain: Common Law
Protections for Security of Tenure: An Essay in Honor of John Otis Calmore, 86 N.C. L. REV.
817, 820–29 (2008).
20. But see Stephanie M. Stern, Residential Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of
Home, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1093, 1109–19 (2009) (noting the relative lack of empirical evidence
to support the common assumption that displacement from the home inflicts a particularly
grievous loss on households).
21. For example, mortgagees must go through specified foreclosure procedures, while
landlords must comply with applicable legal provisions when converting property from rental
units to condominiums.
22. Where formal title is unavailable, squatters may devote significant resources to guard-
ing the property. See Erica Field, Property Rights, Community Public Goods, and Household
Time Allocation in Urban Squatter Communities: Evidence from Peru, 45 WM & MARY L. REV.
837, 858 (2004); see also infra note 75 and accompanying text. Even with secure property
rights, land may be lost to adverse possession if interlopers are allowed to enjoy a lengthy
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become relative to the stream of expected benefits generated by
staying, the less likely it is that one’s option will be “in the money”
or worth exercising. Implicit limits on the applicable strike price for
exercising the possessory option are embedded in many contractual
and institutional arrangements, from fixed-rate 30-year mortgages
to rent control to property tax caps. But long-lasting possessory op-
tions with low strike prices and limited trumping options do not
come cheap. Mandating strong residential ERPOs may thus curtail
households’ access to housing in the first place.23
The option to stay implies the option to leave, yet doing so is not
always costless. Households with mortgages are often said to hold
embedded put options that give them the right, but not the obliga-
tion, to force a sale of the property back to the mortgagee at the
price of the outstanding loan balance, even when the property is cur-
rently worth far less.24 In some states, this option is the explicit prod-
uct of laws that forbid lenders to take recourse against a defaulting
mortgagor’s other assets, while in others it exists in de facto form
whenever borrowers have too few other assets to be worth pursuing
for the shortfall.25 The exercise of such options has raised serious
concerns in the present U.S. housing market, given the significant
proportion of homes that are worth less than their outstanding loan
balances.26 In one sense, the defaulting borrowers are simply exer-
cising a bargained-for option. But the potential for such exercises to
generate externalities, especially if conducted on a broad scale,
period of uninterrupted occupancy—although either regular possession or monitoring by the
owner can avoid this result. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules and
Adverse Possession, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1122, 1130 (1985).
23. This charge is frequently leveled at rent control and other regulations designed to
protect tenants. Although the empirical picture is often complex, the core intuition is not:
making landlording significantly less profitable could be expected to result in less of it, other
things being equal.
24. See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law and Economics of Subprime
Lending, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 26–27 (2009).
25. See id. at 30.
26. Nationwide, between a fifth and a quarter of homes with mortgages are “underwater,”
or worth less than what is owed on the mortgage, with significant regional variation. See
CoreLogic, Corelogic Reports Negative Equity Increase in Q4 2011 (Mar. 1, 2012), available at
http://www.corelogic.com/about-us/researchtrends/asset_upload_file360_14435.pdf (reporting
a national figure of 22.8% for underwater residential mortgages at the end of the fourth quarter
of 2011; in five states the combined average negative equity rate is 44.3%, while the re-
maining states’ combined average is 15.3%).
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complicates the picture considerably—the lender is not the only one
who stands to lose.27
C. The Option to Dispose
As the preceding discussion of strategic default already illus-
trated, landowners may hold ERPOs to end their involvement with
the property and its improvements.28 Most ways of legally getting
rid of property require the cooperation of a buyer or other recipient
and hence are not options in the usual sense. However, in a legal
regime with free alienability, there is an option to offer the property
for sale—an act which can be accomplished unilaterally, and which,
like the option to develop, carries a calculable strike price and ex-
pected return under specified market conditions. Implicit in the right
to alienate the property is the option to hold onto the property as long
as desired before exercising that option, whether in expectation of
price appreciation or in the hope of receiving returns on a site-specific
investment. Of course, the option to sell at a time of one’s own choos-
ing may be trumped by involuntary transfers (as through eminent
domain) or curtailed by governmental limits on alienability.
Alienability limits can take many forms and can be used to achieve
a variety of ends.29 Of particular relevance to the discussion above
is the way in which alienability restrictions (including limits on the
ability to alienate security interests) can be used to advance the op-
tion to remain. A paternalistic rationale for restricting alienability
is to prevent ill-considered transfers that leave the transferor worse
off. Some alienability limits take the form of an enforced delay or
“cool off” period to keep individuals from making a rash judgment
27. See Luigi Zingales, The Menace of Strategic Default, CITY J. (Spring 2010), available at
http://city-journal.org/printable.php?id=6069. But see Brent T. White, Is Strategic Default a
Menace?, CITY J. FORUM, http://www.city-journal.org/2010/forum0427.html (April 27, 2010)
(responding to Zingales’s arguments).
28. Not all ways of cutting short one’s involvement with property are legally permitted,
even under conditions of free alienability. For a discussion of the common law’s disallowance
of abandonment of fee simple interests see Lior J. Strahilevitz, The Right to Abandon, 158 U.
PENN. L. REV. 355, 399–402 (2010).
29. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1403 (2009);
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
931 (1985).
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that they will later regret.30 In some cases the limit may be a product
of presumed information asymmetries. Paternalistic rationales may
also fade into pure externality-based rationales when transactions
would threaten a society’s normative commitments. The character-
ization of rural land in China as a “social safety net” for peasant
households31 seems to draw on at least some of these considerations.
An even more interesting rationale for alienability limits relates
to self-selection.32 If one wishes to attract buyers who will use the
property themselves, there is perhaps no more direct way to do so
than to forbid resale. Even when resale is not forbidden outright,
restrictions on how, when, and by whom interests can be sliced and
reaggregated will have the effect of shaping the market in particular
ways, attracting certain market participants and repelling others.
II. OUTLAWED OPTIONS
Legal restrictions on property may be disregarded where the net
gain from doing so is great enough, given the expected sanctions.
This Part examines options to move outside of legal parameters.
A. Pricing Unapproved Alternatives
Occupiers of land are often in an excellent position to use prop-
erty in legally unapproved ways or to transact over it outside of le-
gally recognized “transaction structures.”33 In the context of housing,
30. See, e.g., Bruce Twomley, License Limitation in Alaska’s Commercial Fisheries 6 (2003),
available at http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/handle/10535/2203 (describing 60-day waiting period
for sales of certain Alaskan fishing permits “[t]o avoid intemperate sales”).
31. See, e.g., Feng Frederic Deng, Housing of Limited Property Rights: A Paradox Inside
and Outside Chinese Cities 7 (Working Paper 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=1151101 (“with rural land forced to stay in peasants’ hands, it functions as a safety net or
last resort for those peasants who work in the city in case of economic downturn or job loss”);
Gregory M. Stein, Private and Public Construction in Modern China, 12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
5, 42 (2010) (noting concerns about dislocation associated with loss of agricultural land); see
also Ruoying Chen, Informal Sales of Rural Housing in China: Property, Privatization and
Local Public Finance 20, 36 (working paper 2010), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu
/files/file/Chen New- Informal Sales of Rural Residential Land.pdf.
32. See, e.g., Rose-Ackerman, supra note 29, at 960–61.
33. Cf. Alvin K. Klevorick, On the Economic Theory of Crime, in NOMOS XXVII: CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 289, 301–03 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1985) (using the notion
of “transaction structures” to define criminal conduct).
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the potential for informal, extralegal, or just plain illegal arrange-
ments is relatively great. The ways in which people use residential
spaces are heterogeneous and hard to monitor, and privacy interests
may limit the extent to which intrusion into the specifics of living
arrangements will be pursued. Thus, the fact that certain choices
are not available through recognized legal channels does not neces-
sarily make them completely unavailable; it may instead merely
alter their prices.
The law and economics literature is replete with discussions of
certain kinds of sanctions as “liability rules” that permit entitle-
ments to change hands on the unilateral initiative of one party, upon
the payment of a fee.34 Liability rules are often explicitly described
as call options because they give one party the right but not the obli-
gation to do something upon paying what amounts to a strike price.35
While there is controversy surrounding this way of thinking about
legal violations,36 the fact remains that often what appear on the
surface to be prohibitions end up operating like prices. As informal
work-arounds shade into non-recognized or even legally prohibited
arrangements, the strike price of exercising a given option will in-
corporate the uncertainty and risk associated with moving outside
the law’s formal protection.
Questions arise not only with respect to formal legal sanctions,
but also as to whether particular interests will be protected against
exploitation by other private parties or against uncompensated ap-
propriation by the government. The government clearly has choices
in this regard, and can adjust the level of legal protection afforded
to informal or unapproved arrangements to suit its ends. For exam-
ple, it might leave informal settlers exposed to governmental appro-
priation, but protect them from private expropriation.37 Depending
34. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
35. See, e.g., Madeline Morris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 822,
852–54 (1993).
36. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95
YALE L.J. 1335, 1370–71 (1986); Dale A. Nance, Guidance Rules and Enforcement Rules: A
Better View of the Cathedral, 83 VA. L. REV. 837, 858–61 (1997).
37. An interesting example of this approach is provided by the British Colonial Office’s
(“BCO’s”) licensing system for squatters on the Australian frontier during the nineteenth
century. See Lee J. Alston, Edwyna Harris, & Bernardo Mueller, Property Rights, Land
Settlement and Land Conflict on Frontiers: Evidence from Australia, Brazil and the US, in
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on the stream of consumption benefits produced by the informal ar-
rangement and the costs and risks of the outside options available
to the residents, something less than full-blooded title may be enough
to spur transactions and investments in residential property.38 In
the balance of this Part, I will use the “small title”39 sales of rural
land to urban buyers in China as a springboard for thinking about
these issues.
B. The Case of Small Title
In China, all urban land is state owned; private parties occupy
it under long-term leases.40 The only legal method to transform
collectively owned rural land into urban land is through eminent
domain.41 Yet the expansion of urban areas and the demand for
urban housing make the prospect of simply turning land designated
as rural into urban residential developments very attractive. Doing
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 9, 15–16 (Kenneth Ayotte &
Henry E. Smith eds., 2011). As the authors explain, “[u]nder the license system, squatters
paid £10 annually to occupy as much land as they pleased. Licenses gave squatters occupancy
rights and were enforceable against all parties except the Crown.” Id. at 16. These annual
squatting licenses were established in An Act to Restrain the Unauthorized Occupation of
Crown Land, 7 Wm. IV, No. 4, and the eviction rights retained by the Crown reflected the
BCO’s concern about “ceding Crown rights and potential revenue from later sale.” Id. All the
same, the squatters’ interests were protected by the license system against other private
parties; enforcement, including resolution of boundary disputes, was provided by the Crown
Lands Commissioners. Id.
38. See, e.g., id. at 16 (noting that despite the ability of the Crown to “evict squatters at
any time without compensation” on the Australian frontier under the BCO’s licensing system,
there remained “an active market for squatters’ runs”); see generally Michael Trebilcock &
Paul-Erik Veel, Property Rights and Development: The Contingent Case for Formalization, 30
U. PA. J. INT’L L. 397 (2008).
39. Terminology varies, with the terms “small title,” “minor title,” and “petit title” ap-
pearing in the literature.
40. See Deng, supra note 31, at 2; see also Yun-chien Chang, Property Law with Chinese
Characteristics: An Economic and Comparative Analysis, 1 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROPERTY
RIGHTS CONF. J. 345 (2012).
41. See, e.g., Deng, supra note 31, at 1 (describing eminent domain as “the only legal way
to convert rural land into urban land that is owned by the government”). In China, rural land
that is owned by local collectives cannot be legally alienated for urban development outside
of the eminent domain process. See id. at 2; see also Ruoying Chen, Divided World: China’s
Land Tenure System and Implication to Foreign Investment in China, DONG-A J. INT’L BUS.
TRANSACTION L. (Spring 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1665175; Eva Pils, Waste
No Land, 11 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 2, 18 (2010) (detailing the strict alienability restrictions
on rural land).
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so allows the parties to the transaction to capture the surplus as-
sociated with moving land from a low-valued use to a high-valued
use—surplus that would otherwise be captured by government
actors or developers. Whether because monitoring and enforcement
are imperfect, or because local collectives green-light the transac-
tions and provide some protective cover from adverse governmental
action, a significant amount of property is transferred in this way.42
These small title sales occur at a large discount (in Beijing, re-
portedly at about 25–30% of the price of a legitimate housing unit).43
The discount is presumably due to the greater risk or reduced market-
ability associated with the lack of a legally recognized title. Questions
might arise as to the purchaser’s rights against interloping private
parties, as well as against the government in the case of dispossession.
We would expect to see the price reduced by the expected costs of hold-
ing property that lacks legal approval, whether those costs come in
the form of legal sanctions, non-compensable losses inflicted by pub-
lic or private actors, or greater difficulty retransferring the property.44
The magnitude and composition of the expected costs associated
with small title are empirical questions that I must leave to others.
The generalizable point, however, is that parties will evaluate out-
lawed options based on their expected costs and benefits, which must
in turn be compared to the costs and benefits associated with the
available legal options.45 The following stylized example illustrates
some dimensions of the choice to transact outside the law.46
42. See Deng, supra note 31, at 1 (relating reports “that about 20% of all new housing
sales in Beijing in 2007" were small title housing units).
43. Id.
44. As Ruoying Chen has suggested, and as discussed below, difficulty in transferring may
actually be a strength from a policy perspective if it induces self-selection along normatively
desirable lines. Chen, supra note 31, at 31–36; see also infra notes 62–63 and accompanying text.
45. An analogy can be found in discussions of the opportunity costs of crime, which focus
on how much someone has to gain and lose from violating the law, relative to her current
position. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, Economic Costs of Inequality, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
23, 27–28.
46. This example dovetails in some respects with Tom Ginsburg’s “actuarial theory of
property rights protection.” Tom Ginsburg, The “China Problem” Reconsidered: Property
Rights and Economic Development in Northeast Asia 13–20 (2011) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author). Under that theory, a risk of undercompensated expropriation does not
entirely negate the investment-inducing benefits of a property regime, if the risk is kept
within acceptable bounds by outside constraints, political or otherwise. My point in the
ensuing example and in the later discussion of property hydraulics is that both public and
private expropriation risks nonetheless form the backdrop against which other embedded real
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1. A Stylized Example
Suppose that there are 100 parcels in a particular rural commu-
nity, each worth 500 in its present use. Ten of the parcels will be
randomly selected to have its value to the owner diminished by one
half (thus, to 250) without compensation (whether through outright
appropriation with undercompensation or otherwise).47 The back-
ground expected loss per parcel, then, is 25, and the value of each
parcel given the risk of appropriation is 475.48 At present, all 100
parcels are legally restricted to a low-intensity residential use (one
small cottage per acre) but would be twice as valuable (that is, worth
1000 rather than 500) if developed for use at a higher density for
multifamily urban housing.
The present occupants are legally precluded from removing the
use restriction or transferring new use rights to someone else. But
suppose both moves are accomplished anyway, outside of the law.
Suppose further that the only negative consequence that will follow
is a risk of a completely uncompensated appropriation that will de-
stroy the value of the property to its owner. If the chance of appro-
priation remains at 10%, but compensation drops to zero (owing to
the lack of formal title held by the in-movers), then the property
now has an expected value, given the appropriation risk, of 900
(1000 minus 100). This is much better than 475. Of course, the risk
of appropriation might rise, whether because the government seeks
to deter future transfers of this sort or simply because the property
has become a more attractive target to a price-sensitive government.
property options are exercised, and against which decisions about activities will be made. In
my view, this analysis can also be applied to highly property-protective liberal democracies
like the United States; Ginsburg, in contrast, limits his actuarial theory to “developmental
states.” See id. at 16.
47. To keep the example simple, I assume a single-period interaction rather than a series
of periods to which we might apply a hazard rate. Because the alternatives being compared
all extend risks across time in a similar way, the simplification does not interfere with the
main point of the example. I also assume that the appropriation simply drops the value to one
half of what it presently is in its current use, setting aside the possibility that the appro-
priation of half the parcel would be coupled with other changes that would increase or reduce
the value of the remaining portion.
48. Each owner runs a 10% chance of losing 250 (half of 500), for an expected loss of 25.
When this expected loss is subtracted from the original value of 500, the resulting expected
value is 475.
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But even if the risk rises fivefold, the expected value of the trans-
formed land would still be 500 (1000 minus 500), in excess of the
starting value of 475.
With numbers like these, it is not hard to see both why such trans-
actions might happen, and why they would happen at a substantial
discount (as compared with a legally valid transfer). In this example,
the background risk of governmental option exercise plays only a
small role in the story; the sharp rise in value associated with urban
use seems to be doing most of the work. But such background risk
could well play a larger role than the expected value numbers alone
suggest, leading to a preference for outlawed transfers even when
the value increase from the land’s transformation is more modest.
This is particularly likely to the extent that risk-averse current res-
idents are able to enter into or influence informal transfers.49 For
such households, the ability to replace the specter of an uncertain
displacement with a certain departure would be very valuable.50
2. Remaining Puzzles
The simple example above is not meant to (and does not) capture
the empirically complex picture of small title in China. But it does
help to illustrate the impetus behind small title transactions. If the
gains from trade are large enough, they may swamp the disadvan-
tages associated with a transfer that lacks legal approval—especially
when considered against a backdrop in which undercompensated
appropriation risks already loom relatively large. Two questions re-
main, however. First, why are in-movers, who may also be risk averse,
willing to take their chances with small title? And second, why does
the government seem to tolerate small title transfers?
49. Small title sales have reportedly included both transfers by individual peasant house-
holds and sales by local village collectives. See Pils, supra note 41, at 41. The fact that local
collectives own the land complicates the decision-making picture even in the former case.
Where collectives transact over large blocks of rural land, the preferences of particular rural
households may or may not be taken into account by the village leadership. I thank Donald
Clarke for comments on this point.
50. See, e.g., Pils, supra note 41, at 40–41 (noting the advantages alienability would hold
for peasant households).
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Why Do In-Movers Chance It? If the effect of the housing trans-
action is to shift risk to the in-movers, and perhaps amplify it in
the process, shouldn’t the in-movers’ own risk aversion make such
transactions unattractive?
An initial question is whether risk is actually amplified or re-
duced by the transfer. One hypothesized repercussion of engaging
in unapproved transactions might be a heightened risk of government
appropriation, if the lack of legal title eliminates the government’s
obligation to compensate. But it is far from clear that this has been
the case. The government is likely to be sensitive not only to the le-
gality of holdings but also the identity of the holders, and the politi-
cal power that they have. Even if the in-movers are legally easier to
dispossess, they may be politically harder to dispossess than the rural
residents who were previously on the land.51 Moreover, the longer the
new residents remain in place, the more entrenched their expecta-
tions may become, and the higher the political strike price will rise
for the government to exercise its expropriation option. Another po-
tential disadvantage of small title might be a reduced ability to en-
force one’s property claims against private encroachment. Here too,
however, some indications point in the opposite direction.52
It is also possible that the urban in-movers are a self-selected
group that tend to have lower levels of risk aversion than other
would-be urban home buyers. Urban in-movers may also have access
to other advantages (relatively greater wealth, better access to urban
employment, or stronger claims on the social insurance system) that
make them systematically better able to bear risk than the rural
out-movers.53 Under these circumstances, the large discount in home
51. I thank Donald Clarke for discussions on this point.
52. Suggestive in this respect is the treatment of land disputes that have arisen between
villagers who sold their property through small-title transactions to artists in what is now the
Songzhuang art district in Beijing. LAIKWAN PANG, CREATIVITY AND ITS DISCONTENTS: CHINA’S
CREATIVE INDUSTRIES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OFFENSES 155 (2012). Because
land prices rose sharply after the sales, the villagers came to regret the bargains. In one
decided case, the villager Ma Haitao sued the artist Li Yulan four years after a small title
land transaction, seeking to have the deal struck for illegality. The court recognized that
the deal was illegal and invalidated the sale—but also held that Ma had to compensate Li
for the loss. Id.; see also Chen, supra note 31, at 5.
53. China’s Household Registration System (hukou) historically drew sharp distinctions
between rural and urban residents that kept rural migrants from securing the benefits of
urban dwellers. Although these barriers have been lowered considerably in recent decades,
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prices (compared with legally approved purchases) may prove suffi-
cient to compensate in-movers for the risk they bear. Put another
way, the gain from changing the use of the property is so great as
to swamp both the increased expected value of appropriation and
risk-averse reactions to it.54
Why Does the Government Tolerate It? When small title trans-
fers occur, the transacting parties glean surplus that could other-
wise go to the government.55 Why, then, are small title transactions
tolerated,56 given the ability of the government to adopt polices
(with respect to eminent domain, for example) that would diminish
their attractiveness?
Here, I can only speculate and ask for information from those who
know the situation better. As a matter of theory, three possibilities
are worth considering. An initial and relatively uninteresting one
would turn on enforcement costs. While some commentators report
that monitoring problems are considerable in some contexts,57 these
some distinctions remain. See BARRY NAUGHTON, THE CHINESE ECONOMY: TRANSITIONS AND
GROWTH (2007); Chen, supra note 41, at 2–7.
54. The fact that surplus exists sufficient to cover the heightened risk does not, of course,
tell us whether the in-movers or the out-movers are the efficient risk-bearers. If the trans-
action costs are too high for leaving appropriation risk on the rural out-movers (as through
some form of warranty or seller insurance program) the in-movers might end up with the risk
even if they are not systematically better at bearing it.
55. The surplus from a rural to urban redesignation might flow to developers instead of
to the government, but the government’s role in directing that flow would presumably produce
valuable political capital. It is also possible that some of the surplus could be captured by
corrupt government officials.
56. The government’s stance toward small title transactions appears to be in flux as
of this writing, although the direction of movement is unclear. I have been advised of a re-
cent Chinese news report indicating the government will allow collectively owned land to be
leased (email communication from Donald Clarke, citing http://china.caixin.com/2012-01-08
/100346665.html). I have also been advised of a pronouncement in November 2011 by China’s
Ministry of Land and Resources that rural land registrations will be accelerated but small
title transactions will not be registered (email communication from Yun-chien Chang, citing
http://www.mlr.gov.cn/zwgk/zytz/201111/t20111110_1024313.htm).
57. See Gregory M. Stein, Acquiring Land Use Rights in Today’s China: A Snapshot
from on the Ground, 24 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1, 29 (2006) (noting reports of difficult en-
forcement, including that of “[o]ne professional” in China who stated “that the central
government has been taking satellite photos of agricultural areas on a regular basis and
examining them to confirm that cultivable land is being used for agricultural purposes
throughout the growing season and is not being used in other ways without the knowledge
of the central government”).
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transformations of rural land to urban residential use seem to be
relatively easy to spot.58 Moreover, following Gary Becker’s obser-
vations, more severe sanctions could compensate for a lower rate
of detection to achieve a desired level of enforcement.59 Yet, as Eva
Pils observes, enforcement to date has mostly been “half-hearted
and inefficient.”60
A more interesting possibility is a price discrimination story. The
government might be viewed as providing land use transformation
services when it acquires rural land through condemnation and con-
veys it anew as urban land. Urban developers and in-movers who de-
sire the benefits of such land use transformation may be unwilling
to pay the going rate. Small title transactions offer a cheaper mech-
anism of accomplishing the transformation. If the in-movers would
not have paid full price, the government may not have lost a reve-
nue stream.61 Governmental losses are controlled in any event by
the appropriation option that it maintains over these properties,
especially if compensation requirements are diluted by the lack of
formal title.
The market-thinning work that legal restrictions perform has
other implications as well. Ruoying Chen builds on the idea of self-
selection prompted by legal restrictions to argue for delinking for-
mal title in rural property from free alienability.62 The lack of legal
approval for informal small title transfers currently thins the market
by ruling out the risk averse and those bent on speculation. Formal-
izing title would carry clear advantages, but unless it is accompa-
nied by alienability restrictions that perform a similar function in
58. Pils, supra note 41, at 41 (“While the phenomenon of ‘minor property rights’ share
important features with black—or gray—markets, it is a market in a commodity that is
startlingly difficult to hide away, and that can only be thought to exist because it is to some
degree tolerated by officials.”).
59. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169,
184 (1968).
60. Pils, supra note 41, at 42; see also Chen, supra note 31, at 5 (noting the absence of
public reports of eviction of small title urban buyers, aside from two resettlement cases in
which urban buyers were relocated and received back the full original purchase price).
61. The price discrimination story works better if the central government gains some
revenue (or saves costs) as a result of these transfers. The local collectives play an important
role in informally ratifying the sales, and the repeat-play interactions between these local
governing bodies and the central government might afford opportunities for some of the
surplus from small title sales to flow to the latter.
62. Chen, supra note 31, at 31–36.
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restricting market participation, the character and pace of transfers
would be very different from what is observed now.63
A third possible explanation flows from the real options literature.
When parties exercise options in ways that are visible to others, those
exercises provide information.64 For example, if one owner drills an
oil well or develops a shopping area, nearby owners learn something
as a result.65 Thus, there may be instances in which a party would
not want to be the first mover in exercising a particular option. If
the government wants to observe and gather information from the
option exercises of others, it cannot simultaneously maintain a com-
plete monopoly on exercising options of that sort. A compromise po-
sition would be a formal monopoly with some degree of tolerance for
informal option exercises on the ground. Seeing where development
is taken up and where it succeeds in attracting buyers (even within
the somewhat constrained setting of small property rights) yields
useful information.
III. LESSONS FOR SOCIAL POLICY
The discussion to this point has focused primarily on describing
and analyzing how ERPOs work—both inside and outside legal
parameters. In this last Part, I want to offer some brief thoughts on
the lessons that an appreciation of ERPOs can hold for social policy.
A. Get Beyond Ownership
The first and clearest takeaway point is for social planners to
recognize the ERPOs that already exist, and to understand the ways
in which they interact with legal rules and governmental policies.
Because these options are embedded rather than explicit, it can be
easy to miss their significance and to fall back on legal categories
like “ownership” that are ultimately less helpful.66 Whether or not
63. Id. at 35–36.
64. Steven R. Grenadier, Information Revelation Through Option Exercise, in GAME
CHOICES: THE INTERSECTION OF REAL OPTIONS AND GAME THEORY 125 (Steven Grenadier
ed., 2000).
65. Id. at 126–27.
66. See Donald Clarke, China’s Stealth Urban Land Revolution 1 (June 2011) (un-
published manuscript, on file with author) (arguing that “[t]he concept of ownership . . .
ultimately proves useless as an analytical tool”).
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the law deems an occupier to be an “owner” may tell us little or noth-
ing about what set of options the person holds—she may be desig-
nated as a non-owner but yet have a robust set of valuable options,
or be considered an owner but have a tightly curtailed set of options.
Moreover, informal arrangements and de facto rights, along with tol-
erated forms of illegality, can make property rights look quite different
on the ground than they might appear in formal legal descriptions.
Translating de jure and de facto entitlements into the common
currency of ERPOs is particularly important when cross-country
comparisons are involved. For example, inordinate emphasis is often
placed on the fact that entitlement-holders in China do not actually
own the land they occupy but rather only own rights in the land.67
But rights in land are all that anyone can really own, whatever la-
bels we may apply to the legal relationship.68 Indeed, in the U.S.,
the lofty title of “owner” often corresponds to highly restricted sets
of options.69
This is not to deny the power of labels. Surely it is significant as
a matter of ideology and politics that one society calls holders of en-
titlements landowners and another does not. Moreover, the cultural
meaning associated with particular ways of describing property en-
titlements can shape the social and political reality in very impor-
tant ways.70 Yet unless policymakers can get behind the labels to see
what a system of entitlements actually lets a given party do (both
inside and outside the prescribed legal parameters), they cannot
fine-tune the contents of the package or even assess the implications
of one label or another.
B. Heed Hydraulics
A second takeaway lesson suggested by a focus on ERPOs relates
to what we might call the hydraulic nature of property rights: pres-
sures along one margin can produce responses along other dimen-
sions.71 Suppose that, through some combination of legal restrictions
67. See generally id.
68. See id. at 2.
69. See, e.g., id. at 4.
70. See Jonathan Remy Nash & Stephanie M. Stern, Property Frames, 87 WASH. U. L.
REV. 449 (2010).
71. The hydraulic metaphor has been used in many legal contexts. See, e.g., Peter K.
Yu, Intellectual Property and the Information Ecosystem, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 16 (2005)
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and market interactions, people end up with entitlements that are
not well suited to their needs. These kinds of mistakes fall under
the general head of misassigned entitlements. If transaction costs
are zero, the mistake does not matter, but where transaction costs
(or other barriers) are significant, the mistake can stick.72 In between
the frictionless plane of zero transaction costs and the deep mire of
locked-in suboptimality lies a range of possibilities that can be col-
lectively understood as hydraulic in nature.
Adaptations can reduce the costs associated with suboptimal prop-
erty interests, but at a price. Like any hydraulic system, property can
be expected to adapt in the way that offers the least resistance (that
is, where the largest marginal gains can be achieved per unit of cost).
Sometimes transactions outside of the law’s approved structure will
be the cheapest path, while at other times a limitation or removal of
one embedded option will prompt the exercise of a different option.73
Significantly, adaptation does not always involve changes in prop-
erty uses alone; people’s behavior may change as well, if this rep-
resents the cheaper path. Thus, property rights (or the lack thereof)
can change the way that people live and work.
Consider, for example, settings where formal property rights are
not available and squatters maintain their claims by continually
physically possessing the land.74 A thicker form of property rights
might be better suited to the set of activities that the household
would prefer, such as pursuing employment and social opportuni-
ties away from the home. Without a ready way to thicken those
rights unilaterally, however, the response may be to adapt behav-
iors by moving employment and socialization to the home, or by
(“To some extent, the intellectual property system functions like a hydraulic system; a change
in the system may be offset by an identical change in the opposite direction.”); Geoffrey A.
Manne, The Hydraulic Theory of Disclosure Regulation and Other Costs of Disclosure, 58 ALA.
L. REV. 473 (2007); Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign
Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705 (1999); Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring:
Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 721–24 (2011)
(discussing “the hydraulics of [doctrinal] borrowing and convergence”).
72. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
73. In this respect, regulation can operate like a tax that alters the relative attractiveness
of the available options. The taxation analogy has been made explicit in the literature on
inclusionary zoning. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, The Irony of ‘Inclusionary’ Zoning, 54 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1167, 1170 (1981) (describing most inclusionary zoning programs as “essentially
taxes on the production of new housing”).
74. Put into an options framework, the lack of formal title raises the exercise price of the
option to remain by requiring that it be perpetually paid in kind through actual possession.
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otherwise pursuing activities that are complements to staying at
home.75 In other words, a form of functional bundling—using the
home for more purposes than just residential—operates as a re-
sponse to thinness in formal rights.
The fact that behavior changes in response to a property system
does not necessarily carry negative normative implications. Like a
Pigouvian tax that is designed to internalize externalities, a prop-
erty system can quite consciously and rationally put pressure on
certain behavioral choices and ease the path for others. Indeed,
property systems as a whole can be understood as mechanisms for
channeling behavior along certain lines, such as investment and
trade, rather than others, such as shirking and fighting.76 The diffi-
culty is in identifying when a property system’s design is inducing
needless behavioral distortions, and when the design is actually cor-
recting a distortion of some kind.
To return to the example above, it is possible that very thin pos-
sessory rights that induce functional bundling of residency, work,
and socialization could produce important positive spillovers within
a given social context. On the other hand, we can easily imagine in-
stances where this same bundling would produce large deadweight
losses. Tracing the likely adaptive responses offers policymakers
opportunities to avoid unintended consequences and channel be-
havior in desired directions. It also underscores a fact that may go
underappreciated—that property as experienced on the ground is
the result of an iterative process involving not only law and markets
but also the choices of owners and other possessors.
75. See Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, Property Rights and Economic Develop-
ment, in 5 HANDBOOK OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 4525, 4531–32 (Dani Rodrik & Mark
Rosenzweig, eds., 2010) (noting the possibility of such complementarity, as where constant
presence on agricultural property by a farmer can simultaneously serve purposes of guarding
the property and maximizing its productivity). A more skeptical view is suggested in SPENCER
HEATH MACCALLUM, THE ART OF COMMUNITY 77 (1970) (noting the losses in productivity for
one who “must rest one hand always on the sword, leaving but one for the tiller or the plow”);
see also Field, supra note 22 (finding differences between titled and untitled squatter commu-
nities in Peru with respect to household members remaining at home during the day).
76. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk
Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 131 (1998) (explaining that
“property allows owners to trade with one another, rather than getting into unproductive
and wasteful fights over resources”); Besley & Ghatak, supra note 75 (reviewing empirical
and theoretical literature and developing an analytic framework for assessing how property
rights affect economic development).
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C. Learn from Option Exercises
Responses to legal constraints, including the use of outlawed
options, can create challenges for legal policy. But, along with other
observed option exercises, they can also offer opportunities for
learning. An anecdote from Jane Jacobs about sidewalk placement
provides a useful analogy:
Back in the 1950s when plans started to appear for one-story,
spread-out high schools instead of three or four storied tradi-
tional buildings, architects for one of these first new schools—in
Connecticut if I remember correctly—weren’t sure where to lo-
cate walks for students and staff criss-crossing outdoor grounds
between classrooms and other facilities like gyms, auditoriums,
and cafeterias. Should they rely on guesswork? Or depend on
neat geometric schemes? Should perhaps everything be paved?
The architects let the problem stand unsolved until the school
had been in use throughout its first winter, during which they
mapped the paths which users had made in the snow. The archi-
tects let users inform them where paths should go.77
The idea that social planners can learn something from those who
blaze new paths or deviate from the ones that society has laid down
is an intriguing one. Eduardo Peñalver and Sonia Katyal have ex-
plored the potentially valuable role of “outlaws” who break property
rules.78 Although, as the authors acknowledge, lawbreakers can in-
flict high social costs, there may be some silver linings associated
with their behavior. Perhaps the most important of these is the in-
formational signal produced by a violation or pattern of violations—
which is all the stronger for being a violation, and hence something
the violator is willing to risk punishment for.79 Interpreting and
77. Jane Jacobs, Random Comments, 28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 537, 539 (2001); see also
CHRISTOPHER ALEXANDER ET AL., A PATTERN LANGUAGE 586 (1977) (“The layout of paths will
seem right and comfortable only when it is compatible with the process of walking. And the
process of walking is far more subtle than one might imagine.”).
78. See EDUARDO MOISÉS PEÑALVER & SONIA K. KATYAL, PROPERTY OUTLAWS: HOW
SQUATTERS, PIRATES, AND PROTESTERS IMPROVE THE LAW OF OWNERSHIP (2009); Eduardo
Moisés Peñalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1095 (2007).
79. See PEÑALVER & KATYAL, supra note 78, at 169–82; Peñalver & Katyal, supra note 78,
at 1137–38, 1181; Lee Anne Fennell, Order with Outlaws?, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA
269 (2007), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/12-2007/Fennell.pdf (response to Eduardo
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responding to these signals requires a clear understanding of the
outlawed options embedded in the possession and use of property
and their relationship to other legally approved ERPOs.
CONCLUSION
In this brief essay, I have only introduced in a general way the
considerations that follow from understanding property entitle-
ments as packages of embedded real property options. An option-
based understanding of property can offer useful guidance to those
who are charged with pursuing workable adjustments in legal rules
and social policy. Such an approach can also facilitate comparative
work, by providing an analytic framework that emphasizes func-
tional commonalities and resists labels and rigid categories. While
others are better equipped than I to speak to the on-the-ground
situation of small title transactions in China, I hope to have shown
how options analysis offers a useful tool for examining this property
puzzle and many others.
Moisés Peñalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1095 (2007)); Lee
Anne Fennell, Efficient Trespass: The Case for “Bad Faith” Adverse Possession, 100 NW. U. L.
REV. 1037, 1073–75 (2006).
INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
LAN CAO*
In recent years, the call for strong and clear property rights has
grown in law and development circles. In the landmark book The
Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails
Everywhere Else,1 de Soto put forth the claim that “strong and clear”
property rights, formalized rather than informal, are necessary for
economic efficiency and for the protection of the poor, who occupy
through squatting, for example, property that they do not own. De
Soto believes that for capitalism to work in poor countries, as it does
in the West, poor countries must establish a system in which indi-
vidual property rights are protected and formally titled. A formal
land title system empowers the poor by assuring them rights to prop-
erty critical to economic self-sufficiency. De Soto and the Institute for
Liberty and Democracy, which he founded, pushed for reforms to mod-
ernize Peru’s laws and regulations, transferring land titles to more
than a million Peruvian families who had previously subsisted in an
informal land system that gave them no rights over property they
worked or occupied. “Until you have universal, well-protected, clear,
and transferable private property rights, you cannot have a market
economy in Peru, in the ghetto, or anywhere else. And you are going
to have all the problems those places have,” de Soto remarked.2
According to de Soto, unreported, unrecorded economic activity in
the informal sector creates a titling void for the poor because they
are deprived of access to a formal system that gives them legal own-
ership of their property. Without legal title, the poor struggle to get
credit and engage in economic transactions. Because they lack legal
ownership, legal remedies are also beyond their reach should land
disputes arise. When the poor are trapped in the informal, extrale-
gal sector, they are excluded from the formal, legal sector and from
* Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. I thank Prof. Lynda Butler of William
and Mary Law School and Vice Dean Weixing Shen of Tsinghua University Law School for
inviting me to be a panelist at the 2011 Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference.
1. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE
WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2003).
2. Frank Pellegrini, The Modern Hernando de Soto, METRO CHI. REAL EST. MAG., Dec. 2006,
at 43, available at http://www.prairietitle.com/pdf/TitleTalk/TitleTalk1206.pdf.
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gaining access to the benefits of law and globalization—their assets,
adding up to more than $10 trillion USD worldwide, as estimated by
de Soto, languish as dead capital.3
De Soto’s efforts have been widely praised. Bill Clinton, for exam-
ple, called him “The world’s greatest living economist.”4 Secretary
General Kofi Annan of the United Nations said, “Hernando is ab-
solutely right, that we need to rethink how we capture economic
growth and development.”5 But de Soto’s ideas have also been cri-
tiqued by many scholars and activists. His property rights initiative
has generated strong backlash from non-governmental organiza-
tions and social movements because they believe that his policy pre-
scriptions may be inappropriate for the poorest of the poor. According
to these scholars and activists, incorporating the poor conspicuously
into the formal economy, without more, will simply enfold them into
an onerous tax base that might be counterproductive for those living
on the edge.6 Others charge that titling creates incentives for indi-
vidual struggles to get titles and could erode the much-needed soli-
darity that the poor must forge to progress economically.7 Critics
also charge that de Soto oversimplifies the informal economy and its
property relations. For example, according to these critics, it is un-
clear how de Soto would want the legal system to be adjusted to ac-
commodate other parallel systems and “the unsettling implications
for mainstream property systems, are skirted, not confronted.”8
De Soto’s main point boils down to “converting informal property
into private property through systematic titling”9 in order to ensure
3. DE SOTO, supra note 1, at 301–31.
4. Press Release, U.N.C. at Chapel Hill, Noted Economist de Soto to Discuss Property
Rights as Solution to Global Poverty in Oct. 26 Address (Oct. 19, 2004), http://www.unc.edu
/news/archives/oct04/fpg_desoto101904.html.
5. Press Release, Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Press Conference at International Labour
Organization (Jul. 16, 2001), http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sgsm7892.doc.htm.
6. Ben Cousins et al., Will Formalising Property Rights Reduce Poverty in South Africa’s
‘Second Economy’? Questioning the Mythologies of Hernando de Soto, PLAAS POL’Y BRIEF, Oct.
2005, at 1, available at http://www.icarrd.org/en/proposals/Policy2018.pdf; see also MIKE DAVIS,
PLANET OF SLUMS 80 (2006) (arguing that formal titling may help some by incorporating them
into the economic system, it is a double edged sword but for tenants who are unable to pay the
taxes that follow titling).
7. DAVIS, supra note 6, at 80–81.
8. Cousins et al., supra note 6, at 2.
9. Id.
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a system of strong and clear property rights.10 As observers have
noted, de Soto’s primary argument is that “clearly defined property
rights generate what economists call positive externalities, or bene-
fits shared by everyone.”11 This claim, however, has been incisively
critiqued by Professor David Kennedy, who argued that “[t]he case for
a straightforward link between ‘clear and strong’ property rights and
robust growth or development in today’s industrial societies is more
ideological assertion than careful history.”12 According to Professor
Kennedy, the developed economies of the modern West “have experi-
enced periods of aggressive industrialization and economic growth
with a wide range of different property regimes in place.”13 De Soto’s
notion of clear and strong property rights rests on the mistaken
assumption that “‘property rights’ have an ideal form—capable of
being clarified and strengthened—which can be disentangled from
the warp and woof of social and economic struggle in a society.”14
This paper will expand on one of the points Professor Kennedy
espouses, specifically positioning property rights against a “complex
system of forces” that include not just the “legal fabric” but also “the
informal world of custom and business practice which transform the
meaning of entitlements for different actors.”15 Professor Kennedy
stated that
[t]he focus on strong and clear rights . . . obscures the fact that
no property law regime is composed solely of rights, however
strong or clear. There are always also lots of reciprocal obliga-
tions, duties and legal privileges to injure. Property law is a com-
plex system of forces pulling in contradictory directions. As such,
it offers myriad opportunities for fine-tuning the relationship
10. De Soto is not the only one who has made this claim, although he has been most
identified perhaps with this principle. Scholars in the field of New Institutional Economics
have made similar arguments. The World Bank too asserts that secure and well-defined land
rights are key to growth and development.
11. Robert J. Samuelson, The Spirit of Capitalism, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.–Feb. 2001, at
207, available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/56674/robert-j-samuelson/the-spirit
-of-capitalism.
12. David Kennedy, Some Caution About Property Rights as a Recipe for Economic
Development, 1 ACCT. ECON. & L. 1, 3 (2011), available at http://www.bepress.com/ael/vol1
/iss1/3.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 8.
15. Id. at 6.
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among economic and social interests in pursuit of a develop-
ment strategy.16
In other words, an emphasis on strength and clarity “has tended
to take the focus off the sorts of social, cultural, institutional and
political transformations generally associated with ‘development.’”17
Indeed, simply making property rights strong and clear does not
begin to address a host of thorny issues that implicate distribu-
tional considerations or rights and obligations that are associated
with a country’s historical or cultural fabric. Thus, the call for strong
and clear property rights cannot sidestep allocative determinations,
whether those determinations are made as a matter of explicit pub-
lic policy or implicit cultural norms.18
Because property is a “bundle of rights”19 which are themselves
embedded in institutional regimes, it is important to place property
rights against an institutional framework. In this respect, Douglas
North’s observation that institutions are “rules of the game” or
“humanly-devised constraints that shape human interaction”20 is
especially relevant. For North, constraints include both what are
prohibited and what are permitted, providing the “incentive frame-
work” that guides human behavior.21 And institutions can be formal
or informal,22 consisting of both “formal written rules as well as
16. Id. at 4.
17. Id. at 29.
18. One reason the “strong and clear property rights” idea continues to seem
innocent of any allocative public policy commitment is the lay notion that
property rights concern the relationship between an individual and “his
property.” Strengthening and clarifying that relationship does not seem to
implicate anyone else. It seems merely to empower him to participate more
effectively in the economy. For a legal professional, however, property is not
about the relationship between persons and things. Rather it concerns the
relationship between people with respect to a thing.
Id. at 26.
19. James Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711–
820 (1996).
20. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PER-
FORMANCE 3 (1990).
21. Indra de Soysa & Johannes Jütting, Informal Institutions and Development: Think
Local, Act Global?, OECD DEV. CENTRE & DEV. ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE—NETWORK ON
GOVERNANCE 3 (Dec. 11–12, 2006), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/16/37790393.pdf.
22. Id. at 2; see also Hans-Joachim Lauth, Informal Institutions and Democracy, 7
DEMOCRATIZATION 21 (Winter 2000); Guillermo O’Donnell, Another Institutionalization: Latin
America and Elsewhere 10 (Kellogg Inst. for Int’l Stud., Working Paper No. 222, 1996),
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typically unwritten codes of conduct and regularized behavior that
underlie and supplement formal rules.”23 The former are enforced
by formal entities such as courts, judges, police, and other officials,
whereas the latter are “largely self-enforcing through mechanisms
of obligation, such as in patron-client relationships or clan networks,
or simply because following the rules is in the best interests of in-
dividuals who may find themselves in a ‘Nash equilibrium’ where
everyone is better off from cooperation.”24 Although “all informal in-
stitutions (rules governing behavior outside official channels) should
not be confused with culture,”25 there is nevertheless “a close associ-
ation between . . . the ‘constitutive’ and ‘regulatory’ effects of culture
and informal institutions.”26 Informal institutions then are reflected
in and encompass a cultural regime. Thus, culture is part of the
institutional regime that North discusses. In other words, the con-
stitutive dimensions of informal institutions
relate to aspects of culture that shape economic behavior by guid-
ing relative valuation, categorizations and understandings of eco-
nomic processes and outcomes, which are passed on through the
generations of parents, schools, peers. The regulatory effects refer
to the way in which the values and beliefs of a society are mani-
fested through social norms and attitudes in ways that regulate
behavior: promises must be kept, contracts must be honored.27
As de Soysa and Jütting observed, Nobel Prize winner Elinor Ostrom
calls such informal rules “rules in force” to reflect the notion that al-
though they are generally not codified they are deemed legitimate
available at http://kellogg.nd.edu/publications/workingpapers/WPS/222.pdf. One way of dis-
tinguishing an informal from formal institution is by reference to the state-societal dichotomy.
“Formal institution” refers to state bodies such as courts, legislatures and bureaucracies or
state-enforced rules such as constitutions, laws, regulations, court decisions. “Informal in-
stitution” refers to “civic, religious, kinship, and other ‘societal’ rules and organizations.”
Gretchen Helmke & Steven Levitsky, Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A
Research Agenda 8 (Kellogg Inst. for Int’l Stud. Working Paper No. 307, 2003), available at
http://kellogg.nd.edu/publications/workingpapers/WPS/307.pdf. However, this approach fails
to take into account informal rules within state institutions or official rules within non-state
organizations (rules of religious orders or political parties). Helmke & Levitsky, supra, at 8.
23. De Soysa & Jütting, supra note 21, at 3.
24. De Soysa & Jütting, supra note 21, at 3.
25. Id. at 2.
26. Id.
27. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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and hence “rules in operation.”28 They are, in other words, “socially
sanctioned norms of behavior (attitudes, customs, taboos, conventions,
and traditions).”29 By contrast, formal rules and constraints that are
part of formal institutions are “constitutions, laws, property rights,
charters, bylaws, statute[s] and common law, and regulations.”30
Property rights are embedded in an existing institutional regime,
which includes formal institutions as well as informal institutions
such as culture. Thus, property rights are themselves a reflection of
formal institutions as well as informal institutions. Law and devel-
opment objectives such as the call for “strong and clear” property
rights—without more—seemingly address only one component of the
overall framework—formal institutions—while ignoring the other
equally important component—informal institutions, such as cul-
ture. Rights, including property rights, are embedded in a cultural
regime. Certainly property can be an instrumental component for
development strategy, but simply asserting that having clear prop-
erty rights is a baseline sidesteps other important considerations.
Such considerations include, for example, who will be entitled to have
property rights, what kind of property rights will be protected—even
if the rights, however defined, are defined clearly and strongly. In
other words, just because a property right is clear doesn’t answer at
all the question of who can be a right holder or what kinds of rights
will be entitled to legal protection. To understand all these other is-
sues requires understanding the relationship between the formal
and informal institutions, between property rights and the back-
ground cultural norms that animate those rights.
The purpose of this paper is to examine precisely this relationship.
The presence or absence of property rights must be examined against
the backdrop of culture. “Property rights are not the be all and end
all of progress but a simple reflection of the larger culture.”31 As I
discuss in the section below, it is important, especially in law and
development, to realize that formal institutions such as property
rights are affected by informal institutions.32 Law and development
28. De Soysa & Jütting, supra note 21, at 3.
29. Id. at 3.
30. Id. at 5.
31. Samuelson, supra note 11, at 211.
32. Since the effectiveness of formal rules, such as penal codes, the rule of law and
democratic governance, depend on informal institutions, such as norms and
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has historically focused only on formal institutions and thus it should
not be any surprise that “not everyone finds strong effects from for-
mal institutions, such as the rule of law to development outcomes.”33
In other words, law and development as a field has been charac-
terized by failures which scholars and practitioners within the field
themselves bemoan and acknowledge. An almost exclusive emphasis
on formal institutions, I argue, has resulted in the field’s systematic
exclusion of culture from its lens. Yet,
changing formal (macro- and micro-level) institutions that might
be compatible with particular structural forms might yet not
fit very well with informal institutions given underlying cultur-
al factors that remain resistant to change, factors that have a
more proximate bearing on the outcomes we are interested in,
such as corruption, education, governance, or questions of gen-
der equality.34
So assuming that law and development efforts wish to establish
property rights in order to attract foreign investment, ensuring that
they are strong and clear does not address the important question
of the cultural framework in which the newly established property
rights are to operate. One needs to turn to background cultural norms
to more fully examine the issue. Thus, “the question of institutions
and development may depend greatly on how informal institutions
moderate formal ones as they affect outcomes.”35 It is important to
understand whether or not property rights introduced by law and
development projects are in sync with local culture or not. This issue
would seem to be as important as whether or not these rights are
“strong and clear.” More discussion on this issue will follow in the
section below.
attitudes and existing levels of social capital, or the patterns of interaction that
individuals assume in any shared activity, understanding where informal in-
stitutions come from and how they change is crucial to understanding how the
interaction between formal and informal institutions can be harnessed to effect
desirable policy goals.
De Soysa & Jütting, supra note 21, at 5.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 5.
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I. FORMAL INSTITUTIONS AND INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS:
PROPERTY AND CULTURE
The development of a law of property is certainly important for a
law and development agenda. But “[b]efore ‘property rights’ can be
strong or weak, they must be allocated.”36 And how they are allo-
cated by law in the formal rule of law regime will depend on political
considerations and informal institutions such as culture.37 Property
rights “are embedded in a larger complex of legal rules, institutions
and procedures which alter the meaning of entitlements, and in a
dense fabric of social expectations and informal arrangements which
affect the meaning and usefulness of entitlements.”38 The question
that law and development is preoccupied with—introducing prop-
erty rights—is itself dependent on how informal institutions modify
formal ones.39
Numerous studies have reinforced what Douglass North termed
“rules of the game” and the extent to which behavioral guides could be
found in informal constraints. These studies generated calls, from
scholars such as Guillermo O’Donnell, for greater attention to infor-
mal institutions and to “the actual rules that are being followed.”40
The phrase “informal institutions” has had varied uses.41 There is
disagreement as to whether informal institutions should be distin-
guished from culture.42 But for the purpose of this paper, I adopt a
broad understanding of the phrase so that it can purposefully en-
compass culture. Informal institutions can be understood as a set
of informal, socially shared rules and norms that structure social
36. Kennedy, supra note 12, at 10.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. North observed that actors respond to a mix of “formal and informal constraints.”
NORTH, supra note 20, at 67.
40. O’Donnell, supra note 22, at 10 n.2. For example, an emerging body of research
suggests that informal rules do in fact influence formal institutional outcomes in a variety
of settings. In some African and Latin American countries, patrimonialist norms of unregu-
lated executive control over state institutions have resulted in executive power assertions
over legislative and judicial branches in ways unanticipated by the constitution. Guillermo
O’Donnell, Delegative Democracy, 5 J. DEMOCRACY 55 (Jan. 1994).
41. The phrase “informal institution” may refer to aspects of traditional culture, personal
networks, clientelism, corruption, clan and mafia organizations, civil society, and a wide va-
riety of norms. Helmke & Levitsky, supra note 22, at 7–8.
42. Id. at 10.
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interaction by shaping and constraining actors’ behavior.43 Indeed,
in the context of developing countries especially, where the rule of
law is weak and informal rules may be relatively strong,44 it is im-
portant to understand how culture affects, modifies or tempers the
establishment of rights, such as property rights. This is especially
important because once established and allocated, “it is not always
easy to remake entitlement regimes. The existence of settled expec-
tations about the meaning and significance of legal entitlements can
also slow both economic and political change. . . . [T]hose with en-
titlements from round one will often be able to exercise political,
economic or legal influence in round two, making it more difficult to
begin again.”45 Professor Kennedy was referring more specifically
to those “[l]arge economic actors in every economy [who] seek to
use their entitlements to consolidate their political and economic
position.”46 But the same can be said of actors who rely on and lever-
age existing informal institutions—cultural norms, for example—
to resist reallocations of resources through the recognition of new
property rights or the reconfiguration of entitlements.
In many cases, it is undoubtedly true that cultural norms such as
clan or ethnic solidarity or community-based trust facilitate eco-
nomic transactions by solving various coordination problems and
thus reduce transaction costs.47 But certain cultural norms can also
have a negative impact. Many “studies highlight phenomena—such
as clientelism, corruption, patrimonialism, and clan politics—that
undermine the performance of markets, states, democratic regimes,
43. NORTH, supra note 20, at 3–4 n.9.
44. De Soysa & Jütting, supra note 21, at 8 (“People in both rich and poor countries rely
on informal institutions to varying degrees to facilitate transactions, but these institutions are
relatively more important in poor countries and small, traditional communities where formal
institutions are less developed and the reach of formal law and state power relatively weak.”).
45. Kennedy, supra note 12, at 11–12.
46. Id.
What is clear is that the arrangement of entitlements is not only the result of
political and social struggle, it also provides the stakes and instruments for that
struggle. The allocation of entitlements in each round establishes actors with
interests and procedures from their pursuit which have an impact on the
evolution of the society in successive rounds of political and economic devel-
opment. As a result, a regime of entitlements helps structure the next round of
social struggle.
Id.
47. Robert Axelrod, An Evolutionary Approach to Norms, 80 AM. POLITICAL SCI. REV. 1095
(1986); Lan Cao, The Diaspora of Ethnic Economies: Beyond the Pale, 44 WM & MARY L. REV.
1521 (2003); Lan Cao, Looking at Communities and Markets, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 841 (1999).
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and other formal institutions,”48 the very institutions that law and
development work to establish.
Take the example of family law. Assume that private property
rights that meet the criteria called for—“strong and clear”—are es-
tablished in a given society. Whether the formal institution of such
property rights grants entitlements to the family, to the head of the
household, or to women and men, it is highly likely that this formal
arrangement will be heavily affected by the cultural framework of
that society.49 This cultural framework transcends the standard
paradigm that has conventionally presented the issue as a “choice
between private property rights and state control, . . . [or] a choice
between public and private ownership”50 and rather, reflects “a
dense network of entitlements reflecting specific social histories of
allocative struggle.”51
There will be, in other words, the pull and tug, between formal
and informal institutions. Cultural norms may interact with formal
institutions in four ways—complementary, accommodating, compet-
ing and substituting.52 In some instances, cultural norms may coexist
with and are complementary to or accommodate effective formal
institutions.53 Or they may converge with or operate in lieu of state
law.54 But often, in developing countries where law and develop-
ment projects operate, competing cultural norms create incentives
and exert pressure on actors in ways that may be incompatible with
the objectives of law and development. For example, civil servants
in Ghana’s public administration believe they would lose their
social standing in the community if they adhered to administra-
tive rules rather than kinship norms that obligated them to provide
jobs to family and clan members.55 In the past, the introduction of
48. Helmke & Levitsky, supra note 22, at 11.
49. For example, when implementing land reform, “ought title to be given to the ‘head of
the household,’ to ‘the family,’ to the ‘matriarch,’ or to the community in common?” Kennedy,
supra note 12, at 47.
50. Id. at 16.
51. Id.
52. Helmke & Levitsky, supra note 22, at 12.
53. Id. at 12–13.
54. For examples, see id. at 14–16 (“[C]omplementary and accommodating informal
institutions exist in stable institutional settings, which are generally found in advanced
industrialized countries . . . and substitutive and competing informal institutions exist in
context of formal institutional weakness and instability, which are more likely found in
developing and post-communist countries.”).
55. See, e.g., id. at 12–13.
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European legal systems to the colonies created “multiple systems of
legal obligation.”56 Because local and European systems each “em-
bodied different principles and procedures,”57 adherence to one often
meant violating the other. Thus, it is not sufficient to issue a single-
bullet prescription without fully understanding how a prescription
to alter formal institutions will affect or be affected by existing in-
formal institutions.
The increasingly loud call in law and development for clear and
strong property rights, through formal titling programs, for exam-
ple, has had mixed results in Cape Town, South Africa. Clear and
strong property rights were instituted for households occupying va-
cant land owned by a parastatal company in the manner exhorted
by de Soto. A housing project was implemented and individual own-
ership was granted. Title was registered in the name of only one
member of each household, resulting, not surprisingly, not only in
“a decrease in security of tenure,” but also “reduced security for
women and members of the extended family.”58
Similar examples abound. In the Ekuthuleni region in South
Africa, residents of a rural community consisting of 224 households,
mostly headed by elderly women, live on state-registered land. These
residents, many of whom receive welfare, wish to formally acquire
title to the land and hold it in collective ownership primarily for
two reasons. The first is because the group wishes to retain “group
control . . . to prevent strangers from coming in and causing con-
flicts,” and the second is because members “cannot afford the costs
of maintaining individual title.”59 However, a system that focuses
only on establishing strong and clear property rights misses the fact
that informal institutions such as cultural norms may in fact com-
pete with formal property norms. The property rights system, for ex-
ample, requires that certain conditions must be met before rights
over property can be registered: “an individual rights holder must
be identified; the exclusive rights of this rights holder must be pre-
cisely described; and the boundaries of land parcels must be accu-
rately depicted through beaconing and geo-referencing.”60 But in
56. Id. at 14.
57. Id.
58. Cousins et al., supra note 6, at 3.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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this particular region, property ownership is rarely exclusively in-
dividual and is often shared by family members.
This is a concept that is clearly in competition with South African
property law. Even a family trust does not fully capture the cultural
dynamics that animate the informal norms of the region. “There are
many nuanced layers of rights in Ekuthuleni (of access, use, transac-
tions and decision-making) and it would be extremely difficult to pre-
cisely describe these in title deeds.”61 Indeed, it may very well be that
formal titling and strong and clear property rights do not benefit the
poorest of the poor.62 Informality means flexibility and flexibility
may benefit the most vulnerable63 because, for example, boundaries
are ever adaptable to reflect social needs or household emergencies.
Informality and flexibility may be important, as transactions involv-
ing land and housing in the informal sector in Cape Town are so-
cially embedded and social relations are an important component of
land tenure,64 reflecting the layered and relative nature of rights and
duties. Thus, there may be a “fundamental incompatibility between
property rights in community-based systems and the requirements
of formal property. Formalization of property rights is therefore not
neutral with respect to existing rights; it does and will transform
and alter both the nature of the rights and the social relations and
identities that underlie them.”65 Studies concerning land use in
rural South Africa show that “rights to land and natural resources
61. Id.
62. Some have suggested that clear and strong property rights through formalization does
not necessarily yield the benefits claimed. For example, it has not been the case in rural South
Africa that formal property rights promote lending to the poor. Banks still do not lend to the
poor because of the high risk of default, the low value of their assets and the high transaction
costs. Indeed, “formalization could expose the poor to the risk of homelessness: If banks could
be persuaded to lend to the poor with their assets as collateral, foreclosure of loans would
result in repossession.” Id. at 4. The poor who need to borrow may do so instead from micro-
finance institutions or other informal sources.
63. In many instances, homeowners were “not interested in a formal sale because their
incomes were too low to move up the housing ladder, and most viewed their homes as a family
asset rather than as ‘capital.’” Id. Moreover, a study of township property showed that there
was a weak secondary market for houses. Hence, emphasizing title deeds here is inappro-
priate, given the “real constraints of affordability and the limited availability of housing
stock.” Id.
64. “Property systems are embedded in many institutional arrangements, not only in
registers. Registers are thus only one component of the formal system, and it is the system
as a whole that makes property ‘visible’, manageable and exchangeable in the eyes of public
and private investors and service providers.” Id. at 3.
65. Id.
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are socially and culturally embedded, and nested within social and
political units operating at different scales.”
The South Africa example suggests that formalization and low-
cost mechanisms for titling may be appropriate, from a law and de-
velopment perspective “only for those already on the way out of
poverty.”66 In addition, clear and strong property rights may not be
appropriate because cultural norms embedded in pre-existing infor-
mal institutions are not complementary to formalization. Some have
suggested in response that the formal system should be more cogni-
zant and supportive of the informal sector and its cultural norms,
which “have widespread legitimacy” rather than replace the latter
with the former.67 Approaches based on Western property regimes
ignore this cultural context and “can lead to distortions that impact
negatively on the poor . . . .”68 “The entire legal and social complex
around which notions of formal and informal property are consti-
tuted needs to be interrogated.”69
In other circumstances and contexts, however, it may be the case
that after examining the informal property system and the cultural
institutions that support it, law and development may indeed con-
clude that the norms of the informal system are at odds with the le-
gitimate objectives of the law and development project and should
instead be challenged. What are the objectives of law and develop-
ment, one would then ask. Development viewed exclusively in terms
of economic growth is passé and in recent years, development has
been viewed more broadly. American governmental officials at the
top echelon, such as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, increasingly
understand that “development, democracy, and human rights can
and must be mutually reinforcing.”70 Indeed it is now generally ac-
cepted in many circles that there is a positive linkage between de-
velopment and human rights71 and that development should be
66. Id. at 5.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec’y of State, Remarks to the Center for Global Develop-
ment, Washington D.C. (Jan. 6, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01
/134838.htm. (“So those who care about making human rights a reality know that develop-
ment is an integral part of that agenda.”).
71. Ana Palacio, The Way Forward: Human Rights and the World Bank, in WORLD BANK
DEVELOPMENT OUTREACH 35 (Oct. 2006), http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL
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understood within a broader framework of political and social institu-
tions that promote basic rights.72 This broad view of development has
been endorsed by scholars as well. Amartya Sen, the noted Nobel lau-
reate in economics, has argued eloquently in favor of a holistic vision
for development.73 For Sen, development means freedom and maxi-
mizing well-being, taken broadly to mean maximizing capabilities—
to participate freely in the political process, to satisfy hunger, to
have access to social networks and connections, reliable information
sources and structures.74 The anthropologist Arjun Appadurai calls
/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/0,,contentMDK:21106614~menuPK:445673~pagePK:64020865
~piPK:149114~theSitePK:445634,00.html. Indeed, more and more, it is understood that de-
velopment is intertwined with broader objectives such as human rights promotion. “The world
now accepts that sustainable development is impossible without human rights. What has been
missing is the recognition that the advancement of an interconnected set of human rights is im-
possible without development.” INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
(IBRD), DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK 2 (1998), available
at http://www.fao.org/righttofood/KC/downloads/vl/docs/HR%20and%20devlopment_the%20role
%20of%20the%20WB.pdf. See also Gernot Brodnig, The World Bank and Human Rights:
Mission Impossible? 9 (Carr Ctr. for Human Rights Policy, Working Paper T-01-05), available
at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/Web%20Working%20Papers/BrodnigHR&WorldBank
.pdf (arguing in favor of integrating human rights objectives with the objectives of the World
Bank because “development represents a bundle of interlocking concepts of very broad envi-
ronmental, socioeconomic, legal and institutional implications, including the protection and
promotion of human rights.”). Research has also shown that countries with substantial po-
litical and civil rights violations are also characterized by lower levels of economic growth.
ROBERT BARRO, DETERMINANTS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH: A CROSS-COUNTRY EMPIRICAL STUDY
(1997); Robert Barro, Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries, 106 Q. J. ECON. 407.
Studies have also shown a strong empirical link between civil liberties and performance of
government projects. Jonathan Isham et al., Civil Liberties, Democracy and the Performance
of Government Projects, 11 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 219 (1997).
72. See generally AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999) [hereinafter SEN,
DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM].
73. Id. See also AMARTYA SEN, CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT (1992).
74. To quote Sen directly, there are five distinct types of freedom:
These include (1) political freedoms, (2) economic facilities, (3) social oppor-
tunities, (4) transparency guarantees and (5) protective security. Each of these
distinct types of rights and opportunities helps to advance the general capability
of a person. They may also serve to complement each other. Public policy to fos-
ter human capabilities and substantive freedoms in general can work through
the promotion of these distinct but interrelated instrumental freedoms . . . . In
the view of “development as freedom,” the instrumental freedoms link with each
other and with the ends of enhancement of human freedom in general.
While development analysis must, on the one hand, be concerned with ob-
jectives and aims that make these instrumental freedoms consequentially im-
portant, it must also take note of the empirical linkages that tie the distinct
types of freedom together, strengthening their joint importance.
SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM, supra note 72, at 10.
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this capacity “voice.” For Appadurai, alleviating poverty means work-
ing to strengthen the capacity of the poor to exercise their voice,75
not only because this capacity is tied to democratic principles of in-
clusion and participation but also because “[i]t is the only way in
which the poor might find locally plausible ways to alter . . . the
terms of recognition in any particular cultural regime.”76
Thus, a cultural regime that subverts the legitimate property
rights of the poor or the marginalized in any given community must
be examined and evaluated. Notably, efforts to reform inheritance
and land rights concerning women in sub-Saharan Africa have been
subverted by informal institutions and traditional cultural norms
that have the effect of systematically constricting the rights and
voice of African women. For many in sub-Saharan Africa, issues
such as marriage, divorce, burial, and inheritance rights continue
to be governed by customary law.77 As noted, “[a]lthough conceptu-
ally distinct from culture, customary law is a legal expression of
cultural norms and values.”78 Many African states have retained a
legal structure wherein the customary law of inheritance, which gen-
erally excludes women as potential heirs, and statutory law operate
simultaneously.79 Driven by traditional notions of culture and gen-
der relationships, customary law has excluded women from property
ownership and inheritance.80 A woman’s relationship to land has
traditionally been defined through her relationship to her father or
75. See also Arjun Appadurai, The Capacity to Aspire: Culture and the Terms of
Recognition, in CULTURE AND PUBLIC ACTION 63, 66 (Vijayendra Rao & Michael Walton eds.,
2004). Using Hirschman’s framework laid out in his groundbreaking book, ALBERT O.
HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS,
AND STATES (1970), Appadurai argued that it is especially important in law and development
to focus on increasing the capacity of the poor to have their voice heard. Exit is not an option
for the world’s poor and loyalty is not clear-cut, leaving voice as the only viable and potentially
powerful tool to alleviate poverty.
76. Appadurai, supra note 75, at 63, 66.
77. Johanna Bond, Gender, Discourse, and Customary Law in Africa, 83 S. CAL. L. REV.
425, 430 (2010).
78. Id. at 430; Thandabantu Nhlapo, Indigenous Law and Gender in South Africa: Taking
Human Rights and Cultural Diversity Seriously, 13 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 49, 53 (1994)
(“Sometimes termed customary law, indigenous law is the system of norms which governs the
lives of millions of African people, particularly (but not exclusively) in the rural areas.”).
79. Bond, supra note 77, at 430, 434.
80. Abby Morrow Richardson, Women’s Inheritance Rights in Africa: The Need to Integrate
Cultural Understanding and Legal Reform, 11 HUM. RTS. BR. 19, 19 (2004).
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husband.81 While married, a woman gains access to use of the land,
however, following the death of a husband, the woman no longer
holds any rights in the land.82 The practice of “property-grabbing”
has recently developed, wherein following the death of a father or
husband, family members and elites repossess the male’s property
often leaving widows and orphans homeless and destitute.83
Where statute has been at odds with customary law, the latter
has generally prevailed when the underlying issue involves gender
relations. The Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, for example, refused to
interfere with tribal customary law when the tribe of the deceased
man refused to appoint his eldest daughter as heir to the estate be-
cause the man is also survived by a son. The Court rejected the daugh-
ter’s allegation that tribal law constituted a prima facie violation of
the Zimbabwean Constitution’s guarantee of equality for women,
holding instead that the Constitution exempts customary law.84
In these instances, it would be appropriate for law and develop-
ment to call for the enforcement of property rights for women even
if such enforcement conflicts with existing cultural norms. Clear and
strong property rights that are available to men should be equally
available to women. However, for these rights to be meaningful on the
ground and not just on the books, culture might need to be engaged
more robustly and even challenged. Therefore, the case for strong and
clear property rights cannot occur only at the statutory level. Given
“the persistence of traditions and cultural norms that give preference
to men,”85and that seek to preserve “religion and culture as spheres
of despotism,”86 experts in this area have suggested “‘massive aware-
ness campaigns’ at both the national and local levels.”87 Yet, unless
cultural norms are confronted and altered, through deliberate edu-
cation campaigns88 “[t]hese statutory changes generally have no
practical effect on the great majority of the population.”89
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L. J. 1399, 1431 (2003).
85. Valerie A. Dormady, Status of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1998, 33 INT’L LAW. 637, 641 (Summer 1999).
86. Sunder, supra note 84, at 1434.
87. Dormady, supra note 85, at 640.
88. Richardson, supra note 80, at 22.
89. Id. at 19.
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CONCLUSION
Strong and clear property rights have always been an objective
of law and development but the call for such rights has markedly
increased with the popularity of de Soto’s titling program and the
publication of Mystery of Capital. I have argued in this paper that
clear and strong property rights can only be part of a complex devel-
opment picture because clarity and strength obscure and sidestep
certain other considerations—specifically how formal as well as
informal institutions influence or modify a property rights regime.
Moreover, I have argued in support of greater scholarly attention
to informal institutional norms, such as culture, especially for a
discipline such as law and development for several reasons. This is
because law and development has been marred by failures and dis-
illusionment. Indeed, for years scholars and practitioners in the field
have bemoaned its decline and flaws.90 It is time to shake up the field
and adopt a different approach towards achieving development ob-
jectives by going beyond the call for the establishment of clear and
formal rights. Indeed, precisely because law and development has
had an almost exclusive focus on formal institutions, it is all the
more important that the latter approach be supplemented by a sys-
tematic examination of informal institutions and their impact on
formal rights.
90. John H. Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Change: On the Origins, Style,
Decline and Revival of the Law and Development Movement, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 457 (1977); LAW
AND CRISIS IN THE THIRD WORLD (Sammy Adelman & Abdul Paliwala eds., 1993); David Trubek
& Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and
Development Studies in the United States, 1974 WIS. L. REV. 1062 (1974).
THE COSTS OF COMPLEX LAND TITLES:
TWO EXAMPLES FROM CHINA
ROBERT C. ELLICKSON*
For thousands of years, Chinese customs and law typically have
directed an owner of land, when transferring it, to retain a right to
reclaim it in the future. Prior to the Communist Revolution of 1949,
the pertinent rules were provided by the custom of dian, which
emerged in ancient China and was formally recognized in legal codes
as early as the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644). Dian provided the seller
of a tract of land the option of buying the tract back many years later
at the original sale price. When the seller died, this right of redemp-
tion descended to his heirs. Current Chinese policies also prohibit
the outright sale of land. Since the 1980s, when China began to dis-
mantle many of the collectivist policies characteristic of the Mao era,
the government has authorized the conferral of land use rights on
private individuals and entities. But Chinese law does not permit the
national government, or a village collective, to transfer use-rights
in perpetuity.1 Instead, a private land interest is limited to a fixed
term, for example, forty years in the case of urban commercial land.
Someone who possesses land under either of these arrangements
holds it subject to a future interest.2 In the case of dian, the future
interest is the former seller’s right of redemption. In the case of a
fixed-term contract, the future interest is the reversion that will re-
turn ownership to the transferor when the fixed term expires. Under
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( ) ( ), 
* Walter E. Meyer Professor of Property and Urban Law, Yale Law School. Prepared
for the 8th Annual Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference, Tsinghua University Law
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Nee, Sonja Opper, and, especially, Du Ying, Shitong Qiao, Katherine Wilhelm, and Taisu
Zhang (who first brought dian to my attention). None of them should be associated with the
views that I express. The Tsinghua Law Journal published a version of this article in January
2012. Robert C. Ellickson, Fuza Diquan de Daijia: Yi Zhongguo de
Liangge Zhidu wei Li   6 Qinghua Faxue 
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1. In Anglo-American law, an owner of perpetual land rights is said to have title in fee
simple.
2. This is the phrase applied in Anglo-American law to property interests that do not
include a right of current possession.
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both these land-tenure arrangements, a current possessor of land is
aware that the owner of the future interest can, at some point in time,
oust him from the land. Legal policies that complicate land titles in
this way tend to result in both the misuse of land and too little in-
vestment in land improvements.
China’s economy has suffered, and potentially will continue to
suffer, from these sorts of land practices. In 1600, according to some
historians, residents of the densely populated Yangtze Delta region3
were roughly as prosperous as the English.4 All analysts agree, how-
ever, that by 1900, the people of China generally were far less well off
than most residents of Western Europe. Drawing heavily on the pio-
neering work of historians Philip Huang5 and Taisu Zhang,6 I argue
in this essay that the dian tradition may have significantly contrib-
uted to China’s relatively poor economic performance during both the
Qing Dynasty (1644–1912) and the Republican period (1912–1949).7
I also offer comments on contemporary land issues. The current
Chinese government is aware of many of the problems that fixed-
term contracts create and is debating legal reforms that would compel
the automatic renewal of these contracts. In the absence of sensible
3. At that time, the typical farm in the Yangtze Delta was a small paddy where a farming
household would plant wet rice in the spring, and, after the rice harvest, a crop of winter wheat.
Philip C.C. Huang, Development or Involution in Eighteenth-Century Britain and China?, 61
J. ASIAN STUD. 501, 506 (2002) (book review).
4. See KENNETH POMERANZ, THE GREAT DIVERGENCE: CHINA, EUROPE, AND THE MAKING
OF THE MODERN WORLD ECONOMY (2000); Robert C. Allen, Agricultural Productivity and Rural
Incomes in England and the Yangtze Delta, c.1620–c.1820, 62 ECON. HIST. REV. 525, 532 (2009)
(implying that during the Yangtze Delta’s “Golden Age” c.1620, agricultural output per day
worked was greater than it then was in England). The proposition that the great divergence
did not begin until after 1800, however, has drawn sharp criticism from commentators who
assert that it was evident centuries earlier. See Stephen Broadberry & Bishnupriya Gupta,
The Early Modern Great Divergence: Wages, Prices and Economic Development in Europe and
Asia, 1500–1800, 59 ECON. HIST. REV. 2 (2006); Nico Voigtländer & Hans-Joachim Voth, Why
England? Demographic Factors, Structural Change and Physical Capital Accumulation During
the Industrial Revolution, 11 J. ECON. GROWTH 319, 344 (2006).
5. PHILIP C.C. HUANG, CODE, CUSTOM, AND LEGAL PRACTICE IN CHINA: THE QING AND THE
REPUBLIC COMPARED 71–98 (2001).
6. Taisu Zhang, Property Rights in Land, Agricultural Capitalism, and the Relative Decline
of Pre-Industrial China, 13 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 129 (2011).
7. Historians have offered varying theories of why England, for example, was able to
surge ahead of China after 1600. Some stress factors such as England’s superior access to
coal, the resources of England’s colonies, weak internal governance during the Qing Dynasty,
and rapid population growth in China. I steer clear of these debates and concentrate on land
tenure practices, the only topic on which I may have some comparative advantage.
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reforms, I predict that the continuation of the fixed-term contract
approach will seriously impair China’s economic prospects.8
I. THE ADVANTAGES OF SIMPLE LAND TITLES
To illuminate the problems that dian and contemporary leasing
practices both create, I start with a brief introduction to the basics of
land tenure. To prosper, a nation must incentivize its people to use
land appropriately, for example, to grow the most suitable crops, to
conserve soils, and to build appropriate structures. In a totalitarian
state, government bureaucracies control most of these decisions. In
a liberal state, by contrast, the multitude of individuals, households,
and firms that privately own land mostly control how their parcels
are used. Instead of micromanaging land, the state focuses primarily
on the foundational tasks of establishing and enforcing the rules of the
game, in particular, property law, contract law, and association law.9
Private property in land has been a prominent feature of Chinese
culture for thousands of years.10 Moreover, subject to constraints
such as dian, private landowners in China have generally been en-
titled to sell and otherwise alienate their lands. The Shang Yang re-
forms of 356 B.C.E., for example, promoted land alienability, and sale
documents of private lands have been found as far back as the Han
Dynasty (206 B.C.E.–220 C.E.).11
In ancient China and countless other pre-commercial civilizations,
local populations embraced private property in land because they
found it to be a simple and effective way to incentivize a household to
8. China currently confronts many other critical land law issues, including the legality
of land transfers and mortgages, and the amount of compensation to be paid when land is
requisitioned. The issue of the extension of fixed-term land-use contracts, while important,
may be no more pressing than some of these other issues.
9. For the sake of simplicity, I omit discussion of various challenges that must be addressed
when private ownership of land is widespread. These include the externalities, negative or posi-
tive, that may emanate from a private land-use decision, and landowners’ needs for public goods.
10. See Kenneth Pomeranz, Land Markets in Late Imperial and Republican China, 23
CONTINUITY & CHANGE 101, 107 (2008) (asserting that the “vast majority” of land was privately
held from the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644) through the Republican period).
11. Hugh T. Scogin, Jr., Between Heaven and Man: Contract and State in Han Dynasty
China, 63. S. CAL. L. REV. 1325, 1338–46, 1354 (1990). Land sales were occurring in both Meso-
potamia and Egypt well prior to 2000 B.C.E. Robert C. Ellickson & Charles Dia. Thorland,
Ancient Land Law: Mesopotamia, Egypt, Israel, 71 CHI.–KENT L. REV. 321, 376–77 (1995).
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make the best choices about the use of the land under its control.12
When a private farmer is entitled to keep a crop he grows, for exam-
ple, he is automatically rewarded for choosing the best crop to plant,
planting at the right time, weeding, applying fertilizer, fallowing a
field when appropriate, and so on. State and village agricultural col-
lectives have rarely been as productive as private farmers, primarily
because collective production weakens the link between work and
reward.13 China has relearned this basic lesson the hard way. In 1981,
the central government’s approval of the Household Responsibility
System helped enable villagers to abandon the collectivist agricul-
tural practices that had mired them in poverty.14
As noted, dian transactions and fixed-term contracts are examples
of the temporal division of land ownership. One party has a present
interest, which provides a right of current possession, and one or more
other parties own future interests. Legal systems permit the division
of ownership across time because, in many instances, arrangements
of this sort are advantageous to all involved. Instead of owning a
farm outright, for example, a farmer might actually prefer to pay a
share of the crop as rent to a landlord. This temporal division of own-
ership enables a farmer to shift to the landlord some of the risks of
crop failure, and may enable the efficient supply of specialized inputs,
for example, the tenant’s provision of field labor, and the landlord’s
provision of irrigation.15
By contrast, both dian and fixed-term contracts generally divide up
land ownership in a wasteful manner. The value of each of the parts,
when summed together, is less than the value of the undivided whole.
Many legal systems have rules that are designed to prevent damage
from the inefficient splintering of ownership interests. The Anglo-
American law of private property, for example, includes doctrines,
12. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. (Papers
& Proc.) 347 (1967); Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315 (1993).
13. See FREDERIC L. PRYOR, THE RED AND THE GREEN: THE RISE AND FALL OF COLLECTIVIZED
AGRICULTURE IN MARXIST REGIMES (1992); see also infra note 91.
14. See Zhu Keliang et al., The Rural Land Question in China: Analysis and Recommen-
dations Based on a Seventeen-Province Survey, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 761, 769–70
(2006). The first steps toward the decollectivization of rural land commenced in 1978 under
Deng Xiaoping. On these early events, see JONATHAN SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA
657–58, 677–78 (1990).
15. See DOUGLAS W. ALLEN & DEAN LUECK, THE NATURE OF THE FARM: CONTRACTS, RISK,
AND ORGANIZATION IN AGRICULTURE (2003).
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such as waste and the Rule Against Perpetuities, which attempt to
mitigate the mischief that potentially may arise from the temporal
division of property ownership.
In general, time-divided titles are least likely to create problems
when there are only two temporally defined interests, both are easy
to value, and both are owned by individuals who trust one another.
To illustrate, suppose that a rice farmer in the Yangtze Delta were
to have one year remaining on the lease of a paddy from a landlord
whom he trusts. Suppose further that during the growing season, a
severe rain storm were to damage a portion of the paddy wall, threat-
ening the farmer’s crop. The farmer could either work for one week to
make a low-quality repair to the wall, or two weeks to make a high-
quality repair. The cheaper repair would keep the wall functional for
one year, but not thereafter. The two-week repair, by contrast, would
last indefinitely. Assume that the high-quality repair would be the
more efficient choice, that is, the repair that both the renting farmer
and his landlord would individually choose if either of them were to
own the land outright. Because only one year remains on the tenant
farmer’s lease, however, he might be expected to choose to repair the
wall on the cheap. But if the tenant and landlord were to know and
trust one another, this inefficient outcome would be unlikely. For
example, after discussing the problem, the landlord might agree to
compensate the tenant for the additional costs entailed in a high-
quality repair. Or the tenant might simply choose to spend two weeks
on the repair, in the hope that the trustworthy landlord, after the
tenant told him about these efforts, would later renew the lease on
more advantageous terms.
In other scenarios, however, a cooperative outcome is less likely.
The tenant might distrust the landlord, or rarely encounter him. In-
stead of there being just one future interest, there might be several,
as there would be if the landlord had already granted several other
farmers one-year leases on the same paddy for specific ensuing years.16
In the worst case, some of the owners of future interests would be
unborn, for example, abstractly identified male descendants of the
16. When too many stakeholders are empowered to veto proposed uses, the splintering of
ownership rights can give rise to the under-use of land. See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of
the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621
(1998) (developing the seed of an idea planted by Frank I. Michelman in Ethics, Economics and
the Law of Property, in 24 NOMOS 3, 6 (1982)).
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owner of the present interest. Or, the landlord might be an untrust-
worthy bureaucratic institution. Under any of these scenarios, the
tenant, unable to readily bargain with the holder of the future in-
terest, might choose the inefficient one-week repair. Dian gave rise
to this risk, and so does a fixed-term land contract.
II. CHINA’S DIAN TRADITION
Kenneth Pomeranz, in his influential but controversial book, The
Great Divergence, asserts that the “overwhelming majority of land
in all parts of China was more or less freely alienable”17 during the
Qing Dynasty, the period during which China fell behind England.
Pomeranz correctly asserts that much land in Western Europe was
fettered during that era with entails and other encumbrances that
would have slowed land transfer.18 In England, however, land titles
generally became simpler and more alienable after 1600 on account
of the continuing decline of, for example, entails and open-field vil-
lages.19 In China after 1600, by contrast, the works of Philip Huang
and Taisu Zhang reveal no steady trend toward the simplification of
land tenure. Following Zhang, I stress the possible negative influ-
ence of the custom of dian on the Chinese economy during Qing and
Republican times. (Other complexities of Chinese land tenure may
also have been pertinent. For example, entitlements to rented agri-
cultural land commonly were divided between a tenant who “owned”
the topsoil, and a landlord who owned the subsoil.20) My assertions
17. POMERANZ, supra note 4, at 71; see also Pomeranz, supra note 10, at 136. Reviews
sharply critical of many of Pomeranz’s claims in this book include Robert Brenner & Christopher
Isett, England’s Divergence from China’s Yangzi Delta: Property Relations, Microeconomics, and
Patterns of Development, 61 J. ASIAN STUD. 609 (2002), and Huang, supra note 3.
18. POMERANZ, supra note 4, at 73–80.
19. On the development in England of the “common recovery,” a unilateral procedure for
“docking” an entail, see A.W.B. SIMPSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW
129–38 (2d ed. 1986). On the gradual enclosure of open-field villages in England, see Ellickson,
supra note 12, at 1391–92, and sources cited therein. Early English law severely constrained
land transfer. In the first centuries after the Norman Conquest of England in 1066, a vassal who
wanted to alienate an interest in land needed the consent of both his lord and his own eldest
son (or other heir apparent). 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *287. By enacting the
Statute Quia Emptores, 18 Edw., c. 1 (1290), Parliament provided a key early endorsement of
the principle of land alienability.
20. See HUANG, supra note 5, at 99–118; Pomeranz, supra note 10, at 131–36. To maintain
topsoil rights, a tenant typically had to pay rent, perhaps nominal in amount, to the landlord.
On the possible interaction between dian and topsoil rights, see infra text accompanying notes
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about dian are tentative, both because the historical record available
in English is thin and ambiguous, and because it is reckless to gener-
alize about the laws and customs in a nation as large and diverse as
China, especially over many centuries.
A. The History of Dian
Pomeranz asserts that dian did not “emerge” until the mid-Ming
period (c.1500 C.E).21 This understates the ancient roots of the custom.
The Chinese character representing dian appeared as early as the
Shang Dynasty (1600–1046 B.C.E.).22 The legal code of the Song
Dynasty (960–1127 C.E.) made informal reference to the dian tradi-
tion, and the Ming code formally referred to it.23 While it could be said
that dian “matured” during Ming times, it had emerged long before.
According to Zhang, a solid majority of land transfers during Qing
and Republican times were dian transactions.24 The nature of dian
interests varied. I first introduce a variety—what I call “strong-form
dian”—that would have seriously impaired the efficiency of land allo-
cation in China. In a subsequent section, I briefly describe weaker
variations of dian that may in fact have been more prevalent.
B. Strong-Form Dian
The dian custom, as noted, gave the seller of a parcel of land the op-
tion of repurchasing it—redeeming it—at a later date. When dian was
strong-form, this right of redemption theoretically lasted indefinitely.25
56–59. Several other features of land tenure in China may also have inhibited land transfers dur-
ing Qing and Republican times. One was the importance in some regions (but not the Lower
Yangtze, see Zhang, supra note 6, at 153) of land ownership by family lineages. See SUCHETA
MAZUMDAR, SUGAR AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: PEASANTS AND TECHNOLOGY AND THE WORLD MARKET
217–30 (1998); Pomeranz, supra note 10, at 113–15. Another was the reluctance of landlords,
perhaps out of a desire to evade taxes, to own parcels lying near one another. See Zhang, supra
note 6, at 193–94.
21. Pomeranz, supra note 10, at 123–24.
22. See Zhao Ya, The History of Dian and Its Contemporary Impact (2007) (unpublished
LL.M. thesis, Zhengzhou University) (translated and summarized by Shitong Qiao) (on file with
author).
23. Id.; Zhang, supra note 6, at 157 n.151.
24. Zhang, supra note 6, at 191. In some instances, the seller would remain in possession (see
Pomeranz, supra note 10, at 124, 128), suggesting that in these instances the “sale” actually was
a mortgage substitute.
25. Zhang, supra note 6, at 160–61.
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When the seller died, the right to redeem descended to his heirs.26 In
addition, according to both custom and Republican Supreme Court
decisions, the redeemer had to pay back only the sum that the original
buyer had paid to the original seller.27 This buy-back price was not
adjusted upward to account for either a general rise in land values
or inflation of the currency.28 Under strong-form dian, a land seller
thus could benefit from an appreciation in land values while bearing
little or no downside risk.
From an economic development perspective, a crucial issue is
whether the redemption price was adjusted upward to account for
the value of the buyer’s post-sale land improvements, such as new
dikes, irrigation canals, or buildings. Huang and Pomeranz think that
the answer is unclear.29 For several reasons, however, I follow Zhang
in assuming that a strong-form dian redeemer would not have to
compensate a buyer for improvements.30 Huang cites an 1868 case
in which a redeemer asserted that this indeed was the proper rule.31
It is also noteworthy that the amount of compensation was rarely
contested in the cases that Huang and Zhang discuss—a hint that
there was a simple answer to this question. Most important, the struc-
ture of actual dian transactions suggests than a redeemer did not
owe compensation for improvements. Land sale contracts involving
dian commonly included a clause granting the buyer what Zhang calls
a “guaranteed usage period” (xian) that extended a specified number
of years after the date of the transaction.32 It is estimated that sub-
jecting a parcel of land to dian reduced its market value to 60 to 80
26. Huang provides a lengthy catalogue of dian disputes in HUANG, supra note 5, at 71–99.
None of these revolved around the question of which heir held the entitlement to redeem. The
nonappearance of this issue suggests both that Chinese inheritance law was clear during the
pertinent centuries, and also that the social bonds among members of a redeeming family tended
to be tight.
27. See HUANG, supra note 5, at 91 (describing Republican Supreme Court decisions issued
in 1915 and 1945); Zhang, supra note 6, at 156–57.
28. See HUANG, supra note 5, at 91.
29. HUANG, supra note 5, at 74–75; Pomeranz, supra note 10, at 124.
30. Zhang repeatedly states that the redemption price was pegged at the original sale price.
See, e.g., Zhang, supra note 6, at 156–57, 161.
31. HUANG, supra note 5, at 82–83.
32. Zhang, supra note 6, at 157. Zhang persuasively argues that both Huang and Pomeranz
have misconstrued the meaning of these xian periods. Id. at 157 n.154, 163. In contemporary
China, a fixed-term contract conferring land-use rights similarly starts off a new possessor with
a longish initial time-horizon.
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percent of its value without dian (i.e., if sold outright).33 During non-
inflationary times at least, if the rule was that a redeemer had to
compensate the buyer for the value of improvements, it is unlikely
that this price discount would be so great.34
Could a seller waive dian redemption rights, presumably in re-
turn for the buyer’s agreement to pay a higher sale price? As noted,
some land sale contracts included a guaranteed usage period, which
essentially did waive dian rights during the first years after a sale.
But when dian was strong-form, waivers of rights in later time peri-
ods were not permitted. According to Zhang, the dian custom gener-
ally forbade a seller either to completely waive redemption rights, or
to waive them beyond some specified end-date, for example, thirty
years after the date of the original sale.35 The grip of the custom of
unending and non-waivable dian was so strong that Qing magistrates
declined to enforce statutes and regulations through which the state
had attempted to establish end-dates (e.g., 11 years, 30 years) for
redemption rights.36
Huang presents a case from Suzhou in the Yangtze Delta that
illustrates what appears to be strong-form dian in action.37 In 1663,
Sang, the seller, gave Shen, the buyer, dian title to a parcel of land
in return for 4 taels of silver. Dian traditions would have given Sang
the right to redeem at that exact price. Possibly to secure prospective
guaranteed usage periods, the Shen lineage made additional payments
to the Sang lineage of 4 taels in 1680, 2 taels in 1701, and 2 taels in
1716. In 1730, the Qing state adopted legislation that sought to limit
a buyer’s post-sale payments to a dian seller to a single payment. This
law may have had some effect, because, according to court records,
in 1733 the Shen lineage made a final payment (zhaotie) of 2.4 taels
to the Sang lineage.
33. See HUANG, supra note 5, at 74 (60–70 percent in North China); Zhang, supra note 6,
at 191 (around 70 percent in North China, up to 80 percent in Lower Yangtze and South China).
34. In addition, if Chinese landowners were to have favored a system that automatically
compensated a buyer for the value of improvements made, they might have supported a custom
that would have entitled a land seller to retain a right of first refusal. Under that approach, if
an improving buyer were to receive a purchase bid from a third party (a bid that would reflect
the value of the improvements), the seller would have been entitled to reacquire the land only
by matching that bid. But dian conferred on a seller a right to redeem, not a right of first refusal.
35. See Zhang, supra note 6, at 161–62; but see Pomeranz, supra note 10, at 127 (implying
that an outright sale was always an option).
36. See Zhang, supra note 6, at 158, 168–75.
37. HUANG, supra note 5, at 90.
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C. The Costs of Strong-Form Dian
Strong-form dian, had it indeed prevailed during Qing and Repub-
lican times, would have significantly impaired economic growth in
China.38 Four sorts of potential costs warrant highlighting.
First and foremost, the dian tradition, which required a land seller
to retain a right of redemption at the original price, would have greatly
discouraged a land buyer from conserving soils and improving the
transferred land.39 Land buyers certainly were aware of this problem,
because, as noted, they often insisted on a guaranteed usage period
during which they could amortize some of the costs of relatively per-
manent land improvements. Nevertheless, a dian sale brought in on
average only about 70 percent of the proceeds of an unconditional
sale.40 This figure suggests that buyers, in non-inflationary times, rec-
ognized that many land improvements would generate benefits that
would last beyond the guaranteed usage period. A dian buyer would
have to choose between either not making these improvements, or
making them and running the risk that the holder of the redemption
right would either threaten redemption, or, less commonly, actually
redeem, in order to capture much of the improvements’ value. Because
a seller could not fully waive strong-form dian rights, ex ante the par-
ties had no way of bargaining around this problem.
Second, strong-form dian, by introducing complexity and uncer-
tainty, would have increased the transaction costs of land transfers
and title disputes. As a result, a larger fraction of China’s scarce
human resources would have been devoted to the tasks of negotiat-
ing dian contracts ex ante and resolving dian disputes ex post. Dian
appears to have been a major source of grief. A significant amount
of the historical evidence regarding the institution comes from records
describing the prosecution of homicides arising out of dian disputes.41
38. But see POMERANZ, supra note 4, at 70–73 (doubting that dian created major dif-
ficulties); Pomeranz, supra note 10, at 103 (similar).
39. See Zhang, supra note 6, at 138, 189–90; cf. HUANG, supra note 5, at 89 (quoting
Guomindang lawmakers’ statement that dian was “hinder[ing] the development of the
country”).
40. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
41. See THOMAS M. BUOYE, MANSLAUGHTER, MARKETS, AND MORAL ECONOMY: VIOLENT
DISPUTES OVER PROPERTY RIGHTS IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY CHINA 167 (2000) (reporting that
92 of 300 homicides arising out of property disputes were provoked by “redemption/sales” issues).
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Third, these transaction costs would have been the equivalent of
a tax on land transfers, and thus reduced the volume of land sales.
The historians who have studied dian typically portray dian sellers
as competent farmers who had encountered financial distress.42 This
doubtless is accurate in many instances. But a small farmer who was
not in financial distress might want to sell simply because a buyer
who could better manage the farm had offered a purchase price that
would generate gains from trade for both the seller and the buyer.43
The selling farmer might be, for example, aged, disabled, or relatively
inept at farming, and also lacking in close kinfolk with agricultural
skills as good as the buyer’s. By raising the transaction costs of land
transfers, strong-form dian therefore would have inhibited the trans-
fer of China’s agricultural lands to abler managers.
Fourth, strong-form dian would have discouraged an agricultural
entrepreneur from trying to assemble small adjacent plots to create
a large farm whose operation would give rise to efficiencies of scale.
In the Yangtze Delta during Qing times, the average farm included
only 1 to 2 acres (6 to 12 mu).44 In many settings, the coordinated
construction of paddy walls, dikes, and irrigation systems to serve
these tiny fields would have given rise to efficiencies of scale. It is
also possible, as Zhang asserts, that a “managerial farm” entailing
supervision of hired labor on a much larger tract (characteristic of
England at the time), would have been a relatively efficient form of
farm organization in China.45 Faced with a custom of strong-form
dian, however, a would-be land assembler might decide against at-
tempting an assemblage. Too many potential redeemers would have
the power to threaten to ruin a completed assemblage by extracting
a key parcel.46
42. See, e.g., HUANG, supra note 5, at 73 (stating that “peasants usually sold their land out
of necessity for reasons of survival”); Zhang, supra note 6, at 188 & n.325 (citing numerous
sources); cf. HUANG, supra note 5, at 88 (quoting Guomindang lawmakers’ statement that
dian was “a strong point of our country’s morality of providing help for the weak”).
43. See Ellickson, supra note 12, at 1375–80. Pomeranz doubts that “the most talented
farmer” would obtain a much higher crop yield from a given plot than would a “less-skilled
farmer.” POMERANZ, supra note 4, at 70–71. Even if the distribution of talent were to be that
compressed, which is far from certain, factors such as a farmer’s health, industriousness, and
capacity to make land improvements might significantly affect relative crop yields.
44. See Brenner & Isett, supra note 17, at 620.
45. See Zhang, supra note 6; see also Huang, supra note 3, at 515.
46. See Zhang, supra note 6, at 189.
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D. Varieties of Weak-Form Dian
In many contexts, the law and custom of dian differed from the
form just portrayed. The leaders of Ming, Qing, and Republican gov-
ernments at times all adopted legislation and regulations aimed at
weakening the practice in order to spur economic growth, enhance
tax revenues, and stem violence arising out of dian disputes.47 Some
laws authorized a seller to sell land unconditionally—that is, to waive
all redemption rights ex ante.48 Others attempted to establish a maxi-
mum length for the redemption period. The 1929 Republican Code,
for example, set a limit of thirty years after the date of the initial
sale.49 And some legal measures aimed to restrict a dian seller to the
receipt of only one additional transfer payment (zhaotie) from a dian
buyer.50 As noted, however, magistrates did not necessarily pay heed
to statutes and regulations that cut back on customary dian rights.51
The custom of dian, however, may itself have been less “strong”
than the prior discussion suggests. In certain times and regions, dian
may have applied more firmly to, or perhaps only to, patrimonial
lands that either included or were adjacent to the grave-sites of the
seller’s ancestors, and not to, for example, non-patrimonial lands of
absentee landlords.52 In at least a few counties, local norms set an
informal end-date on the exercise of redemption rights.53 Although
Huang states that redemption rights theoretically were perpetual,
in the handful of dian disputes that he discusses, the largest gap he
mentions between a dian sale and a claim of redemption is 77 years.54
47. See Pomeranz, supra note 10, at 130, 138–39 (implying that the Qing state opposed
dian in part because dian disputes led to violence); supra note 41.
48. See HUANG, supra note 5, at 72, and Zhang, supra note 6, at 164 (both discussing the
Qing Code of 1730). The prior Ming Code also recognized the possibility of an outright sale.
49. See Zhang, supra note 6, at 174; see also id. at 165–67 (describing Qing attempts to
limit redemption rights to 11 to 20 years after the initial sale). Because these laws fell far short
of abolishing dian, they may have legitimized aspects of the custom. See HUANG, supra note 5,
at 74, 77.
50. See HUANG, supra note 5, at 75–76; see also Zhang, supra note 6, at 157.
51. See supra text accompanying note 36.
52. See HUANG, supra note 5, at 79–81 (noting relative strength of redemption rights affect-
ing grave-sites); Pomeranz, supra note 10, at 129 (asserting that landlords rarely negotiated
to retain redemption rights); see also supra note 24 (suggesting that some dian “sales” were
actually mortgage substitutes).
53. See Zhang, supra note 6, at 160 n.179.
54. HUANG, supra note 5, at 78–79.
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And, in that particular instance, the great-grandson who was claim-
ing redemption rights settled for receipt of the wheat crop currently
growing on the land.55 This outcome suggests perceived weaknesses
in his claim.
The Chinese institution of virtually permanent tenant topsoil rights
also may have mitigated, in some instances, the economic costs of
dian.56 Topsoil rights first appeared during the Song Dynasty (960–
1279), spread widely, and persisted into Qing and Republican times,
when they drew hostility from legal reformers in part because they
impeded tax collection.57 The carving-out of separate topsoil rights,
by further complicating land tenure, on balance may have inhibited
China’s economic growth. But this is far from clear. In situations
where topsoil rights were essentially perpetual, a tenant farmer con-
sidering improvements or conservation measures would plan with
an infinite time-horizon, the economic ideal.58 In a society saddled
with dian, topsoil rights thus may have been an adaptive second-best
institution that on balance stimulated improvements to agricultural
land.59 The interrelationship, positive or negative, between dian and
topsoil rights appears to be a fruitful topic for future research.
E. Why Did the Custom of Dian Emerge and Endure?
Zhang persuasively argues that by Qing times the dian tradition
was hampering China’s economic growth.60 In prior work, I advanced
the hypothesis that the norms of members of a closely knit group
tend to enhance the welfare of the group’s members.61 Zhang asserts
that the persistence of dian is evidence that tends to disprove this
hypothesis.62 I agree. Although all of China has always been far too
large to be regarded as closely knit, the residents of a particular rural
area commonly have intimate and enduring relations. I am indeed
55. HUANG, supra note 5, at 78.
56. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
57. See HUANG, supra note 5, at 100, 107–18.
58. See Ellickson, supra note 12, at 1368–71.
59. For discussion of investments in land improvements by tenants holding topsoil rights,
see HUANG, supra note 5, at 117–18, and Pomeranz, supra note 10, at 105–06, 134.
60. Zhang, supra note 6, at 140, 195–96, 198–99.
61. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 167–83 (1991).
62. Zhang, supra note 6, at 140, 197–98.
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puzzled that, under those social circumstances, they seem to have
so rarely cast aside a custom that was holding them back.
In Huang’s elegant phrase, dian exemplified “the precommercial
ideal of permanence in landholding.”63 China is hardly the only soci-
ety to have honored this ideal. Many ancient societies embraced a
tradition that both tied family members to a patrimonial estate and
bestowed on selected family members non-waivable rights to redeem
that land from creditors or buyers.64 The Israelites’ Holiness Code, for
example, baldly states that “Throughout the land that you hold, you
shall provide for the redemption of the land.”65 In a pre-commercial
society, as opposed to a commercial one, non-waivable redemption
rights have fewer costs and greater benefits. Costs are lower because,
with the near absence of trade, specialized labor, and advanced tech-
nologies for improving land, the disadvantages of tying up land in
a family are smaller. Benefits are greater, in part because a pre-
commercial state is likely to be relatively inept at providing defense
and social insurance. Redemptive rights help to keep rural social net-
works closed by impeding land purchases by strangers, who tend to be
less reliable allies in times of trouble.66 Enduring patrimonial estates
also provide a crude form of insurance. It is harder for members of a
household to dissipate the soils of a land parcel than to squander the
purchase money they receive from a land sale. The right to redeem
ancestral land therefore can be viewed as a paternalistic method of
assuring the availability of at least some resources to the descendents
of members of landholding families.67
It thus is not surprising that dian emerged in ancient China. The
puzzle instead is why China, after it had commercialized, was so
slow to cast off this pre-commercial norm. After 1600, England per-
sisted in its continuing quest to eradicate encumbrances, such as re-
straints on alienation, entails, and open-field villages, that had been
63. HUANG, supra note 5, at 71.
64. See Ellickson & Thorland, supra note 11, at 400–01.
65. Leviticus 25:24; see also, e.g., 1 Kings 21:3 (quoting Naboth as he refuses to sell his vine-
yard to King Ahab, saying “The Lord forbid that I should give you my ancestral inheritance”).
66. See Ellickson & Thorland, supra note 11, at 387–93; see also Zhang, supra note 6, at
196 (stating that dian may have contributed to social stability and cohesion).
67. See Ellickson & Thorland, supra note 11, at 390; see also Pomeranz, supra note 10, at
124 (interpreting dian as an expensive form of insurance against destitution). See also infra
text accompanying note 92 (discussing the analogous contemporary Chinese policy that ties
a rural household to a particular village by means of a registration permit).
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rigidifying its land markets.68 Why didn’t China, then enjoying its
Golden Age, continue as briskly down that same path? Over the course
of the eighteenth century, the dian tradition did weaken in China.69
But the tenacity of its grip endured until the revolutionary govern-
ment took over in 1949. During the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury, for example, Guomindang authorities felt compelled to laud
aspects of the ancient custom.70
Several significant social, political, and cultural differences be-
tween China and England may help explain why China would have
had a harder time throwing off a pre-commercial tradition. China is
far larger in both area and population, conditions that may make its
nationwide norms stickier. China also is a far more ancient culture.
The entails that England had to weed away, for example, dated only
from 1066, two thousand years after dian had taken root. China’s long
tradition of strongly centralized governance, including, for example,
its venerable system of national examinations, may have contrib-
uted to the rigidity of its norms.71 Conversely, the gradual emergence
of democratic institutions in England may have given that nation
greater capacity to institute effective legal reforms. Finally, Confu-
cianism, which features norms of filial piety and the veneration of
elders, may have helped underpin a non-waivable norm of land re-
demption, especially in instances where patrimonial land was adjacent
to ancestral grave-sites.72
III. THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT’S CURRENT POLICY OF LIMITING
PRIVATE LAND-USE RIGHTS TO A FIXED NUMBER OF YEARS
In China today, urban land is owned by the national government
and rural land by some form of village collective. Since 1978, these
landowners have increasingly been transferring fixed-term posses-
sory rights to private parties. As mentioned, the transferor of a fixed-
term contract retains a reversion, that is, the right to repossess at
68. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
69. See Pomeranz, supra note 10, at 122 (citing Buoye, supra note 41, at 181–82).
70. See supra note 27 and accompanying text & note 42.
71. See KARL A. WITTFOGEL, ORIENTAL DESPOTISM: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF TOTAL POWER
(1957) (a classic source on the roots of centralized Chinese governance); SPENCE, supra note 14,
at 229 (describing the national examination system).
72. See Pomeranz, supra note 10, at 126 (stating that it would be “blameworthy” to lose
land “entrusted to you by your ancestors”).
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the end of the term. This retained future interest is analogous to a
seller’s right to redeem under dian, and creates similar risks of short-
sighted land management by the owner of the possessory interest.
A. Urban Land-Use Contracts
When urban land is involved, a state contract confers private rights
to use a specific parcel of land for a fixed time period. When the in-
tended use is commercial, Chinese law permits a maximum term of
40 years; when industrial, 50 years; and when residential, 70 years.73
To obtain land-use rights, an urban contract holder may have to pay
the state a lump sum in advance.74
As the years pass, a contract holder, especially one considering
land improvements, is likely to become increasingly concerned about
several issues:
• whether the holder could compel the state to extend the length
of the term;
• if so, the dates on which the holder could first and last apply
for such an extension;
• what charges, if any, the state could exact when authorizing
an extension; and
• in the event that the state would not agree to extend the term,
whether it would have to compensate the holder for improve-
ments made to the land.
Contemporary Chinese law and practice on all these issues are
unsettled.75 The 2007 Property Law purported to clarify land rights
by providing for the automatic renewal of any fixed-term contract on
land used to build houses.76 For two reasons, however, this provision
will not bring peace of mind to the holders of these sorts of contracts.
First, the 2007 Property Law did not address the third issue listed
73. See Gregory M. Stein, Mortgage Law in China: Comparing Theory and Practice, 72
MO. L. REV. 1315, 1321 (2007). The source of these various maximum periods is Article 12 of
the Interim Regulations of the PRC on Grant and Transfer of Urban State-Owned Land Use
Rights, promulgated by the State Council and effective as of May 1990.
74. Stein, supra note 73, at 1323.
75. Id. at 1324–35, especially n.32.
76. Wu Quan Fa [Property Law] (promulgated by the Tenth Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16,
2007, eff. Oct. 1, 2007) art. 149 (2007) (P.R.C) (available, translated, at http://www.lawinfochina
.com/display.aspx?id=6642&lib=law).
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above, namely, the charges that the state is entitled to impose as a
condition for granting a contract renewal. In the absence of a bear-
able ceiling on renewal charges, a contract holder’s right to renew
lacks teeth. Second, even if the statutory provisions were intended
to be truly protective, a contract holder might doubt that Chinese
courts would enforce the holder’s statutory rights over the objections
of government officials.
China’s practice of conferring private land-use rights in this man-
ner threatens to impair its rate of economic growth. Consider the per-
spective of the owner of a profitable private factory built in reliance on
a fifty-year land-use contract signed in 2000. The date is now 2047 and
the owner still is not certain that the state will renew the contract.
The factory owner might act in a short-sighted manner by, for ex-
ample, skimping on basic maintenance. And, years before, the owner
might have stopped making long-lasting improvements to the manu-
facturing facility, in part because uncertainty about contract renewal
would have made capital investors and mortgage lenders reluctant to
finance those improvements. In the direst scenario, if current policies
continue, the health of every private industrial, commercial, and resi-
dential enterprise in China will fade as its fixed-term land contract
winds down.
This picture certainly is overly grim. There are only two owners
of temporal interests, namely the person or entity that holds the con-
tract, and the state agency that owns the reversion. These two parties
usually could communicate without difficulty and, if they trusted
one another, could easily negotiate a cooperative solution before the
contract began to cause trouble.77 They could agree in mid-term, for
example, to extend the contract term. In reality, however, the two
parties may not trust one another. The owner of the private land-
use rights, for example, might possibly view state agents as inept or
corrupt. If so, the policy of using fixed-term contracts will increas-
ingly cause trouble in urban China.
B. Rural Land-Use Contracts
Farmers’ contract rights are significantly less secure than the rights
of their urban counterparts. In the case of arable land, the usual term
77. See supra text accompanying note 16.
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of a village cooperative’s contract with a farm household is relatively
short—thirty years.78 Many of these contracts were signed in the late
1990s.79 Unless village cadres soon undertake to extend the terms of
these contracts, farming households will begin to manage their fields
in a short-sighted manner.
But the shortness of the contract term is not the primary title risk
that a farm household bears. Unlike an urban land contract, in prac-
tice a rural land contract typically does not confer the right to use
particular fields in a village, but only the right to use some arable
land, which cadres periodically reallocate to households, primarily on
a per capita basis.80 During the past three decades, cadres in a large
majority of Chinese villages have adopted the practice of “readjusting”
land holdings among member households.81 A “small” readjustment
affects only a few fields, perhaps to take into account changes in the
number of residents in particular households.82 A “big” readjustment,
by contrast, reshuffles many or most of the pairings between house-
holds and fields.83 A survey carried out in 2005 by the Rural Develop-
ment Institute (“RDI”) suggests that a typical villager would have
experienced a big readjustment roughly once every ten years.84 Big
78. The thirty-year term for arable land seems to have first appeared in various state de-
crees issued in the mid-1990s. Robin Dean & Tobias Damm-Luhr, A Current Review of Chinese
Land-Use Law and Policy: A “Breakthrough” in Rural Reform?, 19 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 121,
128 (2010). The Land Management Law of 1998 explicitly confirmed that 30 years was the
proper period. Zhu et al., supra note 14, at 771–72. Article 20 of 2002 Rural Land Contracting
Law and article 126 of the 2007 Property Law both repeat the thirty-year figure. A 2005 survey
found that over half of Chinese villagers had some form of written land-use contract. Id. at
787–92. About 90 percent of these contracts indeed specified a 30-year term. Id. at 790.
79. Zhu et al., supra note 14, at 788. To obtain rights to use arable land, a farm household
actually needs two documents: a contract signed by village officials, and a certificate approved
by provincial officials. Id. For information on the contents of these documents, see id. at 790.
80. See id. at 777 n.33. Readjustment is a defining characteristic of a so-called “repartitional
village,” of which the mir of czarist Russia is perhaps the most discussed example. See Robert
H. Bates & Amy Farmer Curry, Community Versus Market: A Note on Corporate Villages, 86
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 457 (1992), and sources cited therein.
81. Zhu et al., supra note 14, at 775 (reporting, prior to 2006, one or more readjustments
in 74.3% of villages, and two or more in 55.0%). On readjustments generally, see id. at 770–72,
775, 792–96, 828–29.
82. Id. at 770.
83. Id.
84. This rough estimate is based on figures provided in id. at 775 tbl. 2. Additional RDI
data on the frequency of big and small readjustments are presented in Brian Schwarzwalder,
et al., An Update on China’s Rural Land Tenure Reforms: Analysis and Recommendations
Based on a Seventeen-Province Survey, 16 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 141, 167–69 (2002).
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readjustments plainly foster wasteful land practices. Why improve
a rice paddy if tomorrow your village may take it away?85
Recognizing this risk, in both 2002 and 2007 the Chinese govern-
ment approved strongly worded statutory provisions designed to help
protect a farm household, during the term of its thirty-year contract,
from losing a field as a result of a readjustment.86 History indicates,
however, that many village cadres do not comply with directives from
Beijing. The authors of the 2005 RDI survey concluded, for example,
that almost one quarter of the villages in its sample had carried out
an “illegal readjustment.”87 Because China lacks a judiciary capable
of ruling against the interests of the politically powerful, farm house-
holds have few means of legal recourse.
C. What Is to Be Done?88
Deng Xiaoping’s vision of a socialist China clearly recognized the
need to incentivize improvements by decentralized land users. The
Central Committee’s “Document Number 1,” issued in 1984, states
in part:
Extending the period for which land is contracted will encour-
age peasants to increase investment, conserve the natural fer-
tility of their land and practice intensive farming. In general, the
period for which land is contracted should be more than 15 years.
85. See Zhu et al., supra note 14, at 807–10 (marshaling sources that indicate the positive
effects of secure titles on investment in land improvements).
86. Article 27 of The Law on Land Contract in Rural Areas forbids the readjustment of con-
tracted land, except under “such special circumstances as natural calamities.” The same article
also states that a village cooperative, in its contract with a farm household, can waive its right
to readjust. Nongcun Tudi Chengbao Fa [Rural Land Contracting Law] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 29, 2002, eff. Mar. 1, 2003) art. 27 (2002) (P.R.C)
(available, translated, at http://english.gov.cn/laws/2005-10/09/content_75300.htm). Article 130
of the Property Law provides that a contracting village organization may not adjust during
the contract term, but also provides for a possible exception in the event of a natural disaster.
Wu Quan Fa [Property Law] (promulgated by the Tenth Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007,
eff. Oct. 1, 2007) art. 130 (2007) (P.R.C) (available, translated, at http://www.lehmanlaw.com
/resource-centre/laws-and-regulations/general/property-rights-law-of-the-peoples-republic-of
-china.html).
87. The villages in the survey numbered 1,773. Zhu et al., supra note 14, at 768. Of these,
“probably 423 . . . have conducted illegal readjustments.” Id. at 794.
88. The temporal dimension of land ownership is the only issue addressed in this section.
China also confronts other pressing issues of land law. See supra note 8.
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Where production is of a developmental nature or takes longer
to be realized—for example fruit growing, forestry or the recla-
mation of barren hillsides and wasteland—the period should be
even longer.89
The Chinese government then was, and still is, fully aware that mak-
ing property rights more secure will help further unleash the remark-
able creativity and energy of the Chinese people. As the clock ticks
down on current fixed-term contracts, contract holders, financiers,
and government economic officials can be expected to push ever more
intensely for some sort of reform.
Most boldly, China could jettison the fixed-term contract approach
altogether, and authorize perpetual grants of urban and rural land
to private parties.90 This would promote better land stewardship by
lessening the short-sightedness that is risked when the temporal div-
ision of ownership is mandated. In virtually all of the world’s most
prosperous nations, perpetual private land rights are routine. The
Chinese government’s resistance to outright private ownership of
land may be a vestige of a fantasy that Marx and Engels, two young
men devoid of rural experience, famously championed in 1848.91
Some government officials, however, may oppose perpetual private
land rights, especially in rural areas, for more pragmatic reasons. The
full privatization of land would disrupt China’s current system of
providing a minimum level of social insurance to rural households.
Currently, each household is registered in a particular village, which
is obligated to periodically allocate to registered households, but no
89. Quoted in SPENCE, supra note 14, at 700.
90. See also Zhu et al., supra note 14, at 834 (urging China to consider granting perpetual
private land rights).
91. In The Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels called for “the abolition of private
property in land” and the “centraliz[ation of] all instruments of production in the hands of the
State.” KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO, reprinted in KARL
MARX: SELECTED WRITINGS 221, 237 (David McLellan ed., 1977). During the first few years
after 1949, China’s new revolutionary government nonetheless largely tolerated a “land-to-
the-tiller” program under which former tenants expropriated the rural lands of landlords for
their own use. See Zhu et al., supra note 14, at 764–66. As the 1950s progressed, however, the
state increasingly took Marx and Engels’s prescription literally and compelled farm households
to join cooperative agricultural enterprises. This effort culminated in 1958–1961 with the disas-
trous Great Leap Forward, when the government collectivized most remaining private land
holdings and placed local farm cooperatives under the direction of larger organizations. See id.
at 768–69 (placing estimates of the resulting deaths at 15–30 million); SPENCE, supra note 14,
at 578–83; Justin Yifu Lin, Collectivization and China’s Agricultural Crisis in 1959–1961, 98
J. POL. ECON. 1228 (1990).
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others, some share of the village’s lands. Because these land rights
are inalienable, a household cannot sell its holdings and squander
the proceeds. As a result, resident members of a registered house-
hold, when they become old or feeble, are assured of having an asset
of some value.
Providing social insurance is indeed an essential function of govern-
ment. But China’s current system is highly wasteful. It encourages
a villager to pursue a life of traditional farming on tiny plots of land,
and not to seek a better life in a city. Per capita income in China’s
rural areas currently is less than one-third of income in its urban
areas.92 This disparity is a recipe for social unrest. Making the land
titles of poor farmers more secure and alienable would free up the
nation’s workforce and increase prosperity in the hinterland by stim-
ulating land improvements and enhancing agricultural productivity.
Because the current system does function as a system of social insur-
ance, albeit a highly inefficient one, these land reforms would have
to be accompanied by some form of tax-supported aid to the elderly
and disabled.
Currently, the conferral of perpetual urban and rural land rights
may not be politically feasible. If it is not, the Chinese government
should consider less bold legislative steps for making private land
titles more secure. It could require, for example, every contracting
authority, when the term of a land-use contract has half elapsed,
either to renew the contract or to agree to compensate the contract
holder, at the end of the lease, for the market value of improvements.
Just as crucially, the government should consider setting a ceiling
on the charges that a contracting authority is entitled to impose as
a condition of contract renewal. In many instances, the state would
be justified in exacting some monetary payment to compensate it for
relinquishing a portion of its valuable reversionary rights. But, in the
absence of a legislative ceiling on this renewal charge, a statutorily
proclaimed right to renew might be meaningless.
The histories of both dian and the current fixed-term contract
policy illustrate the mischief that may arise when land is possessed
in the shadow of a future interest. Both histories also illustrate how
ineffectual law can be in the face of well-entrenched custom.93 During
92. See Zhu et al., supra note 14, at 764–66.
93. See Frank K. Upham, From Demsetz to Deng: Speculations on the Implications of
Chinese Growth for Law and Development Theory, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 551 (2008–2009)
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the Qing Dynasty, magistrates continued to honor the dian tradition
despite statutes and regulations that had been adopted to limit it.94
Currently, many village cadres continue to readjust rural land hold-
ings despite laws that forbid that practice.95 In its efforts to clear its
land titles, China would benefit from having judges with both the
power and inclination to enforce national legislative mandates over
the wishes of regional or local authorities. As long as China continues
to confer complex time-limited land rights, its lack of an independ-
ent judiciary will be particularly worrisome. When law makes pri-
vate land rights perpetual, informal social norms soon bolster these
entitlements. One of the many advantages of a simple system of per-
petual private land rights is its lesser dependence on the existence
of effective courts.
(contending that development specialists tend to exaggerate the influence of the “law on the
books”).
94. See supra text accompanying note 36.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 80–87.
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Commentators have contended that China’s Property Law of 2007
(“CPL”) demonstrates “Chinese characteristics”; yet only the most
obvious ones have been spelled out. Whether the unique features of
the CPL increase or decrease welfare has not been explored either.
In this article, I use comparative and economic approaches to ana-
lyze this important enactment that presumably will lead socialistic
China closer to capitalism. Taiwan’s civil code, because of the simi-
larity of its structure, contents, and origins to the CPL, is compared to
the CPL in order to identify the CPL’s other Chinese characteristics.
Then, economic analysis of law is used to evaluate the efficiency of
the CPL’s unique features or to explain their economic functions.
I find that the CPL contains peculiar contents that are unseen
in other civil codes but at the same time omits some doctrines (such
as the rule of first possession) that are widely recognized in other
jurisdictions. I argue that the most salient Chinese characteristic of
the CPL is centralization of power. Some unique stipulations of the
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INTRODUCTION
China’s Property Law of 2007 (“CPL”) is the latest addition to the
family of civil property law. The CPL was highly controversial in
China before its enactment. A law professor at Peking University
Law School (a top law school in China) even wrote a public letter on
the internet, contending that the CPL would be unconstitutional
because of its capitalistic bent.1 This high-profile incident delayed
the enactment of the CPL for a couple of years. The story of the CPL
is not only socialism versus capitalism, but also the competition be-
tween the U.S. and Germany (or American common law and German-
model civil law2). The Ford Foundation in the U.S. and the German
1. See the description of this event in, e.g., XIANZHONG SUN, ZHONGGUO WUQUANFA
ZONGLUN [GENERAL PRINCIPLES ON REAL RIGHTS LAW OF CHINA] 4 (2d ed. 2009) (in Chinese).
2. There are, of course, other legal systems, such as the French-model civil law, the
Nordic legal system, and the Islamic legal system. See, e.g., KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ,
INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (Tony Weir trans., 3d ed. 1998). Nevertheless, because
of network effects, it makes more sense for the CPL to base its system on either the common
law (also used by, for instance, Hong Kong and Singapore) or the German-model civil law (also
used by Japan and Taiwan, to name a few), as adopting either regime makes it easier for
Chinese businessmen to communicate with China’s major trading partners and attract more
foreign direct investment.
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Academic Exchange Service (“DAAD”) Foundation in Germany,3
among others, have poured grants into China since the 1980s,4 part-
ly hoping to convert the Chinese legal system to their own camp.
Eventually, the CPL and the preceding Contract Law of 1999 fol-
lowed the model of civil law, probably due to the difficulty of trans-
planting the bottom-up common-law system, and due to the more
centralized structure in civil-law systems.5 Below I will demonstrate
that centralization of land use power is the most prominent “Chinese
characteristic” in the CPL.
Chinese scholars have emphasized the “Chinese characteristics”
of the CPL. Indeed, since former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping used
this term in the 1980s, the political structures, economic institutions,
and legal system characteristics in China that are different from those
in other countries have been described as having Chinese character-
istics. One example is “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” which
was written into the preamble of the PRC Constitution in 1993. This
essay takes this claim of Chinese characteristics seriously and tries
to flush out the unique features of the CPL. Some leading property
scholars in China have identified the major Chinese characteristics
of the CPL as adopting state and collective ownership of land and
inventing three new types of superficies rights.6 Others even argue
3. According to DAAD official website, DAAD “is the largest funding organisation in the
world supporting the international exchange of students and scholars.” See http://www.daad
.de/portrait/wer-wir-sind/kurzportrait/08940.en.html. DAAD has funded, among others, the
translation of many German legal textbooks and treaties into Chinese.
4. According to its official website, the Ford Foundation has “made grants totaling more
than $275 million dollars in China.” See http://www.fordfoundation.org/regions/china/history.
The Ford Foundation has funded, among others, the translation of many books by American
legal scholars into Chinese.
5. At the outset of the twentieth century, when China, then ruled by the Qing Dynasty,
was considering whether to emulate the civil law or the common law, the former was pre-
ferred because of its more centralized power structure. See Feng Deng, Qingmo Bianfa De
Falu Jingjixue Jieshi: Weisheme Zhongguo Xuanzele Dalufa [Why China Adopted the Civil
Legal System: A Political Economic Explanation of Transitional Justice in Later Ch’ing’s
Empire], 21 PEKING U. L.J. 165 (2009) (in Chinese).
6. Proponents of this view include Lixin Yang, a professor at Renmin University of China
Law School; Lian Zhang, a professor at Wuhan University Law School; and Baoyu Liu, a profes-
sor at the Law School of Beihang University, to name a few. See Lixin Yang, Woguo Wuquanfa
Nonglie De Zhongguo Tese [The Strong Chinese Characteristics of the Chinese Property Law]
(Apr. 2, 2007), http://www.civillaw.com.cn/article/default.asp?id=31848; Lian Zhang & Hao
Wang, Zhongguo Tese Shehui Zhuyi Tudi Wuquan Zhidu De Jiangou Yu Fazhan [The Con-
struction and Development of a Land Use and Property System with Chinese Socialistic
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that the most salient Chinese characteristic is “equal protection”7 of
public property and private property.8 Nevertheless, the “equal pro-
tection” achievement of the CPL might be more aptly viewed as an
improvement in property jurisprudence within China than viewed
as a theoretical breakthrough or a Chinese characteristic. Protection
of private property has been emphasized in property scholarship
outside China, but it does not follow that state ownership (or collec-
tive ownership, if recognized as a form of ownership) is not “equally”
protected.9 As for the special forms of ownership and superficies, they
are indeed Chinese inventions, but they are not the only Chinese char-
acteristics of the CPL. Many other interesting and special features
of the CPL have not yet been identified by commentators.
In order to spell out other Chinese characteristics of the CPL, the
comparative law approach is necessary. Surely, comparative law
scholarship regarding the CPL is not in short supply, but the lit-
erature has only emphasized the CPL’s inheritance of the German
Civil Code (Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches) (“BGB”) and Swiss Civil
Characteristics ] (Jan. 26, 2009), http://www.civillaw.com.cn/article/default.asp?id=42867;
Baoyu Liu, Zhongguo Wuquanfa De Chengjiu Yu Buzu [The Achievements and Deficiencies of
the Chinese Property Law], http://www.civillaw.com.cn/article/default.asp?id=47390 (last visited
July 9, 2012). A general yet important introduction to the Chinese characteristics of the CPL
by Zhaoguo Wang, the Deputy Commissioner of the Standing Committee of the National
People’s Congress, was delivered in his speech to the congressmen before the last draft of the
CPL was presented for final discussions. The full text of the speech is available online at many
web sites, including the government news agency’s website, Xinhua. Zhaoguo Wang, Guanyu
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Wuquanfa (Caoan) De Shuoming [Description of the “Property
Law of the People’s Republic of China (Draft)” ], (Mar. 8, 2007), http://news.xinhuanet.com
/misc/2007-03/08/content_5818772.htm.
7. “Equal protection” became an issue because the PRC Constitution of 1982 stipulates
that public property is sacred and inviolable (Article 12) while private property is only in-
violable, but not sacred (Article 13), leading to the interpretation that public property enjoys
more constitutional protection than private property. The equal protection argument is that
the CPL has given private property and public property “equal protection.”
8. The leading advocate of this view is Liming Wang, the former dean of Renmin
University of China Law School and the current provost of the university. See Liming Wang,
Wuquanfa Xianming Tese Zaiyu Queli Pingdeng Baohu Yuanze [The Distinct Characteristic of
the Chinese Property Law Is Establishing the Equal Protection Principle ] (Jan. 16, 2007)
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/l/2007-01-16/184412054017.shtml. See also Zhang & Wang, supra
note 6; Liu, supra note 6; YIN-CHIN CHEN ET AL., ZHONGGUO DALU XIN WUQUANFA JIANXI [AN
INTRODUCTION TO CHINA’S NEW PROPERTY LAW] 18 (2008).
9. For example, in the U.S., the federal government is required to pay just compensation
to states or local governments if the latter’s properties are condemned by the former. See
Michael H. Schill, Intergovernmental Takings and Just Compensation: A Question of Fed-
eralism, 137 U. PENN. L. REV. 829 (1989).
2012] PROPERTY LAW WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS 349
Code—and even the influence of the former USSR.10 The critical role
of Taiwan’s Civil Code (“TCC”)11 has been mostly neglected.12 This
essay contends that only by comparing the CPL with the TCC can
one really appreciate the Chinese characteristics of the CPL.13 This
essay will highlight several theoretically interesting differences be-
tween the CPL on the one hand and TCC, BGB, and other civil codes
on the other hand.
The important role of the TCC in understanding the CPL de-
serves further explanation. First of all, enacted around 1930, the
TCC was the law of the land in China for twenty years, until the
Chinese Communist Party abolished every law stipulated by the
Republican government,14 which continued to rule Taiwan after
1949 and implemented the TCC there. In addition, the TCC was also
modeled after BGB and the Swiss Civil Code. With the same legal or-
igins, a comparison of the differences between the TCC and the CPL
is more likely to reveal the real Chinese characteristics than com-
paring the CPL with the private laws in Hong Kong, Singapore, or
Macau.15 Similar cultural traditions between China and Taiwan fur-
ther enable us to rule out Confucianism or other aspects of Chinese
culture as the reasons for the differences. Moreover, the CPL may
have imported German and Swiss property law by emulating the
TCC. The TCC, intended to govern the whole of China, remained
10. See Albert H.Y. Chen, The Law of Property and the Evolving System of Property Rights
in China 7 (working paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=1615499; SUN, supra note 1, at 190–94.
11. The Taiwan Civil Code contains five books, the third of which is the Law of Things,
the counterpart of the CPL. To simplify my prose, I refer to both the Taiwan Civil Code as a
whole and the Book of Law of Things in particular as the TCC.
12. But cf. Lei Chen, Private Property with Chinese Characteristics: A Critical Analysis of the
Chinese Law on Property of 2007, 5 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 983, 991 n.45 (2010) (mentioning that
Taiwan Civil Code “was referred to frequently” when the CPL was drafted); Chen, supra note
10, at 22–23 (arguing that the tradition embodied in Taiwan’s Civil Code is being resurrected
in China and that it shows the convergence of property law between China and Taiwan).
13. But cf. Gebhard M. Rehm & Hinrich Julius, The New Chinese Property Rights Law: An
Evaluation from a Continental Perspective, 22 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 177, 179 (2009) (comparing
Chinese law with German law to explain the former’s major features and peculiarities).
14. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some Chinese judges in the post-1949 era still
consult the TCC and use the doctrines contained in the TCC as fundamental private-law
principles in adjudications.
15. Hong Kong and Singapore have received the English common law, while Macau
transplanted its Civil Code from Portugal, whose system had been influenced by the Code
Napoléon.
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intact when the CPL was drafted and enacted,16 making the TCC a
fitting starting point for the CPL lawmakers. Indeed, the structures
of the German and Swiss Law of Things in their respective civil
codes differ greatly from the structure of the CPL,17 whereas the
structure of the CPL is more congruent to that of the TCC.18 Finally,
long before the enactment of the CPL, leading Chinese property
scholars heavily cited their Taiwanese colleagues’ doctrinal interpre-
tations of the TCC, as well as decisions, “precedents,” and interpreta-
tions rendered by the ordinary courts and constitutional court in
Taiwan. Since the passing of the CPL, scholars continue this practice.
This essay classifies the unique features of the CPL into two types:
(1) stipulations that are available elsewhere but are omitted in the
CPL; and (2) stipulations that cannot be found elsewhere. The two
types are discussed in Parts I and II, respectively.
Dissatisfied with merely describing these unique features, this
essay employs the law-and-economics approach to analyze them.
Because extant literature in English focuses more on the evolution
of Chinese property law19 or security rights such as mortgage,20 this
essay, to the best of my knowledge, is the first to apply economic anal-
ysis to the CPL. Specifically, this essay examines the costs and bene-
fits with and without such unique features, and explores the possible
economic reasons behind them.21 Because China is contemplating
16. Only one article in the Book of Law of Things in the TCC was revised before the CPL
was passed.
17. But see Chen, supra note 12, at 991 (arguing that the structural layout of the CPL
resembles that of the BGB and the Japanese Civil Code).
18. The CPL and the TCC both start with general principles, registration for real estate,
delivery of personal property, etc.; then both stipulate ownership, condominium law, neighborly
relations, and co-ownership; what follows is several types of superficies and then servitude;
then comes (ordinary) mortgage, maximum amount mortgage, pledge of personal property,
pledge of rights, and right of retention; and finally possession.
19. See Rehm & Julius, supra note 13, at 181–85; Chen, supra note 10; Lei Chen, The
Historical Development of the Civil Law Tradition in China: A Private Law Perspective
(working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1479442.
20. See Yuanshi Bu, Security Rights in Property in Chinese Law: The Unattainable Goal
of Constructing a Coherent Legal Regime?, 5 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 1005 (2010); Gregory M.
Stein, Mortgage Law in China: Comparing Theory and Practice, 72 MO. L. REV. 1315 (2007)
(describing how mortgage in China worked a few years before the CPL was passed).
21. Granted, economic analysis of law, if anything, is a capitalistic methodology, and yet
many unique features of the CPL are arguably driven by socialistic ideology and the com-
munist party’s political concerns. Here I do not intend (or pretend) to excavate the actual
rationales behind the decisions by the CPL lawmakers, but instead explore whether there
may be economic reasons that are also supporting the unique features of the CPL.
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the incorporation of the CPL, Contract Law of 1999, Tort Law of 2009,
and other laws into a comprehensive Chinese Civil Code, this es-
say’s economic evaluations of the unique features in the CPL should
provide the Chinese policymakers with an alternative viewpoint.
My analysis reveals that the most salient Chinese characteristic
of the CPL is the centralization of (thing use) power, as the CPL
subjected the three types of superficies rights to public regulations
(rather than to private negotiations), and chose not to recognize the
right of first possession. Adding administrative regulations into the
CPL also increases controls by Beijing.
Some Chinese characteristics of the CPL make economic sense.
For example, because land in China is not privately owned and
cannot be transferred, optional registration of farming rights will
not impose high information costs on third parties. Also, not recog-
nizing the right to abandon minimizes the social costs of abandon-
ment, given that the right of first possession is not included in the
CPL. Giving up the venerated accession doctrine (specificatio) and
adverse possession doctrine in the CPL is more efficient than incor-
porating it. Nevertheless, the omission of the accessio and confusio
doctrines in the CPL is welfare-reducing.
The CPL also demonstrates China’s late-mover advantage. The
definition of property rights in the CPL is more logically consistent
than that in other civil codes. Paring down the contents in the
“neighborly relations” part of the CPL and leaving it for regulatory
statutes avoids the interpretive problems between the civil code and
regulations that other civil law countries have experienced.22
I. NOTABLE OMISSIONS
The omissions discussed below are no doubt conscious decisions
made by the CPL lawmakers. The right of first possession, the right
to abandon, the accession principle, and the adverse possession doc-
trines are stipulated in most, if not all, civil law jurisdictions, includ-
ing Germany and Taiwan, and many Chinese legal scholars have
elaborated on them in their works before the enactment of the CPL.
22. For example, the TCC has eleven articles on stipulating the right to appropriate water,
whereas several regulatory statutes also prescribe matters regarding water appropriation.
It becomes complicated even for property scholars like me to sort out when TCC stipulations
can and should be used.
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In addition, most of these rights or doctrines have been included in
one or more drafts of the CPL but left out in the final version. In
this Part, I will discuss the possible reasons for the omissions and
evaluate their economic consequences.
A. Right of First Possession
While the right of first possession has been long lauded as the
root of titles in U.S. law,23 and at least still has a place in most civil
codes, the CPL lawmakers avoided giving such a right, supposedly
because the rule of first possession is impractical (as there will be
very few such cases),24 it encourages “gains without pains,” and it
may contribute to the loss of state properties.25 Nevertheless, even
if the rule of first possession is impractical, it will not lead to loss of
state properties, and in any case the CPL could easily put state prop-
erties off-limits. In addition, possession still requires effort; thus,
first possession should not be considered a windfall. Furthermore,
the rule of first possession may only be used in practice occasionally,
but containing a provision on first possession in the CPL takes only
a small amount of fixed costs in legislating, and this would avoid a
lot of confusion in practice and save the judges from the laborious
work of reinventing this rule.26 As for encouraging windfall gains,
most jurisdictions in the world recognize the rule of first possession,
and this rule does not seem to create such a bad incentive scheme.
There should be deeper reasons for ousting the rule of first pos-
session from the CPL. The first reason which comes to mind is social-
istic ideology. The doctrine of first possession transforms resources
from being held in common to being owned privately, averting much
23. See, e.g., Carol Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73 (1985);
Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221 (1979).
24. See WEIXING SHEN, WUQUANFA YUANLI [PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW] 221–22 (2008)
(in Chinese). In a 2004 CPL draft, one article gave the titles to abandoned properties and,
under certain circumstances, wild animals and plants, to the private parties who first possess
them. Nevertheless, this stipulation was thereafter deleted for the above reason. See id.
25. See HUIXING LIANG & HUABIN CHEN, WUQUANFA [REAL RIGHT LAW] 222 (5th ed. 2010)
(in Chinese).
26. Weixing Shen, a leading property scholar at Tsinghua University Law School, China,
told me that he believed if courts in China handle a case that is best dealt with by the doc-
trine of first possession, they will still do it, notwithstanding the rejection of the doctrine by
the legislature.
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of the tragedy of the commons along the way.27 Socialism (particularly
Chairman Mao’s communism), however, praises resources held in
common, and believes that as long as everyone acquires only what
she needs from the commons, there will be no tragedy of the commons.
Thus, for socialists, the rule of first possession provides no benefits.
The second reason is maintaining centralized power. As Richard
Epstein pointed out more than 30 years ago, either first possession or
common ownership has to be the root of title, but the latter requires
much more extensive public control than the former.28 In other words,
the rule of first possession decentralizes the process of resource alloca-
tion.29 Hence, not recognizing the right of first possession in the CPL
retains centralized controls on allocation of unassigned resources.
Indeed, the CPL does just that. The things that are usually sub-
ject to first possession,30 such as city land, mineral resources, water,
wild animals and plants, and the broadcast spectrum, have all been
declared state-owned by the CPL (Articles 46–50). In addition, rural
land and other natural resources are collectively owned (Article 58).
Finally, the CPL does not recognize the right to abandon, so there
is no abandoned chattel for first possession. Consequently, even if
the CPL stipulates a right of first possession, there is hardly any-
thing to get first possession of.31 Still, not recognizing such a right
leaves the state to allocate resources that have not been designated
as publicly or collectively owned in statutes.
B. Right to Abandon
While in the U.S. the abandonment of fee simple interests and
other possessory interests in real property is flatly prohibited,32 in
27. See THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S.
LAW: PROPERTY 21 (2010).
28. See Epstein, supra note 23, at 1238–39.
29. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 62–63 (1995); MERRILL
& SMITH, supra note 27, at 21–22.
30. For discussions of these things, see, e.g., Dean Lueck, The Rule of First Possession and
the Design of the Law, 38 J. L. & ECON. 393, 412–21 (1995).
31. Article 49 of the CPL prescribes that wild animals and plants are state-owned only
if so stipulated in statutes. Thus, certain wild animals and plants (stray dogs probably) could
have been subject to first possession.
32. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Unilateral Relinquishment of Property, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 125, 142 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E.
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the civil law systems the rights to abandon both personal and real
properties are usually recognized by the civil codes.33 The CPL,
however, for unknown reasons, is silent about the general right
to abandon.34 Theoretically, it does not matter, as, following Tom
Merrill’s argument, one can deduce the right to abandon from the
right to exclude,35 which is defined as the core element of property
rights in Article 2 of the CPL. Nevertheless, traditional civil prop-
erty law scholarship never links the right to exclude with the right
to abandon. It will be almost a leap of faith for the Chinese courts
to make such a deduction.
Doctrinal interpretations aside, the more pressing issue for China
should be whether it will be welfare-enhancing to formally recog-
nize the right to abandon in the future Chinese civil code. Lior
Strahilevitz provides the most comprehensive and insightful cost-
benefit analysis of the right to abandon.36 He pointed out three costs
of abandonment: third parties’ confusion as to the state of owner-
ship of property (that is, whether the assets are lost, mislaid, or
abandoned); deterioration of an asset’s value during the time period
of abandonment; and lawless-race costs to be the first one to capture
the abandoned assets.37 To apply Strahilevitz’s insights to the
Chinese context, first consider Table 1, showing the social costs of
abandoning chattels:
Smith eds., 2011); Eduardo M. Penalver, The Illusory Right to Abandon, 109 MICH. L. REV.
191, 200 (2010).
33. See, for instance, Sections 928 (real property) and 959 (personal property) of the BGB;
Article 764 of the TCC. See also Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Abandon, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 355, 394–98 (2010) (describing the escheat system employed in several civil law
countries, in which a real property owner can only relinquish land to the state).
34. Holders of security interests, however, are allowed to abandon their mortgage or
pledge right (Articles 177, 194, and 218). It has also been argued that construction rights
generally can be abandoned. See JIANYUAN CUI, WUQUANFA [PROPERTY LAW] 23 (2d ed. 2011)
(in Chinese). Some Chinese scholars have gone even further and argued that in principle all
property interest holders can abandon their rights. See LIANG & CHEN, supra note 25, at 109.
35. See Yun-chien Chang, An Economic Analysis of the Article 826-1 of the Taiwan Civil
Code: The Distinction Between Property Rights and Quasi-Property Rights, 40 NAT’L. TAIWAN
U. L.J. 1255 (2011) (in Chinese). This argument is derived from Tom Merrill’s insights that
“if we start with the right to exclude, it is possible with very minor clarifications to derive
deductively the other major incidents that have been associated with property.” Thomas W.
Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 744 (1998).
36. See Strahilevitz, supra note 33; Strahilevitz, supra note 32, at 125. For a thoughtful
and critical examination of the right to abandon in American common law, see Penalver,
supra note 32.
37. See Strahilevitz, supra note 33, at 372–75; Strahilevitz, supra note 32, at 127.
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Table 1: Social Costs of Abandoning Chattels in Four Scenarios
The de jure right of first possession
Yes No
The de
jure right
to
abandon
Yes
(1)
Deterioration costs: Low†
Confusion costs: High
Race costs: High
(2)
Deterioration costs: High
Confusion costs: Zero
Race costs: Zero
No
(3)
Deterioration costs: Zero
Confusion costs: Low‡
Race costs: Low
(4)
Deterioration costs: Zero
Confusion costs: Zero
Race costs: Zero
† I mark the costs as high, low, or zero by comparing the same type of costs in each cell.
‡ There are still confusion costs in the absence of the right to abandon, because not all
unowned assets are abandoned assets.
Table 1 has at least two limitations. First, it only includes positive
market value chattels.38 Nevertheless, the right to abandon negative
market value chattels in any case will be qualified by public regula-
tions or criminal laws. And most law-and-economists would agree
that it is welfare-reducing to allow people to abandon negative market
value chattels and impose external costs. Thus, whether in the CPL
or other statutes, abandonment of negative market value chattels
should be discouraged.
Second, Table 1 assumes that people will abandon or first possess
movable things only if they have a de jure right to do so. It is un-
clear how often people exercise the de facto rights in the absence of
de jure rights.39 Part of the answers to these empirical questions lie
in the enforcement level of other regulatory statutes and criminal
laws that, for instance, punish people for dumping toxic wastes at
will or misappropriating state-owned assets.
That being said, from Table 1 one can get a sense of why the CPL
does not recognize a right to abandon chattels. While Strahilevitz
focused on Cells (1) and (3) in Table 1, given that the CPL does not
recognize the right of first possession, our discussions on China
38. For the distinction between positive and negative market value chattels in the right
to abandon context, see Strahilevitz, supra note 33, at 362–72.
39. For example, people littering or throwing toxic waste on public land without being
caught have a de facto right to abandon.
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should focus on Cells (2) and (4). The comparison of these two cells
(indeed, all four cells) immediately reveals that, as long as the
exercise of de facto rights can be reasonably curbed, not recognizing
the right to abandon minimizes the social costs of abandonment.
The social costs of abandoning real properties should be lower
than those of abandoning chattels. Given my analysis above and the
fact that land is publicly owned in China, it is not surprising that if
China recognizes the right to abandon constructions or apartments
in the future, it will adopt the escheat system,40 in which abandoned
real properties automatically become state-owned. In this case, race
costs and confusion costs are essentially zero. As long as a notifica-
tion to the registrar is the prerequisite to abandoning real properties,
deterioration costs should be low—as compared to the high deterio-
ration costs for abandoned chattels (see Cell (2) in Table 1).
Of course, to complete the cost-benefit analysis, we have to pay
attention to the benefits of abandonment as well. As Strahilevitz
pointed out, the major benefits of abandonment are “reduced trans-
action and decision costs.”41 Theoretically, however, it is difficult to
determine whether Cell (3) or Cell (4) will produce higher net bene-
fits. Consequently, it might make economic sense for the CPL to aim
for the (relatively) sure thing—minimizing social costs of abandon-
ment by not recognizing the general right to abandon.
C. The Accession Principle
Although specificatio, accessio, and confusio are stipulated in four
drafts of the CPL, ultimately the CPL does not say a word about them,
purportedly because they rarely happen in the real world and in any
case are better dealt with in tort law.42 Below I will argue that it is
efficient to leave the specificatio doctrine out of the CPL, but efficient
to incorporate accessio and confusio doctrines into the CPL.
First of all, a primer on the three doctrines for readers immersed
in common law: What the venerable doctrines of specificatio, accessio,
and confusio do is reallocate titles to property. Specificatio arises
when a man’s labor is mixed with another’s thing, whereas accessio
40. For an economic analysis of the escheat rule applied to abandoned treasure trove, see
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 46–47 (8th ed. 2010).
41. See Strahilevitz, supra note 33, at 372.
42. See SHEN, supra note 24, at 227–28.
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and confusio arise when two things owned by different parties are
combined or intermingled, respectively. Tom Merrill has used the
term “the accession principle” to cover specificatio, accessio, confusio,
and some other related doctrines, but in the U.S., the term “accession”
is more often used to cover only specificatio and accessio, distin-
guished from “confusion” (confusio).43 This American typology will
certainly confuse civil lawyers, who instead group accessio together
with confusio.44 From an economic standpoint, the civil-law classi-
fication makes more sense, because specificatio and the other two
doctrines are different in terms of their economic efficiency (more on
this below).
1. Specificatio
The U.S. common law45 and the second draft of the CPL have
adopted similar specificatio doctrines.46 The basic structure of this
doctrine is as follows: a bad-faith improver can neither gain title nor
request compensation; a good-faith improver will gain title if the
“disparity-of-value test” is met, but will have to compensate the
owner the value of the object before the improvements were under-
taken.47 According to the “normative Hobbes theorem,” “the law
should allocate property rights to the party who values them the
most.”48 Elsewhere I have demonstrated that the specificatio doc-
trine fails this test and proposed abolishing it.49 China may be the
43. See Thomas W. Merrill, Accession and Original Ownership, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 459,
464 n.4 (2009).
44. For example, in Sections 946–948 of the BGB and Articles 811–813 of the TCC, the
stipulations of accessio are applied, mutatis mutandis, to confusio.
45. For the U.S. specificatio doctrine, see Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property:
Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1769 (2007); Thomas W. Merrill
& Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1849, 1878–79 (2007);
Jay L. Koh, From Hoops to Hard Drives: An Accession Law Approach to the Inevitable Mis-
appropriation of Trade Secrets, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 271, 321–34 (1998).
46. See SHEN, supra note 24, at 227.
47. Note that in most civil law countries, bad-faith improvers can still acquire the title of
the improved thing. For discussions of the specificatio doctrine in civil law systems, see Yun-
chien Chang, An Economic Analysis of the Accession Doctrine: A Case for the Property Rule
(working paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1576426.
48. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 98 (5th ed. 2008); James
E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another
Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 446 (1995).
49. See Chang, supra note 47. But see Epstein, supra note 29, at 116–18 (defending the
efficiency of the specificatio doctrine).
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first country to adopt my proposal, though for very different reasons.
In any case, in my opinion, the CPL lawmakers make a wise choice
in not reallocating titles to properties when nonconsensual improve-
ments happen.
2. Accessio and Confusio
The accessio and confusio doctrines in the second draft of the
CPL50 transplant those in the BGB (Sections 946–948) and resemble
those in the TCC (Sections 811–813). If a movable thing is combined
with an immovable thing (building or land) in such a way that the
former becomes an essential part of the latter, the ownership of the
immovable thing extends to the movable thing. And if two movable
things are combined or intermingled in such a way that they both
become an essential part of a unified thing, the previous owners be-
come co-owners of this thing, except when one of the things can be
regarded as the “principal thing,”51 in which case its owner acquires
the sole ownership but has to compensate the other owner. Below I
will first argue that the CPL should have contained provisions on
accessio and confusio, and then demonstrate how these two doc-
trines can be interpreted economically.
Although in practice very few people would litigate over accessio
or confusio (particularly that of personal properties), these two doc-
trines should be an indispensable part of any civil code.52 Disputes
regarding accessio or confusio arise when, for instance, paints are
attached to tables, liquid fertilizers are sprayed onto the land, or two
cans of tomato juice are poured into one big jug. Without the force
of these two doctrines, two ownerships exist in the colorful table,
fertilized plot, and full jug. Yet any previous owner (say, that of the
paints) who tries to control or possess her “thing” will at the same
50. See SHEN, supra note 24, at 227.
51. The opposite of a principal thing is an accessory thing. Pursuant to Article 68 of the TCC,
an accessory thing is not part of a principal thing, but the former usually facilitates the utili-
zation of the latter. The disposition of a principal thing extends to its accessories. In the TCC,
a principal thing and an accessory thing have to belong to the same owner, while the BGB
does not have such a requirement.
52. As Richard Epstein pointed out, “[it is] misleading to measure the importance of a rule
solely by its frequency in litigation.” Richard A. Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal
Dimension in the Law of Property, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 667, 673 (1986).
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time possess the thing (say, the table) of the other party. Neither
has the right to claim sole title to the combined or intermingled
thing. Absent the doctrines of accessio and confusio in the CPL, if
the Chinese court takes the legislative history of the CPL seriously
and refuses to infer new doctrines similar to accessio and confusio
from other articles in the CPL, the only plausible way to solve the
dispute seems to be dividing the combined or intermingled thing
apart, which often leads to destruction of both things, if such divi-
sion or separation is possible at all. Hence, it should be clear that
when accessio or confusio happens, there are good economic reasons
to reduce the number of titles from two to one, and this is exactly
what the doctrines of accessio and confusio serve to do.53
If the doctrines of accessio and confusio are added to China’s civil
code, they should not be structured, or at least interpreted, in the
traditional way. The TCC, BGB, and the second draft of the CPL all
contain an obscure criterion to judge whether accessio and confusio
have happened—that is, the “essential part” test, which requires the
court to determine whether the two originally separate things have
become essential parts of the newly combined thing. The “essential
part” test is too abstract to make economic sense. The “high separa-
tion costs” test that is used occasionally in the TCC and the BGB is
a more operable standard for judging accessio and confusio.54
Specifically, “high separation costs” should be interpreted as fol-
lows: if [separation costs]>{[the market value of thing A after sepa-
ration] plus [the market value of thing B after separation] minus
[the market value of the combined or intermingled thing]}, separation
costs are high.55 In other words, if the marginal costs of separation are
higher than its marginal benefits, from a social standpoint separa-
tion is not worth doing; the law should either assign the title of the
combined or intermingled thing to one of the parties or make both
parties co-owners, instead of ordering separation.
53. Specificatio does not suffer from similar problems; thus, a civil code can do without the
specificatio doctrine. The reason is that the improver’s labor is not a well-defined property.
Absent the specificatio doctrine, the improver can neither claim lost title for her labor nor
claim title to the improved thing. Thus, the law can simply ignore the contribution of the
improver, and allow the thing owner to keep a sole title.
54. To be more exact, in confusio, the criterion is “high identification costs.”
55. For more discussions, see Yun-chien Chang, An Economic Analysis of Accessio and
Confusio in Property Law, 36 CROSS-STRAIT L. REV. 74 (2012) (in Chinese).
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D. Adverse Possession
Adverse possession (or prescriptive acquisition) is a complicated
and controversial doctrine. To apply the doctrine, the court has to
know the mental state of the possessor,56 the type of the possessed
things (personal properties or real estate), the nature of the posses-
sion (open, notorious, continuous, etc.), and the various issues regard-
ing statute of limitations.57 While most scholars agree on treating
bad faith adverse possessors worse than good faith ones (although
there is still no consensus on the treatment and its justifications),58
Lee Anne Fennell has made a strong case for limiting the use of
adverse possession doctrine to only bad faith adverse possessions
that meet certain requirements, mainly because only a bad faith
possessor could be conscious of her making better use of the re-
source she is possessing.59 Partly due to its doctrinal complexity,60
and partly due to its controversial nature,61 the CPL does not incor-
porate the adverse possession doctrine.
Law-and-economics scholars have provided several justifications
for the American adverse possession doctrine, including slothfulness
of the true owner, rewarding diligent possessors, as well as clearing
land records and stale claims.62 Not all of these economic rationales
are applicable to China’s context, however. Countries (such as China)
56. Unlike in the U.S., where common law courts do not always inquire whether the
adverse possessors are good faith or bad faith, in civil law countries like Germany, France,
and Taiwan, the courts have to ascertain whether the adverse possessors are good faith, in
order to determine whether to apply the prescription doctrine, or which sets of prescription
doctrines to apply.
57. See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP & SHELDON F. KURTZ, PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW
57–58 (6th ed. 2005) (dissecting the adverse possession doctrine).
58. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Adverse Possession and Perpetuities Law: Two Dents in
the Libertarian Model of Property Rights, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 723 (1986); Epstein, supra note 52;
Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession, 79 NW. U. L. REV.
1122 (1984).
59. See Lee Anne Fennell, Efficient Trespass: The Case for “Bad Faith” Adverse Possession,
100 NW. U. L. REV. 1037 (2006).
60. See SHEN, supra note 24, at 223–24 (noting that the scholarly debate on whether to
follow the Japanese or the German system of statutes of limitations has yet to be settled, and
that this is one of the reasons for the CPL not recognizing adverse possession doctrine).
61. The CPL lawmakers worried that adverse possession is against “socialistic morality”
and may encourage “gains without pains.” See LIANG & CHEN, supra note 25, at 148; SUN,
supra note 1, at 310.
62. See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 27, at 37–38. See also Epstein, supra note 52, at 678;
Merrill, supra note 58, at 1128–31.
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that adopt the registration system (rather than the recording system
employed in almost all American jurisdictions) have much less of a
need to clear land records, as old records do not matter anyway—
the registration system is designed to avoid the hassles of examin-
ing previous land records. Moreover, without any legally recognized
future interests in the CPL,63 there will not be many old claims to
be cleared.64
As for other justifications for adverse possession, I agree with
Fennell that the goal of property law should be facilitating transfer
of property rights to higher-value users,65 and the adverse possession
doctrine in the U.S. common law is not helpful in this end.66 Fennell
has advocated that the adverse possession doctrine should be nar-
rowed and applied only when two conditions are met: (1) the differ-
ence between parties’ valuations of the property is very large; (2) a
market transaction is not available.67 Still, I doubt whether even
this shrunken version should have a place in the future Chinese
civil code.68
As far as adverse possession of immovable property is concerned,69
land in China is publicly owned, and Chinese lawmakers are highly
unlikely to allow adverse possession of land. Thus, the adverse pos-
session doctrine is only applicable to ownership of constructions,
superficies rights, or servitudes. The case for adverse possession of
63. As Robert Ellickson’s article that also appears in this issue shows, a redeeming right
to a Dian right and the landlord’s right to take back the property after the lease expires are,
functionally speaking, future interests. Robert C. Ellickson, The Costs of Complex Land
Titles: Two Examples from China, 1 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROPERTY RIGHTS CONF. J. 281 (2012).
But note that lease is a type of contract in China law and Dian is a customary property right.
Other functional future interests in the CPL are registered and thus will not produce great
information costs.
64. See the discussions of the “quieting title” argument in Merrill, supra note 58, at 1129.
65. Cooter and Ulen call this the “normative Hobbes theorem.” See COOTER & ULEN, supra
note 48, at 97.
66. The adverse possession doctrine in the TCC, the BGB, and many other civil codes,
though different in details, share the same contour and will be considered inefficient under
Fennell’s framework.
67. See Fennell, supra note 59, at 1040–41. Judge Posner also emphasizes that transaction
costs have to be high to justify adverse possession. See Richard A. Posner, Savigny, Holmes,
and the Law and Economics of Possession, 86 VA. L. REV. 535, 560 (2000).
68. But see LIANG & CHEN, supra note 25, at 148 (arguing that the future Chinese civil
code should stipulate the adverse possession doctrine).
69. I believe that Fennell’s insights are also applicable to movable properties as well, but
I will concentrate on frying the bigger fish—real properties—here.
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superficies rights or servitudes on land70 is weak, because Fennell’s
second condition does not hold. A market transaction is not available
when one does not know who the true owner is or where she is—in
China, the government or the collective, who owns the land, is always
there. Granted, adverse possession of buildings could meet the two
conditions above. Nevertheless, building ownership is subject to man-
datory registration; thus, it is not often difficult to locate the owner.
Not recognizing the right to adversely possess real properties at
all in the CPL, therefore, seems to be welfare-increasing. The above
discussions show that even a narrow adverse possession doctrine
that aims to transfer property rights to higher-value users can at
most be infrequently used, mainly due to China’s public ownership
of land and real property registration system. Discarding the doc-
trine altogether has the advantage of simplifying the legal rule, thus
reducing (social) judicial costs, as no one will litigate in court to claim
adverse possession, and the court thus does not have to examine the
complicated issues and evidence involved. Eliminating any hope of
acquiring titles to real properties through adverse possession should
facilitate voluntary transactions, which generally promote efficiency.
Moreover, like in the case of the accession doctrine, the property law
system can work smoothly without the adverse possession doctrine,
because in their absence property law can simply stick to its norm—
the property rule protection of titles.71
II. UNUSUAL CONTENTS
This Part demonstrates and analyzes several groups of unusual
contents in the CPL. Subpart A shows that the CPL contains a lot of
stipulations of regulatory nature that are not included in other devel-
oped countries’ civil codes; these unique stipulations are sometimes
symbolic and sometimes substantive. Subpart B observes that in at
least three ways the CPL uses the governance strategy differently
from other civil codes. Subpart C argues that the CPL makes quite
70. In practice, servitudes on constructions are not plentiful. See, e.g., SHEN, supra
note 24, at 293.
71. See Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1722
(2004) (“the law treats property rule protection as the norm and liability rule protection as
the exception”).
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a few exceptions to the rule of mandatory registration. Subpart D
points out that the CPL defines property rights, which is a rare feat
among civil codes.
A. Mixture of Administrative Law and Property Law
One of the most salient differences between the CPL and the
TCC—indeed, probably any developed country’s civil code, is the
mixture of administrative law and property law.72 A handsome
portion of the relatively short CPL is devoted to declaring prohi-
bitions or mandates—but usually without specifying the penalties
for violations. Some of the public law-like stipulations direct gov-
ernment agencies and employees to do or not to do certain things.
For instance, Article 22 stipulates that the registrar should charge
by the number of filings, rather than by the size or market value of
the registered real estate.73 Article 13 forbids the registrar to require,
among other things, repetitive registration in the name of annual
inspection. Article 57 essentially asks government employees in
charge of state-owned properties to work harder. Besides, Articles 10
and 43 declare the legislature’s policy stance on a national real estate
registration system and rezoning, respectively.
Some of the public law-like stipulations target property interest
holders. For example, Articles 83, 89, 90, and 120 tell them to obey
the relevant law, whereas Article 11 lists the documents necessary
for real estate registration application.
Other stipulations shall find an audience in the general public.
For example, Article 42 stipulates that no institution or individual
shall withhold, misappropriate, or embezzle the takings compen-
sation. In addition, after Article 4 announces that state-owned, col-
lective, and private properties are protected by law and shall not be
infringed upon by any institute or person, Articles 56, 63, and 66
72. Note that the public-private distinction is well recognized in China. See, e.g., SUN,
supra note 1, at 30 (distinguishing between property rights and regulatory power).
73. There is no official English translation of the CPL. In this essay, I consult the trans-
lation published by a Chinese law firm, Lehman, Lee & Xu, but I use my own translation when-
ever I see fit. Lehman’s translation is available online for free. See Lehman, Lee & Xu, Property
Rights Law of the People’s Republic of China, LEHMAN, LEE & XU http://www.lehmanlaw.com
/fileadmin/lehmanlaw_com/laws___regulations/Propoerty_Rights_Law_of_the_PRC__LLX
__03162007.pdf (last visited July 9, 2012).
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restate that these three types of property are legally protected and
are prohibited from occupation, theft, cheating, or being withheld or
damaged by any institution or person.
These unusual contents may appear in the CPL because Chinese
lawmakers have been accustomed to the command-and-control ap-
proach in legislating. The CPL lawmakers thus did not notice that
such regulatory contents do not square with other private law
contents. Nevertheless, the Contract Law of 1999 and the Tort Law
of 2009 do not intermingle administrative contents and private law
contents; therefore this argument thus does not hold much water.
An alternative explanation is that the CPL lawmakers may have
wished to use the CPL as an educational document for government
officials and even the general public. Most Chinese people have grown
up immersed in communism, in which every righteous citizen has
a right to take resources from the common and has little respect for
private properties. Hence, the CPL has to tell its readers: “You, you,
and you, we mean it. These are private (or state-owned or collective)
properties, not common resources. Get your hands off them.” In
addition, iteration of “the obvious” in the CPL may also signal the
Party/state’s will to protect property rights.
B. Different Uses of Governance Strategy
Henry Smith has famously distinguished the strategies for de-
lineating property rights into exclusion and governance. In the
exclusion strategy, “decisions about resource use are delegated to an
owner,” whereas the governance strategy “pick[s] out uses and users
in more detail.”74 For transaction cost reasons, property law has to
rely on the exclusion strategy most of the time and as a default,
while using the more costly governance strategy to delineate prop-
erty rights when the stakes are high.75 Interestingly, the CPL uses
the governance strategy in a different fashion than the TCC and
other civil codes do. I discuss three examples below.
74. See Henry Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating
Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S454–55 (2002).
75. See Yun-chien Chang & Henry Smith, An Economic Analysis of Civil Versus Common
Law Property, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) available at http://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2017816.
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1. Superficies Subject to Public Regulation
The CPL frequently uses public regulation in delineating the three
types of superficies rights76: the farming right (Articles 124–134),77
the construction right (Articles 135–151),78 and the residence right
(Articles 152–155).79 Ordinarily, the term, renewal, transfer, and oth-
er contents of a superficies right is subject to negotiation between
the “bare owner”80 and the (potential) holders of lesser property in-
terests. Under the CPL, due to the state ownership of land in the
city (Article 47) and collective ownership of farmland (Article 60),81
the bare owners in a superficies relation are always the state or “the
collective,”82 whereas the holders of farming, construction, or resi-
dence rights are private parties. Still, the CPL can authorize the
“quasi-public”83 collectives and the local governments that manage
the state properties to negotiate, as if they were private parties, the
contents of the superficies with the (potential) holders of lesser prop-
erty interests. The CPL, however, chooses instead to rely on the gov-
ernance strategy more heavily than the TCC and other civil codes do.
The CPL deprives the collectives and local governments (as man-
agers of state properties) of discretion, and controls various contents
of superficies rights. For example, Article 126 stipulates that upon
expiration of farming rights, the bare owners generally are obliged
76. For an overview of these three types of superficies rights, see Rehm & Julius, supra
note 13, at 208–16.
77. This right can be literally translated as the “right to manage land through contracting”
(tudi chengbao jingyingquan). Article 125 of the CPL stipulates that a holder of such a right en-
joys the right to possess, utilize and obtain profits from the farmland, forestland and grassland.
78. This right can be literally translated as the “right to use construction land” (jian-
sheyongdi shiyongquan). Article 135 of the CPL prescribes that a holder of such a right shall,
according to law, be entitled to possess, utilize and obtain profits from the state-owned land,
and have the right to build buildings and their accessory facilities.
79. This right can be literally translated as the “right to use residential housing land”
(zhaijidi shiyongquan). Article 152 stipulates that a holder of such a right shall enjoy the right
to possess and utilize collectively owned land, and the right to build residential buildings and
their accessory facilities on such land.
80. A bare owner or a nude owner is an owner of a thing that is burdened by a lesser
property interest, such as mortgage or servitude.
81. Many other different types of resources are state-owned or collectively owned. See
Articles 45–52, 58, and 59 of the CPL.
82. Article 60 defines how and when the resource is collectively owned. For discussions
of the meaning of “the collective” in the CPL, see Chen, supra note 10, at 19–22.
83. The nature of the collectives is a complicated question and I will defer the discussion
to another paper.
366 PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE JOURNAL [Vol. 1:345
to renew.84 Similarly, Article 149 stipulates that construction rights
on residential land are automatically renewed upon expiration.85 In
addition, Article 126 prescribes the exact term of farming rights on
arable land (30 years). Moreover, according to Article 153, the acqui-
sition, exercise, and transferal of residence rights are regulated by the
Land Management Act, among other statutes. Finally, Articles 128
and 140 require holders of farming rights and construction rights to
obtain approvals from relevant competent administrative agencies
if they plan to use the land in a different way.
The rationales behind these unconventional uses of the governance
strategy are probably to centralize land use power.86 If the length of
term and the standards for renewal and allowing changes of land use
are not specified by a national law, but are left to the discretions of the
collectives or local governments, the central government would lose
the power to shape land use policy. Additionally, as Steven Cheung
pointed out in China’s context, “[t]he right to decide and allocate land
use is the key issue in a developing country,” and the economic power
has already by and large rested in the xians (a level of local govern-
ment below provinces and cities) in today’s China.87
Given the non-private land ownership under the CPL, centraliza-
tion of power, however, is not necessarily a bad thing.88 The farming
right and the residence right are so-called “member rights,” meaning
that one has to be a member in the collective to qualify for acquisition
of such rights in the first place.89 In addition, the constitutional right
to travel freely within the country (or, for that matter, to change
“membership”) is still in its infancy. Consequently, the collectives are
monopolists in agricultural land and land for residential use in the
84. See CUI, supra note 34, at 278.
85. Interestingly, the automatic renewal of construction rights on residential land and the
bare owners’ obligation to renew farming rights make these superficies rights, economically
speaking, essentially full ownership.
86. Eva Pils also pointed out that “both rhetorical ‘over-protection’ in the private sphere and
under-protection against the government result in a concentration of power in the hands of
the State . . . .” Eva Pils, Chinese Property Law as an Image of PRC History, 39 HONG KONG
L.J. 595, 597 (2009).
87. See STEVEN N. S. CHEUNG, THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM OF CHINA 45–46 (2008).
88. In the context of police control, Tanner and Green argue that decentralization of law
enforcement power constitutes “a major obstacle to building rule of law in China.” Murray
Scot Tanner & Eric Green, Principals and Secret Agents: Central Versus Local Controls Over
Policing and Obstacles to “Rule of Law” in China, 191 CHINA Q. 644, 645 (2007).
89. See SHEN, supra note 24, at 273, 289 (noting that the farming right and the residence
right are generally member rights); LIANG & CHEN, supra note 25, at 275–76.
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countryside and face no competition from other collectives, because
peasants hardly have the right to “exit.” Granted, for most home-
owners in most jurisdictions, exit is always a costly option. Never-
theless, there are always some people looking for new places to live,
and the possibility of “entrance” (particularly entrance of people from
the upper echelon, who contribute to the local tax receipt) often stim-
ulates juridical competitions. In China’s context, due to the nature
of membership right, peasants simply cannot move to different vil-
lages. Therefore, local governments have fewer incentives to reduce
corruption to attract new taxpayers.
If the land use power is decentralized to the collectives, and they
abuse the power, peasants can still “voice.”90 Voice, however, is much
less powerful without regular, competitive local elections. A unique
type of voicing in China, xinfang or shangfang,91 is not always very
effective and certainly very costly. It is doubtful whether peasants’
voice alone is enough to curtail the local corruption. Therefore, the
heavy use of the governance strategy in superficies rights to central-
ize the land use power and to reduce abuse of such power by the
collectives may be more welfare-enhancing for Chinese peasants.92
2. Neighborly Relations Lightly Treated
The “neighborly relations”93 part in a civil code is usually a gath-
ering point for governance strategies, but the CPL contains a rela-
tively short and simple neighborly relations part. Many civil codes
contain long and sophisticated stipulations in the neighborly rela-
tions part. For example, in civil codes of Portugal, Italy, Taiwan, and
Germany, neighborly relations takes up roughly 20%, 12%, 10%, and
5%, respectively, of their Book of the Law of Things in terms of the
90. For discussions of voice versus exit, see, e.g., ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND
LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970);WILLIAM A.
FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES 72–74 (2001).
91. For discussions of xinfang, see, e.g., Taisu Zhang, The Xinfang Phenomenon: Why the
Chinese Prefer Administrative Petitioning Over Litigation, 3 SOCIOLOGICAL STUD. 139 (2009).
92. Note that the governance strategy used here does not simply transfer the decision-
making power from local officials to officials in central government. If done this way, it may
be the officials in central government that are taking bribes. The crystal-clear rule stipulated
by the national legislature, instead, gives no official the opportunity to take bribes.
93. In civil law systems, the law of neighborly relations contains doctrines that in the
common law would usually be discussed in nuisance law, and sometimes in trespass law.
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number of articles. And many of these stipulations are typical ex-
amples of the governance strategy.94 By contrast, only 4% (9 out of
247) of the CPL concerns neighborly relations, and the nine articles
are brief.95
I have two conjectures on the light treatment of the neighborly
relations by the CPL. First, land is either collectively owned or state-
owned; thus, there is no private dispute between neighboring land-
owners, simplifying the neighborly relations. Second, many civil codes
were enacted before the rise of the regulatory state. Adjustments
of property rights in a civil code will not be in conflict with an exist-
ing public regulation. In China, the development is the other way
around—many regulations were already in place by 2007. Thus,
sophisticated governance of neighborly relations in the CPL may
confuse the administrative agencies or the court as to when and
whether the CPL or regulatory statutes should prevail. Therefore,
the CPL shies away from beefing up the contents in the neighborly
relations part, but only because the governance strategy has already
been employed elsewhere—in regulatory statutes.
3. Imposition of a Market Standard
The socialistic CPL at times imposes a market standard when
capitalistic civil codes fail to.96 Articles 195, 219, and 236 require
that market prices shall be used as benchmarks when mortgaged,
94. For examples of the governance strategy used in neighborly relations, see Yun-chien
Chang, Customs in Taiwan’s Property Law: From the Perspective of the Information-Cost
Theory, 188 TAIWAN L. REV. 81 (2011) (in Chinese).
95. Note that the CPL contains 14 other articles regarding condominiums, which are
traditionally treated as part of the neighborly relations. For the CPL lawmakers, it makes
sense to emphasize condominium dispute resolution, as apartments, unlike land, are mostly
privately owned.
96. For example, the civil codes of Taiwan, Germany, and the Netherlands do not impose
such market standards. Section 1221 of the BGB does mention market price, but does not use
it as a mandatory benchmark. Section 1221 of the BGB stipulates that “if the pledged item
has a stock exchange or market price, the pledgee may affect the sale privately at the current
price through a commercial broker officially authorized to affect such sales or through a
person authorized to sell by public auction.”
Note, however, that codes of civil procedure or civil enforcement acts may contain stipula-
tions that try to maximize the value of mortgaged, pledged, and retained assets. In Taiwan,
anecdotal evidence suggests that mortgaged land and buildings are usually sold or auctioned
by the court at below market value (I am starting to work on an empirical project to verify this
claim). Imposing a stipulation of a market price standard like those in the CPL and the TCC, if
taken seriously, would change the whole dynamics of court auctions and court sales in Taiwan.
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pledged, and retained assets are “sold” by the court (or other inde-
pendent institutions) or “converted into money” through bilateral
bargaining. Nevertheless, this market price standard is not imposed
when these assets are “auctioned” by the court. The CPL does not
specify the consequences for failure to comply (for example, when
the court sells an asset for 80% of its market value). To my knowl-
edge no Chinese scholars have elaborated on these stipulations,
either. If these articles are interpreted to mean that a mortgagor’s
debt claim equivalent to the asset’s market price will be written off,
no matter how much the asset is actually sold for, Articles 195, 219,
and 236 use a strong governance strategy. If these articles are in-
stead just a gentle reminder or a wish by the lawmakers, the gover-
nance strategy adopted here is at most symbolic.97
C. Occasional Optional Registration
Registration of real property rights is not always mandatory,
declarations by Articles 9, 14, and 17 of the CPL notwithstanding.98
For instance, servitudes and residence rights need not be registered
(Articles 158 and 155, respectively).99 China has yet to have a uni-
fied registration system or an electronic real estate registration
database,100 and many lesser property interests had not been reg-
istered before the enactment of the CPL in 2007, either. The huge
97. At the private law workshop in Renmin University Law School, the attending scholars,
judges, and doctoral students all have a different take of what these three articles mean.
Notably, a judge in the People’s Supreme Court informed me that in practice, “market prices”
are a floating concept. Secured assets are usually auctioned first. After two rounds of auction,
if no one bids, the court will try to sell the secured assets at half price—because in the second
auction, the asset is listed at 80% × 80% = 64% of its original market price, and it is expected
that only by further lowering the sale price can the court actually sell the asset. The judge
contends that the practice will not violate Articles 195, 219, and 236, because the asset’s
“market price” has decreased as the foreclosure process drags on.
No matter how these three articles are interpreted, their ambiguity imposes transaction
costs on parties who need to use secured transactions.
98. Pursuant to Articles 9 and 14, modifications of real property rights shall take effect
upon registration, unless otherwise provided by law. Article 17 adds that the land register is
the final authority on real property rights.
99. See LIANG & CHEN, supra note 25, at 275.
100. Although Article 10 of the CPL proclaims that it implements a “unified registration
system,” the real estate registration system in China as it now stands is extremely compli-
cated, as various administrative agencies are in charge of registration for different property
rights. For a list that matches the property rights with the agencies in charge, see SHEN,
supra note 24, at 167–70.
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administrative costs of integrating all the current real estate regis-
tration systems, investigating all unregistered interests to put them
on record, and daily updating of registration records must have pre-
vented the CPL from sticking to the system of mandatory registra-
tion that is quite common in civil-law jurisdictions such as Germany
and Taiwan.
One particularly interesting example of optional registration is
farming rights.101 Local governments are obliged to issue certificates
to farming right holders and keep an up-to-date registry, which is
separate from the land registry (Article 127). Farming rights that
are not registered in the local government’s registry are invalid only
in relation to third parties acting in good faith (Article 129). For ex-
ample, Abby is the original holder of a farming right; Abby first sells
the right to Bob, without updating the transfer in the local govern-
ment’s registry, and then to Christine who is unaware of the previ-
ous transaction between Abby and Bob. Christine will acquire the
farming right.
It has been argued that the optional registration of farming rights
makes economic sense for the following reasons. First, only peasants
who are “members” of the collective are qualified to acquire farming
rights, and these peasants would know each other and everyone’s
rights—information costs are low for potential farming rights ac-
quirers. In addition, the certificates issued by the local governments
serve as notice and further decrease third parties’ information costs.
Finally, mandatory registration of all—literally millions—of farming
rights would overwhelm the land registrar.102
I would add one more economic rationale for the optional registra-
tion of farming rights. The key is that a bare owner has incentives
to conceal the existence of superficies to her potential buyer (to in-
crease prices), while a holder of superficies rights has incentives to
prove to her potential buyer that her right exists (to make a deal).
Uniform and mandatory registration, therefore, reduces information
costs mostly for land buyers. But since under the CPL, farming land
is collectively owned and cannot be sold, no potential buyers exist to
101. For criticism of optional registration of farming rights, see CUI, supra note 34, at
266–67. But see LIANG & CHEN, supra note 25, at 260–61 (arguing that it is impractical to
mandate registration).
102. See CHEN, supra note 8, at 222.
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benefit from mandatory registration. As for buyers of superficies
rights, the official certificate and records kept by the local govern-
ments are enough evidence to show them that the farming rights
indeed exist. Therefore, optional registration of farming rights shall
not hamper market transactions of farming rights.
D. Definition of Property Right
A surprising fact regarding civil property law is that the civil
codes rarely define what a property right is.103 As a result, civil
property law theories often fail to distinguish between property
rights and ownership.104 Article 2 of the CPL manages to avoid such
conceptual confusion and define a property right as a right to directly
control a specific thing and to exclude others. Article 2 further ar-
ticulates that property rights are composed of ownership, usufruct,
and security rights, dispelling any notion that property rights are co-
terminous with ownership. In doing so, the CPL also demonstrates
that it follows the civil-law tradition in conceptualizing a property
right as “men versus things,” rather than “men versus men regard-
ing resource,” which is rooted in the common-law tradition.105 Else-
where, Henry Smith and I have already criticized the concepts of
property rights in both traditions,106 so I will stop here.
Article 2 also stipulates that the objects of property rights include
movable and immovable things, which is quite conventional. What
demonstrates the CPL’s late-mover advantage is the unusual clause
that ensues: “Rights can be objects of property rights if the law so
stipulates.”107 Movable and immovable things are corporeal, while
rights are incorporeal. The BGB has been criticized as inconsistent
because, on the one hand, it recognizes only corporeal things as ob-
jects of property rights and, on the other hand, pledge of rights is
103. It seems that only one civil code has done so: the Austrian Civil Code of 1811 (in
Article 307). See Chunqi Wu, Wuquanfa [Property Law], in CHINESE CIVIL LAW [ZHONGGUO
MINFA] 246, 246–47 (Jer-Sheng Shieh ed., 2007) (in Chinese); SHEN, supra note 24, at 42; SUN,
supra note 1, at 30, 41.
104. See Chang & Smith, supra note 75.
105. For discussions of these two traditions, see id.
106. See id.
107. For a critical discussion of rights as objects of property rights, see Chen, supra note 12,
at 992.
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listed as a property right.108 By adding the aforementioned clause,
the CPL, at least doctrinally speaking, avoids the inconsistency.
CONCLUSION
After years of fierce debates, in 2007 China finally enacted the
first comprehensive property law since the communist party took
over China in 1949. Using civil law logic and “style,”109 the CPL
firmly declares its stance of protecting private properties. For a
country that is only thirty plus years removed from the Cultural
Revolution and, despite the economic reforms, is still under social-
ism, the achievement of the CPL, its lawmakers, and the large num-
ber of property scholars that have worked on or commented on the
drafts of the CPL should be lauded.
Nevertheless, to integrate capitalistic ideas into a socialistic struc-
ture, and to maintain social and political stability, the CPL makes
quite a few compromises, some of which are unique in modern prop-
erty law—thus, the CPL is called a law with Chinese characteristics.
This article finds that the compromising choices by the CPL law-
makers often lead to the (unintended?) consequence of centralizing
the power to determine the use of immovable things and even mov-
able things, although this is not necessarily inefficient, given the
current overarching structure of the CPL. In addition, a few stipula-
tions that are unique features of the CPL have unfortunate welfare-
reducing effects.
The long-awaited Chinese civil code had been expected to come out
in 2010, but has since been postponed. Still, it may be enacted in the
near future. Hopefully, being informed of the inefficiency of certain
stipulations with Chinese characteristics in the CPL, Chinese law-
makers can fix them in the civil code. Without doubt, property law and
property theory should be adjusted to reflect the idiosyncrasy of a
country; hence, enacting a law with a jurisdiction’s own character-
istics is a laudable endeavor. Nevertheless, eventually, at least from
the law-and-economic perspective, the welfare of the people should
be the priority concern.
108. See CHRISTIAN VON BAR & ULRICH DROBNIG, THE INTERACTION OF CONTRACT LAW AND
TORT AND PROPERTY LAW IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 317 (2004); Chang & Smith,
supra note 75.
109. For the common law’s and civil law’s different styles of delineating property rights,
see Chang & Smith, supra note 75.
THE USE AND ABUSE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SAVING
THE ENVIRONMENT
JAMES S. BURLING*
“The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces
of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may
blow through it; the storm may enter; the rain may enter; but
the King of England cannot enter—all his force dares not cross
the threshold of the ruined tenement!” 1
Private property creates for the individual a sphere in which he
is free of the state. It sets limits to the operation of the authori-
tarian will. It allows other forces to arise side by side with and
in opposition to political power. It thus becomes the basis of all
those activities that are free from violent interference on the part
of the state. It is the soil in which the seeds of freedom are nur-
tured and in which the autonomy of the individual and ulti-
mately all intellectual and material progress are rooted.2
INTRODUCTION
While freedom and property may be inseparable, the temptation
to sacrifice one or the other to seemingly more critical societal goals
is ever present. And when either one is threatened, so is the other.3
Yet, the temptation to yield either is an inexorable imperative of those
who govern. In the United States, for example, the threat to security
in the post-9/11 world has led to the Patriot Act, which some claim
intrudes upon individual liberty and privacy of American citizens.4
* Director of Litigation at Pacific Legal Foundation, Sacramento, California. For more
information see http://www.pacificlegal.org.
1. See Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 & n.7 (1958) (citing THE OXFORD
DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 379 (2d ed. 1953)) (attributed to William Pitt, Earl of Chatham).
2. LUDWIG VON MISES, LIBERALISM IN THE CLASSICAL TRADITION 63 (Ralph Raico trans.,
1985), available at http://mises.org/liberal/ch2sec3.asp.
3. BERNARD H. SIEGAN, PROPERTY RIGHTS: FROM MAGNA CARTA TO THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (Transaction Publishers 2001); RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM (Knopf
Doubleday 1999), BERNARD H. SIEGAN, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTION, THE
COURTS, AND LAND-USE REGULATION (Transaction Publishers 1997).
4. See, e.g., John W. Whitehead & Steven H. Aden, Forfeiting “Enduring Freedom” for
“Homeland Security”: A Constitutional Analysis of the USA Patriot Act and the Justice
Department’s Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 1081 (2002).
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Starting with the rise of progressivism and continuing through the
post–New Deal era, the compulsion to reengineer society for the
“common good” has been effected at great cost to originalist under-
standings of individual rights.5
Another artifact of progressivism was the wide-scale adoption of
zoning and other land-use controls, a trend that received its first
major imprimatur of legitimacy in an opinion written by the con-
servative Supreme Court Justice George Sutherland, in Euclid v.
Ambler.6 When it comes to the transfer of the control over estab-
lished rights in property and wealth, nothing has come close to the
revolution engendered by the widespread adoption of zoning and
land use controls in the United States.7 Where land use decisions were
once exclusively made by owners of the land, subject only to the pro-
scriptions against creating common-law nuisances, the decisions rest
today in myriad boards, commissions, and regulatory agencies at the
local, state, and federal level, all of whom have one or more hands in
the decision-making process. This curtailment of an individual’s lib-
erty to make choices over the use of property is the functional equiv-
alent of the impressment of various easements and negative covenants
on the property. Thus while neighbors could once have voluntarily
negotiated the terms of neighboring land uses through easements con-
taining, for example, height or density restrictions, in the new zon-
ing world these same restrictions are imposed on a broader scale by
political bodies. Moreover, these governmental bodies can and often
do use this power to leverage exactions, fees, and other direct wealth
transfers from owners to government.
Landowners today are facing another reality: the rise of pressure
to put property into conservation easements. While there can be tax
5. See, e.g., Thomas J. West, The Constitutionalism of the Founders versus Modern
Liberalism, 6 NEXUS J. OP. 75, 89 (2001) (noting that progressive era theories of consti-
tutionalism rejected traditional understandings of rights); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, HOW
PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION (Cato Institute 2006).
6. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
7. But see Nadav Shoked, The Reinvention of Ownership: The Embrace of Residential
Zoning and the Modern Populist Reading of Property, 28 YALE. J. ON REG. 91 (2011) (Euclid
v. Ambler represents not so much a usurpation of property rights as a fundamental change
in the definition of property ownership. Specifically, Shoked argues that with the rise of sub-
urban ownership, the Jeffersonian ideal of the independent yeoman farmer has been trans-
formed into an ideal of yeoman suburban owners. In order to protect the interests of these
suburban owners, the meaning of property entails less liberty of action in order to promote
the stability interests of suburban owners.).
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advantages of donating land to conservation easements, the long-term
consequences of splitting estates though the conservation easement
process is unknown. Similarly, when landowners feel compelled to put
land into conservation easements, either to stave off more severe
zoning or to appease government regulators and environmentalists
during a development process, the resulting land patterns may be
more haphazard than planned.
There are some checks imposed upon governmental avariciousness.
There can be a democratic response to attempts by government to take
property from small landowners for the benefit of politically well-
connected developers.8 But that response has largely been confined to
the post-Kelo backlash and some of that response was “engineered”
by redevelopment interests to render reform into a joke.9 Ordinarily,
democratic instincts do not treat landowners particularly well as the
leveling instinct criticized by Madison remains with us today.10 Rent
control in cities with politically powerful renter constituencies is a
classic example of democratic usurpation of property rights.11
But both supporters and critics of property rights recognize the
decline.12 Some of this has been reflected by replacing the common-
law language of property (related to a hard and fast physical thing)
with reference to a “bundle of sticks”13 or an invocation of social norms
that promote “human flourishing.”14 The bundle of sticks metaphor
8. One such example is the reaction to redevelopment in the wake of Kelo v. City of New
London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
9. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Op-Ed., Prop. 99’s False Promise of Reform, L.A. TIMES, May 19,
2008, at A15. See also Timothy Sandefur, The “Backlash” So Far: Will Americans Get Mean-
ingful Eminent Domain Reform?, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 709 (2006); Ilya Somin, The Limits
of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100 (2009).
10. Madison argued that the structure of the federal government would resist “A rage for
paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other im-
proper or wicked project . . . .” THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
11. Ted Dienstfrey, The Politics of Rent Control in the United States: A Program at the
Yellow Light, in RENT CONTROL, MYTHS AND REALITIES 5 (Block et al. eds., 1981).
12. See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, Some Thoughts on the Decline of Private Property, 58 WASH.
L. REV. 481, 481 (1983) (“[W]e are in the midst of a major transformation in which property
rights are being fundamentally redefined to the disadvantage of property owners.”); Gideon
Kanner, “[Un]equal Justice Under Law”: The Invidiously Disparate Treatment of American
Property Owners in Taking Cases, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1065 (2007).
13. United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278 (2002) (“A common idiom describes property
as a ‘bundle of sticks’—a collection of individual rights which, in certain combinations, con-
stitute property.”).
14. See Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2009) (describing property in terms of a social-obligation norm that pro-
motes human flourishing).
376 PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE JOURNAL [Vol. 1:373
is just another way of dividing up ownership rights, taking some, and
leaving the owner with the remainder and without compensation.
Property in terms of “human flourishing” may be a fine exercise for
the academy but it fails to provide a means for defining and under-
standing property by lawyers, judges, and lay people. Both of the
latter constructs are also, conveniently, much more malleable in the
hands of those seeking to restrict more traditional understandings
of property rights.
Imprecision in language reigns supreme. As far back as 1922 we
learned that a regulation that goes “too far” may be proscribed by the
United States Constitution as an uncompensated regulatory taking.15
But what is too far? Ninety years later we can only wish for a judicial
nostrum as precise as Justice Stewart’s quip about pornography.16
We do know when there is a total wipeout of all use or value, there
may be a categorical taking.17 We know that a physical invasion of any
magnitude is a taking.18 And, to some extent we know that in at least
some circumstances, an exaction that is untethered to an impact
caused by land development may be determined unconstitutional by
Supreme Court doctrines articulated in Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission19 and Dolan v. City of Tigard.20 And, of course we know
that there may or may not, but usually not, be a taking in other cir-
cumstances after various ambiguous and undefined “factors” are
weighed against each other.21 Today, after 90 years of chasing the
quark,22 the promise of relief suggested by the law of regulatory
15. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
16. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964).
17. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
18. Id. at 1015; Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 428 (1982).
19. 483 U.S. 825, 836–37 (1987) (requiring that there be a “nexus” between the impacts
caused by a development and exactions demanded by a permitting agency).
20. 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994) (requiring that there be “rough proportionality” between an
exaction and an impact caused by a development).
21. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (suggest-
ing three factors have particular significance in determining the existence of a regulatory taking:
the economic impact of the regulation, impact on distinct investment-backed expectations and
the character of the regulation); Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 16 Cal. 4th 761,
776–77 (1997) (listing seven additional factors).
22. See Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 200
n.17 (1985) (analogizing trying to discern the meaning of a taking to the search by physicists
for the quark). See also Gideon Kanner, Hunting the Snark, Not the Quark: Has the U.S.
Supreme Court Been Competent in Its Effort to Formulate Coherent Regulatory Takings Law?,
30 URB. LAW. 307, 327–33 (1998) (noting that at least the physicists have found their quark).
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takings exists more in theory than as practical reality for the typical
landowner of ordinary means.
New challenges to rights in property surfaced in the 1960s with
a revolution in land use controls. With rising environmental con-
sciousness, Euclidean zoning schemes, which supposedly existed to
provide reciprocal economic and aesthetic benefits to all landowners,
have been supplanted by more overarching and pure environmental
controls. Such controls have ranged from an early utilitarian ethic
to conserve natural values for the benefit of people and their future
generations to a later embrace of an ethic to preserve environmental
values for the sake of preservation itself. In some cases the public’s
thirst for environmental amenities has given way to expressions of
classic Nimbyism and even into cooption by those who harbor the
misanthropic dreams of deep ecology.23
The doctrine of regulatory takings has been powerless to protect
any but the most extreme regulatory assaults on property rights. If
rights in property are vulnerable to majoritarian desires for zoning,
rent control, and all manner of environmental controls, and if freedom
and property are interdependent,24 does this pose a genuine threat
to “freedom?”
This article will focus upon the threats to property represented by
the environmental initiatives of the past forty years and how these
initiatives have evolved from the ideals of conservation to the schemes
of preservation, including conservation easements. Finally, it will ask
whether the threats to freedom are truly dangerous assaults on in-
dividual liberty or simply bumps in the road to a green Nirvana.
I. A FEW WORDS ABOUT FREEDOM AND RIGHTS IN PROPERTY
If the regulatory state poses a threat to freedom, it must be asked,
freedom to do what? Freedom to stand up to the government bureau-
crats who hold the keys to the regulatory kingdom? Freedom to earn
a living from the use of privately owned property? Freedom to use
property and property-derived wealth to challenge the government
23. See BILL DEVAL & GEORGE SESSIONS, DEEP ECOLOGY, LIVING AS IF NATURE MATTERED
(Gibbs Smith 1985). For an account of the deep ecology, the forests, and the spotted owl, see
ALSTON CHASE, IN A DARK WOOD: THE FIGHT OVER FORESTS AND THE MYTHS OF NATURE
(Transaction Publishers, 2001) [hereinafter IN A DARK WOOD].
24. See, e.g., supra notes 1 and 2.
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itself? I do not presume in this article to suggest any new or novel
ideas about the meaning of freedom. Nor do I presume it is possible
to suggest that there is a universally accepted definition of the word.
Freedom is universally considered a good thing to have—in varying
degrees at any rate. Even those states unwilling to allow it to flour-
ish in the classical liberal sense have often adopted the Orwellian
tactic of providing freedom to the state’s citizens after redefining
what freedom means. Thus, some states are in the habit of defining
freedom to be the availability of whatever the government provides
for its citizens—jobs (freedom from want), security (freedom from
fear), and food (freedom from hunger). Other states have an even
more paternalistic way of suggesting to its citizens that they have
all the freedom they will ever need—conservative religious-based
dress codes for women provide freedom from male harassment, pro-
scriptions on Islamist or Christian preaching provides freedom of
the fear of an Islamist or Christian state. In other states restrictions
on “hate speech” can provide citizens with freedom from blasphemy
and unwanted societal intolerance for one’s race, religion, or gender
orientation. And zoning, of course, by limiting the freedom of one set
of owners to utilize their property, may provide freedom from un-
wanted neighborhood uses to another set of owners.
Generally, however, at least for the purposes of this paper, free-
dom means, or meant, something entirely different in the tradition
of Western democracies. Reflecting the classical liberal tradition, free-
dom in these states traditionally meant not the positive provision of
goods and services, and not even the protection from the slings and
arrows of one’s fellow citizens, but the freedom from government it-
self, spelled out in terms of negatives imposed on government. The
best example is in the Bill of Rights—the government shall not re-
strict free speech,25 the government shall not infringe on the practice
of religion or the beliefs of its citizens, the government shall not take
property except in limited circumstances and only after the payment
of just compensation, the government shall not deprive one of his
life or liberty without due process of law, the government shall not
25. But a more positivist view is that “the 1st Amendment is about government fostering
speech—the more, the better—with public funds if necessary.” Michael McGough, Supreme
Court Justices Can Pick from Two 1st Amendments, LOS ANGELES TIMES, June 29, 2011, avail-
able at http://opinion.latimes.com/opinionla/2011/06/supreme-court-justices-can-pick-from-two
-first-amendments.html.
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search one’s home or effects without a warrant, and so on.26 More-
over, just because a proscription doesn’t exist in the Constitution, it
doesn’t mean the government can infringe upon an unenumerated
freedom.27 This sense of freedom permits one to speak for or against
the government and for or against a particular religious belief with-
out fear of being punished. It permits one to believe any legitimate
or cockamamie philosophy one likes without being locked up.28 It
permits one to worship the One True God, several middling False
Gods, the Devil, Gaia,29 some Really Big Trees,30 or the holy of the
holies—the Great Pumpkin31—all without the benefit or impediment
of government sponsorship or persecution. At the same time, freedom
in the classical liberal tradition permits the Greta Garbos of the world
to exercise their freedom to be let alone.32
Property provides a buffer between government and the individual.
If an individual may utilize property as a means to a livelihood, as a
cushion against economic want, and as a physical place to be free from
the prying eyes of officious government employees, then the essential
relation between property and freedom is apparent. But if property
cannot be used without obtaining an assortment of arbitrary permis-
sions from a multitude of officials, if the right to earn a living from
property is made dependent on the good will of others, and if prop-
erty may be routinely entered and inspected as a condition of its use,
then the hallmarks of a free society are diminished.
Thus, the freedoms embodied in classical liberalism cannot be
considered in isolation. They are not hermetically sealed off from
one another and there are common threads running through them
all. In the views of the Founding Fathers, first and foremost of the
26. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I, IV, V.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
28. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) (A First Amendment case,
Justice Kennedy wrote, “The right to think is the beginning of freedom.”).
29. See David Spangler, The Meaning of Gaia: Is Gaia a Goddess or Just a Good Idea?, IN
CONTEXT, Late Winter 1990, at 44, available at http://www.context.org/ICLIB/IC24/Spangler
.htm.
30. For more, see Tree Worship, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tree_worship (last
visited June 23, 2012).
31. Worship of The Great Pumpkin was first recorded in 1959. See Religion of the Great
Pumpkin, COMIC BOOK RELIGION, http://www.comicbookreligion.com/?c=24710&The_Great
_Pumpkin (last visited June 23, 2012).
32. “I want to be let alone.” Greta Garbo in The Grand Hotel. See Greta Garbo, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greta_Garbo (last visited June 23, 2012).
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common threads was the right to own and use property. In his Essay
on Property, James Madison took a generous view of property, ex-
plaining that property and rights are one and the same, “As a man
is said to have a right to his property, he may be equally said to have
a property in his rights.”33 He later posited that if the United States
keeps the promise to respect property, greatness would be in store:
If the United States mean to obtain or deserve the full praise due
to wise and just governments, they will equally respect the rights
of property, and the property in rights: they will rival the govern-
ment that most sacredly guards the former; and by repelling its
example in violating the latter, will make themselves a pattern
to that and all other governments.34
The Founders’ respect for individual rights in property is under-
standable. To varying degrees, they were influenced by the likes
of John Locke and William Blackstone. In his Second Treatise on
Government, Locke had an almost libertarian take on property. In
one passage, for example, Locke suggested that the preservation of
property is the essential reason why government is instituted among
men:
And ’tis not without reason, that he [man] seeks out, and is willing
to joyn in Society with others who are already united, or have a
mind to unite for the mutual Preservation of their Lives, Liberties
and Estates, which I call by the general Name, Property.35
The consequence of a government’s failure to protect the property
of its citizens was severe:
[W]henever the Legislators endeavor to take away, and destroy
the Property of the People . . . they put themselves into a state
of War with the People, who are thereupon absolved from any
further Obedience . . . .36
33. James Madison, Property, in THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON (William T. Hutchinson et
al. eds., 1792), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch16s23.html.
34. Id.
35. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, SECOND TREATISE, § 123 (P. Laslett
ed., 1988).
36. Id. § 222. Accordingly, the Declaration of Independence echoed this theme: “[W]hen-
ever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends [life, liberty and the pursuit
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William Blackstone was equally effusive on property. In his
Commentaries on the Laws of England, he wrote:
There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and
engages the affections of mankind, as the right of property; or
that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exer-
cises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of
the right of any other individual in the universe.37
The recognition of the inseparable bond between property and
freedom remains alive to this day. In Lynch v. Household Finance
Corp., the Supreme Court noted:
[T]he dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is
a false one. Property does not have rights. People have rights. The
right to enjoy property without unlawful deprivation, no less than
the right to speak or the right to travel, is in truth, a “personal”
right, whether the “property” in question be a welfare check, a
home, or a savings account. In fact, a fundamental interdepen-
dence exists between the personal right to liberty and the per-
sonal right in property. Neither could have meaning without the
other. That rights in property are basic civil rights has long been
recognized.38
This long Western, British, and American embrace of a natural
law conception of property rights—rights that are inherent to man-
kind and not the boon of a magnanimous government—has not been
of course universally acknowledged or appreciated. Jean Jacques
Rousseau lamented the nature of private property:
The first man, who, after enclosing a piece of ground, took it into
his head to say, “This is mine,” and found people simple enough
to believe him, was the true founder of civil society. How many
crimes, how many wars, how many murders, how many misfor-
tunes and horrors, would that man have saved the human species,
of happiness], it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new
Government . . . .” THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
37. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
38. 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972) (citing J. LOCKE, OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 82–85 (1924); J.
Adams, A Defense of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America, in
F. COKER, DEMOCRACY, LIBERTY, AND PROPERTY 121–32 (1942); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *138–40).
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who pulling up the stakes or filling up the ditches should have
cried to his fellows: Be sure not to listen to this imposter; you are
lost, if you forget that the fruits of the earth belong equally to us
all, and the earth itself to nobody!39
There have been many successors to Rousseau. From Karl Marx
to Lenin to Mao, many scholars and political leaders have had little
use for a philosophy of rights that elevates individuals above their
governments and that attempts to justify and cement the inequalities
that inevitably arise in a system of laws that distributes property and
wealth on principles other than total equality. Rousseau also presaged
a more modern attack on private property—the notions of deep ecol-
ogy that animates a core ethos within the environmental movement.
In his Discourse on Inequality he posited that without civilization
and all its accouterments, men would be in a state of perfect health
and bliss.40
This tradition is seen today in the deep ecology movement, which
eschews modern industrialization and technology.41 As will be shown,
while the egalitarianism most famously championed by Marx and
Engels was the greatest threat to traditional understandings of and
respect for private property in the19th and 20th centuries, the rise
of environmentalism poses an equally serious challenge in the 21st.
II. THE RISE OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
On the eve of the first Earth Day in 1970, the propaganda machine
was in full swing. The earth was in decline. The world’s population
was headed toward massive famine of apocalyptic dimensions.42 Our
air and water were poisoned.43 The great animals were on a fast train
to extinction, and Noah was absent, his God having recently died.44
A mock documentary on public television portrayed two greedy cap-
italist developers in the near(?) future shaking hands as the last
39. JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE INEQUALITY AMONG MANKIND, PART II, at 1, available
at http://www.bartleby.com/34/3/2.html.
40. JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE INEQUALITY AMONG MANKIND, PART I, at 9, available
at http://www.bartleby.com/34/3/1.html (“Man therefore, in a state of nature where there are so
few sources of sickness, can have no great occasion for physic, and still less for physicians . . . .”).
41. See, e.g., DEVAL & SESSIONS, supra note 23.
42. See, e.g., PAUL R. EHRLICH, THE POPULATION BOMB (Ballantine Books 1971).
43. See, e.g., RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1962).
44. The death was reported in a Time cover story. Is God Dead?, TIME, Apr. 8, 1966, avail-
able at http://www.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19660408,00.html.
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square foot of land in America was paved under. It wasn’t subtle, but
it was effective.
In order to stave off the coming calamities, Congress and the Nixon
White House lurched into action. In the space of a few short years,
Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,45
Clean Air Act of 1970,46 turned relatively ineffectual water pollution
laws into the powerhouse of the Clean Water Act in 1972,47 and, in
what turned out to be true wolf in endangered megafauna’s clothing,
the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) in 1973.48
In addition, in order to combat toxic wastes, Congress passed the
Toxic Substances Control Act in 1976 (“TSCA”)49 and the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (“RCRA”).50 A few years
later, in response to a perceived toxic waste calamity at Love Canal,51
Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA” or “Superfund”).52
There are other federal statutes as well.53 In addition, and largely
beyond the scope of this article, all the states have adopted their own
environmental laws which serve to complement the federal laws.
These statutes changed everything, and everything was changed
in ways that were mostly unanticipated by those who adopted them.
If there is one truism about the combined weight of these statutes,
it is that they went way beyond Euclidean zoning in their ability to
convert the right to develop and use property into a privilege where
the ultimate decision-making powers were wrested from the owners
and given to the public, the bureaucrats, and the courts. The enact-
ment of each one of these statutes, combined with the associated regu-
lations and enforcement actions, have served to reduce the freedom
of individual landowners to utilize property as the owners see fit. In
45. 42 U.S.C. § 4321, et seq. (1970).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 7401, et. seq. (1970).
47. 33 U.S.C. § 1251, et seq. (1972).
48. 16 U.S.C. § 1531, et seq. (1973).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. (1976).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 6901, et seq. (1976).
51. Love Canal was the site of a toxic waste site that later became a residential neigh-
borhood. It became the subject of national and international attention in the mid-1970s. See
Love Canal, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Love_Canal (last visited June 23, 2012).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 9601, et seq. (1980).
53. For a complete list, see Summaries of Environmental Laws and EOs, UNITED STATES
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/lawsregs/laws/#env (last visited
June 23, 2012).
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some cases, the freedom of individuals has been circumscribed in
other ways as well. The alleged external harms caused by particular
land uses may well have justified the expansion of the statutory law
after the common law proved inadequate to prevent and remedy con-
cerns over pollution. Nevertheless, the question of how much individ-
ual freedom has been sacrificed in pursuit of an environmental utopia
has been seldom asked. In a few years we will be entering the fifth
decade of robust environmental regulation. It may be time to con-
sider what we have wrought, and whether it is time to alter course.
A. The Endangered Species Act
The Endangered Species Act54 (“ESA”) is the most powerful of all
environmental laws.55 In the early 1970s, public angst over the fate
of charismatic megafauna such as the bald eagle, trumpeter swan,
peregrine falcon, various whales, grizzly bears, and similar animals
led to a clamor for federal protection. With the ESA, species received
federal protection. But we also got a whole lot more than virtually
anyone anticipated. The reach of the Act is not confined to mega-
fauna; it covers virtually every plant and animal including many
that Congress never considered in its wildest collective imagination
as deserving federal protection. Nor is it likely that Congress appre-
ciated that species would be protected, “whatever the cost.”56
The mechanisms of the Act are far-reaching and the impacts of
the ESA on economic activity have been legendary.
1. Spotted owl—imperiled the timber industry in the Pacific
Northwest after a series of lawsuits filed by environmen-
talists.57
54. 16 U.S.C. § 1531, et seq. (1973).
55. For a description of the impacts of the ESA and suggestions to reform the act, see
JOHNATHAN ADLER, REBUILDING THE ARK: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
REFORM (Jonathan H. Adler, ed. 2010).
56. In Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), the Supreme Court held that
a major federal dam project must be stopped because of a small fish called the snail darter.
The Court explained that the ESA required the protection of species above all else, “whatever
the cost.” Id. at 184. But see Brandon M. Middleton, Restoring Tradition: The Inapplicability
of TVA v. Hill’s Endangered Species Act Injunctive Relief Standard to Preliminary Injunctive
Relief of Non-Federal Actors, 17 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 318 (2010) (arguing that costs
should be a factor in ESA enforcement).
57. See IN A DARK WOOD, supra note 23.
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2. Delta Smelt—severe water cutbacks in California’s central
valley so more water is available for a five-inch minnow-
like fish have caused a regulatory drought—meaning farm-
ers have had to fallow hundreds of thousands of acres of
farmland and farmworkers have experienced much higher
levels of unemployment.58
3. Klamath Basin—severe water cutbacks to save salmon
have caused severe economic distress to many farmers in
a region bordering California and Oregon.59
4. Grizzly bears, wolves—with the protection of the former
and reintroduction of the latter, western ranchers have be-
come bitterly opposed to the ESA, which they see as allow-
ing for depredations without adequate compensation.60
Beyond all these examples of economic impact, the ESA has worked
more fundamental changes. First, along with the Clean Water Act
described in the next section, the ESA has provided the federal gov-
ernment with the authority to wrest local land-use decision-making
powers from local and state governments (those powers that belonged
to landowners in the pre-Euclid days). While nowhere does the ESA
explicitly usurp local land use decision-making powers, it has that
practical effect. A local government may, for example, decree that
Greenacre be used for ecosmart affordable working class housing.
But if an endangered or threatened plant or critter is found on
Greenacre, the owners may be required to attempt to obtain a fed-
eral incidental take permit before building to avoid running afoul of
Section 9,61 and if any federal permits or actions are required (say the
filling of a wetland or the use of federal low-income housing grant
58. See, e.g., Delta Smelt, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Delta_smelt (last visited
June 23, 2012).
59. Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Fish, Farms, and the Clash of Cultures in the
Klamath Basin, 30 ECOLOGY L. Q. 279 (2003).
60. See, e.g., Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Christy
v. Lujan, 490 U.S. 1114 (1989) (holding that depredation by protected bears is not a taking);
Brian N. Beisher, Are Ranchers Legitimately Trying to Save Their Hides or Are They Just
Crying Wolf—What Issues Must Be Resolved Before Wolf Reintroduction to Yellowstone National
Park Proceeds, 29 LAND & WATER L. REV. 417 (1994). For information supporting wolf in-
troductions, see Gray Wolf, DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, http://www.defenders.org/wildlife_and
_habitat/wildlife/wolf,_gray.php (last visited June 23, 2012). For a view calling for active manage-
ment of wolf populations, see the statement of the Rocky Mountain Elk Foundation at http://
rliv.com/wolf/WolvesND09_LOWREZ.pdf (last visited June 23, 2012).
61. 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (1973) (prohibiting taking protected species without federal permission).
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moneys), then the federal agencies must comply with Section 762 of
the act (which requires extensive preactivity review and possible
mitigation). More significantly to local governments, however, are
those cases suggesting that a local or state government official who
issues a permit that might result in a “take” of a species may be held
liable for violating the ESA.63 Clearly, with the overlay of the ESA,
local land use regulation is not what it used to be.64
But there has also been a more fundamental shift with respect to
the individual property owner. With the enactment and enforcement
of the ESA, the federal government now holds a de facto conservation
easement, or at least a negative covenant, over private land that con-
tains endangered plants or animals and a potential easement over
all other property that might someday be found to contain a species
that might someday be listed.
In the circumstance of a private easement, one party acquires an
easement over the land of another in a voluntary exchange, with the
payment of consideration, and the availability of private enforcement
mechanisms enforceable by arbitration or a court. But the imposition
of species easements is quite different. There is often little or no notice
to the landowner that the federal government has acquired authority
over the property. There is certainly no payment of consideration.
And, most distressing to a landowner, the easement can be enforced
with massive fines or imprisonment. It is no wonder that some land-
owners have been become bitter over the legacy of the ESA.
Whether the ESA has saved any species may depend on what we
mean by “saved.” Has the ESA allowed the “recovery” of a meaning-
ful number, or at least a nonzero number, of species? Or has it pre-
vented the slide of species into the abyss of extinction? By the recovery
62. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1973) (requiring federal agency consultation for federal actions affect-
ing protected species).
63. See, e.g., Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1997) (permitting by state regulators
of lobster fishing, which may interfere with endangered whales, could be a take in violation of
the Endangered Species Act).
64. Rarely asked, however, is whether the federal government actually possesses such
local land-use powers under our constitutional system that considers that government to be
one of limited jurisdiction, with only the powers enumerated in the Constitution. Especially with
respect to non-commercial intrastate species, arguments have been raised that not even the
New Deal era expansion of the Commerce Clause provides the federal government the authority
to impose species-based restrictions on land use. So far, however, these challenges to federal
authority have been unsuccessful. See, e.g., San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Authority v.
Salazar, 638 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __ (2011) (holding that regulation of
intrastate fish did not violate Commerce Clause).
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standard, most acknowledge that the ESA hasn’t done much. But
the ESA’s defenders posit that it has met the “slide into the abyss”
standard—though this is more through supposition than any hard
evidence. After all, we don’t have a spare Earth handy to test the effi-
cacy of the ESA against the parallel universe Earth that lacks an ESA.
On whether the ESA does any harm to endangered and threatened
species, there have always been whispered but, for obvious reasons,
largely unverified tales of landowners who deal with their endangered
species “problem” with the “shoot, shovel, and shut-up” trifecta. But
there are more plausible, and documented, stories of landowners
“preplanning” for the arrival of endangered species by rendering land
unfit for nonhuman habitation. Owners of southern pine plantations
are thought to be harvesting trees early and before the trees are
mature enough to develop cavities that red-cockaded woodpeckers
are wont to interpret to be an “open house” invitation.65 Owners of
meadows likely to attract the endangered preble’s meadow-jumping
mouse have taken similar actions.66
Species protection is a public good, like any other public good. When
the cost of anything approaches zero, the demand for that good will
trend toward the infinite. With the ESA, not only is the cost to the gov-
ernment of acquiring control over private property close to zero, but
there is the added incentive of costs and attorneys’ fees for anyone who
successfully sues the federal government over the need to list addi-
tional species and set aside critical habitat for those species. With
that, entities like the Center for Biological Diversity (“CBD”) and
others have embarked on mass-litigation tactics to list hundreds of
species and set aside hundreds of thousands of acres of public and
private land as critical habitat. Landowners are not happy.
In 2005, Congressman Richard Pombo engineered the passage of
the most sweeping reform of the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) since
it was passed in 1973. HR 3824, The Threatened and Endangered
Species Recovery Act of 2005, would have required more workable
habitat restoration and better peer review science for listings.67 Most
intriguingly, it contained a compensation mechanism that would have
65. Jonathan Adler, The Leaky Ark: The Failure of Endangered Species Regulation on
Private Land, in ADLER, supra note 55, at 16.
66. Id. at 17.
67. See Threatened and Endangered Species Recovery Act of 2005, H.R. Rep. No. 109-237
(2005) available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-109hrpt237/pdf/CRPT-109hrpt237.pdf.
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rewarded landowners for maintaining endangered species habitats
rather than the current practice of punishing landowners with a
massive devaluation of their land values. While it passed the House
with bipartisan support, it failed in the Republican-controlled Senate.
To thank Representative Pombo for his efforts, the environmental
community labeled Pombo an “eco-thug” and flooded his district with
attack ads and volunteers in order to ensure his defeat at the 2006
election.68
Despite the clout of powerful environmental groups, the escalating
and economic regulatory gridlock engendered by groups like CBD
may someday be too much for Congress and the American public. It
is one thing to take on the logging industry in the Pacific Northwest,
or the farmers in central California, or an isolated reservoir here or
a major energy pipeline in the West. But as the impacts of the Act
ratchet down on more and more landowners, and the affected land-
owners begin to understand more clearly how the ESA has effectively
imposed an uncompensated easement upon their lands, Congress may
be forced to fix what’s broken. Until then, however, the ESA will re-
main a deeply flawed vehicle that has not begun to meet its promise
for protecting species on private land.69
B. The Clean Water Act—Wetlands Regulation
Another statute of far broader consequence than anticipated is
the Clean Water Act’s provisions for the protection of wetlands. The
CWA’s stated purpose was to restore the nation’s waters to swimming
and drinking standards. Section 404 of the CWA pertains to wet-
lands.70 Prior to the CWA, the Corps of Engineers had some control
over wetlands—those indisputably adjacent to navigable waters—
through the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.
Like the ESA, the CWA’s wetlands section has had a dramatic
impact and impingement on both state and local governments and
private landowners. If a landowner suspects there might be wetlands
on a parcel, the landowner may ask the United States Army Corps of
68. Rachel Gordon, Challenger Defeats Pombo in a Stunner, S.F. GATE, Nov. 8, 2006, avail-
able at http://articles.sfgate.com/2006-11-08/bay-area/17318630_1_jerry-mcnerney-pombo-and
-doolittle-evasion.
69. See generally ADLER, supra note 55.
70. 33 U.S.C. § 1344, et seq.
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Engineers to perform a “wetlands delineation” of the property. Alter-
natively, the owner may ask the Corps to approve of a delineation per-
formed by a consultant for the landowner. If wetlands are found, the
landowner usually must obtain a Section 404 permit prior to under-
taking any activities that affect the wetlands. However, if the owner
disagrees with the delineation, there is no recourse. For example,
assume a local government desires to build a playground on land it
does not think contains wetlands. If the Corps considers the property
a wetland under its jurisdiction, then the municipality must either
apply for a permit at great cost71 or risk an enforcement action with
concomitant fines and even criminal penalties.72 Most disturbingly,
the landowner cannot challenge a wetlands delineation in court.73
The toll of Section 404 can weigh even more heavily on individual
landowners without the resources to fight back and who become en-
tangled in an enforcement action. For example, if a landowner does
not even suspect that a parcel contains wetlands, the owner may
innocently neglect to ask for a wetlands delineation before altering
the land—such as by grading the land to prepare it for farming or
development. This can lead to a surprise enforcement action in the
form of an Administrative Compliance Order. Based on “any evidence”
which could be as little as a drive-by observation or complaint from a
disgruntled neighbor, the EPA could issue a compliance order demand-
ing a restoration—with no avenue of appeal. This, in fact, is the fate
of the Sacketts from Priest Lake, Idaho. It is a system of neighbor
informing against neighbor.
In 2007, the Sacketts purchased a modest residential lot across the
street from Priest Lake, a navigable waterway. Michael Sackett was
an experienced local contractor, and knew well the implications of
wetlands. He also thought he knew a wetland when he saw one. But
alas, identifying a wetland can be notoriously difficult—and subject
71. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 721 (2006) (“The average applicant for an indi-
vidual permit spends 788 days and $271,596 in completing the process, and the average appli-
cant for a nationwide permit spends 313 days and $28,915—not counting costs of mitigation or
design changes.”).
72. Id. (“These costs cannot be avoided, because the Clean Water Act ‘impose[s] criminal
liability,’ as well as steep civil fines, ‘on a broad range of ordinary industrial and commercial
activities.’”).
73. Fairbanks N. Star Borough v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 543 F.3d 586 (9th
Cir. 2008), cert. denied, __ U.S. __ (2009) (wetlands jurisdictional delineation of playground
site not appealable under the Administrative Procedures Act because it did not constitute final
agency action).
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to widely divergent opinions.74 Shortly after the Sacketts began clear-
ing their lot in order to build their single-family home, they received
a compliance order from the EPA. In a nutshell, the order demanded
that the Sacketts restore their lot to the status quo ante, plant it
with native vegetation, and fence it off for three years.75 After three
years, if the Sacketts still wished to build, they could then apply for
a Section 404 permit which the Corps and EPA may or may not grant.
Only then could the Sacketts appeal the basic question of whether
their land contained any wetlands at all.
The Sacketts consulted wetlands consultants who agreed with the
Sacketts that the property was not in fact wetlands.76 Yet there was
nothing they could do.77 Every day that the Sacketts failed to restore
their “wetlands” meant another day of violating the compliance order
and a fine of $37,500 per day plus an additional fine of $37,500 per
day for violating the underlying statute.78 The Sacketts are under the
sword of Damocles, because the EPA may never bring an enforcement
action, or it might bring one tomorrow. Logically, one would think
that a couple in the predicament of the Sacketts could challenge the
compliance order before a neutral arbitrator, i.e., a federal court. And,
for nearly five years, they were told they could not. According to the
74. See, e.g., Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715.
75. See Scope of Work, Attachment 1 to EPA Compliance Order (Nov. 26, 2007), in Joint
Appendix Sackett v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, __ US __ (No. 10-1062),
2010 WL 7634112 at 25–29.
76. This would hardly be the first time the Corps and EPA have made a serious mistake
over the identification of wetlands. After spending 18 months in prison for illegally filling wet-
lands on a small residential lot, Ocie and Carey Mills, a father and son, went back to court over
the adequacy of their restoration of their wetlands. This time, however, the court concluded
that their property had never been wetlands to begin with. See, e.g., United States v. Mills,
817 F. Supp. 1546 (N.D. Fla. 1992), aff’d, 36 F.3d 1052 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S.
1112 (1995).
77. Unless they wanted to take the other option of ignoring the order, continuing the filling,
and waiting to see if the EPA would bring civil and criminal charges against them—in which
case they could bring a defense that the land was not a wetlands. But such a course of action
is inadvisable.
78. As of the date of the Sacketts filing their opening brief before the Supreme Court, the
accumulated fines totaled over $40 million dollars for violating the order alone. Opening Brief
Sackett v. United States EPA, __ US __ (2011) (No. 10-1062), 2011 WL 4500687, available at
http://www.pacificlegal.org/document.doc?id=567. If violations of the act itself are added in,
the fines can be up to $75,000 per day, or over $80 million for the Sacketts’ small lot. The gov-
ernment admitted at oral argument that these fines amount to $75,000 per day of violation.
Oral Argument, Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency (2012) (No. 10-1062), 2012 WL
38639 at 26, 1.15–1.18, available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument
_transcripts/10-1062.pdf.
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Ninth Circuit, neither the CWA nor the Administrative Procedures
Act provides judicial review.79 The only remedy, according to Ninth
Circuit, is to wait until EPA brings an action against the Sacketts for
violating the order, or for the Sacketts to restore the putative wetland,
wait, and apply for a permit—a permit that may or may not allow the
Sacketts to challenge EPA’s finding that there were jurisdictional
wetlands on their property.80
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court reversed.81 First, the
Court held that the ACO was a final agency action because there was
no post-ACO process and the ACO had legal effects, such as reme-
dial obligations, civil penalties, and increased difficulties in obtain-
ing permits.82 Second, any available review was inadequate because
the Sacketts cannot initiate review but must risk EPA’s penalties and
because judicial review of a permit denial from the Corps would not
provide an adequate remedy for the ACO from the EPA.83 Finally, the
Court found that the judicial review of ACOs will not harm EPA’s
enforcement powers. While avoidance of judicial review might be
more efficient, efficiency is not a sufficient reason for evading judi-
cial review.84 But the Sacketts are hardly out of the woods. Now they
must return to district court and argue, presumably on a very limited
record, that their property does not contain wetlands. The trouble
is that no one really understands the definition of a wetlands. As
Justice Alito pointed out in a concurrence in Sackett, “[r]eal relief
requires Congress to do what it should have done in the first place:
provide a reasonably clear rule regarding the reach of the Clean
Water Act.”85
Notably, the Sackett decision does not address the first problem
normally addressed by landowners: whether a jurisdictional deter-
mination is reviewable. At best, Sackett indicates that the Court was
distressed about the hardships engendered by unreviewable agency
79. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701, et seq. See Sackett v. United States
EPA, 622 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010).
80. The Sacketts may apply for an after-the-fact permit only after their property has been
restored pursuant to the compliance order. If the permit is approved, they cannot challenge
the compliance order. If the permit is denied, they can challenge the wetlands determination,
but not the compliance order per se.
81. Sackett v. EPA, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012).
82. Id. at 1371.
83. Id. at 1372–73.
84. Id. at 1374.
85. Id. at 1375 (Alito, J., concurring).
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actions. But whether Sackett translates into greater reviewability of
agency actions beyond Clean Water Act ACOs remains to be seen.86
The point of cases like the Sacketts and the Mills87 before them is
that a fundamental interest in property ownership no longer exists
for vast numbers of property owners who are saddled with wetlands,
real or imagined, subject to federal jurisdiction or otherwise. The
development of any property is fraught with peril so long as a fed-
eral agency can swoop and demand compliance with a finding of
wetlands without any practical recourse for the affected landowner.
And because of the ambiguities in the basic definition of what is a
wetland, and with the federal government’s expansive reach in de-
fining navigable waterways, the CWA represents another shift in the
ownership of property rights away from the individual and toward the
federal government. In essence, with Section 404, the federal govern-
ment has obtained an easement, fully realized or inchoate depending
on whether “wetlands” have been identified yet, over a vast acreage
of property in the United States.
C. The Clean Air Act
There is enormous pressure on the federal government to “do
something” about the specter of anthropogenic global warming. With
“greenhouse gasses” having recently been brought under the ambit
of the Clean Air Act with an endangerment finding, the potential for
further incursions on property rights is palpable. At present, EPA is
proposing what it calls a “tailoring rule” wherein it will regulate only
emitters of more than 50 tons of greenhouse gases. The rule is an
eminently pragmatic response to the absurd potential that EPA could
otherwise be forced to impose a permitting regime over every bakery,
dry cleaner, office building, and homeowner with a fireplace in the
United States. For better or worse, the tailoring rule, however, has
no basis in law.
For landowners, one threat looming on the horizon is the impact
attempts to regulate greenhouse gasses will have on land develop-
ment. Already in California, which has passed its own greenhouse gas
86. For further analysis, see Robert Meltz, The Supreme Court Allows Pre-Enforcement
Review of Clean Water Act Section 404 Compliance Orders: Sackett v. EPA, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE, Report 7-5700 (March 26, 2012), available at http://www.nationalaglaw
center.org/assets/crs/R42450.pdf.
87. See supra note 76.
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law, AB 32,88 there are initiatives underway to regulate and restrict
residential development under the assumption that people driving
to and from their new homes will add to the output of greenhouse
gasses.89 When added to existing land use restrictions, this may con-
stitute yet another uncompensated land use restriction.
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF GROWING GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP
OF INTERESTS IN LAND
A. Government Interests in Private Property
The federal government owns nearly one-third of the nation’s
landmass in fee. When land owned by state and local governments
is added, we see that between 40–50% of the nation’s landmass is
owned by government.90 As governments at all levels embark on
efforts to acquire additional land for conservation purposes, these
percentages are increasing.
With the growing regulatory control over wetlands and endangered
species in the United States, the federal government has gained a
servitude in the millions of acres that once were not subject to fed-
eral regulation. For example, in the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service’s most recent report, issued in 2006, total wetland acreage
in the United States was estimated to be 107.7 million acres91 to 110
88. California Health & Safety Code § 39650 et seq. See California Environmental Protection
Agency Air Resources Board, available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ab32/ab32.htm.
89. See Patricia E. Salkin, Sustainability and Land Use Planning: Greening State and Local
Land Use Plans and Regulations to Address Climate Change Challenges and Preserve Resources
for Future Generations, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 121 (2009).
90. Over 900 million acres out of a total of 2.2 billion acres are owned by state and local
governments. State by State Government Land Ownership, PROPERTY RIGHTS RESEARCH
(June 6, 2004), available at http://www.propertyrightsresearch.org/nationalfrms.htm (follow
“2004 Archives” hyperlink; then follow “June” hyperlink; then scroll down to “State by State
Government Land Ownership, 06-02-04”). In the Western states, that figure is closer to 81%.
Western States Data, WILDLAND FIRE (Nov. 13, 2007), http://www.wildlandfire.com/docs/2007
/western-states-data-public-land.htm (last visited June 23, 2012). However, the figures on how
much land is owned by state governments is not well known and the exact amount of land owned
by the federal government is subject to some uncertainty as well. See Anthony Randazzo & John
M. Palatiello, Knowing What You Own: An Efficient Government How-To Guide for Managing
State and Local Property Inventories, REASON FOUNDATION POLICY STUDY 383 (June 2010),
available at http://reason.org/files/how_to_manage_or_sell_state_local_property.pdf; Anthony
Randazzo & John M. Palatiello, Knowing What You Own: An Efficient Government How-To
Guide for Managing Federal Property Inventories, REASON FOUNDATION POLICY STUDY 384
(June 2010), available at http://reason.org/files/how_to_manage_or_sell_federal_property.pdf.
91. Claudia Copeland, Wetlands: An Overview of Issues, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
(July 12, 2010), available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RL33483.pdf.
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million acres, excluding Alaska.92 With the uncertainty over what
is and what is not a wetlands subject to federal jurisdiction, prudent
landowners are told that they ought to consult first with the federal
government before engaging in earthmoving activities. Even if prop-
erty contains no wetlands, it could be listed as critical habitat for
threatened and endangered species throughout the United States.93
Even if private property is not designated as critical habitat, it re-
mains unlawful to “take” an endangered species. Because a take can
include habitat modification, landowners no longer own an absolute
right to utilize their property in a way that could affect a species. To
date, no court has found a significant constitutional limit on the
growth of federal restrictions on private land development.
B. Conservation Easements
1. Conservation Easements and the Common Law
In addition to control over real property through regulatory fiat,
there is a growing use of conservation easements to accomplish the
same ends. With a conservation easement, the fee title to land is
divided up with the underlying ownership remaining in the original
owner and a “conservation easement” is sold or donated (not always
voluntarily) to a governmental entity or an NGO. The owner of the
conservation easement has the right, in perpetuity, to prevent new
development in the newly encumbered parcel. In other words, if the
owner of a farm or cow pasture sells or donates a conservation ease-
ment on his land, he may never again have the right to improve the
property, build on it, or sometimes even convert it to another use if
the existing use becomes uneconomic.94
92. See Five-Year Survey Shows Wetlands Losses are Slowing, Marking Conservation
Gains and Need for Continued Investment in Habitat UNITED STATES FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE
(Oct. 6, 2011), available at http://www.fws.gov/wetlands/Documents/Status-and-Trends-of
-Wetlands-in-the-Conterminous-United-States-2004-to-2009-News-Release.pdf.
93. There are no readily available estimates of the total critical habitat acreage in the
United States, although the raw data for individual species can be found at: Critical Habitat,
U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, http://www.fws.gov/gis/data/national/index.html (last visited
June 23, 2012).
94. For a history of conservation easements and a discussion of some of the challenges they
create, see Julia D. Mahoney, Perpetual Restrictions on Land and the Problem of the Future,
88 VA. L. REV. 739 (2002).
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Conservation easements work by splitting an estate in real property
into two or more parts and throwing at least one of those parts into
the dustbin of history. The purpose behind conservation easements
is that they provide a mechanism that will permanently protect land
from development. It is a dubious proposition that is contradicted by
over seven centuries of legal tradition.
In a typical case, a parcel of land that is presently used for rural
agricultural purposes (ranching, farming, or timber harvesting) is
subdivided so that its “development rights” are severed from its lower
intensity agricultural uses. These development rights are in turn
sold, donated, or condemned by a government agency or private land
trust (which may in turn sell those rights to the government). The gov-
ernment or land trust now owns a “conservation easement” over the
property. The owner of the underlying estate may continue to use the
property for agricultural uses, but is proscribed from any additional
development of new infrastructure or buildings. In many instances
the owner of the conservation easement may also acquire the right to
regulate the nature of the agricultural use to maximize the protection
of ecological values. A farmer may be prevented from replacing or up-
grading farm buildings, a rancher may be ordered to avoid riparian
areas or to reduce the density of cattle, or a timber owner may be pro-
scribed from clear cutting or rebuilding access roads.
Conservation easements present a significant challenge to tradi-
tional understandings of real property interests because they are new,
were not allowed under the common law governing real property, and
may detract from the role that property ownership plays in maintain-
ing the independence and liberty of the landowner. What is most anti-
thetical about the relationship between conservation easements and
traditional understandings of property law is that these easements
contradict the long tradition of the law that has rebuffed attempts of
present generations to control the actions of future generations.
Since at least the 13th century, every major attempt to change real
property law has resulted in unintended consequences. Every attempt
to restrict the ability of future generations to put property to pro-
ductive use has been eliminated or watered down in relatively short
order. There will be unintended consequences of the accelerating trend
to create conservation easements on a massive scale. Nobody can pre-
sume to know precisely what those consequences will be—but a few
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good guesses are in order. We also do not know what future genera-
tions will think of conservation system easements, but it would be
naive to believe that conservation easements will survive precisely as
the creators of these easements now postulate or that future genera-
tions will not alter or abandon those easements as necessity requires.
There is an expression in the law that the “dead hand cannot reach
beyond the grave to control the living.” Or, as one state Supreme
Court put it, “society is better off, if property is controlled by its liv-
ing members than if controlled by the dead.”95 What the court meant
was that if the members of future generations cannot decide what to
do with their property, society and the economy will suffer. But first
a little history of the English common law of property is in order.
If there is one short phrase that can best some up the history of
the English common law of property, it is a trend toward pragmatic
utilitarianism. As we have moved from the feudal estates set up by
William the Conqueror after the Battle of Hastings in 1066 to the
Industrial Age, the move has always been, in fits and starts and a
few temporary back steps, toward the free alienability of land.
After William the Conqueror acquired his real estate holdings in
England, he rewarded many of his nobles in the military with estates
in land. That is when the feudal system of land tenure is usually
considered to have begun in England. William’s supporters, however,
did not acquire the land outright. They did not have a right to sell
the land or pass it onto their heirs without the King’s permission.
They were required to provide certain obligations such as perform-
ing specified duties or providing knights, money, or food to the King
in exchange for the right of keeping their land.
Over time, the nobles chafed under the absolute control of the King.
Political tensions between the nobles and King John escalated into a
battle at Runnymede where the King, in the face of superior military
power, agreed to the Magna Carta, first adopted in 1215. Among other
things, the Magna Carta established that should a nobleman die, his
heir had the right to inherit the nobleman’s estate after payment of
only a reasonable sum of no more than £100 to the King.96 In other
words, the King could no longer attempt to regain the estate after a
nobleman’s death in derogation of the nobleman’s heirs.
95. Cast v. National Bank of Commerce Trust & Sav. Ass’n of Lincoln, 183 N.W.2d 485,
490 (Neb. 1971).
96. The Magna Carta, Para. 2 (1215).
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Another one of the abiding tensions in the development of the com-
mon law has been the desire by some to sell or devise property with
strings attached. Most commonly, the owners of large estates wanted
to make sure that the property would remain in the family estate in
perpetuity and not be dissipated by spendthrift heirs. At the same
time, however, the inheritors of that property desired the freedom to
do with it what they wished without being ruled by the dead hands of
their ancestors. The law has been seesawing on this issue for nearly
800 years. But inexorably, the trend has favored free alienability. The
developments include97:
• 1225: D’Arundel’s Case: A conveyance to “A and his heirs” per-
mitted A to convey to third parties, despite the interest of the
heirs. One of the earliest cases promoting the free alienability
of land.98
• 1285: Statute de Donis Conditionalibus: Created “entails” or
“fee tails” wherein a conveyance to A and his heirs forbad A
from selling the property in fee if there were heirs. This lasted
for about 200 years.99
• 1290: Statute Quia Emptores: Ended the creation of new feu-
dal obligations, and permitted freeman to sell property. Meant
to reform feudal estates, this statute unintentionally led to the
ultimate end of the feudal system.100
• 1583: Spencer’s Case: Provided that covenants could run with
the land, but required such covenants to meet strict tests, to
prevent such covenants from interfering with free alienability
of land.101
97. For a long list of statutes and cases exemplifying the back and forth struggle in the
common law to create perpetual interests, see EDWARD H. RABIN, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN
REAL PROPERTY LAW 213 (Foundation Press 1974). The cases here have been excerpted from
Rubin’s list.
98. Bracton’s Notebook, Case 1054; see discussion in John R. Rood, The Struggle for
Perpetuity, 8 MICH. L. REV. 181, 183–84 (1910).
99. The Statute of Westminster the Second (De Donis Conditionalibus), 1285, 13 Edw. 1
c. 1 (Eng.). See Rood, supra note 98, at 187–88. Rood notes disparagingly that the result of this
statute was “mischief” that “had to be endured” “for nearly two hundred years before a means
of evading it was discovered.”
100. 18 Edw. I, c. 1–2 (Eng.). See discussion in Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The
Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1303, 1319–20 (2003).
101. 5 Co. Rep. 16a, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (K.B. 1583) (Requirement that brick wall be built on
leased land upheld against sublessees because the parties so intended and the covenant
“touched and concerned” the land). For discussion of covenants that run with the land, see
Olin L. Browder, Running Covenants and Public Policy, 77 MICH. L. REV. 12 (1978).
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• 1660: Statute of Tenures: Abolished last incidents of feudal
land law, allowing tenants to devise lands without obligations
of knighthood.102
• 1682: Duke of Norfolk’s Case103: Established limits on the
ability to devise property to heirs with conditions and led to
Rule Against Perpetuities.104
• 1848: Tulk v. Moxhay105: Enforcement of restrictive covenant
upheld.
• 1886: Gray’s Rule Against Perpetuities: Limits ability of tes-
tators to control use of land for a period of time longer than
the last life in being plus 21 years.106
• 1948: Shelley v. Kraemer: 234 U.S. 1 (1948), United States
Supreme Court strikes down racially based restrictive cove-
nants—covenants that were enabled in large degree 100 years
earlier in 1848 in Tulk v. Moxhay.
• 1980s: Many states adopted laws, sometimes after lobbying by
The Nature Conservancy, that liberalized the ability to estab-
lish perpetual land trusts and conservation easements.
The purpose behind conservation easements (also known as con-
servation servitudes, futures, or scenic or open space easements) is
to destroy the economic utility of the development rights in the under-
lying fee. The idea is to put the development rights into the hands of
some third party—either the government or a nonprofit—which will
preserve the land forever from development. But quite clearly, such
easements are of questionable viability in light of the history of almost
800 years’ worth of common law that has inexorably moved toward
a system that promotes the economic utility of property through the
removal of restraints on alienation. For under the modern law, until
very recently, conservation easements would have been struck down
by the courts.107
102. 12 Charles II, c. 24 (1660). See Tenures Abolition Act 1660, THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES,
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/aep/Cha2/12/24/section/IV (last visited June 23, 2012).
103. 3 Ch. Ca. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (1682).
104. See discussion in Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 100, at 1319–20.
105. 2 Ph. 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (deed required perpetual maintenance of ornamental
garden for the benefit of the inhabitants of Leicester Square).
106. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (Roland Gray ed., 4th ed.
1942) (1886). For a discussion on the demise of the Rule Against Perpetuities in the United
States, see Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 100 (noting the rise of perpetual trusts to alleviate
the sometimes harshness of the rule and for federal estate tax purposes).
107. Andrew Dana & Michael Ramsey, Conservation Easements and the Common Law, 8
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 2, 12–17 (1989). See also Mahoney, supra note 94, at 748.
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Conservation easements first came into use in a significant way
in the 1930s, often with government purchasing easements for high-
way viewsheds and the like. These easements often proved impractical
and difficult to manage. There were also serious questions about the
viability of such easements in light of principles of property law.
To deal with this problem, in recent years many states have
adopted new laws that specifically allow for conservation system ease-
ments.108 These laws, many modeled after the Uniform Conservation
Easement Act,109 work to separate the fee from the development
rights, thereby making it even more difficult for future generations
to put land to a use contrary to the intent of owners at the time a
conservation system easement is created. These statutes generally
have no means for terminating the easement.
Florida, for example, adopted the following: (§ 704.06):
(2) Conservation easements are perpetual, undivided interests
in property and may be created or stated in the form of a restric-
tion, easement, covenant, or condition . . . .
. . . .
(4) Conservation easements shall run with the land and be
binding on all subsequent owners of the servient estate . . .
and shall entitle the holder to enter the land . . . to assure
compliance.110
In 1979, the California legislature declared that it was “in the
public interest of this state to encourage the voluntary conveyance
of conservation easements to qualified nonprofit organizations.”111 To
that end, it defined a conservation system easement to mean:
“[C]onservation easement” means any limitation in a deed, will,
or other instrument in the form of an easement, restriction, cove-
nant, or condition, which is or has been executed by or on behalf of
the owner of the land subject to such easement and is binding
upon successive owners of such land, and the purpose of which
108. See Mahoney, supra note 94, at 749–50.
109. Uniform Conservation Easement Act, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS (1982), available at http://www.cals.ncsu.edu/wq/lpn/PDFDocuments
/uniform.pdf.
110. Fla. Stat. § 704.06 (emphasis added).
111. Cal. Civ. Code § 815.
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is to retain land predominantly in its natural, scenic, historical,
agricultural, forested, or open-space condition.112
As in all the other states codifying conservation easements, in
California, a “conservation easement shall be perpetual in dura-
tion.”113 The statute further states that only nonprofits and govern-
mental entities may hold conservation easements. Special provisions
are made for the enforcement of such easements.
2. The Long-Term Implications of Conservation Easements
Conservation easements are a relatively new trend in the common
law, but they seek to achieve the same thing that large landowners
have tried to achieve for centuries: to determine today how an estate
of land shall be used for generations. Recognizing the history of the
common law of property, what are we to make of this modern attempt
to tie land in perpetuity? At this early stage in the history of conserva-
tion easements there are many more questions than answers, such as:
• What unintended consequences will there be?
• Will this lead to the agglomeration of huge estates of conser-
vation easements that will someday be the target of govern-
ment dissolution, as Henry VIII dissolved the monasteries in
the late 1530s?
• Will it lead to an ever diminishing supply of land for new home
construction, driving up the price of housing and driving an
ever increasing percentage of Americans into rental housing?
• Will the separation of the development rights from the under-
lying fee lead to the ultimate economic nonutility of the
underlying fee, leading to the widespread abandonment and
foreclosure of those lands?
• Have the creators of the modern conservation system ease-
ment truly created a mechanism that will allow the dead hand
to reach beyond the grave? Or will the common law ultimately
repeal even this attempt?
There may be mechanisms available today to break up existing
conservation easements. Traditional trusts are not inviolate. Courts
have long used a doctrine known as cy pres to alter existing trusts if
112. Cal. Civ. Code § 815.1 (emphasis added).
113. Cal. Civ. Code § 815.2(b) (emphasis added).
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a court finds that circumstances have changed so much that the in-
tent of the original trustor can no longer be met, or that it is against
public policy.114 Thus, a trust established to provide aid for persons
with smallpox might be transformed to allow the money to be used
to fight other diseases today. Or a trust that prohibits the use of its
scholarship funds for minorities might be modified today as being
against public policy.115 It is conceivable that the changed land owner-
ship patterns and economics of the future decades or centuries will
be enough for a court to break a conservation easement and allow the
development rights to be reunited with the owner of the fee.
If, however, the original grantor of the easement was paid for or
took a tax break for granting the easement, or realized the benefit
of lower property taxes, the termination of the easement will be
complicated. In addition, the likelihood that a court will terminate
a conservation easement just because the fee owner is facing financial
hardship is not a particularly likely scenario in today’s legal climate.
This will depend, however, on a court finding that a conservation ease-
ment is more like a covenant than a traditional easement in land—
courts usually do not reform easements on public policy grounds, but
covenants (such as racial restrictions) are more easily altered. It also
may depend on whether a court takes to heart the legislative intent
in many conservation easement statutes that the easement shall be
“perpetual.” Similarly, the legislative intent here is clearly a rejection
of the common law principle that the law should not hinder land from
being put to beneficial or productive use.
If a conservation easement is created for a specific purpose, such as
the preservation of a particular endangered species or endangered
animal, and the animal becomes extinct, then it is more conceivable
that the easement could be terminated.116 Conservation easements
are a troubling attempt to abrogate almost 800 years of common law
experience. What the next 800 years will bring is anybody’s guess.
114. See, e.g., Roger G. Sisson, Relaxing the Dead Hand’s Grip: Charitable Efficiency and
the Doctrine of Cy Pres, 74 VA. L. REV. 635 (1988) (arguing for expanded use of the doctrine).
115. See Frances Howell Rudko, The Cy Pres Doctrine in the United States: From Extreme
Reluctance to Affirmative Action, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 471 (1998).
116. For a discussion of conservation easements and the doctrine of changed circumstances,
see Jeffrey A. Blackie, Conservation Easements and the Doctrine of Changed Circumstances,
40 HASTINGS L.J. 1187 (1998). See also Gerald Korngold, Solving the Contentious Issues of
Private Conservation Easements: Promoting Flexibility for the Future and Engaging the Public
Land Use Process, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 1039 (2007).
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CONCLUSION
Since 1215, a pervasive trend in common law began to throw off
the control by the King and then other large landowners on the free
alienability of land. With the greater control over of the land by ordi-
nary citizens, so too did understandings of freedom grow for the com-
mon Englishman.117 Now we are moving in the opposite direction. The
right to develop property is increasingly controlled by government
through regulation, or outright ownership, or ownership of conser-
vation easements.
The history of land ownership patterns in the United States closely
mirrors the history of government power. The age of homesteading
of federal property and devolution of land to the states ended, for all
practical purposes, in the 1930s, at the same time the federal govern-
ment began its dramatic New Deal era expansion. In recent years the
federal government has gone on an acquisition binge. Land equals
power, and one follows the other. The adoption of the Endangered
Species Act and wetlands rules under the Clean Water Act are the
most dramatic government and power land grabs of this century. On
the state and local level, government is likewise acquiring more and
more property. The push toward the acquisition of conservation ease-
ments will accelerate this trend all the more. What will be the un-
intended consequences of placing more and more property into the
hands of governmental entities?
We must also ask if the diminishment of property rights is good
for the environment. With the ESA, there are many examples where
the threats to landownership from endangered species have caused
negative consequences. Backlash against other onerous land use
regulations could have similar effects. History has not been kind to
attempts to severely restrict, permanently or otherwise, the free
use and alienability of property. While the new environmental ethic
might indeed be as permanent as any major new religion, it is im-
possible to predict with certainty what the future may hold. If the
past is any guide to the future, some skepticism over attempts to
117. See PIPES, supra note 3, and SIEGAN, supra note 3, for broad discussions of the relation
between freedom and property. Pipes, especially, suggests that individual landownership cor-
relates to the English tradition of individual liberty as contrasted to the Russian experience
where ordinary citizens traditionally had neither property nor freedom.
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impose servitudes—whether regulatory or voluntary—over property
may be in order.
Moreover, the environment is not static. Lakes turn into meadows,
meadows into forests, and forests back into meadows. Rising sea levels
and temperatures may alter many ecosystems, just as much as falling
sea levels or cooling temperatures might. Invasive species are creat-
ing permanent changes in ecosystems across the globe. And yet with
statutory prescriptions and the growth of conservation easements,
we are attempting to freeze a dynamic environment in perpetuity.
Ultimately, if property and freedom are inexorably intertwined,
as several centuries of political philosophy and experience seem to
indicate, it might also be worthwhile to ponder what the ultimate
consequences for freedom might be caused by the diminishment of
property rights in the United States.
PROPERTY AND EMERGING ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES—
THE OPTIMISTS VS. THE PESSIMISTS
CAROL M. ROSE*
Over the last generation, market-based or property-based
mechanisms have been much discussed as a means to deal with
environmental problems. A turning point in this discussion came
with the United States’ acid rain control legislation of 1990, a cap-
and-trade program that has been widely heralded as a model for
other kinds of market-based environmental programs.1 While it was
not the first environmental legislation of its type—New Zealand in-
stituted a cap-and-trade program in fisheries in the mid-1980s2—the
scope and apparent success of the U.S. Acid Rain Program breathed
life into suggestions that economists had been making for many
years.3 More recently, market-based measures have been proposed
for many other environmental resources, including not only other
fisheries, but also wetlands, wildlife, grassland and forestry.4 In par-
ticular, ideas for controlling greenhouse gases have steadily raised
the possibility of property rights and trades in carbon emissions.5
Can property-based or market-based measures cure our environ-
mental ailments? Some say yes, and some say no. In fact, some have
been saying yes and others saying no for quite some time now, al-
though they have said yes and no in different ways over time. This
Article will recount several of the early cycles of the debate between
* Ashby Lohse Professor of Water and Natural Resource Law, University of Arizona
Rogers College of Law; Gordon Bradford Tweedy Professor of Law and Organization (emer.),
Yale Law School; J.D. Univ. of Chicago, 1977; Ph.D. Cornell Univ., 1970.
1. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651–7651o (2006).
2. Dallas DeLuca, One for Me and One For You: An Analysis of the Initial Allocation of
Fishing Quotas, 13 N.Y.U. L. J. 723, 754–55 (2005) (New Zealand adopted individual tradable
quota systems for fish in 1985 and 1986.).
3. See, e.g., J. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY AND PRICES 93–97 (1968) (early discussion of
tradable rights in pollution); Joseph Goffman, Title IV of the Clean Air Act: Lessons for
Success of the Acid Rain Emissions Trading Program, 14 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 177,
177–178 (2006) (describing success of the United States Acid Rain Program).
4. See, e.g., Jan Laitos, The Problem with Wilderness, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 503,
556–57 (describing tradable rights schemes for variety of resources).
5. See, e.g., William Boyd & James Salzman, The Curious Case of Greening in Carbon
Markets, 41 ENVTL. L. 73 (2011) (optimistic discussion of possibilities for greenhouse gas
trading schemes).
405
406 PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE JOURNAL [Vol. 1:405
the Optimists and the Pessimists, because even the early discussions
laid out some of the important possibilities—and the caveats—for
property solutions to currently emerging environmental problems.
I. THE BIG BET
One early version of the argument between the Optimists and the
Pessimists took the form of a bet. The bet was between the eminent
and very well-known biologist Paul Ehrlich (and some colleagues) on
the Pessimists’ side, and on the side of the Optimists, an economist
named Julian Simon, who at the time was much less well-known.6
But first, some background: in 1968, Ehrlich published a book called
The Population Bomb.7 In this book, he made the gloomy forecast
that, because of global population increases, the world was well on
its way to running out of food. The book struck a chord with the envi-
ronmentalist Zeitgeist of the late 1960s, and Ehrlich continued to ex-
pand and expound the main claim in other books and articles over the
next several years. By the mid 1970s, he was arguing that the world
was on the brink of running out of a number of essential resources.8
Meanwhile, Julian Simon was doing a slow burn. He had not be-
lieved the running-out thesis of The Population Bomb at the outset,
and he could not believe that Ehrlich’s Cassandra voice—joined by
others in the “Limits to Growth” camp—continued to sound with so
little challenge.9 Simon, an inveterate collector of data, thought that
the facts proved the thesis to be all wrong; population increases ac-
tually did not accompany greater poverty, but rather greater wealth.
We are not running out, Simon asserted. And what is more, Simon
was ready to make a bet on it.
6. An extensive background story on Simon and the bet is that of Ed Regis, The
Doomslayer, WIRED MAGAZINE, February 1997, 136, available at http://www.wired.com/wired
/archive/5.02/ffsimon_pr.html; see also John Tierney, Betting on the Planet, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2,
1990. For more on Simon’s intellectual approach, see Paul Dragos Aligica, Julian Simon and
the “Limits to Growth” Neo-Malthusianism, 1 ELECTRONIC J. OF SUSTAINABLE DEV., Issue 3, 74
(2007) available at http://173-45-244-96.slicehost.net/public/journal_article/16.
7. PAUL R. EHRLICH, THE POPULATION BOMB (1968).
8. PAUL R. EHRLICH & ANNE H. EHRLICH, THE END OF AFFLUENCE: A BLUEPRINT FOR
YOUR FUTURE (1974).
9. See, e.g., PAUL R. EHRLICH, THE POPULATION BOMB (revised ed. 1971); EHRLICH &
EHRLICH, supra note 8; somewhat later, PAUL R. EHRLICH & ANNE H. EHRLICH, THE POPULA-
TION EXPLOSION (1990); see also DONELLA H. MEADOWS ET. AL., THE LIMITS TO GROWTH: A
REPORT OF THE CLUB OF ROME’S PROJECT ON THE PREDICAMENT OF MANKIND (1972).
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Thus came Simon’s challenge. The opening salvo appeared on
the pages of the prestigious Science journal in 1980, where Simon
marshaled an impressive array of facts to argue that population in-
creases had accompanied increasing rather than diminishing re-
source availability.10 When Ehrlich and others responded that he was
outrageously wrong,11 Simon replied in the Social Science Quarterly
with The Bet, repeated in the pages of his 1981 book, The Ultimate
Resource.12 In an open offer to the public, he said that he would stake
$10,000 on a wager that prices would actually fall, not rise, for any
set of minerals or commodities chosen by anyone who dared to take
the wager, at any date the wager-taker chose—and he pointed to
Ehrlich as one of the people who should “put their money where
their mouth is.”13
Ehrlich took the bait, and gladly, too, saying that he wanted to
snap up this offer “before other greedy people jump in.”14 He and
two colleagues agreed with Simon on a basket of commodities, all
of which Ehrlich thought were going to rise in price substantially
because of increasing scarcity: chromium, copper, nickel, tin, and
tungsten. On paper, the three “bought” $2000 worth of each min-
eral, at the price on September 29, 1980, with the price to be com-
pared to the price (adjusted for inflation) on September 29, 1990.
The loser was then to pay the winner for the difference between the
two prices—Simon would pay if prices rose, and Ehrlich would pay
if prices fell.15
And who won? Simon won, hands down. Every single one of these
commodities was cheaper, some by as much as two-thirds. The up-
shot of the episode was that in October 1990, Paul Ehrlich sent a
check to Julian Simon for $576.07.16
How can this result have occurred? How did Simon know that he
could bet on that basket of commodities? What Simon was betting
10. Julian L. Simon, Resources, Population, Environment: An Oversupply of Bad News,
208 SCIENCE 1431 (1980).
11. See letters by Paul R. Ehrlich and several others, 210 SCIENCE 1296–1305 (1980), and
Simon’s response, id. at 1305–08.
12. JULIAN L. SIMON, THE ULTIMATE RESOURCE 25–27 (1981) [hereinafter SIMON, THE
ULTIMATE RESOURCE].
13. Id. at 27.
14. Paul R. Ehrlich, An Economist in Wonderland, 62 SOCIAL SCI. Q. 44, 46 (1981).
15. Id. at 46; JULIAN L. SIMON, THE ULTIMATE RESOURCE 2, at 35 (1996).
16. Regis, supra note 6.
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on was human ingenuity—ingenuity that is sparked by economic
incentives.17 Take tin, for example: tin prices rise when more people
want tin, or want more of it—say, when a new industrial power like
China or India or Brazil starts to demand more. Producers start work-
ing the margins, turning to locations that are more difficult to mine,
or that present higher transportation costs, or that have different
kinds of ore. But a more general way to look at the result of higher
prices is a little different, and implicitly, this is what Simon was bet-
ting on: higher prices encourage inventiveness. Engineers find better
ways to extract in tricky locations, chemists find new ways to reduce
ore, or scientists find something else that will substitute for tin. The
upshot is that because of human ingenuity, the costs of commodities
like tin do not rise when more people want more of them. Just as
likely, they drop.
The check in the mail to Simon, of course, was not the end of the
story. Thanks to the bet, Simon himself acquired some notoriety, as
did his message. Our natural resources, he said, are not going to run
out. The future will bring more, not less. Or, stated more technically,
human intellectual capital will substitute for natural capital.18
Can the bet be generalized? Well, to some degree, it probably can
be. Although Simon lamented that no one seemed to pay attention,
the importance of human capital in total social wealth has impressed
a number of authors over the last few decades.19 But there is some
room left over for the pessimists in all this, at least on the environ-
mental front. Reconsider for a moment the resources involved in
the bet: chromium, copper, nickel, tin, tungsten. Simon’s claim ap-
plied not only to those minerals, but also expanded to encompass
environmental resources. Air quality and water quality were among
them, and presumably they could expand to include the other usual
suspects like erosion, wildlife and wildlife habitat, not to mention
greenhouse gases.
So, does the bet about metals really capture those environmental
resources? There is at least one big difference between those metals
and the usual environmental subjects, and that difference is property.
17. SIMON, THE ULTIMATE RESOURCE, supra note 12, at 44–45.
18. Id. at 211–14.
19. See, e.g., Robert Solow, An Almost Practical Step Toward Sustainability, reprinted in
19 RESOURCE POLICY 162–72 (Sept. 1993) (describing matters like education and skill as part
of total “capital” along with natural resources).
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Somebody owns chromium, copper, nickel, etc. Moreover, someone
owns the land where those metals are mined; someone else owns the
product when it is made; someone else owns the substitutes when
they are made. Owning those things makes it worthwhile to invest in
new technology to extract and produce the metals and substitutes, be-
cause the owner gets the benefit of the investment. By the way, some-
one may own the technology itself, via the patent system—another
factor that makes it worthwhile to invest in useful invention.20
But consider environmental goods like air or wildlife or ground-
water: Who owns them? And who is going to invest in those resources
if there are no property rights in them, and hence no specific payoff
for investment? To be sure, someone might invest in unowned envi-
ronmental resources, and no doubt many do, but they have to share
the returns with all the other users—a situation that is likely to lead
to underinvestment. The same is true of investing in learning about
environmental resources: why learn about something if there is no
return for doing so? To be sure, some people do, out of love of learning.
This is not a trivial motivation. But unless it is supported by capital
investment—usually spurred by hope of return—love of learning can
only carry the learner so far.21
The point is that environmental goods are not like tin and tungsten.
Environmental goods are commons-es, or at least they have signifi-
cant commons or collective aspects, as the pessimists know very well.
Resources open to general common use have an unfortunate procliv-
ity toward overuse and underinvestment, because individual users
neither suffer the full consequences of their overuse nor take the gain
from their investment, and one might add, they have little incentive
even to learn about environmental goods, for the same reasons.
Simon was aware of this problem, distinguishing owned “resources”
from “pollution”—that is to say, pollution of unowned environmental
goods—even though he did not dwell on the issue.22 But others have.
Perhaps because of its catchy title, the presentation that is probably
best known is Garrett Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons.”23 To be
20. See Carol M. Rose, Scientific Innovation and Environmental Protection: Some Ethical
Considerations, 32 ENVTL L. 755 (2002) (linking scientific investigation to gains secured by
property rights and describing knowledge gap for unowned environmental resources).
21. Id.
22. SIMON, THE ULTIMATE RESOURCE, supra note 12, at 129.
23. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
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sure, Hardin, the iconic theoretical pessimist, used a bad example
when he picked the medieval commons as an illustration of the
commons problem (or more properly designated, the “open access”
problem);24 the medieval common fields were in fact owned by de-
fined groups, and their productivity lasted a thousand years. But
Hardin’s story has more resonance for environmental resources in
which there is no owner and no restraint on access, and Hardin did
list pollution among the important commons or open access issues—
air pollution and water pollution, along with deforestation and wild-
life mismanagement.
In retrospect, Ehrlich and his friends should not have bet on tin.
They should have bet on coral reefs, or codfish on the George’s Bank,
or on the hole in the ozone layer, not to speak of the levels of carbon
dioxide in the atmosphere. That is the environmental pessimists’ an-
swer to the Simon’s victory in the great bet: the bet was about the
wrong kind of resources. The bet may be a winner for Simon with
tungsten, but it would not have been so successful with New England
cod. The bet may have been a winner for tin, but not so good for the
polar ice caps.
Simon himself argued that the air was getting cleaner too, and he
implied that this occurred without the benefit of air pollution regu-
lation, though he was not entirely straightforward on the matter.25
But Simon wanted people to look at facts, not theories, and the facts,
he said, were that environmental resources have been improving too.26
But if so, he did not explain how it happened (if it did), and that is why
theory is important: if we don’t know how it happened, we don’t know
how to replicate the success. We do know how it happened with tin—
property rights would drive investment in tin and substitutes for
tin. We do not know with coral reefs, and in fact, coral reefs are not
looking so good these days.
A more modest version of Simon’s general view, and one that he
apparently agreed with, is that developing areas suffer environmental
24. For the distinction between open access and commons, see ELINOR OSTROM, GOV-
ERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 23, 48–49,
222 n.23 (1990).
25. Regis, supra note 6 (saying that air quality had improved steadily with no notable
difference when legislation had passed). On the other hand, Simon elsewhere did somewhat
reluctantly attribute environmental improvement to public pressure for political measures;
see SIMON, THE ULTIMATE RESOURCE, supra note 12, at 138–42.
26. SIMON, THE ULTIMATE RESOURCE, supra note 12, at 130–36.
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degradation at the outset of the development process, but then im-
prove as they grow wealthier and can devote more resources to the
environment. The environment in this story is a kind of luxury good.27
But even with this modified version of the optimistic story, it would
be enormously helpful to know how and why improvement occurs.
As people become wealthier, do they invest individually in the collec-
tive good of environmental protection, and if so, what induces them to
do so? Do they take collective action—including legislation—to over-
come the commons problems that environmental resources present,
and if so, how do they overcome the collective action problem? In
short, given that environmental goods are still commons-es even as
wealth increases, what does drive environmental improvement?
And so, with the question of how environmental resources have
been salvaged in the past, and more importantly, how they are to be
salvaged in the future, we arrive at the second round of the battle,
beginning with a new set of optimists.
II. FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM
Depletion of wildlife stocks? Pollution? Inroads on other environ-
mental resources? No problem, says the proponent of Free Market
Environmentalism. We can do everything with private initiatives, in-
cluding preserving environmental resources, if we will just let the
market work.
But of course the market needs something to make it work: it
needs property rights, of course. That is because property rights are
the instruments that induce investment, planning, effort, informa-
tion gathering, and of course trade. Why do property rights encour-
age those activities? They do so because with property rights, the
owner takes the payoff from intelligent and appropriate investment,
and she pays the price for foolish or wasteful behavior. In technical
terms, property rights internalize externalities.28
27. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Bridging the Trade-Environment Divide, 15 J. ECON. PERSP.
113, 115, 119 (2001) (describing Kuznets curve literature); cf. Douglas A. Kysar, Some Realism
About Environmental Skepticism, 30 ENVTL. L.Q. 223, 249–52 (2003) (describing relation be-
tween wealth and environmental improvement, with some caveats); for Simon, see SIMON,
THE ULTIMATE RESOURCE, supra note 12, at 241.
28. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS
& PROC.) 347 (1967) (outlining a well-known argument that property rights internalize
externalities).
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But wait! Environmental resources are almost by definition re-
sources that do not belong to anyone. They are too big, too diffuse,
too fugitive for anyone to put a fence around them. How are prop-
erty rights going to deal with resources that can’t be property?
The answer of Free Market Environmentalism (“FME”) is that we
have to rethink the relationship of property to environmental re-
sources. It is not that we can’t own environmental goods; it is just
that they may call for an expensive kind of property. According to
FME, a system of property rights is just like any other good thing.
It costs something to have property rights: a fence costs something,
a land record system or registration system costs something, a pat-
ent system costs even more. But like other scarce goods, systems of
property rights respond to demand.
That is the thesis of the well-known economist Harold Demsetz,
and his thinking was further elaborated by, among others, two more
economists associated with FME, Terry Anderson & P.J. Hill.29
Anderson and Hill used some wonderful examples from the history
of the American West, about the evolution of property rights for
water, land, and cattle. They started with the early stages of Anglo-
European settlement, when there were few settlers in the West and
the Great Plains, and little demand for property rights because the
settlers really did not need property rights very much. Property
rights are important to deal with conflicting claims where things are
scarce, but at the outset of the new settlers’ entry, the major re-
source—grassland—was not scarce, at least by comparison with the
low demand for it. There was enough grassland to go around for the
few ranchers who ran their stock in those vast spaces; and as for the
cattle themselves, there were few confusions over which rancher
owned which animal. And besides, the methods for establishing
property rights were expensive, especially wooden fences out there
on the open range, where trees were few and far between.30 Why
bother with property rights when no one is encroaching?
But with time, there were more ranchers and more cattle—and
more threats from cattle thieves, the so-called rustlers. With those
more intense uses and threats, the demand for property rights in-
creased. Ranchers started with something simple, a common roundup
29. See id.; Terry Anderson & P. J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the
American West, 18 J. L. & ECON. 163 (1975).
30. See Anderson & Hill, supra note 29, at 170–73.
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of the cattle, and thus no one could claim to be mixed up about whose
steer belonged to whom. Then they moved on to more complicated
(and more expensive) versions of property rights: brands on the cat-
tle, then a registration system for the brands, then criminal prosecu-
tion of the rustlers. But meanwhile, the increasing cost of property
rights also invited technological innovation. For cattlemen, the break-
through invention was barbed wire in the 1870s: it was instantly de-
ployed on ranches in the West, enabling the cattlemen to separate
out all their cattle into individual herds.31
And so, the picture that FME paints about property rights looks
much like the one that Simon painted for other kinds of resources: do
we need property rights to deal with environmental resources? Yes?
OK, they will be expensive. But we will get around to creating them
when it is worth it. One example comes from the subject with which
we started, that is, tradable environmental rights. In fact, there has
been considerable progress in creating property rights related to air
quality. We can’t fence in the air, but we can create property rights
in pollution. That is to say, we can create a kind of negative property,
meaning that one has to pay for pollution, in a charging scheme
calibrated to the amount and kind of pollution that one produces.
What is more, with a sophisticated version of this kind of property,
one can even trade the pollution charges around, so that polluters
with higher reduction costs can avoid charges by paying lower-cost
preventers to reduce pollution in their stead.
To be sure, it is not cheap to create tradable environmental rights
regimes like these in order to control air pollution or water pollution,
or even to protect wildlife habitat. Among other things, rights of this
sort require monitoring and verification devices, record-keeping sys-
tems, and enforcement.32 But as with the invention of barbed wire,
the FME story tells us that higher demand induces human ingenu-
ity, and new inventions reduce the costs of the various aspects of
these regimes.
And so, in this story, a picture emerges: if we have enough de-
mand for property rights in environmental goods, we will get just
that: we will create an environmental property rights regime. As we
31. Id. at 172–75.
32. See, e.g., Tom Tietenberg, The Tradable Permits Approach to Protecting the Commons:
What Have We Learned?, in THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS 197, 212–16 (Elinor Ostrom et al.
eds., 2002).
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get to that point, we also get more inventiveness: more conservation-
ist methods for using environmental goods, more substitutes for
polluting equipment, better pollution control devices, more sophisti-
cated monitoring methods. We will get all those things because the
payoffs make it worth the effort. True, an environmental property
rights regime may be much more complicated and sophisticated than
a fence or even a land record system, but on closer analysis, it is just
another ratchet outward on the gears of the evolutionary property
rights machine.
Sounds good, right? This is the Optimists’ Answer Part II: environ-
mental property rights are just like any other property rights: they
will evolve as we need them and are willing to pay for them.
But now it is the pessimists’ turn. And their answer is this: wait
a minute! Something is amiss with this evolutionary story, too.
III. THE RETURN OF THE PESSIMISTS
For the moment, let us put tradable rights in air emissions to one
side. We can instead reconsider for a moment Anderson and Hill’s
example of the evolution of property rights related to cattle-raising
in the Old West. To be sure, the cattlemen did ratchet up the level
of property rights protections, but once they got past self-help, all
the other teeth on the ratchet—up to but not including fences—were
collective goods. And that’s a problem. A lot of people were involved in
all these steps toward property creation. Someone had to think up the
roundup, and then persuade all the other ranchers to join in. If there
were shirkers, someone had to take on the collective responsibility of
strong-arming them into joining. A branding system needed a com-
mon registry, i.e., another collective good. Enforcement at any level
is yet another collective good, but especially enforcement through a
criminal justice system, which requires the establishment of govern-
mental structures. In short, no single owner could claim the payoffs
from inventing and executing any of these measures that were taken
for the common welfare.
So, what induced everyone to do his or her part? The problem is
that these management systems were all versions of commons-es,
but now at the organizational level. And the question is, why don’t
all the participants try to take a free ride on the efforts of others?
Notice that if enough of them do take that route, the whole system
will fall apart.
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To be sure, these collective efforts at the organizational level do
work out sometimes, even many times. But it is not enough to point
to a success story and say it exemplifies a universal pattern, when
we can’t tell what made the collective effort work—or how many
other similar efforts fell apart. Yes, the ranchers did invent property
rights to manage their cattle. But meanwhile, the sodbusters, farmers
who plowed up other parts of the Great Plains, created the Dust Bowl.
Which is the real story? One resource economist, Gary Libecap, sug-
gests at least figuratively that maybe it is the Dust Bowl. His writing
is full of examples of would-be resource exploiters, especially in the oil
business, who would make big gains from cooperating, if only they
could come together on the way to divide up the surplus from their
collective efforts—but in many instances they can’t, so they don’t.33
Property rights are supposed to overcome collective action prob-
lems, in which everyone wants to free-ride and no one wants to invest,
or at least no one wants to invest enough to make things work. But
the trouble is, a property rights system is another collective, or if you
will, another commons.
That is a point that has often been made by eminent property
scholar James Krier. The most notable example is in an article that
he made in reviewing a book on Free Market Environmentalism. He
called it, very aptly, The Tragedy of the Commons, Part Two.34 In
Krier’s account, the FME claim is that one can overcome environ-
mental commons issues with property rights; but what gets glossed
over is that the creation of property rights is a commons effort itself,
even if it is a kind of meta-commons. Who wants to call the meet-
ings to set up the regime? Who wants to go to those meetings? Once
done, who wants to enforce the system on other participants? True,
you can hire police, but who is going to pay them? If the costs are to
be shared, who will keep the records and make the calls to make
sure that everybody is paying his or her share? Indeed, who is going
to watch the police to make sure that they are doing an honest job?35
Krier’s suggestion to the Free Market Environmentalists was that
33. Gary D. Libecap & James L. Smith, The Economic Evolution of Petroleum Property
Rights in the United States, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 589 (2002) (describing instances in which oil
resources were wasted because parties could not agree, due to transaction costs, differing
information, and inappropriate political intrusions).
34. James E. Krier, The Tragedy of the Commons, Part Two, 15 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y
325 (1991) (reviewing TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMEN-
TALISM (1991)).
35. Id. at 322–23.
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they should be more modest. They should look around to see where
Free Market Environmentalism works out well, and where it does
not, and why.36
IV. THE BOTTOM LINE: OPTIMISM OR PESSIMISM ABOUT
ENVIRONMENTAL PROPERTY?
When one looks at the matter in the way that Krier suggests,
one does see some characteristics that help to make a property re-
gime take hold. Indeed, some of these characteristics are quite well
known, because they help to make any kind of common effort func-
tion. For some resources, it may help that limited numbers of people
are involved in the bargaining or implicit bargaining process over
the property arrangement. It helps, too, to have participants with
similar information and goals37—as with the cattlemen in the Old
West. Indeed, larger and more complex property regimes can emerge
where the participants share a common culture and a common judg-
ment about what is good behavior and what is bad behavior.38 The
long transcontinental migrations of mid-nineteenth-century North
America give some quite startling examples of the migrants’ respect
for the property of other migrants, even among people who were in
desperate need. But those same migrants often showed little con-
cern for what the native peoples claimed as their own property.39
This brings us back to a gloss on Krier’s argument: if he is right that
establishing a property regime confronts us with a commons problem
at the organizational level, then overcoming that problem becomes
a social and political problem, and not just a natural evolution from
demand and supply. True, people can succeed in creating effective
property rights regimes, but social and political factors are going to
have an influence, and they may influence the characteristics of the
property rights regime as well.
36. Id. at 346–47.
37. Libecap & Smith, supra note 33, at 608.
38. Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. & C. Leigh Anderson, Culture and Fairness in the Development
of Institutions in the California Gold Fields, 61 J. ECON. HIST. 114, 114–15 (2001).
39. JOHN PHILIP REID, LAW FOR THE ELEPHANT: PROPERTY AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
ON THE OVERLAND TRAIL 326–34, 350–55 (1980) (describing extreme level of respect for prop-
erty among immigrants to the West but limited recognition of Native American ownership);
cf. ARTHUR MCEVOY, THE FISHERMAN’S PROBLEM: ECOLOGY AND LAW IN THE CALIFORNIA
FISHERIES 1850–1980, 43–51, 54 (1986) (describing California settlers’ murder of Native
Americans and disruption of their settlements).
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There is a related point to be made about the evolution of prop-
erty rights: earlier property rights regimes can get in the way of
emerging ones, even though new kinds of property regimes would
produce more total wealth. One of the people who has made this
argument most forcefully is an economist mentioned earlier, Gary
Libecap. Libecap has argued that winners under an earlier property
rights regime will not easily agree to a change in regime that would
be more productive in total, but that would cut into their particular
shares.40 One can see these issues in many places, but one notable
location is in the fishing industry, where the “highliners”—the most
successful fishers in open access fishing—drag their feet about es-
tablishing any limits for the sake of conserving the overall stock
levels. They are used to an open-access fishery, and they don’t be-
lieve in the Tragedy of the Commons. Libecap argues that the po-
litical cost of turning to a new regime—say, a tradable quota system
for fishing—may involve making special concessions to these kinds
of erstwhile winners.41
Libecap focuses especially on distributional issues: who is going
to get the goodies if the property regime changes? But his sometime
co-author, resource economist Dean Lueck, also points to contract-
ing costs or transaction costs as a source of stagnation. Lueck has
written a good deal on wildlife, and he has observed the way that
the costs of contracting can impede landowners from assembling the
kinds of large habitat areas that some animals require to feed and
breed adequately, especially megafauna like bears and bison.42 Land
values for wildlife—e.g., for fishing, hunting, and viewing—may well
exceed the value of the lands in question for agriculture or other
uses, but with multiple ownership and heterogeneous interests, land-
owners may face insuperable contracting costs, blocking them from
combining their lands and attaining the more valuable large scale
that the wildlife require. In short, transactions costs impede land
consolidation, and what creates the transactions costs is the prior
pattern of smaller-scale ownership.43
40. GARY D. LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 5–6 (1989).
41. Id. at 22–23, 73–74, 82–84 (stressing that different skill levels among fishermen lead
more successful ones to resist alteration of regime); cf. Katrina Wyman, From Fur to Fish:
Reconsidering the Evolution of Private Property, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 117, 146–48 (2005) (ar-
guing that heterogeneity might not impede regime change under some circumstances).
42. Dean Lueck, Property Rights and the Economic Logic of Wildlife Institutions, 35 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 625, 628, 638–44 (1995).
43. Id. at 643.
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Lueck and Libecap together have recently collaborated on another
major contribution to the point that prior property arrangements
can impede the introduction of more efficient and valuable ones. In
an important study of eastern and western land survey patterns in
the United States, they conclude that land is generally more valu-
able when it is demarcated by reference to a larger universalized
rectilinear survey of latitude and longitude, with regular and easily
understood special categories; and by comparison, land is generally
less valuable when measured by customary claims or measures of
metes and bounds, where property lines are designated from local-
ized landmarks.44 The contrasting methods between these is obvious
to anyone who has traveled across the United States by air, and who
has seen from above the crazy-quilt land boundaries in the eastern
part of the country, as well as the regular square patterns in the
more westerly areas. The universalized rectilinear designations make
it easier to describe and delineate land parcels, and thus make land
transactions much easier—which tends to increase land values. But
for the eastern states to change would be well-nigh unthinkable; the
older metes and bounds systems is too entrenched, and by this time
too much surrounded by prohibitive walls of transactions costs.
In a more abstract version of the Libecap and Lueck study, prop-
erty law scholars Henry Smith and Tom Merrill have argued that
relatively simplified systems of property categories—the “numerus
clausus” that limits those categories to a manageable number of
comprehensible forms—can enhance the availability of property
for trade, and hence for allowing resources to arrive ultimately in
the hands of those who value them most.45 But property regimes
often have to displace pre-existing older property regimes, and
scholars of less developed countries have noted the difficulties and
conflicts that come with moving from complex customary rights
structures to more modern rights definitions like those that Smith
and Merrill describe.46
44. Gary D. Libecap & Dean Lueck, The Demarcation of Land and the Role of Coordinating
Property Institutions, 119 J. POL. ECON. 426 (2011).
45. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property:
The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L. J. 1 (2000).
46. See, e.g., Daniel Fitzpatrick, Evolution and Chaos in Property Rights Systems: The
Third World Tragedy of Contested Access, 115 YALE L. J. 996 (2005) (describing violence and
instability with incomplete transitions between conflicting property regimes).
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Similar issues affect the efforts to establish new kinds of property
for environmental resources. Merrill has noted the very slow accep-
tance of tradable rights regimes in the environmental field, however
promising these regimes may seem to be. Merrill attributes a consid-
erable proportion of the delay to conflicts over distributional issues
among the parties who might be regulated, some of whom see their
personal fortunes as better served under older but less globally effi-
cient property systems.47
On the other hand, some resource uses do suggest that transitions
to more valuable property regimes might be possible, even in the face
of major obstacles from distributional issues and transaction costs.
Some interesting if very tentative examples come from water rights
regimes. In the western parts of the United States, many streams are
now more valuable for recreational uses like fishing and boating than
they are for agriculture, mining, or other traditional resource exploita-
tion uses. Recreational and scenic uses of rivers require leaving water
in the stream, but it has been difficult to accommodate those uses le-
gally. This is because the creation of instream water rights entails
significant changes in the older western “appropriative” water rights
regimes, where the whole definition of rights has historically re-
quired taking water out of the stream.48 Not only is system-wide
change subject to many administrative hurdles, but there are many
vested interests in the traditional ways of defining rights. Neverthe-
less, given major shifts in demand, along with some court orders,
and considerable organizational effort by some non-governmental
organizations, western states have begun to adjust their water rights
systems to accommodate the newer instream uses.49 Market transac-
tions, legislative, and voluntary actions have all played a role. Equally
interesting are the possibilities for trades of water from lower-value
agricultural uses to much higher-value municipal uses—possibilities
much discussed in academic literature on water rights, although quite
47. Thomas W. Merrill, Explaining Market Mechanisms, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 275, 291–
97 (2000).
48. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, From H2O to CO2: Lessons of Water Rights for Carbon
Trading, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 91, 100–01 (2008).
49. See, e.g., Janet C. Neuman, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: The First Ten Years of
the Oregon Water Trust, 83 NEB. L. REV. 432 (2004) (describing obstacles and progress in
voluntary programs to move consumptive water uses to instream uses).
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slow in practice.50 Nevertheless, slow or not, some agricultural-to-
municipal trades have already occurred (after pointed prodding by
the Federal government), particularly between California’s agricul-
tural areas and some of the state’s water-starved cities.51
Tradeable environmental rights bring us back to the beginning, and
the great hope for these kinds of very modern property rights in envi-
ronmental fields, including air, water, wildlife, and perhaps at some
point the regulation of greenhouse gases. It should not be totally im-
possible to overcome the obstacles and to arrive at more sophisticated
environmental rights regimes, and to ratchet out property rights to an-
other and very sophisticated level. But changes of this sort will not be
easy either, and they will certainly not be automatic. Newer envi-
ronmental rights regimes may take considerable social, political and
legislative effort, as well as administrative imagination, and very
possibly compensation schemes. Indeed, even the Optimists about
property rights seem to assume some level of legislative activity in
environmental arenas.52
One could give many more examples where distributional concerns,
technical difficulties and multiple transactions add to the cost of al-
tering existing property rights systems. But the point is that if we are
to be optimistic about the ability of property rights to deal with envi-
ronmental issues, then we also have to be optimistic about collective
institutions, including political ones. That entails optimism about
people’s inventiveness and openness to compromise in social and po-
litical arenas. Though it is perhaps not sufficiently recognized, those
are qualities that underlie everyday private property ownership and
market activity, and that are essential in creating the property rights
infrastructure in which ownership and markets can thrive. But those
qualities are going to be especially important when it comes to transi-
tions in private property and market regimes for environmental goods.
50. See, e.g., Robert Glennon, Water Scarcity, Marketing, and Privatization, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1873, 1884–89 (2005); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Institutional Perspectives on Water
Policy and Markets, 81 CAL. L. REV. 671 (1995).
51. See, e.g., Felicity Barringer, Empty Fields Fill Urban Basins and Farmers’ Pockets,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2011, at A12 (describing program whereby California farmers can halt
irrigation to transfer water to urban areas).
52. One is Julian Simon, who apparently thought that wealth-related interest in the envi-
ronment would result in legislation and public action. See SIMON, THE ULTIMATE RESOURCE,
supra note 12, at 139–42, 241. Dean Lueck, who is sympathetic to FME, regards statutory law
as a part of the evolutionary process in managing wildlife. See Lueck, supra note 42, at 321.
RECONCILING PROPERTY RIGHTS
AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A REVIEW
OF THE CHINESE PROPERTY LAW
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ABSTRACT
The Property Law of the People’s Republic of China, adopted in the
fifth session of the Tenth National People’s Congress on March 16,
2007, made a useful exploration into integrating environmental pro-
tection into property law. The Property Law established the prin-
ciple of comprehensive decision-making, integrating environment
and development, enlarging the definition and scope of property by
accepting as new forms of property rights the right to spaces and the
right to use resources exclusively owned by the State, defining the
obligation to protect public interests when acquiring and exercising
property rights, and providing the adjoining owner’s right to environ-
mental protection. These rules are very important for the sustain-
able development of China. However, the provision of the Property
Law regarding the right of use of resources exclusively owned by the
State as a usufructuary right failed to distinguish different impacts
on the environment through different ways of exploiting resources
and also failed to provide better protection for the environment and
resources. Therefore, it is necessary to reconcile the environmental
law and property law with new methods on the basis of a sound
understanding of the economic aspect and the ecological aspect of
the environment and resources.
INTRODUCTION
Environmental problems and sustainable development are major
issues in the current world. Chinese legislators have to answer the
question of how property law should react to such issues. The Property
Law of the People’s Republic of China (“Property Law”) adopted by the
* Hubei University of Economics.
† Website translations were provided by this author.
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fifth session of the Tenth National People’s Congress on March 16,
2007, gave a clear answer: it is advisable to integrate environmental
protection considerations into the values and rules of property law
by means of integrating environmental protection and development
into decision-making under the guidance of sustainable develop-
ment. However, from the perspective of environmental protection,
the Property Law still has some drawbacks to be improved, espe-
cially those provisions related to resources. We still need to discuss
these issues and find the best solution.
I. GREENING CHINESE PROPERTY LAW
The integration of environment and development in decision-
making is regarded as an important means of achieving sustainable
development. The essential idea is that environmental goals should
be a new factor in the definition of development. We need a way to
integrate environment and development. This integrated decision-
making emphasizes that environment is not necessarily a second-
ary factor when the central government makes political decisions.1
The key to integrating environment and economic factors is at the
decision-making level; the main theme of achieving sustainable de-
velopment is thus to integrate economy with ecology during decision-
making. It is necessary to exert the co-effort of many disciplines; the
discipline of law is a necessary basic safeguard. Just as the Twenty-
First Century Agenda pointed out, the laws and rules of a state are
the most important instruments in transforming environmental and
development policies into actions. They are not only implemented
through command-and-control mechanisms. They are also a frame-
work of economic planning and market tools.2 In fact, the making
and implementing of law should itself be regarded as a decision-
making process. According to the requirements on strategies and
major actions for sustainable development in the Chinese Twenty-
First Century Agenda, making an overall evaluation of the current
policies and rules, along with establishing a new system of laws and
1. XIA GUANG ET AL., INTEGRATING ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT IN DECISION-MAKING:
THEORIES AND MECHANISMS 1 (China Environmental Science Press 2000).
2. WAN YICHENG & WAN YAN, LANDMARKS FOR NEW CIVILIZATION—CLASSIC LITERATURES
OF HUMAN GREEN MOVEMENT 2 (Jilin People’s Press 2000).
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policies, is a major legislative step towards the achievement of sus-
tainable development.3
We admit that solving environmental problems is not a customary
task for property law, a field typically dominated by private concerns.
The reason to integrate property law into the decision-making process
is because of the failure of public law. In a modern society, whether
in developed countries such as Great Britain and the United States
or in underdeveloped countries such as India and China, public law
is the first choice for solving environmental problems. Measures for
addressing environmental problems usually have a tone of command
and control. The deteriorating environmental condition, however,
declares the bankruptcy of public law and demonstrates the neces-
sity of seeking solutions in private law. It is thus natural to solve en-
vironmental problems by the co-effort of public and private law. As
an essential part of private law, property law should be taken into
the integrated decision-making process.
Another reason for taking property law into the integrated decision-
making process is the comprehensiveness of environmental problems.
Environmental problems in modern society are comprehensive, result-
ing from all aspects of the social life. Although environmental prob-
lems are not mainly caused by the insufficiency of property law, they
nevertheless have some relation to property law. Property law, which
is steeped in the modern agricultural society, exacerbated environ-
mental problems. We will address this topic in the following aspects.
A. Environment and Resources Are Beyond the Range of Things
Regulated by the Property Law
In property law, people are the opposite of things. Persons are the
subjects and things are objects. What exactly is a thing? According
to general understanding, the following conditions should be met by
a thing under property law4: a thing should be corporeal, separate,5
independent in the sense of economy and law, capable of being con-
trolled, able to meet the needs of people, and both particular and
specific.6 The object of a property law must be particular and specific,
3. XIA GUANG ET AL., supra note 1, at 6–7.
4. LIANG HUIXING & CHEN HUABIN, PROPERTY LAW 22–24 (Law Press 2003).
5. QIAN MINGXING, PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW 27 (Peking University Press 1994).
6. 1 WANG ZEJIAN, PROPERTY RIGHT OF CIVIL LAW 43 (Taipei Sanmin Press 1992).
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because if a thing cannot be individually identified, it is not a thing
under property law.7 A specified thing is a thing that can be regarded
as a thing separated from other things.8
In contrast, environmental resources refer to anything that can
be used or potentially used by the people. Environmental resources
include those currently being used by mankind, such as minerals,
water, and forests. They also include those resources not currently
being used, but having the potential for future use, such as icebergs
in the Arctic Ocean and snowy mountains on the Antarctic. Although
environmental resources can meet our needs, be controlled by peo-
ple, and are corporeal, they cannot be specified, and so are not things
under property law. Generally speaking, therefore, environmental re-
sources are not objects of property law. The ownership and utilization
of environmental resources cannot be solved within the framework
of environmental law, but can be addressed through the framework
of property law.
For this reason, the tragedy of the commons cannot be avoided
regarding environmental resources. The failure of property law to
regulate environmental resources leads to disorder in the utilization
of environmental resources. This is an important cause behind the
disruption of environmental resources. Although property law has
provisions governing the ownership and utilization of forests and
land, such forests and land are simply a part of the environmental
resources. Such partial provisions cannot solve the problem as a
whole. Furthermore, even such partial provisions are not in line
with sustainable development.
B. Neglect the Non-Economic Values of Things
Everybody knows that things not only have economic values but
also ecological, aesthetic, and other values. The thing regulated by
property law is not the thing as a whole, but only the economic as-
pect of the thing. As the regulation of things is limited to its eco-
nomic aspect, the non-economic aspects are neglected, and property
law does not give due attention to the conflicts between a thing’s
different values. The neglect of ecological and other non-economic
7. LIANG HUIXING, RESEARCH INTO CHINESE PROPERTY LAW 36 (Law Press 1998).
8. Id.
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values by property law is a source of environmental problems in
modern society.
C. Legalize Actions Disrupting the Environment Under Ownership
The rule of ownership is partially responsible for environmental
problems. Although the notion of absolute ownership has to some ex-
tent loosened in modern society along with the wave of socialized prop-
erty rights, its content has not been greatly changed. Ownership is
still an almost omnipotent right, the owner in fact has an unfettered
right to sue and to dispose of his property, including misuse. A per-
son has the right to construct fences along the border of his property,
no matter how high the fence may be or how much sunshine it blocks.9
Actions polluting the environment and disrupting resources may be
sheltered under the notion of absolute ownership. This makes proper-
ty law a shelter for environmental pollution and resource disruption.10
In one sense, property law as it developed in modern agricultural so-
ciety also exacerbated environmental problems. The problems caused
by property law should be solved by property law. Therefore, property
law must be integrated into the decision-making process.
Of course, as the most typical private law, property law takes the
protection of private rights as its principal task. The nature of prop-
erty law in safeguarding rights and freedoms shall not change, no mat-
ter how obvious the trend towards socialization and no matter how
serious social problems may be. This does not mean, however, that
property law cannot be part of the integrated decision-making process.
Property law can be interpreted in light of the current social situation,
maintaining flexibility and without changing its inherent nature.
1. Establishment of the Legislative Principles of Decision-Making
by Integrating Environment and Development
Legislative guiding principles of the property law have direct im-
pact on provisions of this law. Scientific development and the promo-
tion of harmonious society are both specifically listed as legislative
9. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE LAW IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 204 (McGraw Hill, China Uni-
versity of Politics and Law 1989).
10. LÜ ZHONGMEI, NEW PERSPECTIVES OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 67 (China University of
Politics and Law 2000).
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guiding principles of the Property Law. This indicates that the Prop-
erty Law takes full consideration of environmental protection and
the harmonious development of human beings and nature. The leg-
islators clearly declared that guiding principle include the theories
of Deng Xiaoping, the three-representative theory developed by Jiang
Zemin, overall implementation of scientific developments, adherence
to socialist institutions, meeting the urgent needs of actual social life,
coordinating all sorts of interests, and promoting social harmony.11
2. Defining the Property Law and Its Scope of Regulation
The scope of regulation and the types of property rights directly
reflect the essence of property law. Article 2(2) of the Property Law
provides that “the things under this law include real property and
personal property. If a law provides that a right can be regarded as
the object of property right, that rule shall be followed.” In the part
governing ownership of condominiums, the Property Law considers
the ownership of space as a type of property right. In the usufruc-
tuary rights provision, the rights to contract land, use construction
land, use dwelling land, and use natural resources are all listed as
property rights. The Property Law does not follow the traditional
definition of a “thing” and goes beyond the scope of corporeal things
by including the right to space and the right to use resources as prop-
erty rights. This embodies the shift from focusing on ownership to-
wards paying more attention to actual use. This also provides a rights
basis for the rational utilization of natural resources and for the co-
ordination of property law with other related laws and regulations
on natural resources. After the nature of the right to use resources is
determined by the Property Law, the right holders have rights under
the Property Law. This defines the scope within which governmental
authorities can exercise their powers to regulate resources. At the
same time, the right holders also have obligations under the Property
Law. They must follow requirements imposed by governmental au-
thorities on environmental protection and the realization of environ-
mental public interests.
11. Wang Zhaoguo, Explanation on the Draft of the Property Law of the People’s Republic
of China (Mar. 8, 2007), http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Speeches/2007-03/08/content_360345
.htm (last visited August 20, 2012).
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3. The Obligation of Property Right Holders to Protect
Public Interests
Article 7 of the Property Law provides that the acquisition and
exercise of property rights shall abide by the law, respect the social
moral standards, and should not injure public interests and the
legitimate rights and interests of other persons. This provision di-
rectly embodies the socialization of property rights and restricts the
absoluteness of ownership. In contemporary society, environmental
protection is obviously a social and moral requirement and a public
interest. The Property Law confirms that the right holders shall have
the obligation to protect the environment when they acquire or ex-
ercise property rights. It clearly declares its intent to restrict the
absoluteness of the ownership interest with this general provision
and also provides a legal basis for environmental protection in the
exercise of property rights. Without the change of the traditional
notion of ownership, and without the restriction of absolute owner-
ship, it is impossible to achieve environmental protection.
4. Establishment of the Neighbor Right
In the chapter on neighbors’ rights, the Property Law, after making
provisions about the principles of regulating right holders of prop-
erty bordering on each other, specifically provides rules on reason-
able use, environmental protection, and pollution prevention. These
provisions not only specify requirements in the General Provisions
that the acquisition and exercise of property rights should respect
the public social standards and should not injure public social in-
terests but also incorporate environmental protection in the deter-
mination of public social standards and public interests. Without
fresh air and sunshine, a house is not a healthy dwelling. It is a
basic right of any human being to have fresh air and sunshine, and
it is a basic environmental protection obligation for any human being
not to litter by discharging solid wastes and other pollutants into the
environment. Provisions of the Property Law on the one hand protect
the property right holders, and on the other hand provide a legal ba-
sis for legislation governing environmental rights and the revision
of environment law. Provisions on access to fresh air and sunshine
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will greatly promote the recognition and protection of such rights in
environmental legislation.
II. PROBLEMS WITH CHINESE PROPERTY LAW
It is a sign of progress that the Property Law made some achieve-
ments in reconciling property rights with environment protection,
but its provisions on the property rights governing resources still
have much room for improvement.
As aforementioned, the Property Law takes into its scope of reg-
ulation the right to use natural resources exclusively owned by the
State. It also states provisions on property rights concerning natural
resources held by collective units and individuals. However, from the
perspective of reconciling property rights with the environment, there
are still two problems not to be neglected. The first problem is that
the Property Law failed to take into its scope of regulation some im-
portant natural resources, such as environmental capacity and the
weight or limits of ecological and other non-economic values. The
second problem is that it is inappropriate to treat all rights to use
natural resources as usufructuary rights. Such a provision is against
the environmental protection goals and may lead to negative impacts.
I will mainly discuss the second problem here.
When drafting the Property Law, scholars proposed different ways
to address this problem. Generally speaking, these proposals were of
three types. The first type regards the right to use state-owned natural
resources as usufructuary rights, the second possession, and the third
quasi-property rights. All these proposals recognize the exclusive state
ownership of natural resources.12 The Property Law adopted the first
proposal. Although all these proposals are reasonable in one sense,
they all have problems if we open our eyes and examine this issue
from a natural and ecological perspective according to the principle
of sustainable development.
In China, the state ownership of natural resources is based on a
declaration in the Constitution. Its basis is the socialist public own-
ership. However, I do not understand the statement in civil law
12. Although the socialist public ownership includes both state ownership and collective
ownership, natural resources are owned by the State. Accordingly, this article does not discuss
collective ownership.
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textbooks that the State is the independent, exclusive, and only owner
of natural resources, although this is the most accepted statement
in all civil textbooks. Is the constitutional ownership based on so-
cialist public ownership an ownership in civil law? First, in terms of
the objects, are natural resources things under property law? If so,
how to specify such natural resources and make them qualified as
objects of the property rights, as the air moves, water flows, forests
grow and die, and wild animals migrate? Second, why does the Prop-
erty Law use the term “permit” instead of “entrustment” or “agency”
to describe how the State authorizes other subjects to use natural
resources? Why does the Property Law provide that natural resources
should be used with compensation instead of providing that the users
should pay consideration? Third, from the perspective of safeguard
and remedies, why the does the law not provide for tort liabilities
but directly provide for criminal liability for damages to state-owned
natural resources? Is it a loss of the state-owned property when the
rivers reach the sea, the fish swims away, the birds fly away, or
when the forest and grasslands burn themselves? Can the Property
Law answer these questions? If not, what should we do?
A. The Usufructuary Rights Failed to Distinguish Different Ways
to Use Natural Resources
Why does the Property Law provide that use of state-owned natural
resources is a usufructuary right? The basic logic is that no individ-
uals or organizations own state-owned natural resources because
there is only one owner of the state-owned natural resources. It is a
principle of property law that there is only one owner for one thing.
Therefore, the rights of all other parties in natural resources are not
ownership but usufructuary rights, though they can possess, use,
make profit with, or dispose of natural resources.13 This may be log-
ical reasoning, but it may lead to many problems in practice. For ex-
ample, as to the mining right, when the State confers the mining right
to a company or an individual, such companies or individuals have
the right to mine mineral resources in a specific area. The actual
13. Cui Jianyuan & Wang Weiguo, Developments of Hot Topics in the Legislations of
Property Rights, http://article.chinalawinfo.com/Article_Detail.asp?ArticleID=2349&Type=mod
(last visited August 20, 2012).
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result is that the mining companies or individuals do not use what
they take out of the land but sell it to others. The buyers will con-
sume (for example, coal) or process (such as iron ores) what they
buy. However they consume or process what they buy, they com-
pletely change the things they buy and the original things no longer
exist. We all know that mineral resources cannot be returned to the
original owner once they are taken out of the land. Can we treat this
kind of use as the exercise of a usufructuary right? Who exercises
such rights and who benefits from such use? Why can the holder of
a usufructuary right freely dispose of mining products, even though
they do not have the ownership of mineral resources? Are mining
products the same as mineral resources? After the expiration of usu-
fructuary rights, how can the right holder return what they used?
Is the payment for the use of natural resources the benefit the state
gets as the owner?
Here, we just take the mining right as an example. The situation
of a logging right, hunting right, fishing right, or water right is sim-
ilar. In fact, the use of resources can be classified as non-consuming
use and consuming use, each having a different impact on the own-
ership. If the non-consuming use meets the features of a usufruc-
tuary right, it is not convincing to treat consuming use as the exercise
of a usufructuary right. Furthermore, to treat consuming use as an
exercise of a usufructuary right will promote excessive use and waste
of resources. This is against the goals of resources conservation and
environmental protection. Because the Property Law has some sig-
nificant problems, this article takes the view that the Property Law
makes some declarative provisions but fails to make complete and
perfect rules on natural resources.
B. The Right of Possession Cannot Incorporate Environmental
Protection Obligations into Property Law
Some scholars proposed that property law should use the right of
possession to solve the problem caused by the separation of owner-
ship and use of natural resources.14 The basic logic of this idea is to
14. MENG QINGUO, DOUBLE STRUCTURE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (3d ed., People’s Court Press
2008).
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discard the notion of one right for one thing and establish both
ownership rights and rights of possession for natural resources. This
idea recognizes serious problems in the usufructuary rights regime.
We praise its innovativeness but doubt its usefulness. Can posses-
sion be an independent right? If so, what conditions should be met
to be such a right? What is the relationship between ownership and
possession? If possession derives from ownership, what is the differ-
ence between possession and other non-ownership rights? If owner-
ship and possession are parallel, what is the content of ownership
and what is the content of a possession right? Can a possession right
be established on all public goods? Even disregarding the obvious
conflict between the notion of possession and other notions of the
civil law of the continental law family, if possession is parallel with
ownership, it will be detrimental to the conservation of resources,
rather than improving it. Many environmental problems are caused
by situations where resources are public and multi-functional on the
one hand, while not subject to ownership and instead subject to the
principle of first capture on the other. For this reason, the possession
right goes against the goal of incorporating environmental protec-
tion obligations into the civil law.
C. A Quasi-Property Right Is Reasonable, but There Is Still Much
to Study
Some scholars propose that China should learn from the notion
of accessory (permit) property rights in other continental law coun-
tries, especially Germany.15 The basic logic of this proposal is that
natural resources should be freely used by the public but that this
freedom should be restricted for the benefit of public interests be-
cause natural resources are limited and multi-functional. For this
reason, the scope and content of such rights should reflect the na-
ture of public law. We call it permit property right because it has
the features of private law as well as public law. It is not a typical
property right and is not a complete property right in the private law.
The notion of permit property right is generally recognized by con-
tinental law countries. Compared with other proposals, it is more
15. SUN XIANZHONG, PROPERTY RIGHTS (Law Press 2001).
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appropriate for incorporating public law obligations into civil law
rights and meeting the needs of sustainable development. A careful
analysis of this proposal indicates that there are still many prob-
lems to be solved for this proposal to work under the state ownership
of natural resources in China. The establishment of quasi-property
takes the permits of public law as a prerequisite, no matter whether
in civil code or in special laws on natural resources. Since it is a pri-
vate right with the features of public law, can the public nature of
natural resources be completely achieved with state ownership? What
is the nature of the permit? Does it confer a private right? In what
role does the state grant this permit? What is permitted? According
to the principles of administrative law, a permit does not confer rights
but rather imposes requirements on the exercise of rights. Under
the condition of state-owned natural resources, which rights of pri-
vate persons should be regulated and how should this regulation
function? In fact, permit is a measure to reconcile the conflict between
the economic aspect and ecological aspect of natural resources and
serves to reconcile freedom and fairness through the introduction or
intervention of public law. Therefore, clarification of the ecological
and economic nature of natural resources is a prerequisite for de-
signing property law.
III. SOME IDEAS ON HOW TO RECONCILE PROPERTY LAW AND
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
My doubts are all based on my questioning of relevant rules. It is
in fact my reflection from the perspective of environmental law or
the notion of sustainable development. The traditional civil law is
insufficient. I think the challenge of property law by environmental
problems is because of the conflict between freedom and fairness
caused by the economic and ecological values of natural resources.
If we cannot find the causes of the conflicts between different val-
ues, cannot find ways to coordinate and balance conflicts between
values, then we cannot completely solve the problem. Therefore, we
must incorporate ecological rationality and overcome the insuffi-
ciency of economic rationality on the basis of a thorough review of
the economic rationality of the traditional civil law.
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A. The Two Aspects of Things
Things under property law mainly refer to things with economic
value. Many things fall into the category of natural resources. In one
sense, the object of environmental law and property law are iden-
tical. However, the same object has different meanings in property
law and environmental law. The environment and natural resources
have ecological values in environmental law but economic values in
property law. The Property Law provides rules on ownership and use
of natural resources for the purpose of making use of their economic
values. For this reason, environmental function is not under its con-
sideration. However, rights provided in property law will undoubt-
edly affect environmental values when such rights are exercised. If we
hope to reconcile these two values and incorporate the ecological val-
ues of things into the scope and regulation of property law, we need to
solve the conflict between the economic values and ecological values.
The first value to be considered is that of the thing in its economic
form. Generally speaking, we call those environmental elements that
are useful to our economic development natural resources. They are
things in the form of resources. These things are objects of human
labor. Our understanding of natural resources has economic mean-
ing: forests can provide wood, water flow supports navigation, and
mineral resources can be mined. In this sense, resources are scarce
and useful, which leads to conflicts among different interests. The
law should provide rules on ownership to prevent conflicts. Such
rules are rules of property law.16
The second value to be discussed is that of the natural resource
as an ecological thing. From the perspective of ecology, environmen-
tal resources are necessary conditions for the existence and develop-
ment of human beings. These resources combine with human beings
to form the ecological system through the flow of energy, recycling
of matter, and transference of information. From the perspective of
ecology, forests, water flows, and mineral resources are all necessary
components of the biological circle. As ecological things, natural re-
sources form an integrated whole and have self-adjusting capacity.
Environmental resources are critical to human beings, so we have
to consider this ecological aspect and establish rules to protect it.
16. SHI SHANGKUAN, PROPERTY RIGHTS 1 (China University of Politics and Law 2000).
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Otherwise, the existence of human beings will be directly endangered.
This system of rules protecting the integrity and self-adjusting func-
tion of natural resources is environmental law.
The two aspects of natural resources as things lead to the variations
in values placed on natural resources. Property law and environmen-
tal law recognize and provide protection for different parts and val-
ues of these resources. Because of the past neglect of the ecological
values of environmental resources, property law did not protect the
ecological values of environmental resources; environmental law
later developed to make up for this deficiency. The classification of
ecological and economic values of environmental resources, however,
is only in theory because these two values are inseparable in reality.
The traditional civil law only cared about economic value, neglecting
ecological values. This is one of the direct causes of environmental
problems. Although we now have environmental legislation that pro-
tects the ecological functions of environmental resources, the achieve-
ment of this goal relies on two prerequisites. The first is to recognize
the two aspects of environmental resources, while the second is to
establish mechanisms to coordinate their conflicts. Therefore, envi-
ronmental law alone is not enough. There must be a way for envi-
ronmental and civil law to communicate and coordinate. Property
law must recognize the ecological values of environmental resources.
Currently, property law has established some channels for the rec-
ognition of ecological values and established some rules conducive
to protection of ecological values. But these rules are far from perfect.
I think China should establish more active rules for recognition and
protection of ecological values.
B. Establishment of Environmental Property Rights
The understanding of the economic and ecological aspects of things
provides a basis for protection, but we still need to identify a way to
break through.
1. Redefining Property Rights
The definition of a legal term is based on the value given by a
subject, along with a legal description of its inherent nature. We
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currently use values to define legal terms. This value embodies how
the object satisfies certain needs of the subjects. The needs of hu-
man beings for certain purposes form the value criteria. Among all
values, the existence of human beings is the most important.
To classify things into corporeal things, specific things, and con-
trolled things is similar. Things in property law are different from
matters in physics because things, as objects of legal relations, must
meet the value judgment of subjects and meet certain needs of sub-
jects. According to the basic theories of civil law, the subjects are
presumed to be rational economic persons. The maximization of in-
terests is the inner impetus and the maximization of property is the
highest goal for a human being. For a human being, the purpose of
a right is to advance the acquisition of economic value. Only those
things actually controlled by a human being can be possessed and
used in one way or another; all other things are not things under
property law. In this way, there is only one standard to determine
whether something is a thing under property law: whether it can
create economic value for human beings. Therefore, although all hu-
man beings need air, water, and other things, they are not things
under property law because they cannot be controlled and bring
direct economic interests to any human being.
The needs of human beings can, however, change over time. Being
subjective, value orientations also change over time. When the envi-
ronment deteriorates, human beings gain a deeper and deeper un-
derstanding of the environment and understand that the seeking of
purely economic interests will bring destruction to humanity. Now,
human beings have not only economic rationality but also ecological
rationality. They think that the continuing existence of human beings
is the most important goal and that the pursuit of economic benefits
should yield to the need to maintain human existence.
Against this background, we can still use values as a way to de-
fine legal terms, but we can change the nature of things to make
them meet the needs of subjects. This method will, however, bring
confusion. The first problem is that we have to explain the values
and the definition used. The second problem is that it will be diffi-
cult to apply legal norms if we change the criteria for value judgments.
The legal norms of the past are based on economic rationality, while
the current understanding is based on ecological rationality. These
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two premises should not be changed randomly, for then the applica-
tion of legal norms would have no premise. Furthermore, the existence
of property law is itself reasonable., Property law also regulates many
other things besides things of environmental value. If we abandon
property law because of some deficiencies, property law will lose its
function and this will lead to new problems and social disorder.
It is necessary, therefore, to consider a new way to define legal
terms. We can define things according their economic or ecological
functions. I call this way of defining terms functional definition. As
an objective definition, the definitions can be expanded as we gain
more understanding of the term to be defined. Different functions
can coexist and be separately defined by different laws and can also
be integrated.
Following this line of thinking, things have economic and ecolog-
ical functions and these functions can coexist in one value. Now
suppose a person with economic rationality is seeking the maximi-
zation of his interests through the possession and control of things.
His rationality will tell him that he will not only jeopardize his own
interests but will also endanger his living condition and harm him-
self if he uses his things without limits. Now he must take ecological
functions into account. When he considers the ecological function,
he has ecological rationality. In this way, ecological consideration
can be incorporated into the definition of things.
In fact, this way of defining terms already exists in property law,
as exemplified in the rights relating to condominiums. Additionally,
more and more countries separate water right from the right to land.
This is in fact an embodiment of this way of defining terms. The
concept of accessory property rights in Germany is a typical example
of integrating economic and ecological functions into property law.
2. Specification of Environmental Resources
Functional definition can provide us a way to have a multi-aspect
and multi-dimensional understanding of things, and provide us with
conditions to support the integration of ecological functions into prop-
erty rights. The remaining question is what ecological functions can
be integrated into property law. Things in the sense of property law
are not things in the sense of physics. According to the interpretation
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of German civil law, things are not only corporeal but also capable of
being felt and controlled.17 Being corporeal means things have forms,
either liquid, solid, or gaseous. No matter what form it has, a thing
must be capable of being controlled by human beings.18 According to
these requirements, it is still difficult to integrate environmental re-
sources with ecological functions into property law. How can things
without an owner and price can be objects of property law?
Environmental resource is a broad term. We still cannot control its
scope and function. However, what is not controllable is the entirety
of the environment. We can still control parts of the environment
and some of its functions. Just as aforementioned, environmental
resources have forms and content. The ecological function is the
content, while the physical existence is the form. As to its economic
function, the physical existence is both the form and the content.
Now the question is whether incorporeal ecological functions or
values are capable of being integrated into property law. This de-
pends on whether such functions can be felt, made independent, and
be specified.
The first issue is whether they can be felt. Environmental resources
are the entirety of the basic conditions for human existence. The en-
vironment is a complete ecological system with different functions,
structure, and features, such as renewability, recoverability, and re-
cyclability. All values are embedded in these functions. All physical
things are only embodiments of such functions, not the values them-
selves. However, ecological values are indeed capable of being felt.
Clean air, fresh water, suitable climate, and beautiful sceneries can
be actually enjoyed by the people.
The second issue is the controllability of environmental resources.
Objectively, the ecological function as an entirety is not controllable
by human beings. Humanity can only control part of it. Human beings
have understood some basic laws of ecology and possess ways to find
more. To a certain extent, the lack of prices for environmental re-
sources is because they have no owner. Once prices are determined,
environmental resources can be allotted through market mecha-
nisms. Therefore, a simple and convenient way to solve the problem
of controllability is to set prices for environmental resources and
17. SUN XIANZHONG, MODERN GERMAN PROPERTY LAW 2 (Law Press 1997).
18. LIANG HUIXING & CHEN HUABIN, PROPERTY LAW 31 (Law Press 2003).
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make them exchangeable in the market.19 Theoretically speaking,
it is feasible to monetize environmental resources. For example, some
Japanese scholars determined the prices of forests by calculating the
alternative costs to provide functions of water source conservation,
prevention of desertification, prevention of soil erosion, provision of
entertainment and health care functions, protection of wildlife, and
provision of oxygen. There are also many other ways to value ecolog-
ical functions. It is feasible to integrate ecological functions quantifi-
able with technical measures.
The above analysis indicates that ecological property rights are
in fact a new type of property rights developed by integrating the
economic and ecological functions of things by functional definitions.
It is essentially the addition of the ecological function of things into
the traditional economic functionality. I call it ecological property
rights. This type of property right has features different from those
of traditional property rights. There are two ways to materialize
such ecological property rights, either by interpretation of tradi-
tional property rights in light of ecological requirements or by the
establishment of new property right systems. The establishment of
ecological property rights needs the co-effort of property law and
environmental law.
19. WANG LIMIN, PROPERTY RIGHTS 36 (China University of Politics and Law 1998).
ON THE LEGISLATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS:
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ENVIRONMENTAL
RIGHTS AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
ZHOU KE & XU YA*†
ABSTRACT
At present, environmental legislation and jurisdiction, as well as
the difficulties inherent in protecting the environment, all call for
the legal confirmation of environmental rights. However, due to the
uncertainty, multi-properties, and antagonism related to environ-
mental rights, future legislation faces a bottleneck. One effective
path to solve all aforementioned problems is to make the ownership
of environment distinct through a reference to the bundle of rights
theory of property, as well as through an imitation of the rights of
condominium owners.
I. NECESSITY FOR THE LEGISLATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS
On March 10th, 2011, the chairman of National People’s Congress
(“NPC”) Standing Committee, Wu Bangguo, declared in the second
plenary meeting of the eleventh NPC’s fourth meeting that the so-
cialist law system with Chinese characters had been established.
Seven sections compose this law system, to the exclusion of the envi-
ronmental law. Consequently, how environmental law is to develop
in the future has been a hot topic for the academic discussions.
A. Dislocation of Chinese Environmental Law in the Legal System
In the socialist legal system with Chinese characteristics, envi-
ronmental law is forced to break down into administrative law and
economic law. But in fact, there is little content related to environ-
mental protection in either administrative or economic law provi-
sions. Instead, there are many provisions in civil law relating to
environmental protection, including general principles of civil law,
* School of Law, Renmin University of China, Beijing, China.
† Website translations were provided by these authors.
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property law, and tort liability, which involve a large number of spe-
cific provisions on environmental protection.1 From a legislative per-
spective, environmental law and civil law are linked more closely.
But in a socialist legal system, environmental law is attributable to
the economic and administrative law departments. As far as the
author is concerned, the location of environmental law within the
legal system is not accurate. This dislocation is mainly due to China’s
tradition of environmental protection and legislation. From the be-
ginning, China’s environmental protection has adopted a planned,
top-down approach. It depends more on the government instead of
public participation, resulting in citizens who have a weak aware-
ness of environmental rights. Accordingly, environmental legislation,
especially pollution prevention and control legislation, has a strong
administrative image. For example, the Constitution of the People’s
Republic of China (“PRC”), Article 26, stipulates that “The State pro-
tects and improves the environment in which people live and the eco-
logical environment. It prevents and controls pollutions and other
public hazards.”2 It shows that in China the duties and rights con-
cerning environmental protection are given to the state rather than
to the citizens. This is why the legal system places part of environ-
mental law under administrative law. In addition, because China’s
environmental legislation was influenced by the former Soviet Union,
whose environmental law system only contained the natural reser-
vation part, the main content of natural reservation law is limited
to specific development and utilization of natural resources, which are
1. Property Law of PRC art. 90 (promulgated by the National People’s Congress, Mar. 16,
2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007) LAWINFOCHINA, http://www.lawinfochina.com (last visited Aug. 25,
2012) (stating that “[a] holder of real property may not discard solid wastes or discharge
atmospheric pollutants, water pollutants, or such harmful substances as noise, light and
magnetic radiation by violating the relevant provisions of the state”); Property Law of PRC
art. 120 (promulgated by the National People’s Congress, Mar. 16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007)
LAWINFOCHINA, http://www.lawinfochina.com (last visited Aug. 25, 2012) (stating that “[a]
usufructuary right holder shall, when exercising its or his right, abide by the provisions on
protection, reasonable exploration and utilization of resources as prescribed in the laws. An
owner shall not intervene in the exercise of rights by the usufructuary right holder”); Tort
Law of PRC art 65 (Promulgated by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress,
Dec. 26, 2009, effective July 1, 2010) LAWINFOCHINA, http://www.lawinfochina.com (last visited
Aug. 25, 2012) (stating that “[w]here any harm is caused by environmental pollution, the pol-
luter shall assume the tort liability”).
2. THE LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS COMMISSION OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL
PEOPLE’S CONGRESS, CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 155 (Beijing: People’s
Publishing House 2004).
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typically economic activities. This is why many Chinese economic
law scholars believe that China’s environmental law could feasibly
be incorporated into economic law. Because the adjustment object
of environmental law is contained within the adjustment objects of
economic law, environmental law should be a branch of economic
law.3 It is for this reason that the legal system puts the remaining
parts of environmental law into economic law.
Based on the above analysis, it is obvious that the dislocation of
environmental law in the legal system will inevitably lead to two
incorrect? tendencies. First, China’s environmental protection will
continue to develop in the single government-led direction. Second,
China’s environmental protection will continue to bear a strong
planned-economy image. These two tendencies directly and indirect-
ly exacerbate China’s environmental crisis. The limited rationality
and limited neutrality of the government will lead to its failure in
the field of environmental protection, reflected by its environmental
decision-making mistakes, poor supervision and management on en-
vironmental issues, rent-seeking, and other opportunism behavior.4
Furthermore, the planned economy will lead to high economic costs
of environmental management and the promotion of short-term be-
haviors of general entities within the market. This explains why,
although over time the Chinese government has made environmen-
tal commitments and environmental laws, initiated environmental
actions, and invested environmental protection funds, the speed of
pollution exceeds regulation.5 According to the theory of modern
environmental law, public participation and the introduction of
market mechanisms are the most effective ways to solve the above
problem. Public participation in environmental protection can com-
pensate for the weakness of a single administration. Such supervision
to the government’s environmental management can promote a more
scientific and democratic outcome, while reducing government mis-
takes. The premise of effective public participation in environmental
3. See YANG ZIXUAN, ECONOMIC LAW (Beijing: Peking University Press, Higher Education
Press 1999).
4. Some academics point out that the malfunction of government in the environmental
protection may cause difficulty in eradicating the five typical types of opportunistic behavior.
See WANG RONG, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CHINESE ENVIRONMENTAL LEGAL SYSTEM 12–23
(Beijing: Law Press 2003).
5. Qie Jianrong, Why There Are More Environmental Law and Regulations and Less
Legal Effect, THE LEGAL DAILY, July 26, 2007, at 8.
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protection is giving the public a clear understanding of their legal
rights, as well as how to participate and bring suit. The market
mechanism is the basic form of optimal allocation of resources; it
can reduce the cost of government environmental management and
protection, and stimulate the passion of stakeholders involved into
the market to maximize the efficiency of resource allocation. The
market mechanism is a prerequisite to running the system of clear
property rights. It is necessary to adopt laws on environmental re-
sources for a complete definition of property rights, and for the en-
vironment, so as to pave the way for market transactions involving
such rights. This market mechanism would allow environment exter-
nalities, to be more internalized, and to achieve the optimal allocation
of environmental resources.
Right constitutes the core of the legal system. Many factors of the
legal system are derived from the right, decided by it and affected
by it. Right plays a very important role in the legal system. When
we explain and understand the legal system from an extensive
perspective, the right in the initial position, it’s the most impor-
tant and central part, it’s the basis and genes of legal rules.6
The dislocation of China’s environmental law in the legal system
has caused various environmental crisis responses and requires the
establishment and improvement of public participation and market
mechanisms. It also requires that the law give citizens a clear and
specific understanding of environmental rights, including clear prop-
erty rights regarding environmental resources.
B. Dilemmas of China’s Environmental Civil Liability
Although the Environmental Protection Law of PRC and the
majority of environmental protection have separate edition laws
containing provisions of environmental civil liability, strictly speak-
ing, China’s environmental law has no independent civil liability of
its own. The civil liability for environmental law is contained in the
traditional civil liability system. From this perspective, China’s en-
vironmental civil liability is the subject of environmental legal re-
lations that bear the burden under the framework of civil liability,
6. ZHANG WENXIAN, RESEARCH ON CATEGORY OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 345 (Beijing: China
University of Political Science and Law Press 2001).
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following the rules of civil law. Civil liability is usually divided into
tort liability and liability for breach of contract. In the field of envi-
ronmental law, environmental responsibility is triggered by tortious
behavior. Therefore, the environmental liability in this article refers
to environmental tort liability. Moreover, as natural resources have
a significant economic value, and have already been included in ad-
justing the range of property law, their protection is fully applicable
to general tort theory. Because the environment as a whole does not
have a significant economic value, it cannot be directly adjusted by
traditional civil law, so a special tort theory should be applied to envi-
ronmental pollution prevention and control.7 Currently, the thoughts
of China’s legislators on environmental pollution prevention and
control tort theory focus on the newly adopted Tort Liability Law of
PRC. According to Article 65 of this law, “Damages caused by the
environmental pollution, the polluter should assume tort liability.”
Environmental pollution tort liability consists of damage and the
causation, as opposed to traditional civil tort liability, in which the
elements of subjective fault and illegal conduct are not included.
This dual-element theory of environmental pollution tort liability is a
great breakthrough compared to traditional civil tort liability. While
it helps citizens protect their environmental rights better, from the
perspective of judicial practice, there still remains a big dilemma.
First of all, current environmental tort action in our country does
not include the harm relief to the environment itself, which causes
difficulties in raising and winning a lawsuit by the public. According
to the Tort Liability Law of PRC, Article 2, the civil rights and in-
terests used are restricted to personal and property rights and in-
terests. As per the system interpretation, “harm” in Article 65 only
refers to personal damage and property damage. Therefore, rights
damaged by “environmental pollution infringement” only include the
personal rights and property rights of pollution victims. This means
that relief from environmental pollution action only concerns the
loss of life, health, or property of the victim caused by the environ-
mental pollution act, and does not include damage to the environ-
ment itself. It obviously puts the incidental before the fundamental,
as the direct purpose of environmental civil remedy is to maintain
7. Because the civil law of our nation always places natural resources in the category of
property law as a prescription towards property, the torts remedy about natural resources in the
legal practices does not meet the problems mentioned in this thesis, which only launches dis-
cussions about the theoretical problems concerning torts remedy of environmental pollution.
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the public right to live in a healthy and good environment, and the
indirect purpose is to compensate the public for personal or property
damage caused by environmental pollution. Therefore, in judicial
practice, the current environmental pollution infringement system
is not suitable to institute legal environmental proceedings when
environmental pollution has caused environmental deterioration but
has not yet caused actual personal or property damage, until scien-
tific evidence (especially expert testimony) could prove that personal
or property damage has indeed occurred. But as environmental pol-
lution has delayed development characteristics, potentialities and
scientific uncertainties, this kind of damage could appear several
years or several decades later, which would not meet the require-
ments of maintaining the environmental rights of the pubic, and is
unfavorable for the development of environmental protection in our
country. Some scholars suggest that the environmental public in-
terest litigation system should be established in order to solve the
dilemma of the environmental pollution infringement system men-
tioned above. Environmental civil public interest litigation includes
any organization or person that could initiate legal proceedings in
the People’s court against any action that violates or infringes on
the public’s environment rights and interests according to the law,
and the People’s court will carry out judicial activity according to
the civil litigation procedures of the law. However, as per the basic
model of norms and systems of civil law concerning “right-relief,” no
right means no relief, which also means that if “the damage of the
environment itself” does not have the corresponding rights in law,
it cannot obtain relief by itself and the polluter need not assume lia-
bility for the damage caused to the environment itself. Therefore,
the affirmation of the public’s environmental rights by law is a pre-
requisite to establishing environmental public interest litigation. Of
course, the environmental pollution infringement relief emphasized
herein shall not exclude relief regarding personal damage and prop-
erty damage of environmental pollution victims, but will extend re-
lief to include damage of the environment itself.
Secondly, current environmental pollution infringement liability
implements the principle of liability without fault, which may pose
a potential threat to the property rights of numerous enterprises and
influence the economic development of our country accordingly. The
principle of fault liability is the basic principle within the principle
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of imputation in civil liability. This means the injuring party that
shall assume civil liability for its actions but if there is no fault, there
is no liability. The “fault” refers to the psychological status of blame
that the actor has. It includes two forms: the deliberate and the neg-
ligent. As fault liability could prompt the personal act yet not blame
the actor for every move, it is favorable for the activity of the enter-
prise and the revitalization of the economy, and could actively pro-
mote the development of modern market economy. However, with the
high development of large-scale, hazardous industries and transpor-
tation industries in modern times, the accidents and disasters caused
by related infringement action have become serious social problems.
Besides, these infringement acts have gradually overshadowed the
fault liability principle due to the complexity of the injuring party,
the unclearness of the causality, and the difficulty in identifying the
fault; the objective fault principle and the fault presumption principle
emerge only as the times require. Objective fault theory functions
to determine whether the actor has fault or not in accordance with
certain standard of the conduct instead of the special psychological
activity of the actor. This kind of standard of conduct is vividly de-
scribed as the reasonable care liability that shall be fulfilled by the
bonus pater familias.8 If this kind of liability is not fulfilled, it is de-
fined as a fault. Assumption of fault means that if the plaintiff could
prove that his or her damage is caused by the defendant, and the de-
fendant could not prove he or she does not have fault, the law will
assume that the defendant has the fault and shall undertake civil
liability. The basic applicable method involves implementing the bur-
den of proof inversion principle. Although these two principles are
more favorable for the protection of the victims, they still take fault
as the final grounds of argument for the determination of liability.
The public environmental hazard problem in modern times has be-
come unprecedentedly serious since 1960. Although the majority of
environmental pollution damages are not caused by the deliberate
or negligent actions of the polluter, profits obtained through the
management of pollution enterprises are to a certain extent estab-
lished on the basis of environmental pollution. Therefore, replacing
8. In Roman law, the term bonus pater familias refers to a standard of care, equivalent
to that of the reasonable man in Common law. See Duhaime.org, http://www.duhaime.org/Legal
Dictionary/B/Bonuspaterfamilias.aspx (last visited Aug. 25, 2012).
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fault liability with no fault liability at all has become the universal
principle of rules governing environmental pollution liability in many
countries, including China.9 The principle of no-fault liability refers
to whether the actor has fault and determines whether he or she will
assume the liability for the damage caused by his or her action, as
long as the law stipulates the actor shall assume the civil liability.
As per no-fault liability, the victim does not need to offer evidence for,
or assume any fault on the part of the injuring party, nor shall the
injuring party demur for reason of having no fault.
The principle of liability without fault embodies the principle of
fairness in civil law from angles of benefit equilibrium within the
whole society, including the balance of power of different social
groups in the community and compensation for the purpose of a
peace-making effect. It reflects the view of equal justice in a modern
socialization environment and is evidently marked with the char-
acteristics of sociological jurisprudence. But, to abandon the appli-
cation of the principle of liability without fault completely, and to
apply a no-fault liability principle unconditionally, may bring about
overburdened liability for enterprises that promote environmental
protection. These enterprises cannot balance benefits between both
parties involved and cannot adapt to the current situation of eco-
nomic development in our country at this point. Especially when
environmental pollution infringements involve more than one legal
subject, it could probably conceal the subjective malicious fault of
the infringers, leading to substantial unfairness, damping down the
enthusiasm for production of market subjects, and violating their
property rights, if we are to apply the no-fault liability principle
completely and indiscriminately. In the first case involving road
traffic noise10 in China, if the developer’s fault in the design of the
housing estate is not taken into consideration, and the no-fault lia-
bility principle is applied exclusively, the property rights of the high-
way operating companies shall be infringed. So, when selecting civil
liability principles for an environmental damage compensation case,
the author claims to apply the no-fault liability principle cautiously
and selectively. Namely, when its infliction has subjective fault, the
9. JIN RUILIN, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 192 (Beijing: Peking
University Press 2006).
10. Fan Yueru, An Analysis of the First Case of Road Traffic Noise in China, Nov. 16,
2011, http://www.chinacourt.org/html/article/200205/21/3414.shtml.
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fault principle should have preference over the no-fault principle.11
Provisions of this will meet both the needs of the current levels of
economic development and the stages of the rules of law, and be
more reasonable and achievable in judicial practice. It reveals that
environmental protection should be carried out conditionally, or the
protection of property rights may risk paralysis. For the same rea-
son, the creation of environmental rights should not only be able to
live up to the public pursuit of the environmental value, but also be
based on practical demand in the economic sphere. Otherwise, it
will not seem to be that powerful and at the same time, the creation
of the environmental rights will seem to lack the precondition. This
is the main reason why the environmental rights theory is met with
legislative bottlenecks in numerous countries. Therefore, if environ-
ment right is really to become legal right, it must take property rights
into account.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS LEGISLATION MEETS A BOTTLENECK
Rights to the environment are “the core question of environmental
legislation and enforcement, environmental management and public
participation, citizen suit and environmental public interest litigation,
and [are] also the center of construction and guarantee of environ-
mental legal system for ecological society and Green Civilization.”12
Among all the theories of creating environmental rights, environ-
mental rights theory is no doubt the most influential one. Environ-
mental rights theory provided a worldwide basis for the environment
crisis and the environmental protection movement produced after
World War II. That theory was first put forward by an American
scholar based on the theories of “public property” and “public trust.”13
11. In order to remedy the information inconformity between the victims and the actors,
mistake presumption theory will be adopted to replace the traditional mistake responsibility
principle.
12. CAI SHOUQIU, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 48 (Beijing: Science Press 2003).
13. The theories of collective ownership and public commission put forward by Professor
Joseph Sax from the University of Michigan of the United States are very popular. He deems
that such environmental elements essential to the existence of humankind as air, sunshine
and water should not be viewed as “free property” or the object of ownership. Instead they
should be viewed as the “public property” owned by all the citizens within a state and nobody
is entitled to occupy, dominate or damage them at will. In order to dominate and protect this
“public property” reasonably, the collective owners entrust it to the management of the state.
The state as a commissioned agent for the collective owners should be responsible for all the
national citizens and should not abuse the commissioned right.
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Hereafter, environmental rights were confirmed as basic human
rights by lots of international legal documents, the most classic of
which is the Stockholm Declaration of 1972, principle 1 which states,
“Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate
conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of
dignity and well-being, and he bears a solemn responsibility to protect
and improve the environment for present and future generations.”14
From then on, the international community has generally accepted
environmental rights as basic human rights, and many countries
have tried to confirm this through their constitutions and other do-
mestic laws. But there is no clear and specific regulation of environ-
mental rights in those countries’ legal systems, where such rights
are only considered “deserved rights”15 or “moral rights.” If the legal
protection of environmental rights “remain[ ] only on paper and
cannot influence human behavior or be rigorously observed, then
the law is merely a myth and not a reality.”16 So in order for envi-
ronmental rights legislation to be realized, it must be based on clear
and specific subjects, objects, and contents of environmental rights.
But these theories have reached no general consensus, and environ-
mental rights legislation continues to bottleneck accordingly.
A. Uncertainties and Generalization of Environmental Rights
The right’s clarity is a precondition to the right’s legislation, so
only specific “deserved rights,” with good maneuverability can be
legally confirmed, while ambiguous “deserved rights,” cannot.
Firstly, the subject of environmental rights is uncertain. Among do-
mestic legal scholarship, there are “nation, legal person and citizens”
14. United Nations Environment Programme, http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual
/Default.asp?DocumentID=97&ArticleID=1503 (last visited Aug. 25, 2012).
15. From the perspective of existing forms, the rights can be divided into vested rights,
legal rights and practical rights. Among them the deserved rights are “the original form of
rights, they are the requirements and demands towards rights of the people in specific society
under certain life conditions and cultural traditions and they are the rights thought or ad-
mitted for people to enjoy.” The legal rights are such rights “prescribed explicitly by the prac-
tical law or declared by the legislation guidelines and law principles, and they exist in the
form of norms and ideology.” The practical rights are the “rights enjoyed and executed by the
subject in practice. The practical rights are the end of rights execution as well as the start of
new rights execution.” See ZHANG WENXIAN, JURISPRUDENCE 113 (Beijing: Higher Education
Press 2003).
16. EDGAR BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE: PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND THEIR METHOD 232
(Huaxia Publishing House 1987).
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theories,17 “citizens” theories,18 “human” theories,19 and “natural
rights” theories20 on the subject of environmental rights. So far, no
agreement has been reached in this field. Therefore, environmental
rights in theory would have no value without a clear and specific
subject. Secondly, the content of environmental rights is uncertain.
There have already been great divergences among scholars on the
connotation of environmental rights.21 In addition, some scholars
17. The typical representatives of this theory are Cai Shouqiu and Tang Pengmin. See Cai
Shouqiu, A Preliminary Study of Environmental Rights, 3 SOCIAL SCIENCES IN CHINA (1982);
Tang Pengmin, On Environmental Rights, 1 SEEKER (2002). This theory defines the “nation,
legal person and citizens” as the subjects of the environmental right. According to this theory,
with the different subjects of environmental right, there are three corresponding kinds of en-
vironmental rights, namely the national environmental right, legal person environmental right
and citizen’s environmental right. However, this theory does not make a reasonable expla-
nation of the contents of these three kinds of rights, which leads to the inconformity of the
nature and content of them as well as the appearance of certain contradictions and conflicts.
18. The typical representatives of this theory are Lv Zhongmei and Chen Quansheng. See
Lv Zhongmei, Citizen’s Environmental Rights, 2 CHINESE JOURNAL OF LAW 62 (1995); Chen
Quansheng, An Analysis of Environmental Rights, 2 CHINESE LEGAL SCIENCE (1997). This
theory holds that the subjects of the environmental right should be citizens including the
“modern people as well as the posterity.” However the admission of the posterity as the sub-
ject of environmental right will make the self of environmental right become hollow. For
example, how to protect the rights of posterity? How can the posterity claim right for the
deceased modern people?
19. The typical representative of this theory is Xu Xiangmin. See generally Xu Xiangmin,
Environmental Rights: Stages of Development in Human Rights, 4 SOCIAL SCIENCES IN CHINA
(2004). Mr. Xu thinks that the subject of environmental right is humankind. Making human-
kind the subject of right satisfies the objective legitimacy and public article property of the en-
vironment as common benefits of humankind. However, in the present international society,
it is impossible to find an organization to form, express and execute the ideas of the whole hu-
mankind or a general practice of humankind as a specific function of social existence.
20. This theory was initiated by the American scholar and professor Nash and later pro-
moted by Professor P. W. Tyler and Japanese scholar and professor Yamamura Tsunetoshi.
See Fan Zhanping, On the Indefinite Nature of the Environment Right, 2 JOURNAL OF ZHENG-
ZHOU UNIVERSITY: PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE EDITION (2006). According to this theory,
all the natural objects have legal rights, especially those animals with life just like the human-
kind; they grow up in the natural environment and need also the sunshine, air and fresh wa-
ter, so they also should be the subjects of the environmental right so as to enjoy such right.
However, the admission of the status of natural objects will damage the principle of distinc-
tion between the objects and subjects which is the basis of the traditional laws. Meanwhile this
theory also meets the same predicament on the remedy just as the theory of viewing the pos-
terity as the subjects. The insuperable difficulties in the technology of law will only do harm
to the authority of law.
21. At present, there are two relatively typical theories concerning the environmental right
in our country. Professor Lv Zhongmei assumes that the environmental right should include
at least: the right to use environment, the right to know the environment, and the right to par-
ticipate in the environmental issues as well as the right to claim the environment objects.
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further make the connotation of environmental rights deductive
and generalized. Environmental rights are accordingly becoming all-
encompassing rights. However, “if a right includes everything with-
out a defined boundary, this right will be meaningless.”22
In fact, it is believed this uncertainty pertaining to environmental
rights is rooted in the indefinite conception of the environment.
Since environmental right is, in essence, the right of allocating en-
vironmental elements, the contents and subjects of environmental
rights will not be defined without a clear concept of the environment.
Therefore, we should make an in-depth analysis on the concept of
environment and the relationship between the environment and its
resources. As a relative concept, the definition of the environment
varies in academic disciplines. Among them, the definitions given by
environmental science and ecology are of great importance for en-
vironmental law research, because those branches provide the main
scientific bases of environmental protection. Within ecology, “envi-
ronment” is defined as a biosphere that is the center and the subject
of an atmosphere that must have necessary conditions and non-
living substances around for it to survive biologically. Alternatively,
environmental science defines “environment” as the aggregation of
the space surrounding people and the various natural factors that
could directly or indirectly affect human life and development. This
people-centric environment is also known as the “human environ-
ment” and is the study of human activity, with strong properties of
social science. Compared with “habitat” from an ecological perspec-
tive, “environment” in the law is much closer to the “environment”
in environmental science with regards to the substance of regula-
tion. The definition of “environment” in environmental law should be
based on its definition in environmental science, because, basically,
the environment in environmental law is also human environment.
Among them, the right to use the environment includes, but is not limited to, the sunshine-
enjoying right, viewing right, scenery right, serenity right, smoke-resistance right, close-to-
water right, park application right, historical environment right, and the nature-enjoyment
right. See LV ZHONGMEI, NEW VISION OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 125 (Beijing: China University
of Political Science and Law Press 2000). Professor Chen Quansheng believes that the envi-
ronmental rights consists of two respects; one is the right of subjects in the legal environ-
mental relationship to enjoy the proper health and pleasant life environment, the other is the
basic rights for the subjects in the legal environmental relationship to make reasonable use of
the environmental resources. See Chen Quansheng, An Analysis of Environmental Rights, 2
CHINESE LEGAL SCIENCE (1997).
22. Xu Xiangmin, Query to Citizens’ Environmental Rights, 2 LAW SCIENCE (2004).
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However, the “environment” in environmental law is different from
its definition in environmental science due to its research scope and
perspectives. First, the concept and scope of environmental law must
be specific and clear, so the abstract and general concepts of envi-
ronmental science (e.g., hydrosphere) cannot be within the scope of
legal “environment.” Second, the environment of law must be com-
posed by natural factors that can be affected, adjusted and controlled
by human behavior and activities; otherwise, the law cannot protect
it. Therefore, not all of the environmental factors that are directly or
indirectly related to human survival and development in environ-
mental science are included in the scope of the “environment” in
law. Third, the “environment” in law should be an integral concept.
This is because under the basic theory of ecology, the environment
is “essential for human survival and development conditions, and
is a symbiotic ecosystem with energy flow material recirculation
and transmission of information. Here environment is ecological re-
source which should be understood from ecology . . . as the natural
resource, it has integrity and self-adjusting ability.”23 This integrity
means not only the addition but the integration of dynamic natural
factors. From this perspective, the environment is a unity composed
of a variety of natural factors “having a certain ecological functions
of material and energy flow.”24 Although the legal “environment” is
rooted in “human environment” under environmental science, the
ecological principles and their interpretation are indispensable to
the foundation of human natural science used to solve environmental
problems. In summary, it is believed that the concept of “environment”
in law can be defined as an entity that is composed of various natu-
ral resources or natural factors (including air, water, ocean, land,
minerals, forests, grasslands, wildlife, natural heritage, human re-
mains, nature reserves, scenic areas, and urban and rural areas)
that affect human survival and development with certain ecological
functions in material and energy flow. Such an environment provides
the physical infrastructure for human survival and development. In
23. Lv Zhongmei, On Trade System of Right to Use Environment, 4 TRIBUTE OF POLITICAL
SCIENCE AND LAW 129 (2000).
24. Chang Jiwen, Substantial and Contrastive Analysis of Environmental and Natural
Resources Rights, in Sustainable Development: Thoughts and Practice on Cross Century En-
vironmental Law, ACADEMIC SEMINAR OF SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (The Academic
Paper on the Exchanges of the 1st Congress of Chinese Environmental and Natural Resources
Law Society); LV ZHONGMEI, COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATION: ON CIVIL PROTECTION OF
ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHT 17 (Beijing: Renmin University of China Press 2005).
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order to maintain life, humans must have the right to possess or use
the environment, and such rights comprise the “deserved rights” of
human beings. Due to the ecological integrity of environment, no
subject in the exercise of that right can be excluded, regardless of
whether other subjects exercise that same right. In terms of inner
environmental rights for all citizens, this right is equal to everyone
and inviolable.
Another concept closely linked with the environment is that of
natural resources. Natural resources (the resources25) are the aggre-
gate of all the material and energy that form the natural world for
human use. Clarifying the relationship between the environment
and its resources is critical to solving the fundamental, theoretical
problems associated with environmental rights. Consequently, an
in-depth analysis of basic principles in ecology and environmental
science is needed. First, based on the laws of ecology, resources are
a static and integral part of the environment. As an entity, the en-
vironment is composed of both natural and manmade resources. In
other words, resources are the basic factors for the environment.
Previous litigators only focused on the usefulness and economic value
in developing resources, which were accordingly considered objects
of property right, and were separated entirely from the environment.
Actually, a natural resource provides the material and energy to hu-
mans for their survival and development, as well as broad ecological
values including environmental capacity, aesthetic value, and bio-
diversity. Take forest resources for example: on the one hand, trees
and fruits perform different economic functions; on the other hand,
they perform the same atmosphere environment function by absorb-
ing carbon dioxide and releasing oxygen. Separating resources from
the environment completely can cause the various interests in the
same environmental factor to become unbalanced. This relevant le-
gal adjustment leads to conflicting and more serious resource dam-
age, because the environment is an entity dependent on ecological
relevancy, system balance, and function coordination. Therefore,
25. There are two definitions of resources—a wide one and a narrow one. The widely de-
fined resources include natural resources, human resources, intelligence resources and other
kinds of resources, while the narrowly defined resources only mean the natural resources.
However in the field of environmental law, the resources are commonly taken as the narrowly
defined resources, namely the natural resources, if there is no special footnote. Therefore in
this thesis, for the convenience of writing, the distinction between the resources and natural
resources will not be specially marked out.
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resources can be distinguished from the environment based on their
independent economic value. Simultaneously, the resources must be
an integral part of the environment based on their ecological value.
Second, from an environmental, economic perspective, the value
contained in the resources remains part of it in the environment.
While on this point, scholars, especially those in traditional civil
law, hold a different kind of view; their reason is that environment
factors are the public goods, not exclusive ones, and accordingly pos-
sess only ecological—not economic—values. To support their views,
they frequently take atmospheric environment into account. They
say that one must breathe in order to survive but that one cannot
prevent others from breathing in order to do so. Therefore, the
non-exclusiveness or indivisibility of the atmospheric environment
proscribes any creation of property rights. That conclusion, which
may be correct in the early stage of human society, has been chal-
lenged as the environment becomes increasingly scarce due to
modern environmental problems. Strictly speaking, the concept of
“environment” here refers to environmental capacity, namely the
maximum population size of the pollutant that the environment can
contain and purify once contaminated. That the concept of environ-
mental capacity was put forward means that some subjects can
obtain the right to emit pollutants, while others cannot, even if they
lose a right once possessed; otherwise, the environment may happen
to be polluted. Therefore, the scarcity of environmental capacity,
and the appropriate distribution of benefits, should become the
object of the rights defined by the legislature. In other words, the
law should confer the right to a specific subject to decide who gets
such benefits. Consequently, the scarcity of the environmental ca-
pacity causes it to possess economic value similar to that of natural
resources. Then the value of the environment shows the diversity
not only of its traditional ecological value but also of its economic
value with regards to environmental capacity resources. In sum-
mary, in terms of the environment, whether in its material form or
in its value form, its resources are included. Resources are often
based on individual elements of its basic state, and of its physical
and chemical forms, so the protection of resources must focus on
“quantity” maintenance. The environment is an ecological concept
based on a balance system and a number of complex elements; its
fundamental objective is to maintain the balance of the human
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ecosystem as well as the stability of other ecological systems. To do
so, it is necessary to maintain environmental protection “quality,”
and this “quality” is based on the maintenance of the resources’
“quantity,” so the level of utilization of resources must be limited so
as to not affect the quality of the environment. This is the scientific
basis necessary to create the right system.
In summary, the environment includes resources from both a
material perspective and a value perspective. The basic state of re-
sources is based on individual elements, physical and chemical forms,
so the protection of resources necessarily focuses on “quantity” to
maintain the state. “Environment” is an ecological concept based on
the balance of a system and is a synthesis of many elements. Its fun-
damental goal is to maintain the balance of the human environmen-
tal system, while maintaining the stability of the ecosystem. As a
result, environmental protection means maintaining the “quality”
of the environment, and is based on the resources used to maintain
this “quantity”; therefore, the level of resource utilization must be
limited, without affecting environmental quality, which is also the
scientific basis created by the environmental rights system.
After clearing up the concept of the environment and the relation
between the environment and its resources, it is not difficult to point
out that the environment has two basic values to human beings: one
is the environment’s integral, indivisible, and nonexclusive ecolog-
ical value that can provide essential needs for human survival; the
other is the environment’s partial, divisible, and exclusive economic
value, which can meet the developing needs for humanity. So the dis-
position of creating rights to environment must meet the following
three requirements so as to effectively realize the aforementioned
values. First, the maintenance of the environment at a certain eco-
logical level must be in the hands of the citizens, allowing each com-
mon owner to enjoy the whole environment on an individual basis.
Second, the property rights of the environment (and its resources)
must be clearly defined so that its economic value can be reflected
through a pricing mechanism, turning it into an object that embod-
ies specific legal property rights and that may be utilized. The third
places the management rights of environmentally related affairs in
the hands of its common owners, thus maintaining the whole en-
vironment’s quality at a certain level. Accordingly, the content of
the rights to the environment in our country should also cover the
following rights. Within the concept of a common environmental
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right, in which the right is subject to citizen control, the object is
necessarily a domestic environment; otherwise, its specific rights
can be respectively confirmed by environmental elements, such as
the right to clean air, the right to clean water and lighting right, etc.
The latter rights are the exclusive rights of specific subjects partial
to an environmental resource. According to China’s current condi-
tion of national economic development and environmental protec-
tion, the subject of this right is limited to our country, and collectivity,
while the object is a natural resource in its environmental capacity,
its specific rights include proprietary rights of natural resources and
of an environmental capacity. The last right concerns the manage-
ment of environmental rights and affairs for citivo. The subject of
this right is the citizen while the object includes all juristic acts re-
lated to the environment and its specific rights including the right
to access information, to participate in decision-making, and to ac-
cess the judiciary in environmental matters, and so on. The theoreti-
cal framework of such rights regarding the environment is based on
the fundamentals of ecological and environmental science, which
enable it to satisfy the current needs of our country’s environmental
protection and endure scrutiny both theoretically and practically.
B. Pluralistic Attributes of Environmental Rights
The clearness of a legal property right decides whether this right
can obtain legal protection. After the environmental right theory had
been proposed, its legal property became the problem that was most
frequently discussed by scholars. In its early stages, scholars were
more likely to confirm the legal property of environmental rights as a
single property. Its representative theories are human right theory,26
personal right theory,27 and property right theory.28 Though the above
26. In the doctrine, environmental rights are fundamental rights of citizens, as the basis
for human survival and development. Environmental rights have been affirmed by a series
of international documents, in fact, they have become basic human rights of human society.
See Lv Zhongmei, The Environmental Rights of Citizens, 2 CHINESE JOURNAL OF LAW (1995).
27. In the doctrine, citizens are subjects to environmental rights. Human environmental
rights include personal rights. Because the consequences of violation of environmental rights
are often manifested in the damage to the health of citizens, therefore, the environmental rights
are rights of personality. See Chen Quansheng, Analysis of Environmental Rights, 2 CHINESE
LEGAL SCIENCE (1997).
28. Environmental rights are property rights. The doctrine comes from the Public Trust
Doctrine, which is transplanted from common law by United States environmental law. See
XU XIANGMIN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHT: BASIC RESEARCH OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 28
(Beijing: Peking University Press 2004).
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theories are partially reasonable, they only reveal one or several
characteristics of environmental rights. The complexity and value
of the pluralistic concept of environmental rights is dispositive of the
impossibility of a single property, a point gradually accepted by schol-
ars. However, some scholars hold the idea that environmental rights
have properties of human rights, private rights, public rights, eco-
logical rights, and legal rights.29 But some other scholars consider
the existence of a theory that incorporates the tendency of tradi-
tional cognition and environmental right nature. This is the logic in
pursuing a single correct answer, and this “seat by number logisches
Denken” closely covers the complexity of environmental rights.
Based on “Comprehensive Logisches Denken,” scholars who endorse
this position hold that environmental rights are not only the combi-
nation of human rights and common rights, but also the combina-
tion of the right to receive and behavior rights according to the
property characteristics of environmental rights. It creates a com-
plex right that incorporates due right, customary right, and legal
right.30 Compound right theory shows that scholars have abandoned
the logic of pursuing the sole correct answer and now acknowledge the
pluralistic attributes of environmental right, which has progressive
significance. However, compound right theory just gathers up the
threads of related environmental right cognitions, trying to correct
the defects of environmental right theory. Obviously, this endeavor is
unsuccessful. The main reason is that it simply compiles many spe-
cific environmental rights without distinguishing them, thus lacking
any basic logical point and creating too many disordered properties
to be legally verified. Based on the earlier analysis, the writer makes
the environment and his goal of right subject as his starting point,
integrating the three aspects of environmental right and property.
Firstly, environmental rights possess human rights but are not
limited to this attribute. Common ownership of the overall environ-
ment is an obvious human rights attribute. Each person must rely on
a certain natural environment, so that they can survive, breath air,
and drink water, which are natural, inseparable, and integral rights
of humans. Therefore, environmental rights possess human rights
attributes that have been generally accepted by the international
29. Wu Guogui, The Concept and Property of Environmental Rights, 4 LAW SCIENCES
68–73 (2003).
30. Wang Xiaogang, Lifted the Veil of Environmental Rights: the Complexity of Envi-
ronmental Rights, 3 SOUTHEAST ACADEMIC 138–40 (2007).
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community.31 But if environmental rights are only regarded as hu-
man rights, they can only be incorporated into the law based on the
provisions previously mentioned. So the laws should verify other
specific environmental rights in order to achieve the reification of
environmental rights and to provide the means and ways to achieve
environmental human rights. Secondly, environmental rights pos-
sess properties of both private and public rights. With environmental
rights, everyone enjoys an appropriate, healthy, good living envi-
ronment, and the basic rights associated with the rational use of
environmental resources that significant private owners possess.
However, the public goods nature of the environment will lead to a
tragedy of the commons before coming under the “Public Trust
Theory,” in which citizens entrust individual environmental manage-
ment rights to the country. The country’s environmental administra-
tive power embodies the public right of property within environmental
rights. Thirdly, environmental rights possess both substantive and
procedural rights. To ensure the integrity of environmental rights,
and to avoid its destruction by human activity, it is necessary to place
citizen participation in environmental decision-making, and access
to justice and other rights, under the premise that environmental
laws inform physical environmental rights. The main procedural rec-
ognition of environmental rights is more likely to be accepted than
complicated, ambiguous substantive rights.
In summary, the diverse value of the environment defines environ-
mental rights legally, as property. According to the traditional think-
ing in civil law, it is difficult for multiple rights to form a right as
provisions in the law. Environmental issues are also not considered
traditional property rights, personal rights, and other theoretical
rights that can be handled. Therefore, in order to protect the health
of citizens, and the right to practice environmental responsibility,
we can only refer to the “bundle of rights” theory in order to express
and reflect the environment’s diverse properties. Moreover, conflicts
and confrontations between rights make it difficult for environmen-
tal rights to be legalized.
C. Confrontations of the Rights
The multiple attributes of environmental rights will inevitably
lead to confrontation within these rights. The “rights confrontation”
31. For further explanation, see the first paragraph of Part II earlier in this paper.
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or called “rights conflict” here means that different rights pointing
to a common object, or claims between each other pointing to each
other, will result in the rights not being achieved simultaneously.
Because the various rights of the environment point to a common
object, to the whole or a part, or to their ecological or economic val-
ue, there are restrictions and obstacles to environmental rights,
although the rights are applicable to each other. This means that if
the rights associated with one subject in the law can be achieved,
then at the same time, it is certain that the rights of other law sub-
jects cannot be achieved. In accordance with the second inference of
Cohen about the restrictions of private property on personal liberty,
that is “the protection of private property diminishes the freedom of
non-owners,” correspondingly, environmental property rights of some
subjects established “the liberty of property owners, but withdraw the
liberty from those who do not own it.”32 Similarly, there is a conflict
between common environmental ownership and exclusive resource
ownership. On the one hand, citizens own the whole environment
based on the right of existence and have the right to maintain a cer-
tain level of environmental quality, which is the “due right” of hu-
mans. But when the resource is subjected to overuse, they pollute
the environment, and the rights cannot be achieved. On the other
hand, the resource subjects, especially enterprises, use the resources
for production, creating wealth and promoting economic develop-
ment of the country. The utilization of rights is meant to be justified
and not accusatory, under the premise of not violating environment-
related legal provisions. Even so, due to the complexity of the envi-
ronmental problems, such behavior may result in the infringement
on citizens’ personal or property rights. So the citizens will assert
claims for damage compensation from the enterprise by applying
“the principle of no-fault liability,” while the enterprise will limit the
acknowledgment of rights when compensating. In addition, in deal-
ing with environmental rights, there are conflicts among substan-
tive rights and procedural rights, public rights and private rights.
Because conflicts of rights in the environmental rights system are
popular, subjects cannot establish reasonable expectations for acts
and the results of acts, resulting in the collapse of the environmen-
tal rights system. To add insult to injury, environmental rights still
32. See G. A. Cohen, Illusions About Private Property and Freedom, in JOHN MEPHAM &
D-H. RUBEN, ISSUES IN MARXIST PHILOSOPHY (IV): SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 225–29
(Harvester Press & Humanities Press 1981).
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cannot enter the vision of legislators, which is intolerable. There-
fore, it is necessary to bring the rights into a harmonious and or-
derly state instead of a state of confrontation. The author believes
that the key to achieving this state is to grasp the logical structure
of the system of environmental rights, and to define the boundaries
of these rights clearly.
Through this analysis, it is not difficult to find the theoretical
dilemma of environmental rights entering into legislation. The com-
plexity and diverse values of the environment have led to uncer-
tainties regarding environmental rights’ subjects universally and
domestically, thus determining the diverse properties of these rights.
Because traditional and single rights cannot sum up the properties
of environmental rights, environmental rights should be recognized
as a group of rights constituted by different rights. In addition, be-
cause the right conflicts with environmental rights, laws have to
take full account of the logical relationship between rights while
creating them, and form a bundle of rights with a logical structure.
As Lv Zhongmei pointed out, “environmental rights are the bundle
of rights with human attribute[s], and are a system of rights. Envi-
ronmental rights are rights of a compound nature, possessing prop-
erty rights, personal rights, other economic rights and ecological
rights. The rights of different natures form a complex bundle of
rights.”33 At this point, establishing environmental rights with prop-
erty law has become a prime choice.
III. SOLUTIONS
How can the legalization of environmental rights be achieved?
Peter Stan once pointed out: “The existence of [a] right and the
degree of its being protected can only obtain guarantee when the
general rules of civil law and criminal law are appealed to.”34 Just
as the previous paragraph mentioned, if the bundle of rights prin-
ciple in property law can be used to establish environmental rights,
then the defects of single right may be avoided. The concept of hu-
man rights is especially general and impractical whereas the enti-
tlement of property rights and management rights to the citizens
33. LV ZHONGMEI, COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATION: ON CIVIL PROTECTION OF
ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHT 43 (Beijing: Renmin University of China Press 2005).
34. Peter Stan & John Shannon, 173 (Beijing: Chinese People’s Public Security University
Press 1989).
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cannot only provoke great enthusiasm in the citizens to protect the
environment, but also bring the dexterity of the market mechanism
into play in the environmental field.
A. Basic Clues
By means of adoption of the bundle of rights principle in property
law,35 the basic clues for the solution of legalization of environmen-
tal rights are, firstly, to define the environmental rights as a set of
legal relationships. As mentioned, the environmental right cannot
be generalized into a conceptual and united right “type”; on the con-
trary, it should be expressed as a right system with multiple proper-
ties. According to the subjects’ requirements of the environment, this
right system can be reflected in three concrete sets of rights. These
three sets of environmental rights do not depend on any fixed or ab-
stract type of legal right in traditional law. In theory, they can only
be analyzed in relation to concrete forms of rights in order to expose
the most fundamental component elements. Therefore, the environ-
mental right is anything but an abstract and general concept; in-
stead, it is usually exemplified in a structure composed of all kinds
of concrete categories. In other words, environmental rights do not
form a plural noun but are a bundle of rights combination, namely
an environmental right which is to be confirmed in the law, that is
a somewhat vague bundle of rights that has been broken off from
the united concept of environmental rights. Currently, more than
one person should commonly own a single environmental element.
Under such circumstances, the special and limited right possessed
by every common owner of an environmental element becomes the
central point. This means the boundaries and structures of this set
of rights need to be focused on. Secondly, the law must be certain
about the boundaries and structures of internal rights within environ-
mental rights. In modern civil law, the most typical application of
the bundle of rights principle is the system for “Owners’ Partitioned
Ownership of Building Areas” or “ Condominium ownership.”36 In
35. See Mei Xiaying, The Two Metaphors and Interpretations of the Concept “Ownership”
in Book One of Civil Law—The Construction of Modern Property Legal Relationship, 1
JOURNAL OF RENMIN UNIVERSITY OF CHINA (2002).
36. The term condominium ownership of buildings, as one of the vital forms of property
ownership in the modern times, has been established in the civil law in many countries and re-
gions. The names of condominium ownership in the different countries and regions are unlike,
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defining the structure of this set of environmental rights from a sci-
entific perspective, we may learn to imitate condominium owner-
ship. Owners’ partitioned ownership of building areas means that
an owner shall have ownership over exclusive parts of the building,
such as a residential house or a house used for business purposes,
and shall have common ownership and rights of common manage-
ment over other common, non-exclusive parts. The system of building
ownership distinction is divided into three parts, namely exclusive
ownership, collective ownership, and member rights.37 From the per-
spective of legal theory, the reason why confirmation of environ-
mental rights in law can refer to the division of building ownership
is because both are comparable in object and legal nature.
Firstly, this perspective is complex because the object, in question,
joint ownership, can be created through the division of ownership
within a united and inseparable building. This building can be di-
vided into several independent parts, horizontally and vertically,
depending on the length and breadth and each part, each of which
can be used separately and owned separately. Similarly, the object
incorporating environmental rights is an indivisible whole in its
ecological value, but the resource part of it, with obvious economic
value, can be set apart singularly and owned by specific subjects.
With the object of right as the logical starting point of rights re-
search, this kind of similarity makes it possible to draft a system of
distinct environmental rights by imitating the building ownership.
Secondly, from a multiple property perspective, the distinction made
by building ownership involves a set of rights consisting of exclusive
rights, collective rights, and member rights. The exclusive parts are
occupied, used, profited on, and disposed with by the particular own-
ers alone; the collective parts such as common walls, roofs, doors
and windows, stairways, grass land, and hallways are owned collec-
tively by all proprietors; meanwhile all proprietors enjoy manage-
ment rights in dealing with the common property and the affairs of
the whole building. However, the collective ownership of all the
such as “condominium ownership” in the United States (some states), “Wohnungseigentum” in
Germany, “owners’ partitioned ownership of building areas”(Real Rights law of the People’s
Republic of China contains a special chapter 6 of owners’ partitioned ownership of building
areas.), etc. See CHEN HUABIN, RESEARCH ON THE SYSTEM OF THE MODERN DISTINCTION OF
BUILDING OWNERSHIIP (Beijing: Law Press 1995).
37. Chen Huabin, Talk About the Concept of Distinction of Building Ownership, 7 CON-
STRUCTION OF RULE OF LAW 23 (2010).
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proprietors is different from the shared ownership, because all the
proprietors maintain perpetual collective ownership without divi-
sion. This is exactly the multiple property distinction characteristic
of building ownership. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, en-
vironmental rights also have multiple properties, including citizens’
collective ownership of the whole environment, which illustrates hu-
man rights through the collective ownership of the state’s natural
resources and environmental capacity resources; this also illustrates
this type of property as a private right that includes the citizens’
right to manage environmental affairs within property procedure.
Besides, just like the distinction of building ownership, the three
kinds of rights within the environmental rights cannot simply be
added; they must combine with each other into a tight, inseparable
whole with a certain structure. To sum up, the distinction of build-
ing ownership is extremely beneficial to the legalization of environ-
mental rights. With the inspiration from the concept of distinct
building ownership, this article puts forward the idea of achieving
the legalization of environmental rights through the distinction of
environmental ownership.
B. Establishing the Environmental Districting Ownership
Ownership of distinct environmental property means common
ownership and exclusive ownership that owners distribute between
the common parts and the exclusive parts of the environment. Mem-
bership rights are based on common matters, such as environmental
management, protection, and so on. It includes three specific rights:
common environmental ownership, exclusive environmental rights,
and members’ rights. Through a combination of the foregoing analy-
sis, there are following designs for three kinds of rights.
Firstly, the object of environmental ownership is environment; its
subjects are citizens. The content on rights includes rights of use,
rights to earnings, and disposition. Obligations include use of eco-
logical environment, sharing of common costs (environmental taxes),
and protection and preservation of environmental functions. There
is a broad performance power in the environmental servitude, which
includes the right to clean air, clean water, and sunlight (the right
of ancient lights), as well as the right to ventilation, the right of
overlooking and watching the scenery, and the right to be free of
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pollutant emissions. Scholars have discussed much of the content of
joint ownership in the aforementioned environmental theories, so
this article will not give any more unnecessary details though it will
discuss the provisions of sharing common costs (environmental tax).
From the perspective of environmental economics, the environment
has strong positive externalities. Namely, environmental subjects
cannot obtain all associated benefits; that is, in order to serve the
overall interest of the environment, the subjects must let other sub-
jects obtain ecological benefits, but they could not place claims on
the other subjects for reimbursement. Therefore in order to meet
citizen requirements for ecological benefits, such incentives can only
be realized through reliance on the government, and the financial
burden of the government is very heavy. So in joint ownership, obli-
gations to share costs must be required to determine provisions and
to reduce government burden.
Secondly, currently, the objects in question are mainly natural
resources and environmental capacity resources for exclusive envi-
ronmental rights. The standard for the confirmation depends on its
value, namely its independent economic value and its independent
usage of the environment. The possibility for such distinction has
been mentioned in the section on the relationship of environment &
resources. The subject of the right is limited to the state and the col-
lective group, and the important resources for the basis of confirma-
tion are mainly acquired from the positive externalities of resources,
rather than from the understanding of socialist public ownership
and collective ownership, complying with a Marxist philosophical
conception of our ideology across the Constitution and property law.
Due to a lack of any incentive,38 if resources are distributed to pri-
vate subjects, then their economic value will be more important to
the private parties than their environmental value, and pollution
will be maximized. Because a confirmation of public ownership of
resources is necessary, even in Western countries with a private-
system basis, resources that have positive externalities are all rec-
ognized as public properties. The contents of exclusive rights include
occupying, using, and handling of resources, and provide that the
benefits of the owners will not be violated and that the overall en-
vironmental safety will not be damaged. But it is necessary to point
38. Private parties cannot overprofit for sake of the overall environment.
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out that public ownership is usually a virtue and that the real users
are the real subjects indeed, and that such utilization is effectuated
through an “apply-register-confirm” formality. The environmental
capacity is usually allocated like gratuitous sewage, but such a meth-
od cannot reflect the economic value of resources as well as their
allocation. So we shall establish a complete system through con-
tracts, bidding, and auctions for environmental property as soon as
it is possible to create a real “public legal person” environmental
patent system in our country.
Thirdly, the basis of membership rights is the common relation-
ship established by all districting owners who share in the production
and live together in one environment. A safe and healthy environ-
ment is the basic requirement for their performing common rights.
So all districting owners form a community, managing the environ-
ment as their means, and cover the management of the environment
and environment-related acts (including pollution, improper handling
and misuse). In order to maintain the safety and health of environ-
ment, the membership rights shall include: a right to environment
knowledge and rights to strategy participation and requests. Cor-
respondently, the obligations are: accepting the management and
complying with management stipulations.39 The membership rights
can be realized through self-management, namely through self-
sufficiency by the citizens. But the majority of people are not con-
cerned with the environment, and it is not realistic that such decisions
will be made by every citizen, so the people can commission state rep-
resentatives to make decisions on the environment for them. In this
sense, state environmental administration has a reasonable method
for such management. Although based on membership rights, citi-
zens nevertheless have a right of access to information, supervision,
and participation in decision-making of “management stipulations.”
When the environment is damaged the state will give relief to them.
So the confirmation of membership is not only connected to common
ownership and the exclusive right to make the environment an or-
ganic whole, but it also provides a clear basis for an appealing en-
vironmental law.
39. “Management stipulations” in construction classification means that owners, for the
mutual benefits of a good environment have established the written regulations on the build-
ing, bases and the attached facilities, usage and the differing the relationship between owners,
while the regulations in environment classification refer to the relevant laws and standards.
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P.S.
From the perspective of environmental right, an integrated envi-
ronment law is concentrated on its right to construct obligations, so
that the ownership of the environment has distinct property rights
that shall be confirmed or granted at law. Whether and how it shall
be incorporated into the Constitution and if it will prove consistent
with current laws, remains to be seen, so incorporation into the
Constitution will require the condition of maturity.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE
RULE OF LAW IN CHINA’S ENERGY SECTOR
LIBIN ZHANG*†
OVERVIEW
The future of China’s energy industry will include market-oriented
reforms. Property rights are a fundamental right in a market econ-
omy, and the protection of property rights is a cornerstone of a market
economy. The definition and protection of the energy industry’s prop-
erty rights include the precondition that any enterprise, including
various State-owned enterprises (“SOEs”), the three major State-
owned oil companies, as well as privately owned and foreign-invested
enterprises, can enter the energy industry. The definition and protec-
tion of the industry’s property rights also includes the necessary con-
dition that the energy industry initiates market-oriented reforms.
With China’s energy sectors’ gradual evolution from the traditional
model of State-run monopolies to that of a limited open-market model,
the definition and protection of property rights in China’s energy sec-
tors naturally have become an important part of the country’s rela-
tionship between energy and the law. At the same time, gradually
creating a legal environment comprised of a constitution, laws, admin-
istrative regulations, local regulations and judicial remedies would
be the key for China’s successful economic reforms. This point also
applies to the energy industry’s market-oriented reforms.
However, we also need to realize that at present, any nation’s, be
it a nation governed by the rule of law or a nation that is transition-
ing towards the rule of law, property rights are also subject to var-
ious restrictions under the law. One kind of restriction is based on
environmental laws and borne out of externalities that are a result of
enterprises that pollute the environment. For any enterprise, moral
self-restraint alone is insufficient in preventing said enterprises from
* Libin Zhang is a graduate from the University of Texas at Austin School of Law with
a J.D. degree and is licensed both in the State of New York and the PRC. He is currently the
Head of Legal M&A–Asia & Australia at Siemens. He is also a fellow at the Resources, Energy
and Environmental Law Institute of Peking University and a specially invited professor at
the Tsinghua University Law School.
† Website translations were provided by this author.
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polluting. Moreover, when the law does not require enterprises to
take responsibility for their actions, then any enterprise can act in
its own self-interest in order to maximize its profits by freely ig-
noring or abandoning implementing measures that would prevent
environmental pollution.
Nature has granted mankind a variety of natural resources; how-
ever, mankind, by means of wealth creation, has exploited these
natural resources to the point that many corners of the earth have
now experienced disastrous consequences. Like everything, though,
natural resource exploitation has positive and negative aspects. Ob-
jectively speaking, natural resource development and exploration
comes with a variety of hazards. Mankind’s unrestrained pursuit of
wealth has and will lead to confusion, disputes, wars, and resource
depletion. Also, the predatory exploration of natural resources will
turn the gifts and welfare gained from nature into mankind’s own
curse. Environmental protection law and the limitations that it im-
poses on property rights result from the abuse of property rights
that could lead to the destruction of environmental resources. It is
widely known that China’s environmental condition is deteriorating.
The air, water, and soil are all severely polluted, the nation’s eco-
system has been damaged, and the ever-increasing pollution levels
threaten our quality of life, our health. We are also leaving the next
generation with very few natural resources. Therefore our society will
become, in and of itself, a major source of turbulence. In terms of gov-
ernment, there is a responsibility at every level to pass legislation that
will enhance the nation’s regulatory regime by transforming envi-
ronmental pollution externalities into the responsibility of the enter-
prises that create these emissions. Moreover, there is no alternative.
Of course, in establishing such a mechanism, the appropriate reg-
ulatory issues should also be taken into account in order to avoid
enterprises bearing excessive environmental liability costs, which
could cause China’s economy to stagnate. How to balance the needs
of economic development and also environmental protection requires
an approach that considers these two policy approaches with equal
importance. To successfully address this matter, the Chinese gov-
ernment not only needs courage but also wisdom. To some extent,
decreasing the high speed of gross domestic product (“GDP”) growth
and forcing enterprises to bear some external costs is a much better
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route to change our nation’s “extensive increase model,” to improve
our living conditions and to protect our nation’s natural resources.
This conclusion also applies to China’s present energy industry and
its values and concerns regarding economic development and envi-
ronmental protection.
China is still in a transition period that is defined by its shift from
a planned economy to a market economy. Meanwhile, China’s judicial
system and its process for managing environmental pollution still
cannot function effectively. Also, there are many problems that still
exist for many administrative departments; these problems include:
noncompliance with and lax enforcement of the law, as well as rent-
seeking, which result in unfair competition in the marketplace as
well as other irregularities. In the absence of effective remedies, vic-
tims of environmental pollution are left with few or no measures
that will protect their legal rights.
Currently, State-planning mechanisms and monopolies still exist
in China’s energy industry, specifically in some sectors such as up-
stream, midstream, and downstream oil and gas. Therefore, under
this kind of planned economy model, the nation and society bear the
cost of these circumstances and the consequent problems surround-
ing environmental externalities, which are still quite serious. That
is why, in general, when looking at GDP, China’s energy consump-
tion per unit of GDP production is much higher than in Western
market economies; the phenomenon of high-energy consumption and
low output still exists. Moreover, the misuse of natural resources and
environmental damage is still very common.
I. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
According to economic theory, in market economies or in those
economies transitioning towards a market-based orientation, each
market player, be it a SOE, private, or foreign enterprise, will nat-
urally pursue profit maximization as its primary objective. If there
is no mandatory legislation or a pricing mechanism transforming
the destruction of public environmental resources into the intrinsic
costs of production, each market player in most situations tends to
pass on the costs of environmental damage to society. This makes
up the economics of externalities. A Cambridge economist, Alfred
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Marshall, first proposed the concept of externalities and later his stu-
dent, Arthur Cecil Pigou further improved upon the theory of exter-
nalities with his famous work titled, Welfare Economics.
It can be said that environmental problems are a classic example
of external diseconomies of production. Environmental resources
are typically publicly shared commodities, whether it is an environ-
mental resource used in manufacturing or for other means, their
consumption is non-competitive and non-exclusive. This makes the
ownership of environmental resources more difficult to clarify than
other property rights. Regarding the use of environmental resources,
the marginal private and social costs differ for single economic en-
tities. In manufacturing, manufacturers directly bear the marginal
private cost, which also includes raw material and labor costs, etc.
However, they do not assume the marginal costs of air pollution that
are caused by sulfur dioxide gas emissions, for example. When man-
ufacturers determine appropriate levels of output, they will only con-
sider private costs. However, from a social perspective, manufacturers’
business costs not only include production costs but also costs that
arise from damages caused by pollution, namely marginal social costs,
and should be equal to the total of marginal private costs and pollu-
tion costs combined.1
China’s coal mining industry is best able to illustrate the nation’s
market externalities. When compared to other parts of China’s ener-
gy industry, China’s coal sector was the first to experience market-
oriented reforms, but the coal sector’s externalities are still quite
serious: China’s coal mining enterprises are in part responsible for
the damage done to the nation’s soil and water resources and are
also mainly responsible for the nation’s serious air pollution prob-
lems. In 1994, China’s coal industry was fully liberalized, and now
the price of coal is on the rise. Nevertheless, high coal prices only
contribute to the coal companies’ high profits. It is also of note that
with the lack of legislation that effectively limits the cost created by
externalities, enterprises generally do not have any economic mo-
tivation to invest money in environmental protection. Even if an
enterprise, such as a coal mining corporation, wanted to invest in
solutions to some of China’s current environmental problems, the
1. Cao Wenhui, The Causes of Environmental Problems and the Solutions: An Economic
Analysis, 14 ECONOMIC FORUM, No. 14 (2008).
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cumulative ecological and environmental problems caused by the
long-term development of coal resources would result in massive eco-
logical restoration and construction costs that one enterprise alone
could not afford to pay.
Currently, China’s coal production costs do not include ecological
management costs, while developed nations generally incorporate
ecological management costs of coal mining areas into the produc-
tion costs so as to ensure a stable and reliable source of funding for
ecological management.2 Up until now, China’s central and local gov-
ernments have failed to establish a mechanism that would compel
enterprises to pay for the ecological damage caused by coal mining
activities. However, if there is no change in the pricing mechanisms
and legislative provisions for these coal mining enterprises, then the
externalities will become increasingly severe, which would undoubt-
edly contribute to the further degradation of China’s environment.
Moreover, researchers believe that establishing a sound coal devel-
opment and environmental cost accounting system that factors both
environmental and ecological costs into coal enterprises’ operating
costs would really compel coal enterprises to internalize environ-
mental externalities for which they are responsible.3
According to the interpretation of the theory of externalities and
its application to the environment, we can consider how to establish
the rule of law in environmental protection by basing it on economic
analysis of law. According to economists, the theory of externalities
states that there are three paths that comprise the economic solu-
tion to ameliorate problems related to environmental pollution: first,
direct State intervention. As early as the 1920s, Pigou addressed
environmental problems caused by environmental externalities and
argues that without government intervention, the market will not
automatically fill this regulatory gap. Therefore, this provides a
sound theoretical basis for the government to institute a collection
of “command-control” policy instruments in order to protect the en-
vironment. Moreover, from a sustainable development perspective,
State intervention is necessary. Unlike macroeconomic regulation and
2. Li Wei, Chen Longgan & Zhao JianLin, China’s Coal Mining Industry: Environmental
Damage and Its Countermeasures, 140 COAL MAGAZINE, No. 140.
3. Song Shijie, Environmental Exploration & Coal Mining Regions: An Ecological Analysis
of Environmental Damage and Control Measures, 3 COAL PROCESSING AND COMPREHENSIVE
UTILIZATION, No. 3 (2007).
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control, State intervention and directly regulated microeconomic
measures resolve market failures. Therefore, in order to effectively
control the quality of the environment, environmental pollution reg-
ulations that prohibit, and restrict, as well as permit systems and
standards certification systems must be implemented.4 For example,
China’s current system of environment protection laws has an es-
tablished permit system. Under this system, the environmental im-
pact of various planning, development, and construction projects,
sewage design, and business activities must all first be reported to
the competent authorities; only after obtaining a permit can they
commence operations. There are many types of permits, including:
emissions permits, oceanic dumping permits, mining permits, con-
struction permits, construction and operating permits for nuclear
facilities, chemical management and transfer of hazardous materials
permits, etc.
The second economic solution for environmental pollution is tax-
ation (i.e., neo-classical “Pigovian Tax”). The basic idea is to use the
State’s policy to solve the problems caused by externalities, that is,
taxing polluting industries to reconcile the difference between the
marginal private and social costs. Moreover, Pigou advocated the
adoption of a government-led mechanism by which externalities
would be internalized by the polluting corporations so as to solve the
problem of market failure resulting from environmental resource al-
location. William Baumol, who succeeded and also built upon Pigou’s
views, believed that in order for enterprises to internalize emissions
externalities, a corporate emissions tax must be enacted. Addition-
ally, so as to achieve a “Pareto optimum,” the established tax rate
must depend on marginal damage caused by emissions; moreover,
there should be no distinction between marginal revenue and costs
of polluting companies.5
China’s legal framework has already established a pollution levy
system that regulates waste gas, waste water and waste residue.
This type of collection system includes pollutants according to
variety, quantity, and concentration; furthermore, this system lev-
ies fines against polluters and also those polluters that exceed es-
tablished emissions standards. According to the interpretation of
4. Wenhui, supra note 1.
5. Id.
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Chinese legislators, the main purpose of this system is to enable
legislative authorities to regulate the relationship between econom-
ic development and environmental protection through the act of
levying fines. This system can also facilitate enterprises to improve
their technology and to strengthen their pollution-reducing abilities.
Clearly, Chinese regulators have not conducted in-depth research
on externalities from a perspective that considers the economic anal-
ysis of law. Also, these regulators have no clearly defined method for
compelling companies to internalize the externalities so as to effec-
tively curb pollution. In contrast, our neighboring country, Japan,
has done a far better job than China in this regard: this author re-
cently traveled to Japan on business and developed a deep admira-
tion for Japan’s positive results that have come about because of
their steadfast commitment to environmental protection. According
to local residents, Japanese corporations bear a relatively high so-
cial cost; this concept has been essential to the nation’s success in
achieving its admirable environmental protection goals.
Finally, the third economic solution for environmental pollution
is the protection of property rights. In 1960, Ronald Coase in The
Problem of Social Cost challenged the traditional view on externali-
ties, taxes and subsidies. Coase believed that a particular activity
associated with the existence of externalities does not necessarily
require the government to intervene with taxes or subsidies. As long
as property rights are clearly defined and transaction costs are zero,
then the affected parties are able to implement the Pareto optimal
results, and the nature of this result is independent of the initial prop-
erty rights arrangements. Coase represents a new school of thought,
which proposes a policy that addresses externalities and also the
problems of market failure by using market-based mechanisms. As
such, government intervention would not be necessary. An emission
permits trading system is the application of said property rights
theory with respect to resolving environmental pollution problems.
Through establishing an emissions trading system, the government
can establish a mandatory cap on emissions for a particular region,
then emission rights will be given in the form of corporate or indi-
vidual permits which are allowed to be used and traded; meanwhile,
the market decides the price.6
6. Id.
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The model of using property rights as means to resolve environ-
mental pollution problems is a regulatory mechanism with a certain
degree of flexibility that exists under the rigid emissions standards
that the government sets to control aggregate pollution levels. There-
fore, enterprises can enter the emissions market and purchase one
kind of right, namely the right to pollute the environment. If, after
a corporation pollutes, its benefits gained are greater than payment
of the costs of certain environmental pollution (including living and
societal costs), then this method can maximize the efficiency of re-
sources allocation. That is, we do not need to emphasize the abso-
lute value of the environment, and we can target specific cases and
use negotiation and judicial relief to make polluters and other re-
lated parties obtain an optimum allocation of resources. Chinese
corporations participate in the Kyoto Protocol’s clean development
mechanism by trading emission reduction certificates sold to foreign
companies; this is an example of using property rights to solve
environmental emissions problems.
Currently, China has yet to complete its process of reformation:
the nation’s market economy is far from established; the phenome-
non of ambiguous property rights is also very common; and deeply
rooted economic reform is difficult to achieve. Therefore, China ur-
gently needs to pass legislation and implement effective enforcement
in order to establish a framework with clear property rights. More-
over, a new phenomenon has recently emerged in China’s economy:
“Guojin, mintui,” which shall be translated as “State capital rises
while private capital falls.” (Another translation of “Guojin, mintui”
is “dominance of the State in the economy.”) Moreover, this phrase
more accurately describes the current regulatory atmosphere, which
favors State-owned enterprises with governmental incentive policies
and access to a variety of quality resources in order to make them
bigger and stronger while privately owned enterprises exist in an in-
creasingly unfavorable environment. In China’s energy sector, there
are still some units, such as large State-owned enterprises, that
have no clear division of function between the government bureaus
and the actual enterprises. Such large State-owned enterprises,
including China’s major energy companies, because of their sheer
size and scale, have the potential to damage the environment to an
extent that is considered greater and far more dangerous than many
other Chinese enterprises.
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More seriously, the government failed to perform its public duty
to protect the environment. There are State-owned and provincial-
owned enterprises that receive support from all levels of government;
as such, some instances of damage to and misuse of environmental
resources are a result of decisions made at every level of government.
Under other circumstances, the government did not participate in the
enterprise’s managerial decision-making and were plausibly unaware
of said enterprises’ pollution activities. However, many practical so-
lutions that hold polluters accountable for abusing environmental
resources often favor State-owned enterprises, thus allowing them
to evade serious repercussions.
What’s more, as the Chinese law on “public interest” is not clearly
defined, many government officials mistakenly think that the devel-
opment of the local economy is the greatest public interest; there-
fore, environmental protection is neglected and there is no regard
given to people’s living conditions and its subsequent damage and
pollution. Instead, high-sounding reason for all-out economic growth
is used to support further environmental destruction.
Of course, the aforementioned solutions can be used as a hybrid
of regulatory instruments to solve these problems. For example, in
regard to environmental issues, some suggest that an environmen-
tal standard emissions tax, an emission permit trading system, and
other policy instruments should be implemented. A hybrid approach
is suggested because the instruments are flawed and are limited in
their efficacy; only implementing one of these policies would not ef-
fectively resolve the larger collection of problems. Thus, various pol-
icy instruments need to be combined so as to improve the inherent
quality and external conditions for environmental policies. In fact,
most nations include a hybrid of policy instruments in its environ-
mental legislation. China is also following this trend in that the
nation’s legislators have opted to implement a hybrid legislative
approach which relies mainly on the first and second economic
solutions mentioned above.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE RULE OF LAW
In order to use the three economic solutions to achieve environ-
mental protection targets, the market economy alone could not work
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very well; legal measures should therefore be applied and imple-
mented. Since the beginning of “Opening Up and Reform” in 1979,
China has begun to draft and implement environmental protec-
tion legislation. According to Professor Wang Canfa’s introduction
of China’s environmental law, in 1979 China developed the trial
version of the nation’s Environmental Law. From then on, China’s
environmental legislation began to develop. Compared with other
legislative development in other sectors, China’s environmental leg-
islation has developed the fastest over the past thirty years. In fact,
it can be said that China’s environmental legislation is now quite
comprehensive in its ability to address the country’s environmental
problems. In particular, China’s Property Law also places great im-
portance on resource conservation. Furthermore, the Property Law
provides that air, solid-state waste, and noise pollution are all ex-
amples that violate citizens’ property rights.7 The new Tort Law has
also established civil liability provisions for environmental pollution.
Professor Wang Canfa believes that it is still difficult for China’s
environmental protection laws to effectively curb the current decline
in the quality of China’s environmental condition.8 Also, the law does
not serve its designated role; the results of implementing China’s
environmental protection law are now less than satisfactory. There-
fore, it is necessary to ask: though China has established a relatively
comprehensive legal system for environmental protection, why has
the environment not fundamentally improved? And why are there
still many regions where conditions are still worsening? In this re-
gard, the author would like to put forth the following analysis re-
garding the causes that have lead to this solution and then offer a
few suggestions for future improvement.
A. Legislation: Shortcomings, Ambiguities, and Lenient Penalties
Currently, one criticism that many make about China’s environ-
mental protection laws is that this collection of laws is lacking a
number of necessary legal provisions; there is also the criticism that
7. Wang Canfa, The Field of Environmental Protection: Laws, Regulations, and Indus-
trial Development, Lecture at the People’s Daily Online forum Review & Outlook: 30 Years
of Reform and Opening Up China’s Environmental Protection Efforts (Dec. 14, 2008).
8. Id.
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existing laws are not effectively implemented and that legal non-
compliance is a very serious issue. Take oceanic pollution as an ex-
ample; the recent ConocoPhillips oil spill within China’s maritime
border underscores the deficiencies present in China’s environmen-
tal protection laws. Now, it is apparent that the legislation used to
determine compensation amounts for damage done to China’s ma-
rine ecosystem needs to be updated. This is because the relevant
State ministries can only devise penalties for the responsible par-
ties based on part of the Marine Environment Protection Law, which
covers oceanic water quality. However, the oil spill did more than
affect water quality; it also affected marine life, including commer-
cial fisheries, as well as the health of coastal residents living near
the spill. Thus, it is evident that relying solely on China’s current
Marine Environment Protection Law to determine penalties for caus-
ing ecological damage is problematic. In contrast, the United States
has a relatively sound set of applicable laws for adjudicating oil spills.
After the British Petroleum (“BP”) oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, the
U.S. Department of Justice initiated an investigation, which deter-
mined that BP may have possibly violated several laws, including
the Clean Water Act, Endangered Species Act, as well as others. This
investigation and its opinion demonstrate the provision of compre-
hensive, thorough, and compliant legal support for the victims and
affected region.9
It is well known that coal is China’s primary source of energy, but
environmental protection enforcement in this industry is highly un-
satisfactory. To some extent, the status of environmental protection
in the coal industry is one of the main reasons why the nation’s en-
vironment is facing destruction and degradation. Researchers who
have examined the causes of China’s environmental decline point
out that the nation’s coal mining regions lack a complete and effec-
tive set of laws that can protect the environment in these areas.
Thus, the existing set of laws is unable to meet the practical needs
of these troubled regions; China has long lacked systemic environ-
mental management laws and regulations for coal mining areas. At
the national legislative level, the Mineral Resources Law and Envi-
ronmental Protection Law only provide environmental protection
9. ConocoPhillips Oil Spill: The Whole Story; China’s Laws on Marine Oil Spills Are too
Lenient, http://www.jiuluo.com/jtbc/article/?type=detail&id=332 (last visited Aug. 22, 2012).
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requirements in principle; specific management systems and regu-
lations are clearly missing from these aforementioned laws. Also,
these two laws provide very simple environmental obligations of the
mining right owners in connection with exploration and exploitation
of mineral resources, and are short of effective environmental pro-
tection provisions.10
Under Chinese environmental law, penalties, such as tax and other
liabilities, for polluting entities are too lenient and are also insuffi-
cient for effectively solving externalities. Moreover, these penalties
cannot fill the gap between marginal private and social costs that
results from pollution. Therefore, Chinese legislators should enact
stringent liability provisions under the country’s environmental law.
This legislative action would give teeth to the country’s environmen-
tal legal framework by including higher taxes and harsher penalties
for polluting entities. The general public view is that with respect to
an oil spill which severely scars the oceanic region; the time and mon-
ey being poured into the clean-up and recovery efforts will far ex-
ceed the maximum penalty that can be levied under the Marine En-
vironment Protection Law, which is currently capped at RMB 200,000
yuan. Given the significant size of revenue and profits earned by na-
tional oil companies and international oil companies engaged in off-
shore oil development, the size of this penalty is clearly insignificant
and also insufficient to deter enterprises from engaging in negligent
behaviors that could result in future oil spills. As such, China should
consider amending the existing law so that the penalties are higher
and also take into account externalities; this action ensures that the
larger society does not have to bear the social costs created by an
individual enterprise’s pollution.
B. Law Enforcement: Unsatisfactory Results, Rent-Seeking, and
Unequal Applications of the Law
Another major criticism of China’s environmental protection laws
is ineffective implementation. Even if the country’s legislators de-
velop sound environmental laws and regulations with punitive
teeth, these laws will only be as useful as the paper on which they
10. Wei, Longgan & Jianlin, supra note 2.
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are written unless they are effectively implemented. At present, im-
proper interference is the primary impediment to effectively enforc-
ing China’s environmental laws; improper interference can best be
described as government corruption, bribery, judicial corruption,
and unequal applications of the law. A rational form of law enforce-
ment should hold everyone accountable to the law. Regardless of who
pollutes, be it a State-owned enterprise or an enterprise with pow-
erful supporters, everyone should be equal before the law; this is a
fundamental principle of the rule of law. Otherwise, the law will be-
come a tool of unfair competition. Furthermore, there are some local
environmental protection bureaus that use environment protection
penalties as means for generating income; this is entirely contrary
to the spirit of the rule of law. As a result, it makes those being reg-
ulated lose respect and trust for the laws by which they are sup-
posed to abide.
Within China’s energy industry, there are currently a number of
major accidents that remain unresolved and that leave its victims
and the public without a reasonable explanation. This is often the
case because China’s large State-owned enterprises are behind these
accidents, and many do not dare confront them over these issues.
According to media reports, after the 2010 PetroChina 7-16 explo-
sion occurred, the company bore no responsibility, nor did it give the
public an account of what had happened. Moreover, the authorities
did not penalize those who were responsible for the incident; such
practices are worrisome. After the 7-16 incident, PetroChina further
instigated the public’s dissatisfaction with the situation by not only
failing to hold anyone responsible for the accident, but it also held
a rescue and relief awards ceremony. During the ceremony, nine
work units and 197 people were awarded the titles of “Advanced col-
lectives and individuals,” respectively. Professor Lin Boqiang, the
Director of the China Energy and Economy Research Center at Xia-
men University, argues that PetroChina’s accidents happen in the
same place again and again; there is a dire need for accountability
and an explanation.11
11. Securities Times, PetroChina Dalian: 4 Fires in 13 Months; Experts Suggest that Ac-
countability Is Needed, http://www.cnstock.com/index/cj/201108/1513611.htm (last visited
Aug. 22, 2012).
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C. Judicial Relief: Increase in Litigation Costs, a Lack of
Procedural Requirements, and a Shortage of Professional
Legal Talents
Traditionally, government authorities use administrative means
to solve problems that are precipitated by environmental pollution.
However, these kinds of administrative measures are quite limited
in their efficacy and are subject to various constraints that are af-
fected by personal, procedural, and political factors. In a market
economy, the judicial process is considered a more equitable, effec-
tive and reliable solution for environmental problems. Professor
Wang Canfa pointed out that in the past, people would tend to
emphasize administrative measures and place less stress on judicial
means; that is, the laws and statutes could not be enforced by the
courts, and people would therefore feel that laws were of no use. In
recent years, environment-related court cases have increased at an
annual rate of 25%, and some cities, including Kunming, Guiyang,
Wuxi and Shenyang, have already established environmental courts.
Additionally, some National People’s Congress representatives have
recommended that the Supreme Court issue a notice, which permits
various places to establish environmental courts; these environ-
mental courts will be established so as to allow more environment-
related court cases to be initiated. The courts’ application of the law
to cases will boost the authority and legitimacy of the country’s
environmental law.12
At present, China’s environmental litigation cases commonly have
many problems. Among these problems is the fact that the courts
sometimes refuse to docket this type of cases, and with respect to
those cases which are successfully docketed in courts, plaintiff vic-
tims only win about 30 percent of such docketed cases. According to
reports, on August 16, 2011, the State Oceanic Administration of-
ficially announced plans to initiate public interest litigation against
ConocoPhillips after the oil spill in Bohai Bay. However, current
domestic ecological public interest litigation has always had a
difficult time with evidence and enforcement as well as other issues;
therefore any definitive outcome still remains a distant prospect.13
12. Canfa, supra note 7.
13. ConocoPhillips Oil Spill: The Whole Story, supra note 9.
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In order to improve China’s environmental condition, the nation
could consider establishing a nationwide special environmental court
as well as fair and reasonable procedural rules regarding environ-
mental litigation, evidence, and damage appraisal. This special court
could also provide victims of environmental pollution with the op-
portunity to initiate civil action, particularly in the form of litiga-
tion, against polluting enterprises; thereby, victims would have the
opportunity to obtain adequate and effective remedies, such as dam-
ages or injunctions. Moreover, this new court institution and set of
procedures would allow victims and related public interest groups
(including those that emphasize environmental protection) the op-
portunity to initiate administrative litigation against government
departments for omissions or irregularities in government-developed
regulations or practices. Compared with other methods, there is no-
thing more effective than victims of environmental pollution expos-
ing polluting enterprises and defending their rights to do so. Their
effect will be a thousand times better than that of the environmen-
tal regulatory authorities because these authorities are limited in
manpower, resources, and subjective awareness. This is the only way
that environmental justice can be asserted so that acts of pollution
and environmental damage are condemned and punished. Further-
more, if those involved in disputes or issues regarding environmental
pollution can effectively use legal channels to solve those problems
precipitated by environmental pollution, then they will have fore-
gone violent means to defend their legitimate rights. A benefit of
using legal means to resolve environmental disputes is that it pre-
vents such disputes from unnecessarily evolving into violent frays
that draw the attention of the entire community.
In addition, China should also cultivate a large number of judges
and lawyers who are well versed in environmental litigation so as
to ensure that the judicial process functions effectively. After all,
even the best systems and laws require talented people to operate
them. Unfortunately, China still lacks experts and senior legal per-
sonnel who are well versed in environmental law. With the increas-
ing number of environmental litigation cases, societal demands for
senior legal experts in the field of environmental protection will also
begin to increase. According to reports, the North Sea (Beihai) Branch
of the State Oceanic Administration has announced that, in the wake
482 PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE JOURNAL [Vol. 1:467
of the ConocoPhillips oil spill, it is seeking to employ a legal service
team drawn from the whole country. This team will prepare a law-
suit that seeks reparations for ecological marine damage that re-
sulted from the oil spill. The Beihai Branch said that it will invite
domestic and maritime legal experts to form an expert evaluation
group which is mainly responsible for conducting a preliminary ex-
amination of all the applicants and then selecting at least five teams
to participate in the formal interview. For teams who participate in
the second interview, the Beihai Branch will implement a system-
atic process in order to select the best candidates including one prin-
cipal team and three or four assistant teams to provide the legal
services in this case.
When evaluating the judicial system’s effectiveness and its adju-
dication of environmental litigation, one must consider whether the
victims of pollution receive adequate relief in a timely manner. In
accordance with the provisions of General Principles of Civil Law
Article 134, there are a total of ten civil liability remedies, among
which, there are five that can be applied to environmental tort relief:
cessation of infringements, removal of nuisance, elimination of dan-
gers, restitution, and compensation for damages and losses. As such,
we can take the cessation of infringements, removal of nuisance and
elimination of dangers as types of remedies similar to common law
injunctions. The infringed parties to environmental tort cases often
include a large number of victims and such cases commonly carry
high costs. Therefore, China’s courts mainly grant compensatory
remedies in the aforementioned cases. The reason is that the broad
application of the injunction will deal a devastating blow to China’s
modern industrial base. Thus, courts generally only exercise an
injunction for relief efforts on those polluting enterprises that will
be minimally impacted or that have production activities of little
value.14 Among environmental disputes in China, most remedies
involve monetary compensation.
In reality, China’s environmental disputes have been on the rise in
recent years. Although most of these disputes are resolved through
administrative procedures, the current trend still indicates that there
is an increasing number of cases being heard by basic-level district
14. Zhejiang Wanli, Environmental Protection Law: An Economic Analysis (thesis), avail-
able at http://wenku.baidu.com/view/e7cf4910a2161479171128f6.html.
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courts. However, the compensatory amounts that parties received are
on the decline. When the courts insufficiently compensate the vic-
tims for their losses, judicial relief then fails to serve its original pur-
pose. Moreover, if the courts are useless in resolving externalities,
then this equals encouraging the behavior of polluting enterprises.
It is also unfair for those law-abiding enterprises that assume more
external costs than others; therefore, when considering the saying,
“bad money drives out good money,” it is no surprise that many
enterprises opt to shirk their share of social costs that are precipi-
tated by pollution.
In China’s civil infringement cases, the claimant generally bears
the burden of evidence. As is often the case, polluting enterprises
withhold information regarding their emission-related activities,
while pollution victims only possess information regarding damages
inflicted upon them. Thus this asymmetric information inevitably
results in the shifting of the burden of evidence in pollution cases.
Namely, in relation to the generation of pollution behaviors and the
causation in pollution cases, the plaintiffs generally do not have to
bear the burden of evidence. According to China’s judicial interpre-
tation “Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Evidence in
Civil Procedures,” Article IV, Section 3, “in any compensation claim
relating to damage caused by environmental pollution, the party
alleged to be responsible for such pollution shall be responsible for
producing evidence to prove the existence of any exemption from
liability as provided by law or that no causal relationship exists as
between his conduct and any damage suffered.” The judicial inter-
pretation did not specify the circumstances in which “shifting the
burden of evidence” applies. In reality, the implementation of judi-
cial practice has its deviations. For example, in the Hechi arsenic
pollution case, the plaintiffs were asked to prove that there was a
causal relationship between the infringement and the results of pol-
lution, which was different from the holding in the Black Fungus
case. Therefore, objectively speaking, the practice of different courts
has created great uncertainty for environmental litigation.
In reality, the polluting enterprise is often a large entity with a
government-related background while, in contrast, the plaintiffs in
environmental litigation are often very weak. For many of these
“little people,” it is often difficult, if not impossible, for them to bear
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the high cost of initiating litigation, which includes filing fees, law-
yer fees, fees for the appraisal of damages, and enforcement fees.
However, if the judge rules in favor of the plaintiff, it may not only
benefit the plaintiff individually, but also other individuals and com-
munities that may have been affected by the defendant’s polluting
behavior. Based on the theory of externalities, the aforementioned
fees are in fact the social costs, which are based upon personal and
public interests for environmental protection. Therefore, it must be
said that it is unreasonable for the “little people” to bear the costs
of environmental protection, even if only in part, as many cannot
afford to do so. Furthermore, if the plaintiff and the defendant each
must bear the cost of litigation, then many plaintiffs would be dis-
couraged from initiating civil action. In this regard, China should
consider establishing a State or privately sponsored legal aid center
that provides pro-bono legal services for victims of environmental
pollution. China may also consider making legal provisions by which
losing defendants are compelled to bear their opponent’s legal costs.
This is bound to encourage the victims of environmental pollution to
pick up their legal weapons, and, by lawful means and procedures,
assert their right against polluting enterprises.
III. A SYSTEM FOR DISCLOSING ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION:
ENSURING THAT POLLUTERS HAVE NOWHERE TO HIDE
Environmental management information instruments are consid-
ered a new approach for environmental management and are called
a “third wave” in the history of mankind in controlling and fighting
against environmental pollution. The primary measure for imple-
menting this environmental information system is to publicize rel-
evant information about environmental practices through various
media outlets. Furthermore, through communal and public discus-
sion, it is possible to place pressure on those entities that have ques-
tionable or destructive environmental practices. Through these media
outlets, it is possible to achieve future environmental protection and
preservation goals.15 Actually, the three aforementioned solutions
for resolving environmental pollution and the results of implement-
ing and using each are inseparable from environmental information
15. Wenhui, supra note 1.
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disclosure. If the government does not, in a timely manner, fully grasp
the nation’s environmental information, then the government’s model
of command and control regulation will lose its informational base
for making crucial decisions. A lack of information will also lead to
authorities implementing incorrect decisions or policies that deviate
in varying degrees. In order to levy an “environmental tax,” there
must not be a lack of information; otherwise it will be difficult for
authorities to quantify the externalities’ full extent. For example,
without comprehensive knowledge, it will be impossible to deter-
mine the difference between private and social costs, and thus, it
will be impossible to effectively determine an adequate environment
tax amount. Moreover, if it is impossible to determine an environ-
mental tax, then it can also be said that externalities cannot ultimate-
ly be controlled. In regard to regulatory instruments that monitor
property rights, environmental information is the operational foun-
dation for an emissions trading system.
As can be seen from environmental information sources, all inci-
dents of environmental pollution face serious problems of information
asymmetry. Generally speaking, environmental information’s sources,
including information regarding environmental pollution, come from
the polluters themselves. Polluters are well aware of pollutant gen-
eration, treatment, and disposal, but they also have reason to con-
ceal their pollution activities. Environmental information disclosure
requirements not only inform the public about polluting enterprises’
situations, but it also gives the public the opportunity to take on a
supervisory role. The more information that the public knows about
polluting enterprises, the more pressure the polluters will feel to
overcome a negative public image and to also reduce their emissions
footprint by using pollution-free technology, and so on. Such a policy
can greatly improve pollution and control efficiency under informa-
tion asymmetry.16
Of course, the government should assume responsibility for en-
vironmental information disclosure. First, the government should
adopt legislation that requires all enterprises to disclose informa-
tion relating to the environment, and particularly those enterprises
that will produce various forms of pollution; the disclosures should
be specific and fully disclosed in a timely manner. Secondly, the
16. Id.
486 PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE JOURNAL [Vol. 1:467
government, as the owner of State-owned enterprises, should instruct
State-owned enterprises that might engage in pollution activities to
strictly comply with statutory obligations to disclose environmental
information. State-owned enterprises must not be an exception to
this regulation. The government and polluting enterprises should be
responsible to the people and society for major environmental acci-
dents. Therefore, information on these accidents should be disclosed
to the public in a complete and timely manner so as to avoid causing
social and political crises. In fact, there are many cases that have
already occurred and are worth our deep reflection. For example, on
December 23, 2003, a serious blowout occurred in Kai County, Chong-
qing Municipality at PetroChina’s Northeast Sichuan Gas Field. A
highly toxic hydrogen sulfide blowout released gases with 40 MPa
of pressure into the air for over 18 hours, thus resulting in the deaths
of 234 people.17 According to those present, after the blowout, the
drilling crew notified as many residents as possible to leave the area,
but they did not have enough time to alert the local government.
Consequently, local authorities did not have enough time to notify
everyone to evacuate the area.18
Oriental Outlook, from many aspects, discovered that after the
accident happened, there was a notification chain that commenced
from the drilling crew up to the Chongqing Municipal government
and then back down again to the Gaoqiao town government, which
presides over the location where the accident occurred. This flawed
communication chain created a situation in which the authorities
closest to the disaster were the last to know.19 Clearly, if the drilling
crew had been able to go directly to the town authorities after the
blowout occurred, then more people could have evacuated earlier,
thus minimizing the number of casualties.
According to the reporter, PetroChina developed Article 15 of the
company’s environmental management procedures, which states that
in the event of an accident or other unexpected events that have
caused or may cause significant pollution, it is necessary to take im-
mediate and effective measures to address the problem. Additionally,
17. Pu Baoyi, Zhu Yu & Zhang Xudong, Expert Analysis and the Truth About the Blowout
in Kai County, Chongqing, 8 Questions for PetroChina, ORIENTAL OUTLOOK WEEKLY (Jan. 5,
2004).
18. Id.
19. Id.
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Article 15 states that it is necessary to provide timely information
about potentially contaminated work units and residential areas to
local and regional environmental protection departments as well as
cooperate with any consequent investigations. However, facts in this
case prove that Article 15 was not effectively implemented after the
accident occurred.20
It should be pointed out that, in regard to environmental informa-
tion, the government should be responsible for the following duties:
first, the government should pass legislation that obliges polluters
to perform their statutory obligation to disclose all necessary infor-
mation. Second, environmental information for which enterprises
bear no responsibility to publicly disclose, such as air, water, and soil
quality reports, is the government’s duty to obtain and then disclose
to the public. It is also the government’s duty to obtain this informa-
tion through the use of public funds and to disclose such information
in a timely manner. Finally, the government should develop appro-
priate measures that are based on environmental information in its
possession to prevent future environmental accidents. In order to
evaluate the work of government officials in the area of environmen-
tal information, China should include new performance standards
that evaluate the quality of an official’s work regarding environmen-
tal safety and the proper disclosure of environmental information.
IV. GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES SHOULD ASSUME THE
RESPONSIBILITIES OF PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT
AND GUARDING PUBLIC INTERESTS
The government has obligations to implement the three above-
mentioned economic solutions, which are based on the theory of
externalities, to address the problems of environmental pollution.
This is because the government is the guardian of public interests,
which includes the public use of and access to environmental re-
sources. Clearly, a precondition for effectively implementing the
three aforementioned economic solutions is that the government can
faithfully perform its duties representing the public’s interest. How
well a country protects its environment first depends on that coun-
try’s government. Another reason for the government’s mandate to
20. Id.
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fulfill its inescapable responsibility is that environmental legisla-
tion, effective law enforcement, and judicial aspects need the gov-
ernment to play a major role. As for businesses and individuals that
are regulated by the law, the main role of their environmental pro-
tection work is to remain in compliance with the government, the
law and statutory regulations. In the event that the government
remains passive or inactive, we cannot expect those enterprises that
want to improve China’s environmental conditions or those individ-
uals in environmental protection to have much effect.
The government’s command-and-control regulatory solution, (such
as the permit system), levying taxes solution (such as levying sew-
age charges), and the emissions trading system provide spaces in
which corruption and the trade of power for money can occur. If
those government officials who are responsible for environmental
monitoring abuse their position’s power through accepting bribes,
or there are other interfering factors, such as political or economic
factors, then they cannot properly exercise their supervisory duties.
Under such circumstances, the aforementioned regulatory solutions
and the design and implementation of the nation’s environmental
regulations will fail or will be rendered ineffective. In addition, the
nation’s environment could face further degradation at the hands of
unchecked polluting enterprises.
Currently, China’s environmental law enforcement has some
problems. The first problem is the environmental administration’s
inaction or insufficient enforcement of the law has resulted in a
conspicuous absence of environmental regulation. This absence is
primarily because many polluting enterprises have received the green
light for projects while the responsible powers turn a blind eye to
these enterprises’ polluting activities. In order to protect these com-
panies’ stock listings and ability to attract foreign investment, the
responsible authorities do not dare initiate investigations against
them. The second problem is irregular law enforcement. Not only does
environmental law enforcement lack any procedural adherence, but
it also emphasizes penalties while neglecting to protect the people’s
legitimate rights and interests. The third problem involves abuse of
power for personal gains. In this case, there are many enterprises
that engage in graft in order to obtain favorable enforcement of the
law; favorable enforcement includes shielding illegal enterprises
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and assisting violators in evading legal penalties.21 What’s more,
most of these phenomena occur in local environmental protection
bureaus; the reason for this is that the above situation is related to
the environmental regulatory system’s institutional design. Under
the current system, local environmental protection bureaus are part
of the local governments. This can create an obstacle for the local
environmental protection bureaus as projects that are supported by
the local governments do not wait for the environment protection
bureau’s approval to commence work. This disregard for the envi-
ronmental protection bureaus’ authority makes it difficult for such
bureaus to manage projects of this kind.22
China should establish a monitoring mechanism for environmen-
tal law enforcement agencies that could include measures such as
empowering local people’s congresses to hold government officials
accountable for their work on environmental protection. Under the
aforementioned mechanism, if it is discovered that a government
official may have passively participated in supporting polluting en-
terprises or engaged in malfeasance, then it would be permissible to
initiate an administrative suit pursuant to the PRC Administrative
Litigation Law against the official for the alleged infringement. More-
over, this entire process would be open to the public and various media
outlets so as to encourage a public dialogue regarding environmental
law enforcement. Given previous instances of malfeasance amongst
the authorities, it can be seen that there is a clear need to develop a
supervisory apparatus for government officials. In fact, some re-
searchers have pointed out that the government officials, as the en-
forcement agents of public and political affairs, often have opportu-
nistic tendencies and also engage in rent-seeking behavior. As such,
the greater society should strengthen its efforts to supervise govern-
ment agents so that the government directly addresses and resolves
environmental problems.23
To a large extent, China’s environmental law enforcement efforts
have been insufficient because China’s environmental protection
21. Zhao Lijun & Cheng Lun, Current Problems in Environmental Law Enforcement and
Countermeasures, 30 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE AND MANAGEMENT, No. 3 (June 2005).
22. Chun Xiu, Environmental Legislation and Enforcement Issues and Recommendations,
CHINA ENVIRONMENT NEWS, Sept. 20, 2003, http://www.ep.net.cn/CGI-BIN/UT/topic_show.cgi
?id=14556&bpg=19 (last visited Aug. 22, 2012).
23. Sun Huili & Jiang Huafeng, An Institutional Economic Analysis of Environmental
Issues, ECOLOGICAL ECONOMY, No. 7 (2007).
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bureaus have not been given adequate powers; this delegation of
limited powers is a direct result of the system’s design. Researchers
point out that although Chinese law provides for a unified environ-
mental protection authority with supervisory and managerial func-
tions, it does not clearly define those functions or how they should
be employed. In reality, it is difficult for the environmental protec-
tion bureau to play a supervisory role for two reasons: first, it func-
tions within the same administrative level as other bureaus and
agencies, and second, it has not explicitly been given unified super-
visory powers. It is, therefore, difficult to assume a supervisory role
over other bureaus or agencies since other bureaus and agencies will
not tolerate such regulatory interference. Overall, this situation is
very unfavorable for pollution control.24
Since China’s environmental regulatory functions are scattered
amongst different government authorities, environmental supervi-
sory responsibilities are currently not focused under one powerful
regulatory authority. The recent ConocoPhillips oil spill case under-
scores the shortcomings of this regulatory framework. The oil spill
case indicates that China’s regulatory functions for marine environ-
ment pollution are entirely too fragmented; ideally, these functions
should be consolidated under a strong regulatory authority. Looking
at China’s marine regulatory mechanism from a horizontal perspec-
tive, we see a panorama of the “nine dragons regulating the water,”
featuring marine, fisheries, environmental protection, maritime
transportation, customs, borders, and other various bureaus and
agencies. From a vertical perspective, each province’s oceanic man-
agement is fragmented, as it is only responsible for managing the
waters adjacent to its respective province. The existence of this sys-
tem weakens comprehensive marine management functions as well
as unified and efficient scientific coordination; moreover, this sys-
tem makes it difficult to create a unified, effective and scientific
management system.25
China’s coal industry also lacks a strong and powerful eco-envi-
ronmental management mechanism. Right now, management in
respect to coal industry enterprises and the environment surround-
ing coal mines involves the Ministry of Environmental Protection,
24. Xiu, supra note 22.
25. ConocoPhillips Oil Spill: The Whole Story, supra note 9.
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Ministry of Land and Resources, Ministry of Water Resources and
the State Forestry Administration, but these authorities each have
a different emphasis on environment management. As such, they
only focus on their own authority and function; this makes it diffi-
cult for the above-mentioned authorities to come together as a uni-
fied force to regulate the environment of coal mining areas. Some
bureaus dispersedly use the collected funds and do not spend the allo-
cated funds exclusively on the protection of the environment affected
by coal mining.26 The author suggests that China should restructure
its environmental regulatory authorities, free them from intervention
and control from other bureaus and agencies and local governments
at all levels, as well as empower them, and increase their manpower
and expenditure funds for environmental regulatory authorities at
all levels so as to strengthen their supervision intensity.
V. GOVERNMENT AND ENTERPRISE NEED TO RENEW THEIR
THINKING, AND PURSUE SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Chinese government officials at all levels should renew their
thinking and not just chase indicators of economic development
while neglecting the protection of environmental resources. As the
guardians of public interest, environmental regulatory authorities
should adhere to the principle of environmental priority. The prior-
ity of the environmental regulatory authorities is environment pro-
tection. Based on the theory of externalities, every enterprise will
put its economic interest first, and, lacking mandatory stipulation
of the law, will neglect social costs and, generally speaking, will not
actively increase investment in environment protection. So to speak,
environmental regulatory authorities are the last line of defense or
perhaps the only line of defense in the prevention or reduction of the
costs of externalities.
Simultaneously, we should avoid any extreme view that prior-
itizes environment protection above all else. The principle of envi-
ronmental priority does not mean that environment protection is
decisive or prevails over economic development in any circumstance.
Analysis of these two abstract notions of value in a specific factual
26. Wang Jiuming & Tan Jie, Thirty Years of Environmental Protection in the Coal
Industry, 2 COAL PROCESSING AND UTILIZATION, No. 2 (2009).
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circumstance is needed to put forward a meaningful balancing so-
lution that is based on a specific problem. For example, coal is our
nation’s primary resource, and as a non-renewable resource, the
extended activity of development and utilization of coal might incur
various environmental problems which conflict with the notion of
sustainable development. Therefore, in the process of developing and
constructing coal mines, we should thoroughly research the possible
destructive manner and degree of coal mining to the environment
and devise protective measures, control negative factors, maintain
ecological balance and minimize the negative impact of human ac-
tivity on the environment.
From now on, how to balance economic development and envi-
ronment protection will be a tough question that central and local
leaders at all levels must face. To completely ignore environment
protection and give a green light to polluting enterprises is an un-
feasible economic development mode and will come to an end sooner
or later. On the other hand, if the enforcement of environment pro-
tection is too stringent, thus stipulating excessively strict and econom-
ically unfeasible environment protection standards and requirements,
it will suffocate the local economy. When balancing the economic de-
velopment of the energy industry with the notion of environmental
protection, the government needs to make sure that the cost of envi-
ronment protection is affordable and economically viable. The mod-
erate nature of environment protection requires us not to completely
stall economic development because of environment protection, un-
less policy needs dictate that development in a select inland area
must be suspended or terminated. Therefore, we need to avoid the
excessive application of the environment protection law, and keep
in mind the balance between property rights and environment pro-
tection restrictions.
In summary, for regulators, the priority is to find that perfect
balance point at which environment protection and economic sus-
tainability can progress together. Admittedly, to discover this bal-
ance point is not easy and actually many governments of developed
countries are still struggling on this issue. The externality theory of
microeconomics is a viable tool for us to reach the solution. Based on
this theory, the costs incurred for complying with environmental reg-
ulations, which are to be imposed by the environmental authorities,
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should be sufficient to offset the gap between the private marginal
costs of the polluting enterprise and the social marginal costs in
connection with the relevant polluting act. Therefore, via quantita-
tive economic tools, this balance point may be easier to achieve.
When considering the relationship between economic develop-
ment and environmental protection, some people hold a “develop
first, manage later” point of view. This perspective is borne out of
China’s early efforts to construct a socialist market: the government
could afford to completely forgo environmental protection measures
in order to foster economic development. This perspective further
posits that environmental considerations could be addressed after
the Chinese economy reached a certain level of development; how-
ever, this author begs to differ. First, a long and persistent barrage
of externalities will only create an increasingly large burden for
China’s posterity. The notion of “develop first, manage later” will
easily lead to predatory exploitation of resources, resource depletion,
and major environmental disasters, thus causing severe economic and
social crises. Second, delaying environmental protection and treat-
ment will lead to increased costs of environmental management. As
such, the resulting costs of delaying environmental management will
be much higher than the costs that arise from immediately manag-
ing pollution when it occurs. At the same time, allowing polluting
enterprises to escape liability is also blatantly unfair since it leaves
the burden to the next generation; we have no right to do this to our
nation’s future. However, if this viewpoint persists, then our genera-
tion will infamously reside in the annals of history for the deleteri-
ous legacy that it created.
At present, the mantra “develop first, manage later,” still seems
quite popular. If this persists, then China’s soil, air, and water
quality will continue to be polluted; meanwhile, the environment of
our and future generations would be much worse. As previously
mentioned, this undesirable trend will likely result in social and
political unrest. One particular example involves a host of cities in
coal-rich Shanxi province that currently rely on coal to fuel growth.
However, with the inevitable depletion of coal resources in the
province, these cities will be faced with the daunting task of trans-
formation or risk falling into decline. For long-term development in
Shanxi, the province’s abundant coal resources will become a tragic
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curse upon local residents and their well-being if environmental
externalities remain unresolved.
When reflecting upon the past thirty years of reform and develop-
ment, it can be said that economic growth was fueled at the expense
of the environment. While China’s economic growth has attracted
worldwide attention for many years, this growth and attention has
come at a great cost, the majority of which is arguably environ-
mentally related. These environmental costs originate, in part, from
China’s numerable enterprises that enjoy a significant competitive
cost advantage. While these enterprises might not be compelled to
pay for the inherent social costs that they incur, these costs still per-
sist and are instead imposed on the larger society. When we look out
our window or walk through our front door, we, with heavy hearts,
gaze upon an environment that has endured severe and persistent
pollution. It will be every current and future citizen’s burden to foot
the bill for the costs that we have incurred these past thirty years.
There is still hope for China’s future: government leaders are now
keenly aware of the nation’s environmental problems. As such,
China’s economic policy has changed, green GDP is now being pro-
moted, and the notion of a sustainable and recycling-oriented econ-
omy is gaining strength. Admittedly, China still has much arduous
and difficult work to do in order to effectively implement concrete
laws, regulations, and projects. Furthermore, our generation is des-
tined to pay a certain price for the environmental damage that has
already been caused. For the future, it is still unclear whether our
children will be able to live in a clean and beautiful environment.
The result depends on our current actions and decisions; none of us
are exempt from this burden that has been set before us.
DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENTS OF INVESTMENTS IN THE
CONTRACTUAL RIGHT TO LAND MANAGEMENT
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ABSTRACT
In practice, there are two basic ways to invest in the contractual
right to the contractual land management for equity interest. The
first involves the dynamic equity system, which complies with the
“voluntary joint investment with the land contract and operation right
on a voluntary basis to engage in cooperation agriculture production,”
provided under the Law on Land Contract in Rural Areas. The other
is to invest such a right as the contribution for the establishment of
a company or a cooperative. Current legislation prohibits the invest-
ment of a contractual right to land management for the establishment
of a company. Making the investment for equity interest is an impor-
tant way to circulate the right to land management contractually and
could bring real benefits to peasants. Under the premise of governing
and guiding relevant activities, it would be advisable to loosen the
restrictions on such investments and to distinguish the different ways
of equity investment, i.e., to fully promote the first way and actively
develop the second. Based on the differences between a company and
a cooperative, it would be better to promote the investment with the
right to contractual land management under cooperative equities.
INTRODUCTION
The right to contractual land management has been recognized
as the most important real right for the peasants. With the develop-
ment of the society, the appeal of achieving the investment function
of lands has becoming increasingly intense. The right to contractual
land management being circulated by investing is the hot spot issue.
According to Real Right Law of the People’s Republic of China (re-
ferred to as “Real Right Law”) and Law of the People’s Republic of
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495
496 PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE JOURNAL [Vol. 1:495
China on Land Contract in Rural Areas (referred to as “Law on Land
Contract in Rural Areas”), the right to contractual land management
may be circulated by subcontracting, leasing, exchanging, transfer-
ring or other means. It is generally considered that investing is also
one of the means. However, the current legislation says nothing about
the principles, conditions and procedures of investing, which creates
operational difficulties in the practice. This harms not only the land
management, but also the protection of the peasants’ rights and
interests. In view of this, it is necessary to have further discussions
about investments in the right to contractual land management.
In addition, land contracts should take the form of a household
contract, or the rural land can be contracted by other means. The
legal rules for the latter are looser, which do not lead to disputes.
Hence, this essay focuses on the household contract only.
I. THE CURRENT SITUATION OF INVESTMENTS IN THE RIGHT TO
CONTRACTUAL LAND MANAGEMENT
A. The Popularization Status of Implementation of the
Investments in the Right to Contractual Land Management
The research group led by Professor Xiaojun Chen from Zhongnan
University of Economics and Law carried out a field survey in 2007.
It covered ten representative provinces in China, such as Jiangsu,
Shandong, and Guangdong. The results showed that only 8.5 percent
of the peasant households interviewed in ten provinces acknowledged
that the rights to contractual land management could be pooled as
shares to engage in cooperative agricultural production. The regional
differences were remarkable. In the Guangdong province, 64.09 per-
cent of the peasant households were aware of the existence of this
means of circulation in their villages, and this figure was much lower
in other provinces. However, the survey also indicated that the peas-
ant households from the Sichuan, Guizhou, and Yunnan Provinces
had positive responses to it.1
1. See Legislation Study on Rural Land Problem: The Reality Investigation on the Running
of Rural Land Legal System: A Report from 10 Provinces’ Investigation of China, STUDIES IN
LAW AND BUSINESS, 122 (2010).
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B. The Existence of Forms of Investments in the Right to
Contractual Land Management
In practice, the existing forms of investments in the right to con-
tractual land management in each area have respective differences
and may be divided into approximately two types.
In the dynamic equity system, the contractor may arrange agricul-
tural production according to the requests of a third party (usually
the third party will also provide certain technical support) and it will
be the third party’s responsibility for the product’s sale. An inten-
sive and large-scale land management can be achieved in this way.
The situation in the Hubei and Shandong provinces is similar to the
dynamic equity system.2 The typical representative is Xiangfan in
the Hubei province. The report by the research group led by Xiaojun
Chen in 2002 showed that this county alone set up six dynamic equity
enterprises, 7100 acres of the network industrial base, and estab-
lished 1760 peasant households as shareholders. In Shengkang Town,
a limited liability company named Jintudi has converted 2000 acres
of land to the use of ginger cultivation by signing seed supply and
product sales contracts with the peasant households.3 The adminis-
trators in Shengkang Town hold 25.17 million company stocks and
the municipal government owns shares for more than 50 million. So
far, there are twelve companies in Xiangfan operated in this way.
Together, these companies draw 7.5 million investments from native
residents and 2.9 million from the municipal government fund.4
Naturally, one characteristic of the dynamic equity system is that
the third party is not engaged in the agricultural production, nor does
it use land directly. The third party acts as an intermediary agency,
whereas the peasants still retain the right to contractual land manage-
ment. Therefore, strictly speaking, the dynamic equity system may
not be considered as a means of circulation. However, organizing the
peasant household by signing product supply and sales contracts is
a practical and feasible way for the third party to achieve intensive
and large-scale management.
2. See XIAOJUN CHEN ET AL., A STUDY ON RURAL LAND LEGAL SYSTEM 23 (Beijing: China
University of Political Science and Law Press 2003).
3. Id. at 177.
4. See Fang Wang, Remarks at the Seminar on the Development of Export-Oriented and
Corporate Agriculture (Aug. 29, 2010), available at http://www.xf.gov.cn/contents/2300/185934
.html.
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Under the cooperative operation system, contractors may jointly
pool their rights to contractual land management as shares to form
a cooperative organization and to engage in cooperative agricultural
production. The dividends are paid out based on investments in the
right to contractual land management. The rights and obligations set
by the original contract remain unchanged. This means of circulation
is mainly distributed in some districts that enjoyed a high level of
economic development, such as the Jiansu, Guangdong, and Zhejiang
provinces. Because of the differences in nature among the coopera-
tive operation systems, they can be further divided into two forms:
companies and cooperatives.
The cooperative in Xingang Town, located in Changshu in the
Jiangsu province, is a successful example of a land cooperative. Ac-
cording to the report by the research group led by Xiaojun Chen in
2002, the cooperative in Xingang Town took the village as a unit to
form the cooperative. The land in use not only included the construc-
tion land but also the agricultural land. The villagers who invested in
the right to contractual land management had an equal membership
right compared with the members invested in the funding, technology,
and market information. The cooperative took each household as a
unit, and each acre of the contractual land was converted into one
share. Stock rights could be inherited or donated within the 30-year
statute of limitations, or transferred with the approval of the coop-
erative and village committee. Every member was permitted to buy
or sell stock voluntarily, but the withdrawal of land had to be done
under a unified plan. The main sources of the cooperative’s income
were land management and land leasing. The dividends were paid
out with a minimum standard of 360 yuan per share each year. A
unified registration system for stock rights had been established in
Xingang Town and the villagers could buy stocks voluntarily.5 In
addition, Wenling in the Zhejiang province has become an experi-
mental site since 1997. A field survey by the research group led by
Professor Guanliang Ding from Zhejiang University showed that this
kind of cooperative also existed in several villages in the Zhejiang
province. These cooperatives’ constitutions explicitly stipulated that
“share[s] may not be transferred, mortgaged, leased, purchased or
sold, and inherited.”6
5. See CHEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 93.
6. See GUANLIANG DING & RIHUI TONG, LEGISLATION RESEARCHES ON THE CIRCULATION
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The economic organization in the Baiyun district, located in the
Guangdong province exemplifies the company method. Theoretically,
collective members enjoy stock rights, but the situation here is more
complicated. First, membership is not acquired by investment but
by nativity. The stock share is possibly small before the stockholder
reaches a certain age. Second, membership is not limited to peasants.
Third, peasants may lose their membership when they change the
location of their registered residence. Fourth, stock rights generally
cannot be transferred, inherited, or mortgaged; there is no change in
stock rights when the contracted land is subcontracted or leased.7
Because of the extensive regional differences in agricultural pro-
duction conditions, the means of land investment should be allowed
to diversify depending on location. The dynamic equity system is em-
ployed when there exists a third-party enterprise that can effectively
organize peasants for unified cultivation and production and provide
a stable, long term sales channel for the peasants’ best interests. On
the other hand, the cooperative operation system can be a wise choice
in developed regions where agricultural production is not the main
source of the local peasants’ income and their level of dependency on
the land is low. Peasants may obtain a relatively high price of the
stock when they invest in the right to contractual land management
because of the scarcity of land in such areas.
II. THE LEGITIMACY ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT
SITUATIONS OF LAND INVESTMENTS
A. Interpretation of the Original Legislative Purpose
According to Article 128 of Real Right Law, the holder of the con-
tractual right to the management of land has the right, in accordance
with the provisions in the Law on Land Contract in Rural Areas, to
circulate his right. Article 42 of Law on Land Contract in Rural Areas
indicates that, for the purpose of developing the agricultural economy,
contractors may, at their own free will, jointly pool their rights to con-
tractual land management as shares in order to promote cooperative
SYSTEM OF RURAL LAND CONTRACT MANAGEMENT RIGHTS 131 (Beijing: China Agriculture
Press 2009).
7. See CHEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 115–16.
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agricultural production. The law sanctions investing in the right to
contractual land management. As mentioned above, there are a great
many differences among the different types of investments in the right
to contractual land management in practice. Is each of them legitimate
in practice?
In the legal interpretation of Real Right Law, the Legal Committee
of the National People’s Congress has pointed out,
If the peasants invest to establish the company, they may be ex-
posed to the risk of losing the contracted land when the company
goes bankruptcy [sic], which may causes negative effects on the
peasants’ living. It should be permitted if peasant households
may, of their own free will, jointly pool their rights to land con-
tractual management as shares to engage in cooperative agricul-
tural production. The investments in the right to land contractual
management have the following boundary: First, the circulation
should be among the contractors. It is prohibited to quantify the
right to land contractual management into shares to invest in or
establish agricultural production company. Second, peasant house-
holds may jointly pool their rights to land contractual manage-
ment as shares to engage in cooperative agricultural production,
and get paid in proportion to their shareholding. It is not a com-
mercial investment.8
As the legal committee is in charge of studying and drafting Real
Right Law, this statement may reflect the original legislative intent
to some extent. Therefore, it is reasonable to say that the current
law only allows the pooled investments in rights to contractual land
management to engage in cooperative agricultural production with-
out establishing the company.
B. The Legitimacy Analysis of the Dynamic Equity System
In view of the above, we can now examine the existing types of
investments in the right to contractual land management. As men-
tioned above, in the dynamic equity system, the third-party enterprise
effectively organizes the peasants for unified cultivation and produc-
tion, while the peasants still retain the right to contractual land man-
agement. Therefore, this type of investment fully conforms to the
8. See UNDERSTANDING REAL RIGHT LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 291
(Kangshen Hue ed., Beijing: Law Press 2007).
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relevant stipulations and legislative principles of Real Right Law and
Law on Land Contract in Rural Areas. “The announcement of Central
Committee of the CCP on the circulation of the right to land contrac-
tual management” also stipulated that “[t]he commercial enterprises’
investments in agriculture production should focus on services and
the development of land in rural areas as barren mountains, gullies,
hills and beaches. In order to realize agricultural industrialization,
the company should encourage the peasants to cultivate instead of
replacing them.” Obviously, the national policy makers hold a positive
and affirmative attitude toward this type of investment. Hopefully the
agricultural enterprises will serve peasants and agricultural produc-
tion in a better way under these legal rules and guidance.
C. The Legitimacy Analysis of the Cooperative Operation System
The next step is to examine the legitimacy of the cooperative oper-
ation system. According to the analysis above, the current law pro-
hibits peasant households from investing their rights in contractual
land management to establish a company. However in practice, the
contractors may form a cooperative organization. Is forming a coopera-
tive organization permitted by Law on Land Contract in Rural Areas?
According to Articles 2, 4, 5 and 44 of Law of the People’s Republic
of China on Specialized Farmers Cooperatives, specialized farmers
cooperatives have the legal status of a person to enjoy the right to pos-
sess, use, and dispose of their property and should be liable for their
debts with the aforementioned property. In other words, the peasant
no longer retains the right to contractual land management when he
invests it in the cooperative, and has a right in its stock instead. When
a specialized farmer cooperative goes bankrupt, the right to contrac-
tual land management will be considered a liability asset, meaning
that the peasants may lose their right to the land. This obviously de-
parts from the original intention of Real Right Law and Law on Land
Contract in Rural Areas. According to Article 35 in Law on Land
Contract in Rural Areas and “the Managements of the Circulation
of the Right to Land Contractual Management,” for the purpose of
developing the agricultural economy, the contractors may, of their
own free will, jointly pool their rights to contractual land management
as shares to engage in cooperative agricultural production; when the
rural land is contracted by other means, the contractors may divide
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the rights to contractual land management into shares and invest
them to form a company or cooperative. This regulation treats the
cooperative as a parallel to the company, while such statements are
not mentioned in household contracts. One might say that the legisla-
tors consider the cooperative as analogous to the company; contrac-
tors cannot invest their rights to contractual land management to
found a cooperative, if households have already contracted the land.
However, according to the declaration of Real Right Law (draft)
authored by Wang Zhaoguo, vice chairmen of the National People’s
Congress Standing Committee, the right to contractual land manage-
ment obtained through a household contract may, according to the
Law on Land Contract in Rural Areas, be circulated by subcontract-
ing, leasing, exchanging, transferring, or by other means. The inten-
tion of this article is to maintain the current law and present policies
concerning the land in rural areas. It also leaves room for modification
of relevant policies.9 The Central Committee encourages establish-
ing more experimental sites in order to fully realize the commercial
function of the right to contractual land management. For example,
“The opinions from the State Council concerning the reform and the
development in rural areas in Chongqing” stipulated that the right to
contractual land management obtained through a household contract
may, according to the law, be circulated by subcontracting, leasing,
exchanging, transferring, and investing in a joint stock cooperative
or other means on a voluntary basis and with compensation. For-
malizing investments in the right to contractual land management
among contractors, and developing experimental projects of specialized
farmers cooperatives, are also included in this regulation.
In addition, the local legislation has also carried on certain attempts
in this. For instance, Article 13, paragraph 4 of “The regulation of the
specialized farmer cooperative in Zhejiang Province” stipulated that
“the members of the specialized farmers cooperative can invest in cur-
rency as well as physical capital, technology and the right to contrac-
tual land management.” A similar regulation has been noted in the
first paragraph of Article 9, of the “The implementation of ‘Law of
the People’s Republic of China on Specialized Farmers Cooperatives’
9. See CIVIL LAW OFFICE, LEGAL AFFAIRS COMMISSION OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF
THE NATIONAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS, COLLECTION OF LEGISLATION BACKGROUND AND RELATED
OPINIONS OF REAL RIGHT LAW 9 (Beijing: Law Press 2007).
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in Liaoning Province,” stating that members of specialized farmer
cooperatives can invest in currency, and other non-monetary assets,
such as physical capital, technology, and the right to contractual land
management, as long as their monetary value can be assessed. Fur-
thermore, the monetary value shall be subject to the consent of no less
than two-thirds of the members of the specialized farmers cooperative.
III. DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT TO THE MEANS OF INVESTMENTS
IN THE RIGHT TO CONTRACTUAL LAND MANAGEMENT
It can be concluded from the discussion above that the current
situation of investments in the right to contractual land management
is not consistent with the original legislative intent in certain respects.
Because there is still room for modifications and adjustments in law,
and the relevant polices in Real Right Law, to further the discussion
from a legislative perspective is the essential objective of this essay.
The combined effects of several factors, including the judgment of
facts, consideration of future uncertainties and their cognitive struc-
tures, decide a nation’s momentum. Obviously, the scholar’s legisla-
tive suggestions have to be carried out under full consideration of the
above factors.
To peasants, both the insurance function and the property function
are embodied in the right to contractual land management. The insur-
ance function is of great importance at the present stage. Peasants
can engage in cultivation for a living as long as they own the right to
contractual land management, which has become a basic guarantee
for employment. Because endowment insurance is almost entirely un-
available in rural areas, contracted land has become the vital guar-
antee for the elderly.10 On the other hand, the right to contractual land
management is also a property right. Typically, restrictions on land
transactions lead to a decrease in efficiency. However, some scholars
point out that this insurance function may have a positive effect on
efficiency. One basic function of social security is to avoid devastat-
ing attacks on productivity during a time of emergency. Obviously,
productivity protection can improve efficiency. Compared with peas-
ants who do not have contracted land, peasants who own such rights
10. See QINGUO MENG ET AL., A STUDY ON CIRCULATION PROBLEM OF THE RURAL LAND IN
CHINA 12 (Beijing: Law Press 2009).
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are more likely to get a job in urban areas. Although the peasant may
lose his job, he can still return to his hometown and cultivate his own
land. In other words, the insurance function of land encourages peas-
ants to be willingly engaged in high-risk jobs and high-paying jobs,
thus improving economic efficiency.11 Because of this, it has been
suggested that the loosening of all restrictions would be irrational due
to the serious and irreversible consequences that peasants might face.
If peasants are permitted to invest in their rights to contractual land
management to found a company, they will be directly exposed to their
commercial risks. The peasants will lose their right to contractual land
management if the company goes bankrupt. From a national stand-
point, stable, long-term production relationships undoubtedly benefit
agriculture development and societal harmony.
However, the level of dependency on the land is decreasing. Sta-
tistics show that from 2003 to 2007, non-agricultural income has in-
creased by 90%, and by 4.7% in proportion to the total annual income.
Non-agricultural income has become the main source of the increase.12
The field survey conducted by the research group led by Professor
Xiaojun Chen illustrated that peasants have a strong aspiration to
gain benefits from the circulation. The successful attempts made in
different areas have proved the feasibility of this means of circulation.
Therefore, from a legislative prospective, restrictions on investments
in the right to contractual land management should gradually be loos-
ened to maintain the insurance function and to achieve a property
function. There must be differential treatment with regards to the
means of investments in the right to contractual land management.
A. Strongly Promoting the Dynamic Equity System
As mentioned above, this type fully conforms to the relevant stipu-
lations and legislative principles of Real Right Law and the Law on
Land Contract in Rural Areas, in which the contractors may, of their
own free will, jointly pool their rights to contractual land management
as shares to engage in an agricultural cooperative. More importantly,
peasants still retain the right to contractual land management, so
11. See Yang Yao, The System of Farmland in China: An Analytical Framework, 2 SOCIAL
SCIENCE IN CHINA, 58 (2000).
12. See Wenshan Rao, An Analysis on the Income Level of the Peasants in China, 13
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 37 (2009).
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both the insurance and property functions can be achieved. This would
be a proper option for a peasant whose income is mainly from culti-
vation, but who has longed for a higher income from its circulation.
Moreover, the dynamic equity system has led to good outcomes in
practice. Third-party enterprises are always capable of providing ad-
vanced agricultural technologies and abundant financial support, and
accommodating stable commodity demands. They can act as a mar-
ket guide and financial expert to peasants. For example, the Ginger
Industry Development Co. Ltd. established in Zijin County in the
Hubei province has signed contracts for the cultivation and purchase
of ginger with 796 peasant households. They also signed two other
supply contracts with two processing manufactures, converting ex-
tensive management to intensive and large-scale land management.13
From a legal and practical perspective, we believe that this means of
circulation should be strongly promoted at the present stage.
However, this intensive and large-scale agricultural management
relies on the organization and operation of third-party enterprises.
Therefore, it is necessary to formulate rules to govern the behaviors
of third-party enterprises. A qualification examination system should
be established based on conditions specific to the different areas,
standardized sample contracts should be applied, and the rights and
liabilities of third-party enterprises should be specified. The local gov-
ernment should set up an independent consultation department to
provide services to peasants and to third-party enterprises. This is
the only way peasants’ benefits can be effectively protected.
B. Advocating Investing to Found the Cooperative
According to the above analysis, investments to establish the com-
pany or the cooperative depart from the original intention of Real
Right Law and Law on Land Contract in Rural Areas. However, from
a long-term perspective, this system has irreplaceable functions. First,
as a permanently existing legal entity, the company or the cooperative
can organize peasants effectively and achieve concentrated, large-
scale land management; second, under the modern structure of the
company or cooperative, peasants can share commercial risk with
other members. These advantages have been proven in practice. One
13. See CHEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 177.
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convincing example is the cooperative established in Shanglin Village
in the Jiangsu province. Since 2006, 180 peasant households in this
village have invested their rights to contractual land management
in the cooperative at a price of 5000 yuan per acre, compared to the
250 yuan per acre under a traditional cultivation system. Now peas-
ant households can receive a 600 yuan per acre bonus each year. Some
peasants even choose to engage in the production as the hired labor,
earning an additional 25 yuan per day.14
The social security system has been gradually improved with the
increase of peasant income. With such a background, advocating in-
vesting to found cooperatives would bring peasants more choices re-
garding the use of land. This would be an invaluable way to develop
agricultural production and to narrow the gap between urban and
rural areas. However, due to the lack of a legal basis, the procedures
and rules of this system remain unclear As a result, an analysis and
selection is of importance at this time.
There are two types of organizations: the company and the coop-
erative. Although both constitute an independent legal entity, there
are some distinct differences between a company and a cooperative.
First, their property right systems are different. The structure of a
company is based on a joining of capital, while the cooperative in-
volves the joining of members. Therefore, shareholders in a company
are forbidden to withdraw their investments and can only transfer
their shares. Contrastingly, members of a cooperative can withdraw
their investments but are unable to transfer their shares and mem-
berships to others. In addition, bonus allocation within a company
is determined in proportion to investments made, while cooperative
bonuses are distributed based on the volume of transactions within
the cooperative.
The ways that members are able to exercise their rights are dif-
ferent as well. Shareholders exercise their voting rights according to
the proportion of their investments, while the members’ voting rights
are distributed equally in a cooperative. As indicated in the Law of the
People’s Republic of China on Specialized Farmers Cooperatives, a
cooperative constitution can award one additional vote to members
with a large investment or trading volume. However, the effects of this
additional vote are trivial and unlikely to change the characteristics
of democratic management.
14. See MENG ET AL., supra note 10, at 15.
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Based on the above differences, it is convincing that the cooperative
is more adaptable to the current situation in rural areas. Its advan-
tages can be summarized in three points. First, peasants can join in
or retreat from a cooperative under the principles set forth by Law
on Specialized Farmers Cooperatives. Adopting the cooperative mech-
anism would provide more flexibility for peasants to exploit their land.
There will be a conflict with the resumption of contractual land if we
choose the company method instead.
Second, Company Law permits shareholders to transfer shares,
while this is forbidden in the Law on Specialized Farmers Coopera-
tives. The transfer of shares may result in an irreversible separation
of peasants and their right to contractual land management. How-
ever, according to the Real Right Law and the Law on Land Contract,
in order to transfer the rights to contractual land management, the
party who is giving out the contract must give consent. Again, this
is a legal dilemma.
Third, the cooperative is an internal, non-profit organization. Aside
from the accumulation fund, all profits should be allocated to members
within the cooperative. The accumulation fund is required to be quan-
tified according to the trading volume, and registered to members’
accounts. When membership terminates, peasants will get their in-
vestment returned along with the accumulation fund registered under
their name.
C. Selection According to Specific Local Conditions
Investing in the right to contractual land management for the
establishment of a company or a cooperative usually occurs in devel-
oped regions. This is because the purpose of investments is to concen-
trate separated land and improve the rate of efficiency in using land.
This requires two premises: that the peasants are capable of main-
taining a livelihood after circulating their contractual land, and that
a large-scale operation, with adequate funds and technology, is devel-
oped. These two conditions are hard to meet in undeveloped areas.15
The primary purpose of circulating the right to contractual land
management is to promote development and productivity and to
increase peasants’ income. The means adopted to achieve this end
15. See MENG ET AL., supra note 10, at 15.
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should be adjusted according to the local economic condition. Under
a dynamic equity system, peasants still retain the right to contractual
land management; therefore, they can avoid the risk of losing the
land. Defects such as lack of funding or technology can be compen-
sated for by a third-party enterprise. Therefore, this type should be
promoted nationwide. Investing in the right to contractual land man-
agement for the establishment of a company or a cooperative should
be restricted in particular areas with high levels of economic devel-
opment. Moreover, local legislatures should draft certain local rules
and regulations accordingly.
IV. LEGISLATIVE SUGGESTIONS FOR THE PROCEDURE OF INVESTING
IN THE RIGHT TO CONTRACTUAL LAND MANAGEMENT
To solve the existing problems in practice and to protect the peas-
ants’ legal benefits, investment procedures must be developed. The
situation can be improved in several aspects.
A. Setting up Different Procedures According to Different Types
of Investments
According to the provisions in Law on Land Contract, consent is
required only when contractors intend to transfer one’s right to con-
tractual land management. Under a dynamic equity interest system,
peasants still retain this right, so they should sign a written contract
with the party who is giving out the contract. With regards to land
right investments establishing a company or a cooperative, however,
it should be permitted by the party who is giving the contract because
of the change of right owners.
B. Review of the Status of the Household Assets
Presently, the insurance function of contracted land is still promi-
nent. Therefore, the status of household assets should be reviewed
before households invest their rights to contractual land manage-
ment in a cooperative. Peasants whose agricultural income takes up
a majority proportion should be strictly limited. This would be the
most feasible way to protect the peasants’ benefits and stabilize agri-
cultural production while adhering to current legislative purposes.
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C. Formalization of the Bankruptcy System for Specialized
Farmers Cooperative
The regulations about how to deal with the right to contractual
land management when the cooperative goes bankrupt should be leg-
islated. Article 41 and Article 48 of the Law on Specialized Farmers
Cooperative provide rules for liquidation, but these rules are not
specific enough for the different types. The right to contractual land
management has a living security function, which distinguishes it
from other forms of investment. As a result, it requires special pro-
visions. Some academics suggest allowing contractors to repurchase
their land for a reasonable price. The collective economic organization
of a village can repurchase the rights to contractual land management
if contractors are incapable of doing so. The repurchase price can be
used to repay debts. In this way, original contractors’ benefits would
be protected, and a situation in which non-members of the collective
economic organization could receive rights—a situation prohibited by
law—would not happen.16
16. See Jie Wen & Xiandong Li, Legally Thinking about the Farmers Professional
Cooperative Based on Providing Land Rights to Contracted Management, 4 LAW SCIENCE
MAGAZINE 54 (2010).
